Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Research: A View from Europe by Ferrándiz Martín, Francisco & Robben, Antonius C. G. M.
Francisco Ferrándiz, Antonius C. G. M. Robben (eds.)
Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives on Peace and
Conflict Research
A View from Europe
University of
Deusto
•           •           •           •           •           •           •           • 9
78
84
98
30
06
80
HumanitarianNet
Thematic Network on Humanitarian
Development Studies
HumanitarianNet
Thematic Network on Humanitarian
Development Studies
HumanitarianNet
HumanitarianNet is a network linking three types of partners:
higher education institutions, research centres, and
governmental and non-governmental organisations. At present
the network consists of over 100 universities, 6 research
centres and 9 international organisations across Europe. 
This wide membership demonstrates the capacity of the
network to gather information and mobilize ideas.
HumanitarianNet was created in 1996 to promote research and
education projects in five main fields: Human Rights, Poverty
and Development, Humanitarian Assistance, Peace and
Conflict Studies, and Migration, Diversity and Identities. 
This book represents the scholarly work of the network
«European Doctorate Enhancement in Peace and Conflict
Studies» (EDEN), a broad training and research network
linking scholars, departments and universities interested in
thinking and rethinking proposals, concepts and methodologies
for the expanding field of Peace and Conflict Studies from
different disciplines such as law, history, sociology,
anthropology, international relations, and political science. The
Network has been functioning since the year 1996 and aims
mainly to develop the level and quality of the discussion, to
enhance the collaboration and coordination within the
European academic community —encompassing the diversity
of theoretical approaches in the area—, to promote intellectual
understanding, and to create an appropriate institutional
infrastructure and consistent financial support for academic
research. The Network has also been consistently fostering the
exchange and mobility of graduate students through summer
Intensive Programmes and Marie Curie Fellowships so as to
develop a critical mass of inter-disciplinary comparative
research expertise, providing access to tutorials, methodology
courses, and significant human and practical resources for a
better understanding of research questions, conceptual debates,
and methodological challenges. The final purpose of the
network is to generate sustained debate and exchange among
policy makers, NGO's, media professionals and academics, in
order to facilitate a scholarly dialogue and ongoing feedback
between research, knowledge dissemination and policy.M
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Introduction: Peace and Conflict Research in Europe
Antonius C.G.M. Robben 
Utrecht University
 Francisco Ferrándiz Martín
University of Deusto
 Peace and Confl ict Studies has its origins in the moral refl ection of 
leading polticians, such as Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, and 
David Lloyd George, on the massive human and social costs of World 
War I. An estimated eight million soldiers died in combat, while another 
two million went missing. The awareness that humankind should never 
again engage in this type of industrial warfare led to the foundation of the 
League of Nations in 1919 and the simultaneous development of Peace 
Studies as the multidisciplinary study of peace by social and political 
scientists, in contrast to the fi eld of War Studies, which was dominated 
by military scholars. Almost a century later, this book is a fi rst effort at 
putting together the different perspectives of scholars working in the 
last few years within the EDEN European network, with the intention of 
exploring transversal themes, analytical frameworks and methodologi-
cal dilemmas, as well as to suggest and develop potentially productive 
common grounds. Papers range from the critical analysis of international 
law implementation, to the defence of new global concepts of security, 
to historical, ethnographic and culturalist perspectives on different kinds 
of confl icts and violences. That is, they move back and forth from inter-
national institutions and globalised legal and political frameworks, to 
the military industry, to everyday life and culturally-bound experiences 
and emotions. They have been organized in such way as to ‘rollercoast’ 
the reader around the different theoretical and methodological points 
of view available in the network. The editors of this volume asked the 
members of the network to contribute texts that could achieve precisely 
this multidisciplinary effect, providing both an infl ection point in our 
internal discussions and as a necessary exposure to a broader audience. 
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The essays in this book demonstrate what has become of the 1919 initia-
tive, and how Peace Studies has evolved into the complex fi eld of Peace 
and Confl ict Studies that is no longer narrowly concerned with war and 
peace between states, but has branched out into areas such as human 
rights, human security, transitional justice, violence prevention, peace 
building, reconciliation, identity formation and cultural trauma.
In Human Rights and Human Security: Challenges and Prospects, 
Wolfgang Benedek examines the ways in which the expanding discourses 
and practices of Human Rights have infi ltrated the most recent debates 
regarding development and security in the last decades. Thus, according to 
the author, human rights, human development and the recent model of 
‘human security’ cannot be considered any more as separate or loosely 
related concepts but, rather, as interdependent and mutually reinforced 
areas of diagnosis and action, requiring the articulation of a ‘holistic 
approach,’ one which is in tune with this book’s proposal. Theoretical 
work on the limits, content and intersection of these concepts is abso-
lutely crucial if they are going to be of use for international law, interna-
tional institutions and policy-making. In his essay, Benedek particularly 
explores the cross-fertilization between ‘human rights’ and ‘human se-
curity.’ These conceptual debates are necessarily controversial, for the 
stakes are high, the international actors and institutions are of growing 
complexity, and the kinds of confl icts that the international, national 
and local communities have to face are evolving very fast. Although the 
conceptual tide seems to be going its way and has in Benedek an articu-
late supporter, the author points out that some critics still question the 
adequacy of the concept of ‘human security’ —for some a ‘paradigm 
shift’ or a ‘new organizing principle for international relations and inter-
national law,’ for others just ‘hot air’— preferring instead to continue 
using older ones like ‘comprehensive security,’ which would refer to vio-
lent threats directly derived from confl icts but would not accommodate 
the ‘non-violent threats, related to the violation of economic and social 
rights.’ 
For Benedek, ‘human security’ has a certain ‘European fl avour’ (vs. 
North American mainstream conceptions of ‘security’), as it tilts its agen-
da towards prevention instead of repression. ‘Human security’ incorpo-
rates notions from human rights and has a fi rm potential for redefi ning 
the meaning and nature of ‘threats’ towards the freedom from fear (civil 
and political rights) and the freedom from want (economic, social and 
cultural rights), as a necessary companion to the evolution of confl icts, 
to an undeferable emphasis on the ‘responsibility to prevent’ in humani-
tarian intervention, and to the consequent factoring in of issues such as 
the sources of insecurity, sustainability, people-centered development, 
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infant mortality, disease, hunger, poverty, land mines or light weapons in 
the domain of ‘security.’ Increasing security, on the other hand, is at odds 
with the curtailing of liberties or human rights, as the result of the many 
political and legal initiatives put into practice in the US after 11 Septem-
ber 2001 vividly show. On the contrary, Benedek maintains that there 
is as clear a direct correlation between human security and increased 
democratisation as there is between economic dependence and the risk 
of war. Through the initiative of international institutions as the UN (and 
its Human Security ‘Branch’ and ‘Unit’), international groups such as the 
Human Security Network or well-known scholars such as Amartya Sen, 
the human security model has started to produce a ‘human security 
agenda’ including the revitalization of old and the promotion of new 
legal measures and protocols, an emphasis on Human Rights education, 
the empowerment of local populations, and the parallel participation of 
non-state actors, particularly those operating in the ‘global civil society,’ 
in the establishment of ‘security’ agendas. 
The essay An Anthropological View of Violences by the anthropolo-
gists Francisco Ferrándiz Martín and Carles Feixa Pampols is a refl exive 
examination of the anthropology of violence. Instead of providing a run-
of-the-mill review of the major literature in this fi eld, they have opted for 
a much more innovative approach by focusing on the complex relations 
between violence and culture, regarding the anthropological study of 
violence and the anthropology of peace as interrelated, and by paying 
dual attention to manifestations of violence (violences of culture) and 
constructions of violence (cultures of violence). This approach allows them 
to address the epistemological, conceptual, representational, methodo-
logical, and ethical concerns of the anthropology of violence.
The authors indicate that violence is too vague of a term to be use-
ful for scientifi c analysis and empirical research because violence is en-
meshed in heterogeneous contexts, in fl eeting, short, and long historical 
currents, multiple social levels and realities, enduring structures, and psy-
chodynamic processes. Therefore, they suggest an analytical differentia-
tion of violence into types, modes, classes or categories. Ferrándiz and 
Feixa distinguish between political, structural, symbolic, and quotidian 
violence as four distinct but partially connected modes of violence, and 
emphasize that violence is experienced differently by three types of ac-
tors: perpetrators, victims, and witnesses or bystanders. They also call 
attention to the study of conceptual dichotomies, such as physical vs. sym-
bolic, experienced vs. imagined, visible vs. invisible, and macro vs. micro 
violence.
Ferrándiz and Feixa propose a reconceptualization of the anthropo-
logical study of violence which emphasizes that violence is processual, 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives11   11 4/1/07   11:20:11
12 ANTONIUS C.G.M. ROBBEN AND FRANCISCO FERRÁNDIZ
pluriform, polysemic, a fact of life, part of a continuum from non-peace-
ful to peaceful confl ict resolutions, and characterized by asymmetrical 
power relations. Thus, they reject the older Durkheimean view that vio-
lence is contained in exceptional, extraordinary, dysfunctional, and dis-
crete events which puncture the social contract and therefore do not 
represent the normal state of society. This functionalist view of violence 
as a social pathology impeded the systematic anthropological study of 
violence until the 1960s and 1970s when symbolic, interactionist, and 
refl exive anthropology took fl ight. Anthropologists began to conduct 
ethnographic fi eldwork in many confl ict-ridden settings that ranged 
from post-colonial societies to states victimized by predatory capitalism, 
from prisons to war zones, and from drug addicts to guerrillas.
Field research into the multiple manifestations of violence spurred 
also a search for methodologies that could account for the unique re-
search circumstances and ethnographic relations of trouble spots. Wise-
ly, the authors caution against facile methodological solutions to highly 
complex epistemologies. Aside from the practical problem of facing life-
threatening situations, ethnographers have become emotionally and 
sometimes politically implicated in their research topics, while fi eld rela-
tions with research participants are seldom neutral. Such fi eld immersion 
requires data-gathering methods that are adjusted to each unique situa-
tion, and in the awareness that fear, silence, and the threat of death al-
ter fi eld relations and realities. 
The epistemological implications of such altered research circum-
stances can make scholars in other disciplines question the ethnographic 
emphasis of the anthropological study of violence altogether. If partici-
pant observation often becomes impossible, if interviews are riddled with 
seduction, partisanship, and self-interest —including the awareness that 
an uncensored sharing of knowledge may endanger the informant’s 
life— if social surveys and quantitative data gathering are impossible, 
if key informants have hidden political agendas, and if life histories are 
polished, self-justifying narratives, then what remains of the anthropo-
logical enterprise? Whatever the diffi culties of employing ethnographic 
fi eld techniques, and they are many, the enduring merits of the anthro-
pological approach to violence have been its holistic study of the human 
condition, its multi-layered analysis, and its ability to read the whole in 
the parts and map the bonds and interconnections.
Ferrándiz and Feixa are aware that these merits may be regarded as 
liabilities by scholars from other disciplines who fi nd ethnographic studies 
of violence engaging literature but of little use to their comparative en-
deavors. The subjectivist, interpretive, and actor-oriented approaches, in 
particular, have contributed to such suspicion. Some anthropologists are 
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therefore proposing more analytical, explanatory, and observer-oriented 
approaches that facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue.
The argument over subjectivist versus analytical approaches is not 
just a methodological debate but involves an ethical discussion about 
the position of the ethnographer as an agent of knowledge and power 
in treacherous fi eld locations. To what extent should ethnographers be-
come advocates, critics, opinion makers, policy makers, and agents of 
social change? Some argue that anthropologists should speak against 
power, write against terror, and give the powerless a voice through 
their ethnographies. Such political commitment is said to emerge natu-
rally from the professional ethical code which emphasizes the obliga-
tion of researchers “to consult actively with the affected individuals 
or group(s), with the goal of establishing a working relationship that 
can be benefi cial to all parties involved” and to do “everything in their 
power to ensure that their research does not harm the safety, dignity, 
or privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research, or 
perform other professional activities” (American Anthropological As-
sociation Code of Ethics). Whether or not anthropologists should be 
politically active on behalf of their research participants continues to be a 
controversial issue, but growing numbers of anthropologists feel that 
they should at least show compassion in their writings for the subju-
gated and downtrodden.
The deeply engrained sense of responsibility of ethnographers to-
wards the people they study, which is refl ected in the passage from the 
Code of Ethics quoted above, has made anthropologists reluctant to 
conceive of a culture of violence. They acknowledge that violence is a 
cultural construction —whereas aggression is a biological given— but 
the idea that cultures may be violent is rejected as reeking of essentialism, 
as denying agency, and is thus close to blaming the victim. The study of 
cultures of violence was therefore restricted to youth gangs, hooligans, 
and crime syndicates like the mafi a, tribal warfare, and cannibalism 
where violence was endemic and had a dynamic of its own. However, 
the concept was seldom extended to domestic violence, guerrilla insur-
gencies or economic exploitation. 
Ferrándiz and Feixa are much more open to the notion of a culture of 
violence, which follows logically from their embracing the classifi cation 
of violence into modes, among which they include structural, symbolic, 
and quotidian violence. Once violence is observed as a dimension of so-
cial structures, symbolic imaginations, and everyday behaviour, then the 
notion of a culture of violence is not too far away. The two authors there-
fore encourage the study of structures of domination and interpersonal 
habituses embedded in social institutions, the delineation of cultural 
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codes, scenarios, practices, and images that inform people’s decisions 
and actions, and especially the uncovering of the micro practices and 
microphysics of power, an approach pioneered by Foucault.
Paradoxically, this promising development in the anthropology of 
violence is threatened by the very object of its study. Ferrándiz and 
Feixa point at the new political reality of the global war on terror at the 
beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. The terrorist attacks on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 in New York and 11 March 2004 in Madrid, and similar 
ones in other parts of the world, the occupations of Afghanistan and 
Iraq by American and European troops, and ongoing violent confl icts in 
Chechyna, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine territories, the Congo, Sudan, 
and other hot spots in the world, have made it increasingly more dif-
fi cult to conduct ethnographic fi eldwork. The anthropology of violence 
is looking for innovative methodologies to continue empirical research. 
The two authors are showing one possibility to derive data from inac-
cessible places. They draw attention to the media, globalizing fl ows of 
information, debate spaces, advocacy groups, and the centers of world 
power to understand the fallout on the lives of ordinary people, their 
humble dwellings, refugee camps, and secret prisons. Their postscript 
is an exemplary sketch of a new epistemology and ethnography of vio-
lence that draws creatively on other disciplines and the media to forge 
an insightful interpretation of the multi-layered ramifi cations of the Ma-
drid train bombings on 11 March 2004.
In Critical Edge and Legitimisation in Peace Studies, José Manuel 
Pureza and Teresa Cravo defend the crucial importance of rescuing the 
critical diagnosis that Peace Studies originally contained in the fi eld of In-
ternational Relations before the concept was coopted, ‘regulated,’ and 
partially neutralized through its (mis)use by international institutions in 
post-war reconstruction processes in a context of ‘international disor-
der.’ Here we again face the slippery and often controversial relationship 
between critical academic refl ections and proposals and the ‘reality call’ 
of their ideological and practical implementation. If academics intend 
to prevent the steady demolition of promising and elastic models and 
concepts in International Relations (as well as in other related fi elds) for 
the sake of the status quo, as might be the case with the crude milita-
rization of Human Rights or even medical discourses with notions such 
as ‘humanitarian intervention,’ ‘surgical strike,’ or ‘collateral damage,’ 
then we must remain vigilant and be ready to produce sustained and 
fast-response critiques to de-stabilize and reassess these deactivating re-
appropriations —in concept and in practice. In an effort to refresh the 
debate, as well as the memory, Pureza and Cravo trace back the geneal-
ogy of the heterogeneous fi eld of ‘Peace Studies’ as a critical paradigm 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives14   14 4/1/07   11:20:11
 INTRODUCTION: PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH IN EUROPE 15
confronting the hegemonic ‘positivist’ commonsense —or ‘realist can-
on’— in International Relations since the 1960s. In a second moment, 
so the authors sustain, the concept was mainstreamed and normalized, 
only to enter a third phase of ‘retreat’ in the early 21st Century. 
For Pureza and Cravo, Peace Studies, as expressed in the pioneering 
work of Johan Galtung, initially intended to bring ‘peace’ to the fore-
front of the international agenda and had as a result the birth of an al-
ternative and interdisciplinary paradigm with a potential to displace the 
hegemony of the conservative ‘realistic school’ in the understanding of 
International relations, an effort that former attempts at scientifi cally 
establish the fi eld had declined or being incapable of overcome. For 
Galtung, who established a distinctive European perspective in the fi eld, 
Peace Studies should be understood as a socially ‘productive’ discipline 
only feasible in terms of investigation-action, thus breaking the barrier 
between theory and practice. The authors stress the importance of Gal-
tung’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, one which 
discriminates between the mere absence of war and the unravelling of 
social justice and freedom in integrated societies. With his scheme, Gal-
tung proved that Peace Studies could depart analytically from main-
stream power structures and academic paradigms and that ‘peace’ was 
a far more complex concept that initially thought. With the end of the 
cold war and the advent of the ‘new wars,’ Peace Studies confronted a 
new opportunity to provide critical and sophisticated analysis and show 
its relevance for policy making. In 1992, Pureza and Cravo continue, the 
UN introduced in its ‘Agenda for Peace’ concepts taken straight from 
Galtung’s thinking such as ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking,’ 
‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacebuilding.’ Coming back to their Kuhnian 
analysis of the evolution of the fi eld, the authors consider that this entry 
of Peace Studies into mainstream policy pushed the fi eld into a process 
of ‘scientifi c normalisation.’ As the authors have it, once its position was 
consolidated, Peace Studies lost its critical edge, as its concepts and pro-
posals circulated widely as new and legitimate commonsense and trans-
formed into ‘social norms’ and ‘universal’ procedures —with an empha-
sis on representative democracy and market economy—, implemented 
in different confl ict situations regardless of the local context. This politi-
cal and cultural blindness overlooked the crucial role of local agency, 
establishing peace operations as largely external interventions following 
a well-known and repetitive formula, one which obstructs long term and 
locally ingrained strategies like ‘peacebuilding from below.’ For Pureza 
and Cravo, at this point, Peace Studies had lost its former ability to incor-
porate new critical proposals into its theoretical and methodological 
pool, failing also in its quality of social and political practice. It has be-
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come still one more instrument of power. Along the way, it has also lost 
some of its ‘rhetorical attraction.’ The authors conclude that, to retrieve 
its original and crucial critical edge, lost along the way, Peace Studies 
needs to profoundly ‘decolonise’ and disengage from ‘institutional pre-
scriptions, power relations and the codes of social relations that neo-
liberalism carries with it.’ Only through this ‘emancipation’ can it confront 
the renewed strength of the realistic paradigm, reborn after 11 Septem-
ber, and the advent of the ‘War on Terror.’ 
In his text On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protec-
tion and International Humanitarian Law, Hans-Joachim Heintze stresses 
the importance of considering the ways in which both bodies of law can 
operate in parallel, providing a framework for similar protections —spe-
cially in armed confl icts—, thus enhancing the operative effi cacy of inter-
national humanitarian law in a framework of still insuffi cient implemen-
tation mechanisms. Heintze goes into meticulous detail in order to defi ne 
the fi eld in which these legal debates are taking shape. Starting with a 
critique of the so-called ‘separation theory’ in International Public Law 
—still present today in the thinking of some international lawyers and in 
infl uential readers like the Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Con-
fl ict (1995), which argues that laws of peace and laws of war are differ-
ent domains—, the author shows how this position has been consistently 
undermined since the very UN Charter of 1945, the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and other important legal bodies and initiatives, resulting into an 
effective and increasing legal ‘crossing of the border’ between situations 
of peace and war. Heintze shows how the expansion of the idea of the 
non-derogability of certain rights in war situations, expressed in different 
human rights bodies and instruments, has been a crucial trend in this 
necessary bordercrossing. 
In exploring and trying to overcome what he terms the many and 
complex ‘legal gray areas’ of this true frontier zone of international ju-
risprudence, Heintze argues that the cumulative application of Human 
Rights Law and International Human Law, as opposed to some propos-
als that would privilege merging them into a single body of law (‘con-
vergence theory’), can overcome the many obstacles encountered in 
the debates over legal competences in the different international legal 
bodies, unsatisfactory standards, or the noticeable defi cits met when 
faced with implementation mechanisms, especially underdeveloped and 
ineffective in International Humanitarian Law. To show the complexity 
of these legal grey areas in action regarding the diffi culties in the ap-
plication of International Humanitarian Law, Heintze reviews specifi c 
controversial cases dealt with both by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights —La Tablada (Argentine), Las Palmeras (Colombia), 
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Bamaca-Velasquez (Guatemala)— and the European Court of Human 
Rights —Northern Ireland, Cyprus v. Turkey, Ergi v. Turkey, etc. In the 
latter case, the author argues that in the Strasbourg Court there are 
already ‘considerable overlaps between human rights and international 
humanitarian law.’ Heintze also welcomes the creation of the permanent 
International Criminal Court, as well as the ad hoc international tribu-
nals, as crucial legal instruments that will make it possible under certain 
circumstances to prosecute criminals under international law, ‘opening 
the way for the implementation of an international right to punish.’ In 
turn, this expanding right would contribute to curtailing impunity as it 
simultaneously provokes a preventive effect. 
In comparative perspective and from an anthropological point of view, 
Glenn Bowman analyses in Constitutive Violence and Rhetorics of Iden-
tity: A Comparative Study of Nationalist Movements in the Israeli-Occu-
pied Territories and the Former Yugoslavia the importance of considering 
violence as a basic productive element in the unfolding of all nation-
based ideologies, stressing specially the relevance of the social produc-
tion of ‘antagonism’ as a fundamental base for what he calls ‘nationalist 
imaginaries.’ To correctly understand this process, it is basic to emphasize 
the historical formation of such national imaginaries beyond essentialist 
models. That is, as Bowman asserts, ‘national identity is an historical con-
struct which emerges from a reformulation of one’s relation to a social 
fi eld rather than something essential and non-contingent.’ It is the per-
ceived violence infl icted by an ’external other’ which fuels an equally 
perceived need to organize as an independent state as the only feasible 
defensive device. Bowman’s model runs against infl uential nation build-
ing models such as Anderson’s, where the development of national ‘im-
agined communities’ is mostly linked to the improvement of systems of 
communication and exchange. In fact, Anderson’s model does not apply 
to the two cases that Bowman explores: Palestine and the Former Yugo-
slavia, where it was the construction of antagonisms —used by the au-
thor as a synonym for ‘constitutive violence’— which was crucial in the 
shattering of the existing social fi elds and eventually polarized the devel-
opment of such imaginaries. For the author, the advent of print capital-
ism and other communication technologies was no doubt fundamental 
in the constitution of extended communities, yet they do not account in 
themselves for the apparition and consolidation of nationalist conscious-
ness. Thus, the crux lies not in the increasing sophistication of the me-
dium, but in the content of the information and the knowledge circu-
lated in it. When forced into diaspora after the creation of the state of 
Israel, why did not the Palestinians turn into Arab nationalist instead 
of becoming anti-Zionists? Why did Serbs and Croats never develop a 
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common imagined identity, and later become blood enemies, when they 
shared both a language and the Yugoslavian media? 
For Bowman the answer is: the social and political construction of 
antagonism. Antagonism which is, indeed, a rather complex and poly-
hedral process, as his thorough analysis of the two above mentioned 
cases in historical perspective clearly show. Constitutive violence is the 
main process that eventually catalyses, in social fi elds characterized by 
both internal and external controversy, tension and power struggles, the 
necessary images, locations and landmarks, heroes, religious plots, styles 
of leadership, historical anchorages, stories of common suffering, politi-
cal vocabularies and other sorts of symbolic, economic and political am-
munition to anchor or ‘fi x’ the emergence and development of senses of 
nationalist collective belonging. In these convoluted processes, collectives 
of people come to think of themselves as joint victims of certain violences 
at the hands of recognizable enemies and, through the development 
of a nationalist consciousness, as members of a soon-to-be, future, or 
utopian nation. Thus, we can think of the development of victimhood 
politics as a crucial ingredient in the imagining, and at times constitution, 
of nations. Bowman stresses that this might be a matter of Manichean 
collective perception, or even fantasy, but that it nonetheless funnels 
such processes in very blunt and concrete ways. As counterexamples to 
support his perspective, the author argues that the declining solidarity 
amongst Palestinians in the wake of the Oslo Accords or the ‘dissolution 
of the nationalist imaginary in the post-war Slovene’ are clear indicators 
that identity is always in fl ux and that it has an ample space for readjust-
ment or metamorphosis, and that the weakening of the dynamics of 
antagonism would work against the permanence of the ‘nationalist im-
aginaries.’ In the case of Slovenia, according to Bowman, the overcoming 
of the antagonistic nation building game and the blurring of the former 
collective ‘enemy’ allows for an opportunity to build an ‘identity based on 
civil rights rather than on totalitarian xenophobia.’
In the chapter Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Build-
ing, Luc Reychler dissects the key components of peace building proc-
esses, and designs a comprehensive model to optimize the national 
and international efforts to achieve peace in confl ict zones. Reychler’s 
extensive review of the many scientifi c studies of peace building, and 
their often contradictory analyses, explanations, and recommendations, 
make it tempting to the reader to mentally assess their value for policy 
with contemporary peace initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Pales-
tine, Lebanon, Congo, and southern Sudan, as well as gauge the rela-
tive successes in some older hot spots in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin 
America. Such intellectual exercise quickly reveals that peace building 
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is not a one-size-fi ts-all enterprise because the interaction of the larger 
context with the local situation makes each attempt at peace building a 
unique undertaking. The challenge to any scientist working in Peace and 
Confl ict Studies is to isolate those variables which tend to matter most in 
many situations, and delineate those processes which have often shown 
to be most effective, in particular in peace building operations after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
The end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, and the attention to the 
so-called global war on terror have radically changed the world’s political 
landscape since 1989, and thus also the patterns of peace building. The 
struggle for world hegemony between the First and the Second World, 
and their economic domination of and indirect military engagement in 
the Third World, have taken other forms. The world powers compete 
now on an open global market, intervene militarily whenever they feel 
that their national interests are at threat, and undertake or support con-
fl ict prevention and peace building initiatives in many parts of the world. 
At the same time, violent interstate and intrastate confl icts have reduced 
drastically. The number of armed confl icts and genocides has declined 
rapidly, most democracies have survived the economic and political cri-
ses of the 1990s, and the repression and disenfranchisement of ethnic 
minorities have also diminished. All indicators point in the same positive 
direction of diminished national and international confl icts, even though 
Reychler questions the accuracy of the underlying statistics, the narrow 
defi nition of violence employed, and the arbitrariness of the assessment 
variables. The only dark cloud on the horizon is the expansion of interna-
tional terrorism; a growing threat that is changing peace building efforts 
in important ways.
These changed circumstances are making a removal of the three 
principal obstacles to the improved monitoring and better evaluation of 
peace building initiatives urgent. Reychler identifi es political, managerial, 
and conceptual impediments to greater knowledge and understanding 
of peace processes. Political impediments revolve around self-interested, 
politically biased, and violence-prone perceptions of confl ict prevention 
rather than the pursuit of internationally benefi cial, scientifi cally informed, 
and peace-driven initiatives. The conceptual impediments are threefold: 
1) the absence of a comprehensive multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-
time peace building model; 2) the poor communication about existing 
knowledge among politicians, policymakers, practitioners, scholars, and 
the ordinary people involved; and 3) the diffi culties scientists face in 
rowing against political currents and making politically undesirable rec-
ommendations. Managerial impediments exist in the problems of ad-
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equately supervising, planning and coordinating peace building efforts 
as well as the wanting professionalism and leadership of peace builders. 
Scholars have few possibilities to overcome political impediments be-
cause they seldom operate in the inner circles of national and interna-
tional politics. Still, they can help reduce the conceptual and managerial 
impediments, as Reychler demonstrates clearly.
The managerial qualities and, in particular, the professionalism of 
peace builders can be enhanced by good academic practices in fi ve areas 
of teaching and research. First, the theoretical and empirical knowledge, 
assessment and mediation skills, language profi ciency, and cultural and 
humanitarian sensibilities of graduate students should be given more at-
tention in M.A. and Ph.D. programs in Peace and Confl ict Studies. Second, 
scholars must conduct more systematic comparative research on leader-
ship qualities and strategies of both successful peace builders and effec-
tive peace destroyers. Third, students and researchers should draw more 
extensively on the experience of practitioners, and encourage a balance 
between personal commitment and a professional attitude in the pursuit 
of peace. Fourth, the concerns of students in Peace and Confl ict Stud-
ies programs should be taken more seriously because these students are 
tomorrow’s practitioners. A survey among Belgian M.A. students raised 
concerns about commitment, knowledge, skills, ethics, health, personal 
talents, and psychological aptitude. The fi nal area of improvement dove-
tails with the urgency of solving the conceptual impediments to improved 
peace building, namely the development of better evaluation criteria and 
analytical models to assess successful peace building processes.
Peace and Confl ict Studies has been undergoing an expansive growth 
of academic publications, policy evaluations, popular books, newspaper 
articles, and reports by NGOs and IGOs that cover almost every aspect of 
the peace building process. Luc Reychler sums up the fi ndings of more 
than thirty major academic approaches ranging from silver bullet expla-
nations to elaborate models. He observes the need for a comprehensive 
model which analyzes the peace building architecture and assesses the 
success of specifi c peace process designs within a particular time frame. 
His comparative research has yielded an intricate model that suits many 
different peace building situations.
Reychler’s peace building architecture contains six key components: 
1) the end state (realignment, reconstruction or transformation of the 
confl ict zone towards peace and stability with due attention to secu-
rity, international cooperation, leadership, communication, the political-
psychological climate, and peace enhancing and supporting structures); 
2) the base line (assessment of current confl icts, suitable areas of inter-
vention, and future developments); 3) the peace building process (time 
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frames, differential pacing, priorities, synergies, and the synchronicity 
and sequentiality of the multi-stage peace building process); 4) the peace 
building regime (management of the peace building process through in-
ternal, unilateral or multilateral planning, cooperation, and involvement; 
5) the context (diffi culty of the confl ict, expected outcome, time frame, 
preservation of existing practices, diversity of actors involved in peace 
building process, capability of peace workers, willingness of external ac-
tors to participate, power of stakeholders, availability of material and 
human resources); and 6) the criteria for evaluating peace building (con-
fl ict analysis, peace building defi ciency, risk and opportunity assessment, 
relevance of interventions, confl ict and peace evaluation, involvement of 
stakeholders and owners, and fi nal evaluation and lessons learned).
Reychler’s conclusion is in tune with most other chapters in this book, 
namely that peace and war are complex social and cultural constructions 
that deserve systematic and comparative study to improve peace build-
ing efforts. At the same time, he suggests that these constructions are 
deeply invested with people’s emotions, and are therefore not as mal-
leable and changeable as politicians, policymakers, practitioners, and 
scholars would wish. 
Political reconciliation has become an explicit objective of many 
comprehensive peace building initiatives since the 1980s, in particular 
because of the emergence of truth commissions under the assumption 
that an honest examination and public acknowledgment of past atroci-
ties will create mutual understanding among former adversaries. Kjell-Åke 
Nordquist explains in his essay Reconciliation as a Political Concept: Some 
Observations and Remarks that reconciliation became a key concept in 
political discourse because of three developments in the nature and con-
text of armed confl icts. 
One, the 1945 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1998 
creation of the International Criminal Court made individuals accounta-
ble for their actions in armed confl icts. This individual accountability has 
given an identity to perpetrators and victims, and thus has opened the 
way for reactions that range from criminal prosecution to forgiveness. 
Two, there has been a shift from interstate to internal wars. This change 
has turned civilians rather than combatants into the principal casualties 
of armed confl ict. Older post-war solutions that followed upon a mili-
tary defeat on the battle fi eld, such as the court-martial of commanding 
offi cers and the repatriation of prisoners-of-war, are no longer appro-
priate. The peace process must, aside from prosecuting human rights 
offenders, include the indemnifi cation of the material and immaterial 
losses suffered by the civilian population, and the implementation of 
symbolic ways to repair the social fabric of societies torn by internal 
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violence. Three, comprehensive intra-state peace processes have since 
the late-1980s often included formal peace agreements, individual ac-
countability, truth and reconciliation commissions, and public apologies 
by heads of state, and political and religious leaders. Such public and 
offi cial acknowledgment of past wrongdoings enhances the chances for 
political reconciliation.
Nordquist defi nes political reconciliation as “a process where harm, 
resulting from political violence, is repaired in such a way that trust can 
again be established between victims, perpetrators, and the society at 
large.” This conceptually rich defi nition clarifi es some of the complicating 
factors in achieving such outcome. Kjell-Ake Nordquist emphasizes that 
political reconciliation necessarily involves the re-establishment of broken 
social relations. Trust is a key ingredient of reconciliation and implies a 
reparation of, what Rousseau called, the social contract. People need 
to have faith again in society as a social construct and in the professed 
intention of former adversaries that they will not infl ict future harm. 
The restoration of social trust may be helped by undoing past injus-
tices through legal prosecution, reparative justice or the abrogation of 
punishment through amnesty. Retributive justice is exacted by a court 
of law which punishes the accused for his or her crimes. This approach 
may satisfy the feelings of victims and society at large that justice has 
been served, but may create resentment among the convicted and their 
political supporters. Retributive justice seems most appropriate in situ-
ations where the number of perpetrators is limited, as in cases such 
as Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, but is less 
feasible when large numbers of victimizers participated in the collective 
violence, such as in Congo, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The latter’s inability 
to systematically prosecute all offenders is likely to embitter victimized 
groups, so other means must be found to appease them. Reparative jus-
tice can at least partially neutralize those emotions by compensating vic-
tims in material and symbolic ways for their losses. Amnesty is the third 
possibility towards political reconciliation. Governments and parliaments 
have in the past chosen this route in the hope that amnesty will prevent 
long-term political disruption or will help people concentrate on building 
a better future instead of being held hostage to the past. This quick-fi x 
has proven to be ineffective in the last few decades, precisely because 
of the three developments in the nature and context of armed confl icts 
mentioned above. The overturning of amnesty legislation in several Latin 
American countries demonstrates that survivors of past abuses may in-
sist on legal accountability decades after the end of hostilities.
Kjell-Ake Nordquist recognizes four structural dimensions in the 
process of political reconciliation: relational, attitudinal, legal, and moral. 
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Reconciliation is by defi nition a relational concept, unlike forgiveness. 
At least two former adversaries, and even better society at large, should 
acknowledge and trust the other as a legitimate interlocutor. This mu-
tual relation should ideally be buttressed by a genuine attitudinal and 
behavioral change among former enemies or adversaries. The legal 
reckoning by perpetrators helps to convince the victims of the sincer-
ity of their relational and attitudinal change. Finally, the importance of 
the moral dimension of political reconciliation is its transcendence on 
other social realms, thus strengthening and galvanizing the three other 
dimensions.
Nordquist’s detailed analysis of the form of political reconciliation 
helps much to further clarify its complexity. He delineates ten dimen-
sions whose interconnections turn each reconciliation initiative into a 
unique process. One, political reconciliation is both a goal and a process 
because social trust is a cumulative and contingent condition rather than 
a fi xed state of social interaction. The ingredients of trust and reconcili-
ation are culturally, socially, and politically specifi c and are infl uenced by 
the type of violence suffered. 
Two, there can be intra-generational and also inter-generational rec-
onciliation. People directly affected by violent confl icts may bury their 
differences but may also pass them on to future generations, as hap-
pened in the former Yugoslavia. This transgenerational process requires 
a different peace building approach than when the past can be over-
come in the protagonists’ life time. 
Three, the nature of the relationships between victims and perpetra-
tors is important. Relations may be asymmetrical (victims are victims, 
and perpetrators remain perpetrators) or symmetrical (victims become 
perpetrators and vice versa). 
Four, violent confl icts between two enemies may end through ne-
gotiations or a military victory. There is a considerable power difference 
between these two situations, and a differential effect on the reconcili-
ation process. 
Five, forgiveness, when mutual, can give a powerful boost to the 
reconciliation process. However, forgiveness is a moral or religious con-
cept which operates beyond the political realm, and can therefore not 
be included in a formal peace plan. The attempted imposition of forgive-
ness is ineffective and even counterproductive. 
Six, political reconciliation is not only processual but also situational. 
It may be set in motion in parts of a confl ict zone where the fi ghting has 
stopped, while other parts remain enwrapped in armed violence. Such 
differential reconciliation may spread like an ink blot across the land 
when the benefi cial effects become visible. 
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Seven, political reconciliation may be constituted bottom-up, top-
down, or preferably be combined. Top-down processes bring a political 
commitment to reconciliation by involving important political stakehold-
ers in the process, while bottom-up processes involve victimized groups 
and the general population to create a well-functioning civil society.
Eight, truth-telling by perpetrators can have a benefi cial effect on po-
litical reconciliation because it assumes wrongdoing and acknowledges 
the suffering of the victims; a suffering that had often been publicly de-
nied by the responsible authorities. Complemented with the accounts 
by victims, such public disclosure and recognition can feed into historical 
narratives which assuage the intergenerational transmission of resent-
ment and hatred. 
Nine, the conviction that post-confl ict justice has been served can 
contribute substantially to political reconciliation. Justice can be done 
by national, international, and indigenous legal systems. These systems 
may combine retributive and reparative justice with truth commissions 
to provide a wholesome accountability which involves all parties con-
cerned. 
Finally, political reconciliation can be nurtured in many symbolic 
ways through commemorations, memorials, literature, art, fi lms, and so 
forth. The periodic national attention to past violent confl icts helps peo-
ple mourn the losses, slowly relegate them to history, and make society 
as a whole look towards the future.
Political reconciliation is only possible when the people who were 
pitted against one another during an armed confl ict are treated as fel-
low human beings by the peace enforcing force, and receive equal treat-
ment after the fi ghting ceases. Robert C. Hudson, in his chapter Les-
sons from Kosovo: Cluster Bombs and their Impact upon Post-Confl ict 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, delineates a connection between the 
use of cluster bombs and the Western military response to the global 
war on terror, while analyzing the long-term health problems of unex-
ploded ordnance in Kosovo, the discrimination of ethnic minorities in 
Kosovan hospitals, and its adverse effects on interethnic relations and 
lasting peace.
Robert Hudson argues that the military interventions by NATO troops 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo were neither the fi nal spasms of the 
Cold War nor the concluding stages of the Yugoslav secession wars but 
the beginnings of a new type of war waged on self-proclaimed humani-
tarian grounds and in defi ance of international laws, treaties, and con-
ventions. The Balkan interventions, and the presence of peace enforcing 
troops in the late-1990s, foreshadowed the military occupations of Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the early-2000s. The Kosovo air strike campaign was 
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not conducted because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia posed a di-
rect security threat to any of the NATO countries, but ostensibly because 
of humanitarian concern for Kosovo’s Albanian majority repressed by 
dominant Serbian powers. The humanitarian argument was also em-
ployed to justify the overthrow of Iraq’s brutal dictator Saddam Hussein 
once the weapons of mass destruction, that were the pretext for war, 
were not found. 
This new kind of war has been called a post-modern war by Rob-
ert Cooper, a foreign affairs advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
Reminiscent of nineteenth-century social evolution theories, Cooper 
classifi es the world’s states into pre-modern (e.g. Somalia, and Afghani-
stan before the overthrow of the Taliban regime), modern (e.g. India, 
Pakistan, and China) and post-modern (e.g. the European Union). He 
argues that the post-modern Western world should carry out a civilizing 
mission in the failed, chaotic, pre-modern states through a benign colo-
nization that will bring democracy and respect for human rights. This 
mission statement contains an intrinsic justifi cation for unprovoked war 
which gives post-modern states the moral right to intervene militarily 
without approval from the United Nations or any other international 
body. Cooper makes a call for a “new military humanism” which reverts 
to the laws of the jungle when fi ghting in pre-modern states. The pre-
emptive strike against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is an example of such new 
kind of war, while the torture of Al-Qaeda suspects, their unmonitored 
detention at Guantánamo Bay, and their disappearance into secret CIA 
prisons on non-American soil, are disturbing manifestations of self-right-
eous attitudes in defi ance of international laws and war conventions.
The use of cluster bombs in Kosovo and Iraq is another expression of 
the self-declared moral superiority, and disconcern for the civilian popu-
lation, with which Western states carry out their military interventions 
in so-called pre-modern states. Clusters bombs are airborne dispensers 
with submunitions intended to destroy armored vehicles. Submunitions 
that reach the ground without exploding turn into de facto anti-person-
nel mines, and thus become a lethal hazard for civilians, children and, 
paradoxically, also the occupying ground forces. The dropping by NATO 
airplanes of nearly 1,400 cluster bombs (comprising almost 290,000 sub-
munitions) on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, and the unknown location of 
an estimated 35,000 live bomblets, have caused and continue to cause 
many deaths and wounded. One year after the 1999 Kosovo campaign, 
almost 500 civilians had been killed, of whom 151 by cluster bomblets. 
The cost of clearing the tens of thousands of unexploded ordnance is es-
timated at $1000 per bomblet, while the long-term health costs to treat 
the victims are many times higher.
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Hudson raises the critical question of why NATO forces decided to 
drop cluster bombs on populated areas in Kosovo, knowing the risks 
to civilians of unexploded ordnance, and why they continued to employ 
these bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inexcusable use of such injuri-
ous weapons betrays a worldview that regards the people in failed states 
as inferior, primitive even. Their casualties are ultimately seen as the nec-
essary sacrifi ce for a better future. Pre-modern states are believed to be 
populated by pre-modern people who maintain inferior moral standards, 
fi ght in less civilized and more callous ways, do not have Christian values 
of empathy and compassion with suffering others, bear hardships more 
easily, and who will continue in age-old and deadly rivalries without out-
side intervention. What are a couple of hundred civilian deaths among 
an inferior people, when a better future is sure to lie ahead for all? 
However, not only is the future less shiny than promised, but pre-
cisely the use of cluster bombs is postponing the much desired peace 
because the unexploded ordnance has an effect on the safety of the 
resident population, the return of refugees, the ability to work the con-
taminated land, and ultimately the success of the much-publicized re-
construction efforts. Hudson documents the severe injuries infl icted by 
exploding submunitions touched off by a man, woman or child on foot. 
Add poor local health facilities and the preferential treatment of certain 
ethnic groups to this situation, then the political reconciliation will be 
a long way off. Ethnic minorities in Kosovo, such as Serbs, Roma, and 
Gorani, have had considerable diffi culties in obtaining proper medical 
care when injured. Ethnic Albanian doctors have refused them treatment 
on the charge of collaborating with the repressive Serbian authorities, 
obliging them to travel long distances under armed escort to medical fa-
cilities willing to accept them. Furthermore, the presence of unexploded 
bomblets has made refugees reluctant to return home, and prevented 
farmers from working their fi elds. Economic reconstruction and social 
reconciliation become impossible under such adverse circumstances.
Hudson’s conclusion is unequivocal: ban cluster bombs. They are an 
inhuman means to pursue armed confl icts, infl ict lasting human suffer-
ing on civilians, and therefore will hinder rather than hasten people’s 
willingness to develop peaceful relations. His research demonstrates that 
the peace building process does not begin when the confl ict stops but 
already when the fi ghting begins. 
Antonius C.G.M. Robben’s paper, Mourning and Mistrust in Civil-
Military Relations in Post-Dirty War Argentina, stresses the importance 
of considering and analysing in careful context, but also in comparative 
perspective, the long-term consequences of carefully designed policies 
of fear and terror, such as those which came under the auspices of the 
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so-called ‘dirty war’ in Argentine, a paradigmatic example of the kind of 
State terrorism that has characterised many military dictatorships in Latin 
America, direct heir of repressive strategies already tested in the French 
colonial wars and in US counterinsurgency operations. Each dictatorship 
had its preferences and modulated the repressive training acquired in 
Panama and North Carolina according to internal necessity, and in Argen-
tina ‘disappearance’ came to be the method of choice in the explicit as-
piration to annihilate and, through indeterminacy about the fate of those 
captured and of their corpses, paralyse the ‘enemy.’ The fact that a good 
many of the disappeared were abducted from their homes was a clear 
indicator of how deep the repression went into the social fabric in its 
itinerary from military headquarters and detention centres to the private 
spaces of everyday life. However, according to Robben, the effect was 
the opposite to that intended by the military. Instead of nurturing politi-
cal disbanding and depression, the tense presence/absence of the disap-
peared and the breach of trusts between the political and the domestic 
arenas came to be powerful anchoring points for further and long-term 
political action. The uncertainty about those disappeared, a generalised 
sense of guilt transferred from the perpetrators to the surviving victims, 
and the absence of a public and legitimate social space for proper mourn-
ing and burial, fuelled Human Rights organisations and relatives to mobi-
lise against the military (with a crucial role for the mothers). 
The military-civil distrust generated in the dirty war started in many 
cases in the bed, dining and living rooms (‘home’) where many abductions 
took place, where a major transgression of the limits between the political 
and private spheres, expressed fi rst in repressive actions and later elab-
orated in symbolic terms, took place. This transgression was, following 
Robben´s argument, important in the mobilisation and politisation, even 
in situations of torture, of ‘parental feelings of trust and protection’ that 
usually remain in the private domain: a process of politicisation that would 
eventually become a major transformative force in the country. This was 
an extraordinarily courageous act, in the face of fear, threats, and merci-
less accusations that parents were guilty —through improper rearing— of 
making their children into dangerous activists threatening the stability 
of the State. The public exposure of maternal feelings by the Madres de la 
Plaza de Mayo “transgressed the division between public and domestic in 
the reverse direction to the one used by the military assault teams.” After 
the dictatorship, during the tenure of Raúl Alfonsín, a Commission to re-
search the fate of the disappeared was installed (CONADEP), and new and 
very disturbing elements entered the emotional landscapes and the politi-
cal debates. It was time to confront the still unknown details of the horror, 
the mass graves, and the public and private management of the corpses. 
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Exhumations are no doubt extremely complex and emotionally charged 
events, and the tide went from favouring them to growing misgivings, as 
the expected identifi cations did not come through. A controversy grew 
between those who favoured dignifi ed reburials and those, mostly the 
madres, who valued more the vindication of the disappeared’s political 
ideas, and came to think of exhumations as a form of political deactiva-
tion of their struggle. The latter decided to “keep their emotional wounds 
open” and “socialise their maternity” so as to resist the social stream of 
forgetting associated, in their view, with the opening of the mass graves. 
The complex debates about exhumations and reburials in Argentina and 
other countries, such as contemporary Spain, speak of the enormous dif-
fi culties that societies which have endured wars, military coups, repression 
and violence have in facing the past in ways which are legally convinc-
ing, politically meaningful, socially productive, symbolically satisfying and 
emotionally healing. 
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Human Rights and Human Security: 
Challenges and Prospects
Wolfgang Benedek
University of Graz
I. Introduction
The colloquium organised on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of 
the Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights provides an oppor-
tunity to look back at the condition of human rights 25 years ago, the 
developments during this time in the fi eld of human rights, and the chal-
lenges and prospects for the future. One major development has been 
the broadening of the understanding of the relevance of human rights 
for other fi elds, in particular the fi elds of development and security. 
The launching of the Human Development Report of the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990, signalled the change of 
the concept of “human development” from a quantitative concept of 
looking at the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to a quali-
tative approach, measuring criteria like infant mortality, life expectancy 
or access to education. These criteria can also be taken to represent the 
progress made by states in the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights corresponding to the obligation in Art. 2 of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. Consequently, 
UNDP has decided to mainstream human rights in its activities of human 
development (UNDP, 1998). In doing so, it has also recognized the im-
portance of civil and political rights as well as of democracy and fi nally of 
cultural diversity for human development (UNDP, 2000, 2002, 2004).
In a similar way, also the concept of security has experienced a wid-
ening and deepening, which goes back to the 1990s. Ten years ago the 
concept of human security was fi rst launched in the UNDP Report of 
1994 (UNDP, 1994). The main elements of this concept can be described 
as its focus on the human person, individually or collectively, and the 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives29   29 4/1/07   11:20:15
30 WOLFGANG BENEDEK
insight that the main threats to the security of the person worldwide are 
no longer inter-state confl icts, but the absence of proper health services, 
adequate food, etc., all related to poverty (Ramcharan, 2002), as well as 
the existence of internal, often inter-ethnic confl ict, which can hardly be 
resolved by traditional military means alone. Therefore, human security 
stands for addressing major human vulnerabilities and societal devel-
opment needs, which often can be best expressed in terms of human 
rights, like the right to personal and social security as contained in Art. 3 
and Art. 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Accordingly, 
human rights have also permeated the fi eld of security, which raises the 
question of the relationship between human rights and human security, 
which is the focus of this contribution.
II. Conceptual Issues 
The Commission on Human Security has described human security 
as follows: “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that en-
hance human freedoms and human fulfi lment. Human security means 
protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms that are the essence of 
life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (wide-
spread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on 
people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, en-
vironmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give 
people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (Sadako 
and Sen, 2003). It also refers to a defi nition used by UN Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi  Annan: “Human security in its broadest sense embraces far 
more than the absence of violent confl ict. It encompasses human rights, 
good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring 
that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfi l his or her 
own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing 
poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing confl ict. Freedom 
from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to 
inherit a healthy natural environment — these are the interrelated build-
ing blocks of human, and therefore national, security” (Annan, 2000). 
 Relationship between human rights and human security as well as 
human development
Human rights and human security as well as human development 
are interrelated and interdependent concepts. Without peace and secu-
rity, there can be no full implementation of human rights and the same 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives30   30 4/1/07   11:20:16
 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 31
is true also for human development. Without human development, hu-
man rights can not be fully achieved. But, without human rights, there 
can be no human security or human development either.1 Human rights 
can help to defi ne human security (Ramcharan, 2002). In a positive view, 
these concepts are mutually reinforcing. As the Human Security Network 
declared at its meeting in Lucerne in the year 2000: “most threats to hu-
man security reveal a direct or indirect human rights dimension” (Human 
Security Network, 2000).
With regard to the relationship between human security and human 
development, both, confl icts and the absence of economic, social and 
cultural rights severely affect human development. Accordingly, without 
human security there can be no human development. The relevance 
of both, civil and political and economic social and cultural rights cor-
responds to the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights of 1993 following 
up on the Teheran Declaration of 1968 according to which “all human 
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” 
(para. 5). The interrelatedness between human rights, human security 
and human development requires a “holistic approach” to human rights 
as requested by human rights NGOs like the People’s Movement for Hu-
man Rights Education and Learning (PDHRE).2 
However, there are also critical voices, which question the useful-
ness of the concept of human security (Paris, 2001). OSCE sometimes 
prefers to talk about “comprehensive security” although the term hu-
man security is used as well (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003). There is still, however, 
an ongoing conceptual discussion, which is largely in favour of the new 
concept. The main question discussed is the delimitation of the concept, 
whether it should focus only on violent threats arising in particular from 
confl icts, or whether it should also cover non-violent threats, related 
to the violation of economic and social rights, i.e. human development 
(Burgess and Owen, 2004). The latter is the approach followed by the 
Human Security Commission (Human Security Commission, 2005), the 
former is the approach of the Human Security Report, which focuses in 
particular on confl icts and violence (Human Security Centre, 2005). One 
mediating approach suggests to consider only threats which are surpass-
ing a certain threshold or magnitude, to be defi ned in the political arena 
(Owen, 2004).
Of particular interest is the potential impact of the concept of human 
security on international law and international institutions. A relevant 
1 See Report of the International Workshop on Human Security and Human Rights 
Education and Learning, Graz 30 June to 1 July, 2000, at http://www.etc-graz.at.
2 See http://www.pdhre.org. 
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study concluded that: “Human Security as both an academic concept 
and as a political agenda has the potential to become a new organising 
principle of international relations and international law” (Oberleitner, 
2002, 2005).
 The meaning of freedom from fear and freedom from want for human 
security and human rights
The concept of human security can be explained as an effort to ad-
dress certain threats which can be divided into threats towards the free-
dom from fear and the freedom from want. This distinction is going back 
to the four freedoms announced by President Roosevelt in his message 
to Congress in 1941 and has been followed up by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations in his Millennium report to the General Assembly 
in 2000 (United Nations, 2000b).
In terms of human rights, the freedom from fear mainly corresponds 
to the civil and political rights, whereas the freedom from want can be 
equalled to economic, social and cultural rights.
What the concepts of human rights and human security have in com-
mon is the focus on the “human dignity” of the individual or the people. 
In cases of massive human rights violations, this raises the question of 
“humanitarian intervention”, often misused in state practice. The report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
of December 2001 on “the responsibility to protect”, commissioned by 
the Canadian government, has developed several criteria for humanitar-
ian intervention by military means, but also highlighted the “responsibil-
ity to prevent” as the fi rst priority (Evans and Sahnoun, 2001).
III. Threats to Human Security and Human Rights
The changing character of confl icts is resulting in a different nature 
of threats to the security of the human being, which can be seen in the 
fact that the largest number of casualties today are civilians, in particular 
women and children (Human Security Centre, 2005).
For example, threats against the freedom from fear are related to 
political persecution, violations of humanitarian law, misuse of chil-
dren in armed confl ict, anti-personnel land mines and the proliferation 
of small weapons, organised crime, drug trade and human traffi cking, 
environmental threats etc. About 500,000 people are killed every year 
with small arms or light weapons, whereas the main concern of the big 
powers seems to be with the weapons of mass destruction. Four Secu-
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rity Council member states are responsible for 80% of the international 
arms trade. Therefore, the activities on prevention of human rights vio-
lations committed with small arms and light weapons are of particular 
importance (Frey, 2004).
Examples of threats against the freedom from want are poverty, dis-
parities and marginalization, food shortage, public health, education, 
social security and human development in general. These problems are 
consequences of natural and man-made disasters like HIV/AIDS. Most of 
them are described in the Millennium Goals, like halving, by 2015, the 
proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day, suffering from 
hunger, or unable to reach or afford safe drinking water, primary school-
ing for all children, and equal access to all levels of education, reducing 
maternal and child mortality, and holding the spread of HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria and other major diseases (United Nations, 2000d).3 These threats 
are largely responsible for the growing migration and the large number 
of refugees. 
According to the Human Development Report of 1994, there are 7 dif-
ferent elements of human security, i.e. personal, community, food, health, 
environmental security as well as economic and political security, which all 
are linked to human rights in their implementation (UNDP, 1994).
Two major reports have to be mentioned in this context, i.e. the 
report of the Human Security Commission, which was published in May 
2003 (Human Security Commission, 2003) and the so-called “Human 
Security Report,” to be issued annually from 2005 (Human Security Cen-
tre, 2005). Whereas the former was the result of the Commission on 
Human Security supported by Japan and the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, the latter is an analytical work under the direction of 
Andrew Mack, a former advisor of the Secretary General, presently di-
recting the Human Security Centre of the Liu Institute for Global Issues 
at the University of British Columbia. Some fi rst results show, inter alia, a 
general correlation between GDP per capita and the probability of war, 
i.e. the poorer a country, the more likely are violent confl icts. In par-
ticular, there is a striking relationship between dependence on primary 
commodity exports and the risk of civil war. There is also a clear relation-
ship between democratisation and the decline of armed confl ict (Human 
Security Centre, 2005; World Bank, 2003).
Another report worth mentioning is the Social Watch Report 2004 
entitled “Fear and Want, Obstacles to Human Security” which, based on 
3 Only limited progress has been made so far to achieve these goals as can be seen 
from UNDP (2003).
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country studies and analyses of various topics gives ample evidence that 
the failure to ensure economic, social and cultural rights creates human 
security problems (Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 2004).
How to foster human rights through giving more attention to hu-
man security? In a world of fear there is a growing tendency to pursue 
security at the cost of liberty or human rights. It is therefore important 
to explain that human security cannot be achieved at the expense of 
human rights, which has been one of the main messages in the debate 
on Anti-Terrorist Measures and Human Rights (Benedek and Yotopoulos, 
2004; Walter et al., 2004). Human rights are the result of a liberal and 
social revolution, the separation of church and state, which is a chal-
lenge for fundamentalists and terrorism worldwide.
Human rights issues are also at stake in relations between the US 
and the EU, like the question of the death penalty, the prevention 
of torture, international criminal accountability, economic, social and 
cultural rights, etc. Generally, the human security approach appears 
to be much closer to the foreign policy of the European Union than 
to the policies of the United States, which is opposing several hu-
man security concerns (Benedek, 2004). One major case in point are 
the different attitudes  vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Whereas the European Union as well as the Human Security Network 
has made the support of the ICC one of their major concerns, the 
United States is doing everything it cannot to be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the Court (European University Centre, 2004; Zimmer-
man, 2004), which has damaging effects on the court itself. There is 
more common ground when it comes to multilateralism in post-con-
fl ict situations (Small, 2001).
A recent report by an international study group suggests that the 
European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in 2003 
should be inspired by a “Human Security Doctrine” for Europe, to 
protect individuals from insecurity caused by gross human rights vio-
lations. For this purpose, a “Human Security Response Force” should 
be established combining military, police and civilian capabilities as 
well as a “Human Security Volunteer Service” (Kaldor, 2004). The fo-
cus obviously is on failed states and post-confl ict reconstruction situ-
ations, which need stabilisation and societal reconstruction measures. 
The report fails, however, to include the rich potential of the European 
Union in the fi eld of humanitarian relief, development and economic 
as well as human rights cooperation in a more comprehensive ap-
proach. 
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IV. The Human Security Agenda and Actors
There are different human security priorities, pursued by different 
states and international organisations together with international civil 
society. The Human Security Network (HSN) has agreed on a common 
agenda, which includes “issues such as the universalization of the Ot-
tawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines, the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court, the protection of children in armed 
confl ict, the control of small arms and light weapons, the fi ght against 
trans-national organized crime, human development and human secu-
rity, human rights education, the struggle against HIV/AIDS, addressing 
implementation gaps of international humanitarian and human rights 
law, and confl ict prevention.”4
Measures of Legal Protection
There have been signifi cant achievements in terms of legal instru-
ments, which the HSN helped to bring into existence or to monitor ac-
cessions and implementation: 
— International Humanitarian Law — Geneva Conventions 1949 
and Additional Protocols 19775
— Convention against Anti-Personnel Mines 1997/19996
— International Criminal Court 1998/20027
4 See http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php.
5 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (II) for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Texts of the Conventions are available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebCONVFULL?OpenView.
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention), available at: 
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/rdb/apm-mbc-text.html. The Convention was adopted 
in 1997 and entered into force in 1999.
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: The Text of the Rome Statute 
circulated as UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbeaux 
of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 
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— Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and Protocol on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
2000/20028 
— Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffi cking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children 2000/20039
— Protocol on Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Por-
nography 2000/200210
— Protocol to the Convention against Torture on a System of Visits 
to Places of Detention 200211
Some other concerns have not yet resulted in a convention, but there 
are proposals in this direction, like in the case of measures against small 
arms and light weapons, where a Programme of Action has been adopt-
ed in 2001 and, as a fi rst step towards a future “Arms Trade Treaty,” a 
“Protocol on Marking and Tracing” is being prepared.12 
In other cases, the Network acts as a lobby or tries to develop good 
practices, like the Austrian-sponsored “child rights training curriculum” 
and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. Text of the Rome 
Statute is available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.
8 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/opac.htm entered into force on 29 September 2003, Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/Res/54/263 25 May 2000, entered into force on 12 February 
2002.
9 See the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, UN Doc. 55/25 of 15 November 2000, entered into force on 25 
December 2003, Text available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm. 
10 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 
2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002, Text available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/opsc.htm.
11 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on 18 December 2002; UN Doc. 
A/RES/57/199 of 9 January 2003, Not yet in force, Text available at http://www.ohchr.
org/english/law/cat-one.htm.
12 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15, http://disarma-
ment2.un.org/cab/poa.html. First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Imple-
mentation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (7-11 July 2003), http://www.
smallarmssurvey.org/resources/BMS%202003.htm. Working Draft of 25 May 2004 (re-
flecting, with minor modifications, the text circulated at the UN biennial PoA meeting, 
New York, July 2003), available at http://www.iansa.org/documents/2004/att_0504.pdf. 
See for the Campaign on an Arms Trade Treaty http://www.iansa.org/action/new_york/
arms_trade_treaty.htm.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives36   36 4/1/07   11:20:17
 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 37
for fi eld missions13 or the “Graz Declaration on Principles of Human 
Rights Education and Human Security” of 2003.14
V.  Empowerment through Measures in the Field of Human 
Development 
Of particular relevance is the work of Amartya Sen and his approach 
to development as freedom to have choices, which can also be trans-
lated into having access to human rights.15 This approach has also in-
fl uenced the report of the Human Security Commission, which recom-
mends a number of measures in the fi eld of economic security, such as 
in particular:16
— Social security: minimum living standards
— Universal access to basic health care
— Empowering all people with universal basic education
— Fair trade and markets to benefi t the extreme poor
In addition, food security, corresponding to the human right to food 
as contained in Art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights has found particular attention, in the reports of 
the Human Security Commission and of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food and has been the subject of a specifi c declaration by the 
Human Security Network.17 This shows the relevance of basic economic, 
social and cultural rights for the concept of human security. 
Actors
Since 1999, the Human Security Network consisting of 12 states 
from all parts of the world and South Africa as an observer pursues a 
“Human Security Agenda” starting from the prohibition and destruction 
13 See http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.php. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Sen, Amartya, 2000.
16 See Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, supra note 4, 72ff. 
and 133ff.
17 See Human Security and Food Security with special emphasis on Biotechnology, 
Proceedings of the International Seminar, held at the Vienna International Centre, 3 
December 2002, Organized by the Permanent Decision of Chile, Vienna 2003 and the 
report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Ziegler, Jean, E/CN.4/2004/10 
of 9 February 2004. See also the Declaration of the Human Security Network on Food 
Security of 29 May 2004, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.php. 
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of anti-personnel mines, protection of children in armed confl ict and the 
problem of small arms and light weapons and putting particular em-
phasis on human rights education. The Network is meeting every year 
on Ministerial level and coordinates joint activities in the UN General 
Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission in particular, which 
in some cases have also become part of the agenda of the UN Security 
Council.18 
There are different approaches to the concept of human security 
like in the case of Canada, which has a particular focus on confl ict pre-
vention and Switzerland, with its interest in humanitarian law. Others, 
like Austria, Chile and Mali have emphasized the importance of human 
rights education. Japan has development and human security as the ma-
jor concern of its foreign policy, but is not part of the HSN. Examples in 
case are the UN Trust Fund for Human Security sponsored mainly by Ja-
pan, which made more than US $200 million available for projects of the 
United Nations Organization, or the Canadian Consortium on Human 
Rights, which brings together different Canadian research institutions 
with a focus on human security (Bosold and Werthes, 2005).19 
The UN has taken up the human security concept by establishing 
a “Human Security Branch” as part of the UN Offi ce on Drugs and 
Crime in Vienna, which merges programmes related to drugs control 
and crime prevention at the UN in Vienna and in its fi eld offi ces. It has 
also set up a “Human Security Unit” in its Offi ce for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs in New York, which will cooperate with the UN 
Trust Fund for Human Security and oversee the dissemination, promo-
tion and follow-up of the conclusions and recommendations of the 
Commission on Human Security and the concept of human security in 
general as well as provide support to the “Advisory Board on Human 
Security”, established as a follow-up to the Commission on Human 
Security.20
Of particular relevance for the progress of the human security con-
cept are the non-state actors, in particular international civil society, 
which operates through a variety of Non-Governmental Organisations 
18 See, for example, UNSC-Res. 1539 (2004) on Children and armed conflict and 
UNSC-Res. 1467 (2003) on Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and mercenary 
activities: threats to peace and security in West Africa, or UNSC-Res. 1308 (2000) on the 
AIDS crises; see also Ramcharan (note 4), 21ff.
19 For the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, see http://www.humansecurity.
info/CCHS_web/Home/en/.
20 See http://www.reliefweb.int/w/res.nsf/wDocs/2F57FE7A26213456C1256ED 
8003BF662.
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(NGOs).21 The emerging global civil society (Benedek, 2005) contributes 
to the agenda-setting, but also the preparation of the activities of the 
Human Security Network, which regularly organises preparatory meet-
ings with NGO-experts and also gives competent NGOs an important 
role in the yearly meetings on the Ministerial level. Examples in case 
are the NGO-network “Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Confl ict,”22 the “International Campaign to Ban Landmines,”23 or the 
“Kimberley process” in which transnational corporations are also in-
cluded.24
VI.  The Human Security Approach and the Human Rights 
Approach
Both approaches are characterised by an increasing awareness of the 
importance of the preventive versus the repressive approach in human 
rights and with regard to confl icts (Sicilianos, 2001; Cockel, 2001). By in-
cluding international organisations and non-state actors, they also pur-
sue a participatory and cooperative approach. Consequently, they face 
the same negative reactions by some states preoccupied with protecting 
their sovereignty. The main concern of the human security approach is 
with building the capability of those directly affected, i.e. their empow-
erment of people through human rights. This addresses in particular the 
empowerment of women and the need of a gender-sensitive approach 
(Ainetter-Brautigam, 2002). For this purpose, cooperation with interna-
tional organisations and with NGOs is required as well as cooperation 
in law enforcement and international judicial cooperation.25 One over-
riding concern is the establishment and protection of the rule of law, in 
crime prevention as well as in addressing the problems of post-confl ict 
societies. There is, not surprisingly, a clear negative correlation between 
the rule of law and the extent of organized crime (Van Dijk, 2004). In the 
words of Sergio Vieira de Mello, as UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: “My choice of the rule of law as an overarching theme in my 
21 See for examples of the role of civil society in the HSN http://www.humansecurit-
ynetwork.org/society-e.php. 
22 See http://www.gppac.net/. 
23 See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.icbl.org/. 
24 See http://www.Kimberlyprocess.com:8080/ and http://www.business-humanrights. 
org/Categories/Principles/KimberlyProcess. 
25 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Human Security and Justice, Se-
lected UNODC Projects, Vienna 2004. 
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own work is due not at least to its universality. It is also the most solid 
foundation of security.”26 
Because of his tragic death as a victim of the bombing of the UN 
head-quarters in Baghdad, Sergio de Mello could not open the yearly 
International Summer Academy on Human Rights and Human Security, 
organized since 2003 by the European Training and Research Centre 
on Human Rights and Democracy (ETC) in Graz, Austria. The relation-
ship between human rights and human security, including also human 
development, is the focus of this unique training programme.27 This ex-
perience led participants to start the fi rst electronic journal on human 
security entitled “Human Security Perspectives.”28
In conclusion, the human security approach, is largely similar to the 
human rights approach. It is characterized by its focus on the human 
person, its preference for prevention rather than protection, its inclu-
siveness with regard to Non-Governmental Organizations and non-state 
actors in general as well as its reliance on international multilateral co-
operation rather than unilateral action. However, its focus is on major 
threats, both with regard to threats deriving from confl icts and violence 
and threats deriving from violations of basic human rights, i.e. in the 
fi eld of development.
VII.  Human Rights Education: The Human Right to Know One’s 
Human Rights 
In order for civil society to play its participatory role at all levels and as 
a safeguard against the threat of violations, it is important to improve the 
knowledge and understanding of people of their human rights. There-
fore, human rights education and learning is of utmost importance.
This is a responsibility of all actors, in particular the states, which 
has also been confi rmed by the UN Decade on Human Rights Education 
(1995-2004), which, according to a resolution passed at the UN Human 
Rights Commission in 2004 is to be continued in the form of a Plan 
26 See de Mello, Sergio Vieira, Opening Statement at the 59th session of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, 17 March 2003, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/0/FCBA570604706415C1256CEC0054BAE8?opendocument. 
27 The first International Summer Academy on Human Rights and Human Security 
has actually been opened by Bertrand Ramcharan as acting UN High Commissioner of 
Human Rights on 1 September 2003, see ETC Newsletter 3/2003, 1ff., http://www.
etc-graz.at/, and was dedicated to the memory of Sergio de Mello. For information on 
the Summer Academy see: http://www.summeracademy.etc-graz.at. 
28 See http://www.hs-perspectives.etc-graz.at/.
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of Action (2005-2007) under the World Programme for Human Rights 
Education from 2005, which has been proclaimed by a special meeting 
of the UN General Assembly on 10 December 2004.29 In this context the 
Graz Declaration on Principles of Human Rights Education and Human 
Security is of relevance30 together with the Manual on Human Rights 
Education with the title “Understanding Human Rights,” produced by 
the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and De-
mocracy (ETC) on behalf of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs for 
the HSN, which consequently has been translated into all United Nations 
languages as well as several others (Benedek and Nikolova, 2003). 
It is increasingly recognised that human rights need also to be ad-
dressed at the local level. One innovative approach, promoted by the 
People’s Movement on Human Rights Education (PDHRE), is the self-
declaration of “Human Rights Cities,” which commit themselves to base 
their policies squarely on human rights. So far, about 12 cities, in particu-
lar in the South, have declared themselves as Human Rights Cities, Graz 
being the fi rst in Europe.31 Another approach in the same direction is the 
“European Charter on Safeguarding Human Rights in the City,” adopted 
in the year 2000 by Barcelona and St. Denis/France, which today has 
been signed by about 250 communities, mainly in Southern Europe.32 
The signatories are meeting every two years, in Venice (2002) and Nu-
remberg (2004). The emphasis on implementation of human rights at 
the local level is a new trend in the fi eld of human rights, which is in line 
with the human security approach.33
VIII. Overcoming Retrogressive Forces 
References to human security suggested by Japan and other states 
to be included into certain United Nations resolutions had to be aban-
29 See UNGA-Res. 59/113 (2004) and Revised draft Plan of Action for the first phase 
(2005-2007) of the World Programme for Human Rights Education, UN Doc. A/59/525/
Rev. 1 of 2 March 2005 and UN Human Rights Commission, Res. 2004/71: Follow-up to 
the UN Decade on Human Rights Education.
30 See Graz Declaration on Principles of Human Rights Education and Human Secu-
rity, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.php.
31 See on human rights cities PDHRE, www.pdhre.org/projects/hrcommun.html. 
32 See Charter on Safeguarding Human Rights in the City (2000), http://www.
comune.venezia.it/conferenzadiritti/carta/European%20Charter%20For%20The%20Saf
eguarding%20Of%20Human%20Rights%20In%20The%20City.pdf.
33 See Kapuy, Klaus, The Relevance of the local level for Human Security, in: Human 
Security Perspectives, Vol. 1 (2004), at: http://www.hs-perspectives.etc-graz.at/. 
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doned in view of the opposition of some states opposed to the concept 
for reasons of state sovereignty and fears that the concept could open 
the way to humanitarian intervention.34 These states still favour the in-
ternational law of coexistence over the international law of cooperation. 
Since 2001, this tendency can be felt more strongly also in the sessions 
of the UN Human Rights Commission. 
Generally, there is a need of rethinking the role of the state, which 
has the responsibility to protect, but in doing so increasingly depends 
on the International Community. There is, however, also the problem 
of “failed states,” meaning that only a functioning state can fully guar-
antee human rights. In this context, both, the state-centric concept of 
international law and the “anti-sovereignty label” of the human rights 
movement need to be reviewed. This requires also a review of the role 
of human rights in state theory.35 
There are also implications on global governance meaning that hu-
man rights for their realization increasingly depend on international co-
operation, which can best be seen in the case of the implementation of 
the right to development.36 Since the year 2000, the Secretary-General, 
on the request of the UN General Assembly has produced several reports 
on the impact of globalisation on the full enjoyment of human rights37 
34 The title of the Commission initiated by Canada, i.e. International Commission on 
Intervention on State Sovereignty on “The Responsibility to protect (note 20), might also 
have raised concerns. In any case, efforts to give this report a larger role in the United 
Nations system have also been blocked by the same states, which show similar attitudes 
when it comes to human rights issues.
35 This has also been the topic of a panel of the 98th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of the International Law in Washington on 2 April 2004, see ASIL 
Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting, Washington 2004, http://www.asil.org/pdfs/
ASIL_2004_program_text.pdf.
36 See UN Working Group on Implementation of the Right to Development, http://
www.unhchr.ch/development/right-03.html. 
37 See Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights, 
Report of the Secretary General, A/56/165 (2001) and A/56/254 and Add.1 (2001). 
The 2003 report of the Secretary-General on globalization and its impact on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights (A/57/205, 11 July 2002; A/57/205/Add.1, 5 September 
2002) summarizes the views of the governments of Cuba, Haiti, Sudan and the United 
Kingdom on this issue. http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2002/documentation/genassem-
bly/a-57-205.htm. The 2004 report of the Secretary-General on globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights, UN Doc. A/58/257 of 7 August 2003 
is available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/474/40/PDF/N0347440.
pdf?OpenElement. The 2004 report of the Secretary-General on globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights, UN Doc. A/59/320 of 1 Septem-
ber 2004, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/493/92/PDF/
N0449392.pdf?OpenElement. 
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and there is a signifi cant trend to appoint special rapporteurs on issues 
related to globalisation and economic, social and cultural rights.38
The recent restoration of state sovereignty and unilateralism by the 
Bush Administration in the United States (Spiro, 2000; 2004) has typi-
cally been associated with or even induced by a return to a national 
security approach as opposed to human security. The U.S. has claimed 
for itself even the right to lead pre-emptive wars, which has met inter-
nationally with strong opposition as being contrary to international law 
(Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, 2004). 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, human rights are also a matter of human security. 
There is a need for an integrative and holistic approach of related com-
munities of interest. Looking at the international agenda of humani-
tarian concerns, it can be observed that different communities pursue 
legitimate objectives often apart from each other. A joint approach is 
missing. For example, there is the human rights community, the humani-
tarian law community, the holocaust and genocide studies community, 
the transitional justice community, the criminal justice or crime preven-
tion community, the human security community, the development com-
munity etc. Their concerns are all overlapping and therefore should be 
better pursued in an integrated approach. The same is true for strength-
ening cooperation between the various competent international organi-
sations, which often show a preference for competition rather than for 
cooperation leading to duplication of activities.
Addressing the root causes of violations requires a structural as well 
as a preventive approach. For this purpose, the rule of law and human 
rights are of key importance for human security. A human security ap-
proach provides more sustainable results in solving global issues. Fur-
thermore, a culture of human rights and human security fosters societal 
development. 
The strengthening of human security cannot be achieved simply by 
increasing military spending. Very different policies are necessary, ad-
38 See, for example, the Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty 
(since 1998), the Independent Expert on the Right to Development (since 1998), the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (since 1998), the Independent Expert on 
Structural Adjustment Policy (since 2000), the Special Rapporteurs on Housing (since 
2000) and the Right to Food (since 2000) as well as on Health (since 2002) etc. See 
Nowak (2003: 116). 
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dressing actual challenges primarily by political means and focusing on 
human rights in a holistic approach against the opposition of certain 
states and business interests, to avoid blind spots like Chechnya and 
double standards in the treatment of cases like China, which should be 
dealt with in a cooperative rather than confrontational manner.
The indivisibility of human rights means that no state, no one is 
above the law. Human Security raises also issues of global governance, 
which needs to be more inclusive and democratically legitimised and to 
focus on the needs of the people (Axworthy, 2001).
The internationalisation or globalisation of human rights has to be 
complemented by a “localisation” of human rights, which sometimes 
is called “glocalisation.” Human rights need to be taken care of also at 
the local level, as demonstrated by the human rights cities. Accordingly, 
UNDP has decided to promote human rights cities as part of its pro-
grammes on human development.
The increasing threats to human security have resulted in the fact 
that human security is moving to the top of the political agenda (Human 
Security Commission, 2003: 131). As can be seen from the case of Iraq, 
military intervention has been unable to provide human security because 
military means, although sometimes necessary (Hampson, 2002), can 
only achieve very limited objectives, whereas human security and human 
rights are needed as a general pre-condition for societal development.
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Abstract
This article deals with violences of culture and cultures of 
violence. After reviewing the specificity of anthropological views 
of violence, we propose a processual reconceptualisation of this, 
reflect on the forms and possible consequences of ethnographic 
research and representation in this field, and end by outlining the 
future of an anthropology of violence that can also be an anthro-
pology of peace. An epilogue on 11 March serves to relocate this 
theoretical sketch in the context of global terrorism.
Introduction
The criticism of violence is the philosophy of its own history.
Benjamin (1999: 44)
It is undeniable that violence permeates numerous aspects of so-
cial life, conditioning or determining their dynamics. But although we 
used this word very assiduously, it is not a convenient term with a clear 
demarcation. Quite the reverse: violence is an phenomenon with many 
faces and anchors in different historical and social realities. In order to 
decipher its complexity, there is no option but to divide it into signifi cant 
modes. We speak frequently, for example, of juvenile violence, sexual, 
ethnic, racist, family, ancestral, endemic, terrorist, discursive, open or 
symbolic, physical or psychological, quotidian or structural, high or low 
intensity, legitimate or criminal violence, or victims and perpetrators of 
violence. Although in some cases these categories have a high diagnostic 
and interpretative value for the analysis of specifi c or comparative reali-
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ties, in others they can be limited, stigmatising, obscure or ambiguous. 
For that reason, an objective of this work is to delimit in a critical way 
the range of what we understand by violence, that is to say, to discuss 
its limits, modalities, contexts and consequences, to examine the uses 
that we bring from common sense and to question the relevance of the 
academic categories that we have constructed to analyse it.
In any case, we use the categories that we use, when speaking of 
violence we talk about power relations and political relations (necessarily 
asymmetric), as well as culture and the diverse ways in which the latter is 
tied in with different structures of domination in micro and macro-social 
arenas (in the words of Gramsci, to speak of relationships of hegemony 
and subordination). The increasing interest that anthropology is giving 
to the study of violent acts, their antecedents and their tragic sequels 
— what has recently been called discourse of trauma1 or anthropology 
of social suffering —2 are bound to the search for new ways of thinking 
and interpreting these complex relations between violent acts, meaning, 
representation, hegemony or resistance. At the same time, to research 
or write on violence from a disciplinary position is not, or should not be, 
simple. The analysis itself becomes, sometimes in unanticipated ways, 
part of social reality. From a critical and refl ective position about the 
nature and possible scope of the anthropological methods and texts it 
becomes inevitable, therefore, to face the ethical and political aspects to 
refl ect on the facts and representations of violence.
This article deals with violences and cultures. By leaving the terms 
in their plural form we want to place emphasis on the polyfacetic di-
mension of the different expressions of violence and their diverse cul-
tural modulations; on the other hand, when putting the term violences 
fi rst and cultures second, we want to emphasize the set of analytical 
viewpoints in which the nonpacifi c resolution of confl ict was the topos 
from which we thought it relevant to examine the play of existing con-
1 Sztompka describes a sequence in social theory that goes from the discourse of 
progress, that accompanies the modernizing euphoria, through the discourse of crisis 
that from the middle of the 20th century arose in parallel to the decay of the progress 
idea, arriving at the discourse of trauma, taking over little by little the field of the social 
sciences and humanities. For this author, trauma must go beyond its biological meaning 
to also represent the effect that great social transformations have on the social and cul-
tural fabric (2000: 449-450).
2 For example, see the important series of books published by Arthur Kleinman, 
Veena Das, Margaret Lock and other collaborators (Kleinman, et al., 1997; Das, et al., 
2000 and 2001). In this respect we must indicate an interesting similarity of exposition 
with the concept of social pain arisen in the scope of collective psychology (Arciaga and 
Nateras, 2002).
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sensuses and hegemonies in any cultural fi eld. We aim, then, to study 
violence not so much as an act but as a continuum (Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois, 2004: 1-5), not so much as a exception but as normality, not 
so much as political but as quotidian, not so much as structure but as 
symbol, not so much as threats of war but as negotiations of peace. To 
use the terms of Walter Benjamin in his classic essay “Towards a critique 
of violence” (1922), the study of cultural justifi cations of violence (of 
what the author denominates his philosophy of history) is the condition 
for a cultural critique of the same.3
Antropology(ies) and Violence(s)
Whether the effect be direct or symbolic (working to communi-
cate the value of the individual as member of a social group), one 
can say that violence is a basic strategy for the experience of social 
interaction.
Riches (1988: 47)
The study of violence is not, nevertheless, a new subject on the an-
thropological scene. As Edward Said recalls in the epilogue of Oriental-
ism (entitled precisely “Identity, negation and violence”), the control of 
disorder and the limits of terror are crucial dilemmas in any politics of 
identity. The domestication of aggression, urban anomie, the resolution 
of confl icts and ritual violence were classic themes of the fi rst socio-
anthropological schools (such as social Darwinism, the Chicago school, 
functionalism and structuralism). The trans-cultural study of violence not 
only allowed the biologists’ explanations of human aggressiveness to 
be questioned, but also permitted the recognition that not all violence 
implies the use of force, because in many non-Western societies much 
physical damage is caused invisibly (by means of practices like witch-
craft). The study of non-state political systems — and of subordinate 
sectors within western society itself — contributed to the discovery that 
politics can exist beyond the State and that extra-state violence is nev-
er indiscriminate: few societies lack norms that stipulate how confl ict 
3 In this text we focus on the specificity of the anthropological view, although we 
must indicate that the last decade has been characterized by the advance of transdisci-
plinary views of violence, in which the views meet of different disciplines that have long 
had their backs turned (like psychology, sociology, criminology, psychoanalysis, commu-
nication and social philosophy).
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must be organized (Riches, 1988: 25).4 Thus, although violence tends 
to be defi ned as the aggressive use of physical force against others on 
the part of individuals or groups, there are other forms of non-physical 
aggressiveness (verbal, symbolic, moral) that can cause more damage, 
and mainly that “violence is not limited to the use of force... but rather 
the possibility or threat to use it” (Velho, 1996, cit. in Medeiros, 2003: 
7).5 In spite of the recurrent interest in violence shown by anthropolo-
gists (especially that infl icted at the margin of or below the State), not 
until recent years has its study become a privileged fi eld of research. 
We might mention, in this sense, the publication of diverse transcultural 
anthologies, among which we would emphasize those of David Riches 
(The Anthropology of Violence, 1986); Carolyn Nordstrom and Joann 
Martin (The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and Terror, 1992); Jeffrey 
A. Sluka (Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, 2000); Bettina 
E. Schmidt and Ingo W. Schröder (The Anthropology of Violence and 
Confl ict, 2001); Alexander Laban Hinton (Genocide: An Anthropological 
Reader, 2002); and Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Vio-
lence in War and Peace: An Anthology, 2004). The fi rst, whose Span-
ish version is entitled El fenómeno de la violencia (1988), has the merit 
of including both classic studies on violence in primitive societies (from 
witchcraft among the Mkako of Cameroon to cannibalism among the 
Piaroa of the Amazon) and research on the imagery of violence in west-
ern societies (from Irish terrorism to Japanese cinema). The other more 
recent work (still not translated into Spanish) extends anthropology from 
violence to the study of confl ict and peace, confi rming the fecundity of 
transcultural comparison to escape from the ethnocentric temptations in 
which traditional specialists in violentology — mainly criminologists and 
psychologists — have often fallen, and extending the fi eld of study to 
the political, symbolic, structural and quotidian violences.
In the Latin American scope there are also remarkable precedents 
of anthropological studies around this system. If we limit ourselves to 
4 We could mention here the distinction of Evans-Pritchard (1977), from the case 
of the Nuer, on the segmental character of violence: while fights between members of 
the same town are restricted to the use of sticks, the people of different towns can use 
lances; this type of regulation is suspended when the opponents are not Nuer.
5 Although reductionist definitions of violence (whether biological or psychological) 
were hegemonic for a long time, there is more and more consensus among the transdis-
ciplinary academic community in a holistic definition like the one propose by the World 
Health Organization: a) intentional use of the force objectively or as a threat; b) directed 
against oneself, another person, group or community; c) whose intention is to cause 
damage (physical or psychic); d) constructed socio-culturally and located in a specific 
historical time and space (WHO, 2003).
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Spain, in the fi eld of what we could call political violences, we must 
emphasize the seminal and controversial book of Zulaika on terrorism 
(1988); the contributions of other Basque anthropologists (Aretxaga, 
1988; Aranzadi, 2001); the studies of ethnicity and violence collected by 
Fernandez De Rota (1994) and the more recent review of Frigolé (2003) 
of the research around culture and genocide. In the fi eld of quotidian vi-
olences we can emphasize the contributions of Romaní (1996) on social 
violence, and Delgado (2001) on antireligious and racist violence. With 
respect to gender-based violences, we have the invaluable volume com-
piled by Maquieira and Sánchez (1990). In Portugal we must emphasize 
a remarkable ethno-historical study by Fatela (1989) on the imagery of 
blood and the street in urban violence. As regards Latin America, the 
second half of the 20th century saw the full range of expressions of 
violence (in the forms of state terror, guerrillas, tortures, social and ritual 
violence), although anthropologists were not always the fi rst to arrive at 
the scene of the crime (not speaking metaphorically), which may explain 
the delayed inclusion of the cultural dimensions of violence among the 
dominant paradigms.6
Cultures of Violence, Violences of Culture
Culture is the defeat of violence (...) violence would be rather a 
moment of failure of culture. In that sense there would not be a cul-
ture of violence.
Restrepo (1990), cit. in Blair (2003: 4)
The scope of this article, then, is the discussion of the connection 
(subject to multiple overloads, crossed wires and short circuits) between 
violence(s) and culture(s). For that reason we must begin by indicating 
the conceptual framework in which we locate such a debate. We have 
already mentioned the intentional use of the plural to emphasize that 
we understand neither violence nor culture as essential or static con-
6 The bibliography of studies on violence in Latin America is very broad. In addition 
to the references included in Blair (2003) for Colombia, see also the conceptualising 
proposal of Brazilian anthropologists Velho and Alvito (1996). In the Mexican case, there 
are numerous studies on violence both revolutionary (from Zapata to the Zapatistas) 
and social (from banditry to drug trafficking), but much less on symbolic and structural 
violence. In addition to the classic contribution of Roger Bartra (1996) on imaginary net-
works of power, it is worthwhile emphasizing the contributions to the study of juvenile 
violences, included in a volume published by Alfredo Nateras (2002) and the recent mo-
nograph in the journal Desacatos (2004).
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cepts. Although criminology has tended to use too restrictive a defi ni-
tion of violence (reduced to certain criminal acts included in the penal 
code of Western countries), anthropologists know that the considera-
tion of a physical or moral damage as violence does not always meet 
the consensus of the three different types of actors involved: perpetra-
tors, victims and witnesses (Riches, 1988: 24). It is particularly relevant in 
cases of ritual or symbolic violence in which the executors of the acts of 
physical aggression usually deny their violent character based on cultural 
criteria.
As in the fi lm Rashomon, directed by Akira Kurosawa, in which the 
story of a rape is told from the point of view of the actors involved 
(the perpetrator: the rapist; the victim: the woman raped; the witnesses: 
neighbours, husband, police, accomplices), any violent scene has many 
facets. The fact that discrepant versions of the rape must be considered, 
to the extent that they form part of the reality and the actors’ perception 
of it, is relatively independent of the violent act, that is to say, of whether 
the rape existed or not and who in fact perpetrated it. Defi nitively, for 
anthropologists it is as important to observe the violence in itself as it 
is to understanding the vision that the actors have of it. In addition, in 
our society the function of witness of violence is usually fi ltered by an 
institution: the mass media. Thus, it is necessary to go from a factual to 
a processual consideration of violence. Philippe Bourgois (2001), based 
on the Salvadoran case, has proposed a defi nition of violence based on 
four modes, which we will permit ourselves to restate: 
1. Political violence includes those forms of physical aggression and 
terror administered by offi cial authorities and those that oppose 
them, such as military repression, police torture and armed resist-
ance, in name of an ideology, movement or political state. This 
is the form of violence present in historiography and political sci-
ence, traditionally reduced to its more institutionalised aspects.7
2. Structural violence refers to the economic-political organisation 
of society that imposes conditions of physical and/or emotional 
pain, from high indices of morbidity and mortality to abusive and 
precarious conditions of work. This term was coined in academic 
7 The functionalist school based its theories on political systems on the distinction 
between the legitimate use of force — the patrimony of the State, almost never cha-
racterized as violence — and its illegitimate use — present in the interpersonal relations 
facing, below and against the State. It is worth the trouble to remember here the classic 
essay of Pierre Clastres, Societé contre l‘Etat (1974) and his article “Archaeology of Vio-
lence“ (1980).
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circles by the founder of the fi eld of Peace and Confl ict Studies, 
Johan Galtung (1969), to emphasize a social-democratic commit-
ment to human rights.8
3. Symbolic violence defi ned in the work of Bourdieu as internalised 
humiliations and legitimisations of inequality and hierarchy, from 
sexism and racism up to the internal expressions of class power. 
It is “exerted through the action of knowledge and ignorance, 
knowledge and feeling, with the unconscious consent of the 
dominated” (Bourdieu, 2000; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).
4. Quotidian violence includes the quotidian practices and expres-
sions of violence on a micro-interaction level: between individu-
als (interpersonal), domestic and delinquent. The concept has 
adapted from that of Scheper-Hughes (1997) to be centred in 
the individual lived experience which standardizes the small bru-
talities and terrors in the scope of the community and creates a 
common-sense or ethos of violence.
Of course, these four types do not have to be considered as mutually 
exclusive dimensions: almost all forms of quotidian violence (from delin-
quency to suicide) are based on structural violence, and often symbolic 
violence is translated into politicised forms of collective mobilization. As 
holistic researchers, specialists in the interrelations between diverse as-
pects of culture, the specifi city of an anthropology of violence consists 
of studying the bonds between the different forms of violence present 
in each cultural layer (for example, the relation between labour fl exibility 
and racist violence, or between political dictatorship and delinquency).9
The connection between violence and culture has traditionally been 
resumed in the term — more than in the concept — of culture of vio-
8 Galtung defines the structural violence as “the indirect violence constructed along 
social orders, and creating enormous differences between real and potential human 
self-realization”. It specifically differentiates structural violence from institutional vio-
lence emphasizing the “more abstract nature... than cannot be attributed to any speci-
fic institution” of the former. Structural violence is often “seen in a way as... natural as 
the air that surrounds us.” Much more important, “the general formula behind structu-
ral violence is inequality, mainly in the distribution of power” (Galtung, 1975: 173 and 
175, cit. in Bourgois, 2001).
9 Joan Vendrell recalls a quote from Pierre Bourdieu that it is worth recalling: “struc-
tural violence exerted by the financial markets, in the form of dismissals, precariousness 
of working conditions, etc., has its counterpart, sooner or later, in the form of suicides, 
delinquency, crime, drug adddiction, alcoholism and greater or lesser quotidian vio-
lences” (Bourdieu, 2000: 58, cit. in Vendrell, 2003: 4-5). Another recent debate can be 
consulted on the law of conservation of violence of Bourdieu, in Bourgois (2001 and 
2002) and Binford (2002).
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lence. Although it initially served to question the biological or psycho-
logical paradigms of human aggressiveness (founded by the dominant 
positivist theories in criminological thought based on the work of the no-
table Italian anthropologist Cesare Lombroso),10 the indiscriminate and 
uncritical use of the term could lead to equally essentialist explanations 
of violence (in this case based on cultural criteria). Something similar to 
the debate on the culture of poverty based on the work of Oscar Lewis 
(1981): good intentions (the attempt to understand the cultural codes 
of subordinate sectors) were converted into bad theorizations (the ten-
dency to blame to the poor for their poverty and violent groups for their 
violence, the fatalism of poverty and violence based on cultural criteria). 
Unfortunately, this facilitated the hegemony of materialistic paradigms 
and the forgetting of the immaterial dimensions implicit in any violent 
confl ict.11
In a recent (2003) article Elsa Blair includes an excellent summary of 
this conceptual debate, from the very suggestive Colombian case. The au-
thor recalls that in the last decade the literature on violence in the country 
has gone from denying sharply any relationship with culture to beginning 
to reframe it. The quote from the Colombian sociologist Eduardo Restrepo 
with which we opened this section is, in this sense, perfectly representa-
tive of the state of the dominant academic and political opinion until the 
start of the Nineties: the culture of violence is an unthinkable term be-
cause it would mean accepting that Colombians are by nature violent and 
that violence is, therefore, consubstantial to their history and mainly non-
modifi able (a species of determinist sine qua non). Thanks to this the word 
was taboo for a long time among Colombian anthropologists (a kind of 
curse that was not only unpronounceable but unthinkable). But as Blair 
herself observes, it entailed the contempt of the mental representations, 
values and ritual practices, of the dimensions of expression of pain, suffer-
ing and cruelty that always accompany and orient violent practices (some-
thing always strange but characteristic if Colombian culture is known). 
10 The studies of Lombroso (1878) on jailhouse tattoos and graffitti are very inte-
resting. See the recent reading of his work by an Italian anthropologist of the Gramsci 
school (Leschiutta, 1996). Within Italian anthropology the contributions of Ernesto de 
Martino (1980) to the study of traditional and modern forms of ritual violence must also 
be mentioned.
11 The concept of culture of violence was in its origin associated with the crimino-
logical studies in the tradition of the Chicago school. In the book of Wolfgang and Fer-
racuti (1982 [1967]), entitled indeed The subculture of violence, the bases of this thesis 
are set out: “There is an impetuous infiltration of violence that is impregnating the nu-
cleus of values that mark the lifestyle, socialization processes and interpersonal relations 
of individuals that live under similar conditions” (1982: 169).
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The Hispano-Colombian communications specialist Jesus Martín Barbero 
was one of the fi rst to recover the interest in the cultural nuances of vio-
lence, reminding anthropologists that the disdain towards the term “cul-
ture of violence” appeared to be based on an archaic concept of culture 
“... of an essence that is the opposite of what culture really means, that is 
to say, history and therefore long processes of interchanges and changes” 
Martín Barbero, 1998, cit. in Blair, 2003: 6).
It is clear, then, that in referring to violence(s) and culture(s) in the plu-
ral we are thinking about the continuum of means of non-peaceful reso-
lution of confl icts12 (from the political to the quotidian, via the structural 
and the symbolic) and about their cultural modulations (in the symbolic 
codes that guide such practices, subject to constant processes of change 
and interchange). From this perspective, two possible approaches to the 
anthropological study of violence can be seen: a) the study of cultures of 
violence, that is to say, of the cultural guidelines (uses, customs, rites, im-
ages) and institutions (organizations, powers, subcultures, networks) that 
are structured based on certain codes for the legitimate or illegitimate 
use of violence, whether interpersonal or self-infl icted; b) the analysis of 
violences of culture, that is, of the presence of violence (political or quo-
tidian, structural or micro-social, physical or symbolic, visible or invisible, 
experienced or imagined) in cultural institutions or fi elds, often distant 
from those that are normally assigned to the expression and resolution 
of confl icts. While the fi rst approach has been the traditional one in an-
thropological studies on violence, the second, less frequent, implies an 
attempt to see things from a micro-political perspective — according to 
Foucault’s conception of the microphysics of power.
To Investigate, to Represent, to Disarm Violences
Like the sacramental type of dance, political violence can also 
sometimes be experienced as the connection between the conscious 
and the unconscious and there are no words to say what it is. 
Zulaika (1988: 389)
We have already commented that there is, without a doubt, an in-
creasing interest in the study of violences within the anthropological 
12 We would also have to add to the object of the anthropology of violence the 
forms of “irresolution” of conflicts (because there are some that are not resolved and 
become endemic: think only of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or the terrorism of ETA).
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discipline and other, related fi elds. It’s not that this theme was unknown 
in anthropology, but it lacked the centrality that it is acquiring recently, in 
previously neglected some areas of research. For example, as Nagengast 
indicates, until recent years anthropology had never been systematically 
at the forward edge of the studies on collective violence, terrorism, and 
violence in state contexts (1994: 112), despite all the data and discus-
sions that we could contribute, given our love of fi eld research and the 
comparative method (Sluka, 1992). In addition, a good part of the re-
search work, as Green indicates, has been carried out, in the last thirty 
years, in places where there was some type of political and social violence 
(1995: 107). This being the case, a pending question is why the atten-
tion that there is now on all types of violence did not occur previously 
in the discipline. Let us see a case that may serve to clarify the situa-
tion, at least as regards political violences. Although much caution is 
necessary to extrapolate its conclusions to other geographical scopes, 
in his well-known article “Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and 
the War in Peru,” Orin Starn criticized the lack of interest that spe-
cialised anthropologists in the Andes had shown with respect to the 
expansion — clandestine, certainly, but hardly invisible — of a guerrilla 
detachment as important as the Shining Path, during their fi eld research in 
the Seventies. According to Starn (1992), the theoretical-methodological 
baggage of the time, combined with a nostalgic (Andeanist) vision of the 
Quechua communities as remainders of a pre-Hispanic past disconnected 
from national society, made inconceivable — and therefore nonexistent as 
an object of study — a process of clandestine political organization with 
massive and dramatic consequences, such as was developing. Things are 
changing lately, to the point where it is possible to ask if this rise will not 
have as a collateral consequence an over-emphasis on the violent aspects 
of human societies. It is possible to think that the very increase in the vis-
ibility of violences (as we consume them in the media), together with the 
new theoretical developments that allow us to limit, distinguish, contex-
tualise and relate different types of violence more accurately, are funda-
mental elements in its present popularity as an object of study. In more 
traditional fi elds of study, among which are those that Nagengast has 
denominated tribal (pre-state or sub-state) scenarios of violence, where 
the interest resides in the analysis of violences of a “practical, physical 
and visible” type (1994: 112)13 are now complemented, intensifi ed and 
nuanced with other scenes of research that respond to the recent social, 
13 Nagengast refers to the heated debates between specialists on “violent” tribal 
groups — the Yanomami would be a paradigm in this bibliography — and “pacific” 
groups — such as the Innuit or !Kung, but the thematics of violence are much broader.
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political, economic and cultural changes, linked to the thrust of globali-
sation. This is not only about the appearance of novel areas of research, 
but also the transformation of more classic places in the discipline in 
parallel to the expansion and development of our methodological and 
conceptual instruments to face up to violences.
Without trying to be exhaustive, it is possible to fi nd anthropologists 
investigating violences in refugee camps (Malkii, 1995); military bases 
(Lutz, 2001); war zones (Daniel, 1996); operating rooms and intensive 
care units (Allué, 1994; Comelles, 2001);14 colonial texts and trauma-
tized therapeutic imagery (Taussig, 1987); or among political prisoners 
(Feldman, 1991); military, politicians and relatives of the disappeared 
(Robben, 1995); exiled ex-combatants (Daniel, 1997); drug addicts or 
crack dealers (Romaní, 2000; Bourgois, 1995); guerrillas and spiritual-
ist mediums (Lan, 1985); childhood friends divided by murder (Zulaika, 
1999); war reporters (Pedelty, 1995); war widows (Green, 1995); “be-
tween the lines” (Stoll, 1993); or pursuing clandestine markets in human 
organs (Scheper-Hughes, 2002). Also, as shown in the works presented 
at the symposium on Violences and Cultures of the 9th Congress of the 
Federation of Associations of Anthropology in the Spanish State (FAAEE) 
in Barcelona (Feixa and Ferrándiz, 2003), among psychiatrists forced out 
by the dictatorship; undocumented migrants; police; spiritualist medi-
ums; frightened or institutionalised children; harassed workers; native 
peoples in post-war situations; excluded, mistreated and murdered 
women; marginalized young people; survivors of a disaster; or images 
from the world of fashion.
Violences are not a simple object of study, and less so for a discipline 
whose dominant methodological paradigm is, since the times of Ma-
linowsky, participation-observation. It is obvious that there are radical 
differences between some research scenes and others. But, as a basic 
rule, as the intensity of the violence increases — until it reaches the point 
that Swedenburg calls treacherous fi eld locations (1995: 27) —, so do 
the uncertainties and dangers of carrying out research, whether for the 
anthropologist or for the informants and communities involved in the 
14 The case of researchers who decide to face personal or family tragedies using 
their own bodies and sensations as a research field would deserve a longer and more 
clarified discussion. The tension between subjectivity and objectivity, between intimate 
struggles and social contexts of treatment and convalescence, between personal cou-
rage and methodological rigor, gives rise to a type of projects, reflections and texts that 
are a gender in itself, allowing us to arrive at places where the habitual participant-ob-
server can never arrive. See, in addition to Allué and Comelles, Murphy (1987) — where 
the author studies his own physical deterioration and paralysis as a result of a tumour in 
the spine — and Winkler (1995) — in which the author analyses her own rape.
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study, whether in the short or long term. This is a question without a 
unique solution, but which deserves to be formulated assiduously dur-
ing the research process: what constitutes, in each case, good fi eldwork 
on a specifi c type of violence? To raise this question means to clarify, and 
where necessary readjust, the ethical aspects of the research, the posi-
tion — scientifi c, militant — of the researchers in relation to the object of 
study, the methodological decisions taken when working among victims 
and perpetrators of violence, or the prioritisation of the participant data 
collection on practices and imagery and representations of violence.
The series of articles collected by Carolyn Nordstrom and Tony Rob-
ben in their essential book Fieldwork Under Fire (1995) provides many 
keys for the debate on the anthropological research of violent acts. Rob-
ben and Nordstrom emphasize the slippery quality of violence,15 as well 
as its cultural nature. It is confused and produces disorientation — it 
does not have simple defi nitions, not even among the social actors in-
volved —, it affects fundamental and very complex aspects of human 
survival, and has a massive role in the constitution of the perceptions of 
implied people (1995: 1-23). The complexity of the situation can even 
produce an existential shock in the researcher, which destabilizes the 
dialectic between empathy and distancing (ibid., 1995: 13). This being 
the case, the methodological diffi culties are considerable. Sluka, based 
on his experience in the fi eld when studying armed republican groups 
in Northern Ireland, delineates some general principles to guarantee the 
security of the people involved in a research project with a high politi-
cal and military charge. The prior calculation of risks, the importance of 
diversifying the subjects analysed to reduce the public visibility of the 
most confl ictive, the elimination of incorrect questions or subjects from 
the agenda, the establishment of safety measures and confi dentiality 
around compromising fi eld materials — recordings, photos —, the clear 
defi nition of limits on the situations in which the researcher is prepared 
to participate or not, and inquiry about the sources of fi nancing of the 
research, are some of the subjects raised (Sluka, 1995: 276-294).
The positioning of the author is also very problematic, as well as 
the establishment of productive relations with the informants, in so-
cial fi elds dominated by distrust and death. As Green argues, speaking 
of Guatemala (1995: 105-128), it is diffi cult to carry out fi eldwork in 
sites where fear, suspicion, secrecy and silence are essential and chronic 
components of memory and social interaction. This is the case of war 
zones, although these factors are also important in other contexts (of 
15 Based on the appreciations of Taussig (1987).
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political repression, delinquent violence or illegal traffi cking). In these 
situations the anthropologist, to carry out his work, needs to construct 
a specifi c social space that differentiates him or her from visible or 
hidden agents of violence (military advisers or different categories of 
spies or informers), but perhaps also — although this would deserve 
greater discussion — from other external agents who pass through the 
scenes of violence (journalists, civil employees of international institu-
tions or members of nongovernmental organizations). Finally, not least 
of the problems is that of ethnographic seduction, as is raised by Robben 
for situations of confl ict. For this author, the different social agents in a 
specifi c violent situation, in this case the Argentinean dirty war, would 
try to convert the researcher to join their side and their version of the 
facts, in a context of high competitiveness with respect to the legitimacy 
of representations of violence (Robben, 1995: 81-104).
The game of seductions indicated by Robben takes us to the problem 
of the text. The debates in anthropology on the politics of representation 
receive a special slant when what is investigated are violent situations. The 
ethnographic texts move in interpretative fi elds of enormous complexity, 
and “compete” with multiple versions and simultaneous formats of the 
facts or representations that are the object of study, many of which bear 
the seal of life or death for the agents involved in the violence, victims and 
perpetrators. In this heterogeneous fi eld of interpretations and memories 
that surrounds acts of violence, we fi nd speeches and practices of he-
gemonic propaganda, local areas of resistance — oral, corporeal — and 
a variety of expert discourses — police reports, legal, medical, academ-
ic texts... (Lambek and Antze, 1996: xi-xxxviii) —, all which are cultural 
constructions. However we may write, whatever audiences we address, 
we are necessarily conditioned by the internal dynamics of this market of 
meaning.
Anthropologists, logically, do not come to the fi eld with similar as-
sumptions, nor do they defi ne violences in the same way, nor look for 
the same type of data, nor involve themselves in the same way with their 
object of study. Schmidt and Schröder have recently delineated a tension 
in the anthropology of violence between analytical and subjectivist ap-
proaches to violence, theoretical-methodological options that have clear 
repercussions on the classes of text that are produced. Briefl y, according 
to these authors, in order for this anthropology to make a signifi cant 
contribution to the comparative understanding of violence in the world, 
it needs to emphasize the causal analysis of the material and historical 
aspects of the facts studied. To refl exively prioritise the quotidian expe-
rience and testimonies of the actors of violence, as do the subjectivist 
authors, places us in a dynamic of camoufl ages, silences and disinforma-
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tion that prevents the correct — historical, comparative — understand-
ing of the phenomenon (Schmidt and Schröder, 2001: 1-24).
The authors who choose to place the subjective day-to-day life, as-
pects or testimonies of informants at the centre of their researches and 
representations of violence follow a logic different from that set out by 
Schmidt and Schröder. Robben and Nordstrom maintain that experience 
is indivisible from interpretation for the victims, the perpetrators and 
the anthropologists. We cannot understand violence without exploring 
the ways in which it is represented. The way to avoid the distortions 
that narration of violent facts causes is to remain as close as possible 
to the fl ow of everyday life (Robben and Nordstrom, 1995: 1-23). Simi-
larly, Kleinman, Das and Lock maintain that representation is experience 
and that what it is not represented “is not real.” They propose a type 
of interdisciplinary analysis focused on human subjectivity to examine 
“the most basic relations between language, pain, image and suffering” 
(1995: xi-xiii). With a more extreme discourse, and talking about vio-
lences of greater intensity, Allen Feldman suggests that the entry of “the 
violent, the dead, the disappeared, the tortured, the mutilated and the 
disfi gured” into the anthropological discourse necessarily opens frac-
tures in narrative structures, so that continuous or linear paths cannot 
hope to face what he denominates ethnographic states of emergency 
(1995: 227).
The styles of research and representation, on the other hand, do not 
necessarily have to be exclusive. In her communication to the symposium 
of the FAAEE already mentioned, Aída Hernandez (2003) combines both 
tendencies and divides her text of analytical cut with the voices of the 
women survivors of the massacre of Acteal, in order to rescue “the sub-
jectivity and the pain” of the events, placing them in their historical and 
material context. Also, in his examination of the representations of the 
violations of human rights Wilson suggests it is fundamental to multiply 
the types and styles of narratives that talk about violence to increase 
their clarifi ed visibility, and here fi nds an excellent role for anthropo-
logical texts. With regard to the relevant texts of denunciation produced 
by international organizations, where a realistic, literal, minimalist, style 
predominates, subject to legal logic so as to optimise effectiveness be-
fore the courts, anthropology can contribute with its writings to recover-
ing the wealth of subjectivities and the complex fi eld of social relations, 
the confl icts of values and emotional spaces that the most bureaucratic 
narratives of violence habitually exclude (Wilson, 1997: 134-135).
Finally, we may ask ourselves, what is the importance, if any, of de-
veloping an anthropology of violence? What are the target audiences? 
What is the intended effect? Some authors have as a high-priority objec-
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tive to deepen the global understanding of violence within the frame-
work of disciplinary or interdisciplinary academic debates. For others, 
researching it involves a political commitment to the victims, for which 
it is essential to create a critical conscience. The most militant argue for 
making ethnographies sites of resistance or acts of solidarity where it is 
possible to write against terror (Green, 1995: 108).16 Based on this per-
spective it is possible to describe, to analyse, to disembowel the more or 
less subtle imagery of violences, to denounce them and to contribute to 
disarming them, in a literal and fi gurative sense. Logically, be as it may 
the epistemological, ethical and political commitment of each research-
er, an anthropology of violence must not be oriented to its increase or 
maintenance but, on the contrary, it must have as its main target the 
diminishing of suffering. From a utopian point of view, the anthropol-
ogy of violence would be a disciplinary antecedent of an anthropology 
of peace.
The Future of the Anthropology of Violence
The unseen wars appear, wars not only of confrontation: the 
planetary social war.
Ignacio Ramonet (2002)
In the recent essay published by Ignacio Ramonet, entitled Wars of 
the 21st Century, the director of Le Monde diplomatique refl ects on the 
metamorphosis of violence at the dawn of the new millennium. The au-
thor maintains that traditional political violence, “which tries to change 
the world,” is limited to six or seven centres on the planet now (from 
Palestine to Iraq, passing through Euskadi). Beyond the present-day iron 
curtain, the world seems to live peacefully. But globalised societies expe-
rience a quotidian war, a war of poor people against other poor people, 
and of the poor against the rich: the violence of survival is the new po-
litical violence. Between the fall of the Berlin wall (1989) and the attack 
on the twin towers (2001), the nascent century has seen the passage 
from the cold macro-war (when two enemies fought in silence or in the 
back room) to the hot micro-wars (when an empire without an enemy 
looks untiringly for an imaginary enemy, as a reason and pretext for real 
violences): “an empire without an enemy is always weaker. International 
terrorism is the great alibi: thus is born the infi nite war, the supremacy 
16 See also Taussig (1987 and 1992), Scheper-Hughes (1997) and Bourgois (2001).
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of State interest over the law, the cynical manipulation of information, 
and the modalities change: brutality and torture succeed fair play.” To a 
disoriented and terrifi ed hyper-centre corresponds an immense periph-
ery with new confl icts and threats, “with strange groups whose food 
is no longer Marxism but strange intellectual viruses able to generate 
hyper-violence.” This is what the author calls the planetary social war, 
based on new violences perpetrated, suffered and witnessed globally: 
new political violences without ideology or with blind ideologies; un-
heard-of structural violences without State or with dismantled states; 
emergent quotidian violences without society or with societies in de-
composition; unpublished symbolic violences without ethics nor aesthet-
ics beyond mass-media anything goes. The same perpetrators, victims 
and witnesses as always, but with other codes (or indecipherable codes) 
and on a new global stage (or in non-places without stage).
Mexican-Catalan anthropologist Roger Bartra recently expressed his 
lucid refl ections on the imaginary networks of political terror in the time 
of globalisation (2003). Bartra indicates that with the change of century, 
and after the events of New York, the material and symbolic bases had 
been extended so that these networks had an unprecedented develop-
ment. With this premise, he challenged the anthropologists to open the 
black boxes - and also, now, we would add, to decipher the SIM cards 
(Subscriber Identity Module) of the mobile telephones that triggered 
the events of the 11th of March (11-M) in Madrid — which surround 
the structures of production, mediation and resolution of confl icts: “the 
black boxes of the airplanes of 11-S contain keys to understand the 
imaginary networks of political power - and terror.” It will be diffi cult to 
get to that camera oscura, but as in Plato’s cavern, the challenge for the 
anthropologists of the violence is perhaps to glimpse those keys through 
the black shadows that in reality produce “black” workers, “black” peo-
ple, black nights, black lists, black tattoos and black holes.
The recent contributions on the new violences and the black boxes 
of the airplanes that went up in fl ames on the 11th of September, 2001, 
lead us to a complex stage, which ranges from the quotidian to the mac-
ro-structural, where violences are in a continuous process of mutation. 
It is not so much that they have changed in their nature, which is also 
happening in some cases,17 but that the tension that exists at this histori-
cal juncture between acts, uses, representations and analyses of violence 
17 As noted by Bernard-Henry Lévy in relation to the 11th of September: “The stock 
of possible barbarisms, which we believed exhausted, increased with an hitherto unpu-
blished variant. As always, like happens whenever is believed to be dull or sleepy, when 
nobody is expecting it, it awakes with maximum rage and, especially, with maximum 
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has transformed each of these spaces of social action and, therefore, 
the global whole in which they are executed, interprets and analyses the 
violent acts. And it is evident that the representation of the violences in 
the  media is a fundamental element in this process, not only because 
of what the media show, but also because of what they silence, turn 
aside or hide. It is important to indicate that this kaleidoscopic tension of 
contexts and contours not only affects to massive political violences but 
any type of violence, including what seemed to develop in local scopes. 
For example, the international debates and mobilizations related to the 
practices of clitoral ablation and its link with the expansive discourse of 
human rights — more and more important in the dynamics of interna-
tional relations — have completely re-dimensioned the social, cultural 
and political contexts in which this cruel form of mutilation took place 
previously. As has occurred in this case, even the violences that at some 
time we have called “traditional” are trans-nationalized, acquire anoth-
er visibility, are interwoven in new ways with social, historical and gen-
der processes, force the local authorities responsible for the tradition to 
elaborate justifi catory discourses before a globalised audience, become 
temporary rallying points for the global humanitarian community (Igna-
tieff, 1998), infi ltrate the agendas of certain feminist groups or adhere 
more or less stridently to the debates on migratory fl ows. The examples 
would be multiple and exceed the scope of these pages.18 The basic idea 
is that the recognition and analyses of the forms in which violences take 
place and are transformed into the new sounding boxes and fl ows of 
globalisation — and it still remains to be defi ned what will be the true 
effect of the attacks of the 11th of September, the 11th of March or 
the war on Iraq and its souvenir tortures in the way we will think about 
violences in the 21st century — they must become a crucial axis for the 
articulation of an anthropology of violence of and for the future.
The proposal that violences must be understood in a constant proc-
ess of mutation would require the anthropology of violence to reframe 
continuously, in a critical way, the nature and contours of the study ob-
inventiveness: other theatres, new front lines and new adversaries, more frightful inas-
much as nobody had seen them coming” (2002: 16-17).
18 Another similar example: the news and images on sentences of stoning for adul-
terous women in Nigeria are giving rise to organized cybernetic campaigns of unknown 
dimensions on the part of some hawk-eyed Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
(for example, the campaigns of Amnesty International in favour of Safiya Hussaini and 
Amina Lawal; see the informative page of AI, http://www.amnistiapornigeria.org), to 
heated debates in the mass media, to strong political and economic pressures, and they 
were even the cause of the withdrawal of some national representatives for Miss Uni-
verse competition that took place in this country.
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jects and their relevant contexts of analysis. Studying clitoral ablation 
exclusively in relation to local traditions and meanings, while it is a level 
of fundamental analysis, would leave aside the processes of amplifi ca-
tion previously described, which are already part of this form of violence. 
In such a competitive context of geopolitical interests, denunciations by 
NGOs or social groups, hidden cameras or humanitarian media spec-
tacles (Aguirre, 2001), while new violences capture the imagination of 
signifi cant segments of the local, national or international community, 
penetrate the debate spaces and are added to political and economic 
strategies; others that were temporarily on the cusp lose visibility, are 
extinguished until a new crisis, dissolve in other processes that include 
them or disappear in the increasing list of desolate landscapes without 
memory. Therefore, studying violences also implies drawing up these 
genealogies of light and shade referring to the global contexts in which 
they take place.
But in addition, the proposed exposition must necessarily be associ-
ated with an investigating will based on theoretical and methodological 
fl exibility with respect to violences. If we accept that the contexts of 
analysis of violences exceed the classic limits of some styles of anthropo-
logical research (Starn, 1992), an adjustment is required that allows the 
discipline to face the new questions and also to produce studies that are 
relevant for other related disciplines and for public opinion. Although 
we have already discussed the present debates around the problematics 
of doing fi eldwork in violent situations, their presence in anthropologi-
cal methodology is irreplaceable and, doubtless, they will maintain their 
centrality in future. Ethical and methodological commitment to those 
outside and those below, historically so linked to the anthropological 
discipline — considering the deep transformations that these terms suf-
fer with globalisation —, still remains an essential space of research with 
respect to both victims and perpetrators of violence. But simultaneously, 
following the now-classic call by Laura Nader (1969) to investigate the 
spaces of power — study up — and the recent proposal of Bartra re-
lating to the imaginary politics of terror, it seems recommendable that 
the anthropologists of violence also assume, without complexes, these 
scopes of hegemony as a legitimate fi eldwork location, and deepen the 
analysis of the construction and modulation of violences in the mass 
media, in the political discourses and decisions of elites, in the meet-
ings of international organisations, in the police or military hierarchies, 
in debates between intellectuals in civil society, et cetera. An anthro-
pology of violence that investigates the tensions between global and 
local processes is in a suitable position to contribute to extending the 
discipline’s scope of study. As has already been happening in the last 
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decade, as becomes explicit in collections of texts that have appeared in 
recent years, the presence of anthropologists in jails, refugee camps, in-
ternment centres, military bases or political imageries of terror is a clear 
demonstration of how the theoretical frameworks and methods that 
have appeared within our discipline have suffi cient potential to expand 
in ways that are pertinent to places previously visited only sporadically 
or considered off limits. An anthropology of violence with a future must 
be able to face up to the study of any type of violence at any level of 
analysis, without losing sight of the fundamental keys that characterize 
the discipline.
At the same time, the increasing complexity of the scopes in which 
violences take place and resonate makes it advisable to promote inter-
disciplinary commitments, both in the project elaboration phase, in the 
course of research, and in the search for spaces for dissemination and 
interchange of the knowledge produced. That anthropologists need to 
read and interact more with sociologists, psychologists, jurists, crimi-
nologists, communications specialists, peace and confl ict specialists, ac-
tivists or journalists is as true as the inverse is, or should be. The fact 
that the bibliographies of ethnographies of contemporary violence are 
ever more seasoned with references to authors in other disciplines, or 
that academic interchanges are fomented in networks or institutions, is, 
beyond rhetoric, a necessary process if what we seek is to investigate, 
unmask and disarm violence effectively.19
It will be important, fi nally, to deepen the epistemological and ethi-
cal debate on the role of anthropology in contemporary societies. If the 
objective is for studies to have suffi cient social impact and thus contrib-
ute to the denunciation of the agents and perverse effect of violences, a 
basic premise for critical consciousness-raising of public opinion and the 
narrowing of the legitimate scope of the same violences, then a future 
anthropology of violence should be able to be diversifi ed and to appeal 
19 Related to those cases in which anthropologist-activists take part in specific situa-
tions of violence. In this sense, we must mention a text by Juris (2005), where the author 
reflects on the violence represented and imagined based on the famous “battle of Ge-
noa” (July 2001). The author was doing field work on the anti-globalisation movement, 
participating in the manifestation as an anthropologist-activist, an always difficult mar-
ginal role, as he could verify while present during the assault by the police on the school 
in which he was staying along with other activists. An opposite example would be the 
proliferation of observatories on violence of all type (domestic, sporting, terrorist, racist) 
that, in spite of his origin as a neutral interdisciplinary mechanism to affect immediately 
the social reality of the violences, cannot avoid falling into the traps of the institutions 
that promote them, which always prioritize immediate side-taking over mediated reflec-
tion.
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directly to different types of audiences. This commitment would mean 
a greater modulation of disciplinary rhetoric so as to achieve suitable 
dissemination in each case, without sacrifi cing rigor. If this premise is ac-
cepted, the anthropologists of violence should be as interested in writing 
an expert report, a manifesto, a press release or an in-depth newspaper 
article, as in writing important academic texts. They should be as open 
to presenting their work publicly in the mass media, a school or an NGO, 
as they are to presenting it at a professional congress. And they should 
be as prepared to participate in expert committees or organizations of 
support and denunciation as they are to participate in professional as-
sociations. Really, they should enter the contest for the construction or 
resignifi cation of alternative senses for hegemonic narratives of violenc-
es in the mass media and the dominant political discourses. Of course, 
this is a complex debate that does not offer unique solutions nor com-
mitments, but neither can it be exotic in a discipline that studies social 
spaces of injustice, trauma, terror and death.
Postscript: Madrid, 11 March, Crucible of Visions
Terror arises from any attempt to live beyond the very social limits 
of identity, and is also a means used to control the fundamental dis-
order of the free human being.
Said (1991: 341)
The complex kaleidoscope of emotions and moods caused by the ar-
rival of the train of death on 11 March — sorrow, incredulity, rage, hor-
ror, indignation, pain, solidarity, anxiety for political participation — has 
left us battered, disoriented and, without doubt, exhausted. In the fi rst 
hours we were momentarily blinded by the explosions and their politi-
cal and media sequels. The puzzle was too big, the images, too fright-
ening, the explanations, too ambiguous, and the political context, too 
frenetic. Immersed in the intense and controversial media construction 
of 11 March, in the category of the news in which all the media alluded 
directly to the wounded and mutilated bodies of the direct victims of 
the attack, El País informed us of the most common ocular injuries that 
had come to the Madrid hospitals: “powder burns on the eyelids and 
eyelashes, detachments and haemorrhages in the retina, and impacts of 
foreign bodies on the cornea.”20 These terrible wounds were merely the 
organic fabric marked by the indescribable scenes that the victims saw 
20 El País, Friday 2nd April 2004, p. 17.
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and experienced, fi rst during the explosion and later among the twisted 
steel of the wagons. The eye injuries and the vision of the victims of 11 
March registered gradually and traumatically on the social and political 
body with the passage of the hours, the images and the teletypes, af-
fecting all the witnesses of the attack, those that were present at some 
of the directly associated scenes — stations, hospitals, morgues, et ce-
tera — and those who massively consumed it through the mass media. 
We all, to a greater or lesser extent, saw — glimpsed — chilling things. 
The temptation to trivialize the political scenes, to promote simplifying 
stereotypes of human groups, to lay the foundations of xenophobic at-
titudes or, simply, to dissolve us anew in a consumerist fi esta would be 
a sad destiny for this collective trauma written on the eyes of 11 March. 
Now we cannot lose our vision. On the contrary, we have the possibil-
ity of turning it into a critical apparatus that strengthens its power of 
analysis, while it absorbs and analyses the tragedy. The title of the 
aforementioned article was “Eyes saved,” with reference to the ur-
gent medical interventions carried out by the Ophthalmology Service 
of the Gregorio Marañón hospital. Thus, to continue with the analogy, 
it seems essential — urgent — that this vision, damaged by the vio-
lence of 11 March, avoids, in a sort of preventive social ophthalmol-
ogy, the temptations of resentment, hatred or partisanship and unfolds 
in a form of clairvoyance or lucidity that, although still not completely 
sketched out, has the potential to gradually become consolidated as a key 
infl exion point in the democratic refreshment of our social and political 
surroundings from civil society. The recent and chilling testimony of the 
spokeswoman of the Association of Victims of 11 March (15/12/2004), 
Pilar Manjón, before the Parliamentary Commission of Investigation of 
the Attack, was an extraordinary crystallization of this necessity for demo-
cratic regeneration. We will note briefl y, as guidelines for the reader, some 
possible courses for this convalescent view of the horror.
Its fi rst and vertiginous effect could have been the high level of par-
ticipation in an electoral process which, wiped off the map for some 
minutes or hours, burst again onto the scene of our divisions and con-
fl icts practically from the moment the campaign was offi cially cancelled. 
After the results — without a doubt more complex and nuanced than 
the versions they would have us believe, anchored in the 11 March ef-
fect and the night of the SMS21 — the politicians, spin doctors, image 
21 Short Message System: text messages sent by mobile telephone, calling the de-
monstrations against the government that took place on Saturday 14 March and prece-
ded the electoral upset.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives71   71 4/1/07   11:20:27
72 FRANCISCO FERRÁNDIZ MARTÍN AND CARLES FEIXA PAMPOLS
advisers and crisis councils take note of the price of the systematic use of 
what Jose Vidal-Beneyto has called weapons of mass falsifi cation.
Another clarifying effect can be the erosion or, ideally, eradication 
of the social and political legitimacy of the violence exerted by ETA, as 
well as, in another order of things, the discourses and military actions 
of the most recent and powerful apologists of wars, whether dirty, pre-
ventive, or “humanitarian.” It is still too early to evaluate the echo of 
11 March on the future strategy of ETA and its scope of action, but it 
is a reverberation that is seems undoubted, and hopefully irreversible. 
An more refreshing effect on the vision, caused by the discovery — for 
some, surprising — of the diversity in national origin of those who died 
in the attack, should take shape in a common impulse for recognition 
of immigrants as legitimate, fully visible and possessed of rights and du-
ties in our social framework, beyond the temporary help offered by the 
State to the immigrant victims of the attacks and their families. Another 
important passage of this vision reborn from the tragedy would mean 
the bankruptcy of the saturation of empathy with the other people’s 
suffering by the excess of horrors, recovering, in the most intimate part 
of our geography and our political action, the increasing constellation 
of ground zeros that are generated almost daily on the planet, some 
recognized, others ignored, some spectacular, other hardly perceptible, 
some produced by religious fundamentalists, others by governments of 
known power and prestige. We leave to the reader the task of contrib-
uting to this interminable list, from his or her own vision wounded by 
11 March.
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Abstract
Peace Studies, constituted historically as critical and, there-
fore, alternative knowledge to normal science in International 
Relations, had come, by the Nineties, to be co-opted by the regu-
lating structures of the international system as the  basis of many 
of the options put into practice, above all in the framework of the 
processes of post-war reconstruction. In this context, rescuing the 
critical heritage of Peace Studies implies two radical options to-
day. The first is the qualification of intended peace as sustainable 
peace. The second is the epistemological decolonisation of Peace 
Studies. 
Introduction
Peace Studies are invariably seen as a detached element of the block 
of theoretical currents that comprise the post-positivist rupture in the 
fi eld of International Relations — a fi eld heterogeneous in itself, where 
feminist perspectives mingle with studies of critical theory, deconstruc-
tion and the new normative formularisations. What unifi es this plurality 
of currents is the response of the normal science of International Rela-
tions and its positivist nature, where the retrospective validation of the 
respective internal “laws” and the pretension of objectivity of knowl-
edge through its decontamination from any subjective prejudices, are 
assumed as axioms. In this direction, and on the plane of epistemologi-
cal debate within this fi eld of knowledge, the various post-positivist cur-
rents take on the same desire for a breach with the realist canon of the 
discipline of International Relations. However, this self-representation 
of Peace Studies as a critical edge is now submitted to severe scrutiny. 
In truth, constituted as a discourse based on the aspiration to a deep 
transformation of reality in view of the primacy of peace — physical, 
structural and cultural — Peace Studies see themselves becoming, since 
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the 1990s, a conceptual and analytical domain called to support public 
policy in great measure integrated in the conduct of the international 
system by its dominant actors (from the main funding agencies to the 
platforms of global governance, via the States that control the interna-
tional mechanisms of decision-making). It is important, therefore, to sur-
vey the persistence of the alternative character of Peace Studies relative 
to the founding paradigm of this discipline.
We will do so with reference to three historical moments. First, we 
will follow the steps taken by this current to become one of the strong-
est expressions of the alternative paradigm sought since the 1980s for 
a discipline (International Relations) that was born with a vocation for 
the analytical legitimisation of the international order. In the second mo-
ment, we will try to locate the expressions of co-optation of Peace Stud-
ies, whether by its supposed theoreticians, or through its concretion in 
public politics, and the corresponding loss of critical intensity in the face 
of the reigning international disorder. Finally, in the third moment, we 
will analyse the theoretical and political retreat of Peace Studies that 
follows a resurgence of the realistic paradigm which appears on the 
horizon at the start of the 21st century.
Itinerary of a Rupture Foretold
The formation of the discipline of International Relations consti-
tutes an excellent illustration of the Kuhnian articulation between par-
adigm, as a matrical vision that the members of a scientifi c commu-
nity share relative to the object of this fi eld or discipline, and normal 
science, as one specifi c map of knowledge adopted by this scientifi c 
community.
The synthesis of the process of this disciplinary formation is expressed 
as an intense paradigmatic dispute centred on rival maps of knowledge 
and carried out by antagonistic scientifi c communities. Triumphant in 
the founding attack against idealism (Cravinho, 2002: 116), the realistic 
school placed itself in the defi ning canon of normal science in this area. 
As is told on other occasions, realism, “segregated in the process of af-
fi rmation and consolidation of the inter-state system [... ] is a specifi c 
expression of the cultural climate of scientifi c positivism, which drinks in 
the radical contraposition between facts and values and attributes abso-
lute epistemological priority to the fi rst over the second” (Pureza, 2001: 
9). Enshrining as laws the regularities observed in the fl owing past of in-
ternational reality, realism consecrated three patterns of normal science, 
three contours of the map of knowledge of International Relations: state 
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individualism, the anarchic nature of the international system, and the 
representation of the latter as the terrain of the crudest power politics. 
The simplistic nature of this map and its conservative vocation have 
been denounced as challenges to the political and academic construc-
tion of an alternative paradigm. This challenge is taken very seriously in 
the present debate which places the positivist tradition up against a plu-
rality of currents that oppose, in diverse ways, the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions that feature in the map of normal knowledge.
As a consistent variant of this alternative — which assumes a clear 
conceptual defi nition, a expressive body of teachers and investigators, 
and a solid institutionalisation — Peace Studies is not yet fi fty years old. 
Although its remote origins long precede the twentieth century itself, 
the various proposals and initiatives towards the objective of global 
peace were too isolated and autonomous to be, at root, considered a 
distinct, organized and coherent fi eld of study (Van den Dungen and 
Wittner, 2003: 363). The creation of the Journal of Confl ict Resolution, 
in 1957, and, two years later, of Center for Research on Confl ict Reso-
lution of the University of Michigan, by Kenneth Boulding and his col-
leagues Herbert Herman and Anatol Rapoport, represented the fi rst 
challenge to the predominance of the realistic paradigm as a model 
of interpretation of the phenomenon of peace and war. However, the 
search for recognition of the scientifi c nature of a discipline still in 
the process of formation — precisely at a moment when positivism 
reached its zenith in the social sciences — confi ned the North Ameri-
can school of behaviourism to the collection and quantitative and non-
value-based analysis of data on confl icts (Terriff et al., 1999: 69). The 
inquiry was, thus, limited in its concept of peace — presented, in its 
negative formularisation, as absence of violence and war — and, con-
sequently, in its agenda — determinedly minimalist, seeking only to 
reduce the incidence and extent of confl ict. 
As Martínez Guzmán affi rms, until then, the main challenge confront-
ing the new current of inquiry was necessarily to make peace into its object 
of analysis (2005: 49). The man who resolved this challenge — and who 
is, therefore, considered the founder of Peace Studies — was the Norwe-
gian Johan Galtung. The new orientation of this fi eld of studies — begun 
with the creation, in 1959, of the Oslo Peace Research Institute and, fi ve 
years later, of the Journal of Peace Research — is based, unequivocally, on 
an original proposal by this author.
In characterizing Peace Studies, Galtung breaks drastically with the 
positivist distinction between theory and practice. Surpassing the false 
notion of neutrality of science (since it is recognized that all knowledge 
inevitably involves an evaluative view by those who analyse them), Peace 
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Studies are affi rmed as a socially “productive” discipline — that is, one 
that produces consequences in the social, political, cultural, and economic 
life of societies. Consequences that are intended to be condign with the 
objectives of promoting cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes 
and social transformations and non-violent politics. In other words, Gal-
tung protagonises the resurgence of the normative theory — which con-
stitutes the great novelty of this social science — affi rming the commit-
ment to values, especially that of peace. According to Mcsweeney (1998), 
without this central normative claim, Peace Studies would certainly lose 
its raison d’être as a distinctive vision of the international order. Knowl-
edge of the values of peace is not, therefore, suffi cient: in particular, a 
“emotional adhesion to these values” is required (Martínez Guzmán, 
2004: 412). In the framework of a close relation between theory and 
practice, the theoretical production is “prospective and prescriptive” 
(Pureza, 2001: 14): it is only complete when it actively promotes persist-
ence in contributing to peace and if it translates into concrete strategies. 
Against the critiques of those who receive with scepticisms its objec-
tive to study peace scientifi cally through a normative theory, Galtung 
responds by using his well-known medical analogy: Peace Studies, ethi-
cally guided by peace (in opposition to violence and war), will not be less 
rigorous than medical inquiry, ethically guided by healing (in opposition 
to illness) (Galtung, 1996: 1).
One should emphasise that, inevitably, in this school of thought, 
the search for non-violent processes of political change implies deep 
transformations in existing power structures (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 
1999: 753). Or, in other words, considering Peace Studies as a simulta-
neously analytical and normative instrument, the international system 
does not escape to the intention to change an unjust and inequality-
promoting status quo. Galtung constructs, thus, a distinction in the con-
ceptualisation of peace that will be fundamental for the development of 
this discipline —”negative peace” as the absence of war and “positive 
peace” as an integrated human community, social justice and freedom.
According to the author, Peace Studies would still have to be inter-
disciplinary, in the measure that the dialogue between international 
relations and the different focuses of political and social sciences, such 
as sociology, anthropology or psychology, contribute to the indispen-
sable enrichment of the conceptual picture of interpretation of peace 
and violent confl icts, given its multifaceted nature (Rogers and Ramsbo-
tham, 1999: 741).
This alternative focus of Peace Studies developed in Northern Europe 
turned out to be pivotal for the deepening of this area of knowledge, 
lending itself in support of an alternative orientation to that of the North 
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American school and providing, thus, a response to the critiques of this 
scientifi c fi eld formulated meanwhile. These critiques had as a backdrop 
the accusation of the persistence of epistemological relics of realism in 
the theoretical framework of peace research, which is thus not free of 
the accusation of legitimising the power relations of the global system 
(Terriff et al., 1999: 70-71). 
The recognition both of the reproduction of the hierarchisation be-
tween centre and periphery,1 and of its legitimisation by the dominant 
paradigm in International Relations, and also of the insuffi cient capacity 
of Peace Studies to challenge both situations, had led to an important 
reconceptualisation of the discipline under the creative impulse of Gal-
tung.
The Nordic author identifi es the triangle of violence, to which he 
makes correspond the triangle of peace. The distinction between the 
three vertices is made in accordance with different times: direct violence 
is an act; structural violence is a process with highs and lows; cultural 
violence is an invariant, a permanence [... ]. The three forms of violence 
include time in different ways, in an analogous way to the distinction, 
in seismic theory, between earthquakes as an act, the movement of the 
tectonic plates as a process, and the fault as a more permanent condi-
tion (Galtung, 1990: 294).
Thus, direct violence will be the intentional act of aggression; struc-
tural (indirect) violence will be part of the social structure itself between 
human beings or societies — repression, in its political form, or exploita-
tion, in its economic form; and fi nally, cultural violence will be underly-
ing the structural and direct types, constituting the system of norms and 
behaviours that socially legitimises them (Galtung, 1996: 2).
Traditionally, the pivot of Peace Studies has been direct (obvious 
and sudden) violence — which, eliminated, represents a negative 
peace — not structural or cultural violence (static and hidden) — which, 
eliminated, creates a positive peace. Peace in its broadest sense — direct 
peace + structural peace + cultural peace — corresponds, in the last 
instance, with Galtung’s ambition, while the absence of war in itself can 
hide deeper injustices that, if not dealt with, may contain the seeds of 
potential violent confl icts (Terriff et al., 1999: 193).
With this trilogy, Galtung strips bare the global dynamic of exploita-
tion, responding to the accusation that Peace Studies traditionally was 
in agreement with the dominant conception of power and widening 
1 As recalled by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2004: 8, 19), colonialism as a so-
cio-economic relation survived to colonialism as a political relation, practically keeping 
unchanged the structural standards of oppression, discrimination and violence.
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the scope of its investigation-action, previously centred on the strategic 
relation of superpowers and in the logic of dissuasion. Also the unit of 
analysis was amplifi ed, to include, beyond the nation-state, class dynam-
ics and power at the intra-state and trans-national levels - a signifi cant 
change to the dominant post-1945 paradigm (ibid.: 193).
Materializing this normative reorientation of Peace Studies, the agen-
da structured during the 1980s, which was articulated with a solid in-
stitutional-academic base, showed clear attribution of priority to topics 
like disarmament, the transformation of the unfair global system, environ-
mental questions and the analysis of processes of negotiation and confl ict 
mediation (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999: 48-49). To accom-
pany the central question of international politics of this decade — dis-
armament (in counterpoint to the arms race of the superpowers and the 
beginning of the “Second Cold War”) — Peace Studies showed an un-
discovered capacity for theoretical production. But the great impact then 
achieved by this area was mainly in terms of the pacifi st and antinuclear 
social movements. The campaigns for peace and the movement for nu-
clear disarmament, which expands and diversifi es, illustrate the capacity 
for integration in the agenda of Peace Studies of topics traditionally kept 
out of society by the mainstream (Van den Dungen and Wittner, 2003: 
365). and refl ect, equally, the dialectical investigation-action that is so 
dear to this discipline, making evident its affi nity with activism.
At the end of the 1980s, the community of Peace Studies found 
itself converted into a diverse, active school with effective international 
impact (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999: 749).
Emancipation or Standardisation?
The end of the Cold War represented a critical point in the affi rma-
tion of Peace Studies. Opposing the fears of loss of relevance of this 
discipline in a world without bipolar confrontation, the 1990s offered a 
single chance to Peace Studies to contribute directly to the resolution of 
the increasing number of particularly long and violent civil confl icts that 
defi ed the stability of the new world order.
These “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) demand the persistence of the 
international community and foment the emergence of a model of re-
sponse that takes into account the sources, actors, dynamics, as well as 
consequences of the new forms of confl ict — already visible since the 
Second World War, but which were clearly seen to intensify from the 
end of the bipolar system (Rasmussen, 1999: 43). In this context, the 
doctrinal and institutional positioning assumed by the United Nations at 
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the start of the Nineties turned out to be structural. Seeing the chance 
to expand the role of the UN and assuming the generalized expecta-
tions of a renaissance of the UN with the end of the bipolar confronta-
tion (Roberts, 1998: 300), Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali considered 
that the action of the United Nations (and the international community 
in general) should centre on the phenomenon of the proliferation of 
internal confl icts in States at the peripheries of the international sys-
tem, endemically fragile, involving the UN in the active promotion of the 
respective peaceful resolution, following closely the negotiation of the 
political agreements and committing to support the implementation of 
the peace processes resulting from these negotiated agreements. 
The need to develop a framework of action to respond to this chal-
lenge opened the way to the assimilation and subsequent application 
of the theoretical assumptions that had been advanced for the dis-
cipline of Peace Studies. The fi rst moment of approach between the 
discipline and the UN was necessarily the Agenda for Peace of 1992 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11), whose strategies of action — preventive di-
plomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding — are copied 
from Galtung’s conceptual formularisation of the 1970s. The exhaus-
tive concretion of these strategies throughout the 1990s and all over 
the world, saw the arrival of Peace Studies in the so-called policy-ori-
ented mainstream. From theoretical assumptions, it was transformed 
into authentic social norms accepted and reproduced by the community 
(Santos, 1978), indicating the entry of Peace Studies into a period of 
“scientifi c normalization” — whose concern, returning to Kuhn, was 
necessarily to defend, magnify and deepen the paradigm, resolving the 
problems in accordance with the newly assimilated means of solution. 
This discipline benefi ted, therefore, from the new world order, as-
suming a protagonism in the decision-making of the international sys-
tem that it did not have until then. Starting with the United Nations, the 
hegemony of its conception was received by the scientifi c community, 
multilateral organizations, government donors, ONGs, and was appro-
priated by these same actors to guide public policies of promotion of 
peace.
These internal confl icts of the post-Cold War period were concen-
trated in so-called failed States of the contemporary international sys-
tem (Ayoob, 1996: 67) — States whose attempt at the centralization 
of power inherent to the construction of a State had failed — these 
fundamental policies based on Peace Studies had assumed a stand-
ardization translated in the transformation from a situation of anar-
chy into a situation of centralised and legitimate power, with effective 
capacity to deal with the quandary of security and the insuffi ciencies 
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in the political, economic and social plans of the country involved. In 
other words, the response to put into practice by the international 
community was to support post-war (re)construction of the State itself 
(peacebuilding). 
Being the expression of a dominant scientifi c model in this area, 
post-war reconstruction propagates one defi nitive methodological 
conception, standardized rules and technical procedures to resolve the 
problems that confront States lacerated by internal wars. The model is 
inevitably divided into four dimensions — military and security; political-
constitutional; economic-social; and psycho-social — independently of 
the context where it is applied; what Oliver Ramsbotham (2000) calls the 
standard operating procedure.
The negative evaluation that has had the greatest impact is, clearly, 
the one that relates to the standardized nature of the framework of ac-
tion. As a single model generically applied, it sins by not leaving great 
breadth to local singularities nor to the resurgence of alternative solu-
tions that are more appropriate to the different realities. This critique 
of standardization is still more incisive when we recall that this model, 
which has pretensions to universal application, does not take on board 
multicultural experiences, but limits itself to reproducing its clear West-
ern matrix in countries, in their vast majority, non-Western. This practice, 
refl ecting a pre-conceived Western scheme, led to varied critiques, from 
culturally insensitive behaviour by the troops on the ground to the rejec-
tion of the so-called internationalist liberal model (Paris, 1997), based on 
two pillars in particular — electoral representative democracy and the 
market economy. 
The fact that this liberal prescription emerged victorious at the end 
of the Cold War and the fall of the communist block meant that this 
approach was widely promoted, and even imposed, without rival, in the 
four corners of the globe (Clapham, 1998: 193-194). This makes com-
prehensible the reduced role of local agents in determining the agenda 
for the reconstruction of their own country. It has been an unequivocal 
failure in the wide exploration of the virtues of local capacities, to the 
extent that the model still praises extreme centralization of decision-
making in the seat of the United Nations itself and in the small elites 
previously linked to the confl ict. It has, in fact, a chronic lack of attention 
to what we could call the base of the pyramid, which will correspond 
to the bulk of the population. The idea of peacebuilding from below 
is hindered by the state-centric, top-down approach, adopted by the 
United Nations, which neglects local resources and agents, essential in 
the construction of a participative democracy and a more inclusive and, 
necessarily, more sustainable peace.
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Critical feminists (authors such as Betty Reardon and Birgit Brock-Utne) 
have been particularly mordacious in the denunciation of this model of 
peacebuilding as a space that, in reality, reproduces the relationship be-
tween dominator and dominated. When questioning the stereotypes 
that give rise to these practices, such as the inherent passivity of women, 
in war as in peace, the critical feminists contest the secondary role of the 
women, invisibility or practically non-existent, systematically relegated 
to the sphere of the informal one and the psycho-social dimension of 
peace-building. Their contributions have been extremely useful in re-
jecting the public belief that women are absent — save for honoured 
exceptions - in the negotiation, signing and implementation the peace 
accords and that this condemns them to have quite limited access to the 
decision-making process in post-confl ict circumstances (Moura, 2005).
These critiques show the concentration of knowledge produced in 
the hands of the mechanisms that strengthen domination and the instru-
ments of control. The pre-determination of an institutional framework as 
if it were to automatically materialize horizons of pacifi cation had unques-
tionably shown the lack of openness of Peace Studies to the concretion 
on the ground of new inputs — creative, critical and constructive — from 
such perspectives as the theory and practice of development, critical social 
theory, cultural analysis and sexual identity, etc.
The experience of the 1990s seems, therefore, to represent the 
maximum exponent of the institutionalisation of disciplines: Peace Stud-
ies offer the hegemonic models and the dominant institutions impose 
them. As underlined in the collective work Security Studies Today, in 
reference to the post-WWI period, “peace fell into the domain of high 
politics, imposed on States by supranational institutions as the product 
of a hierarchical relation of power and consonant with an external and 
categorical notion of ‘good’ formulated by international actors” (Terriff 
et al., 1999: 68). 
The new circumstances meant the most ambitious concretion of in-
vestigation-action as the identity of Peace Studies, allowing that much 
of the theoretical production was translated into public politics of peace 
promotion. However, the 1990s served to test the veracity of the post-
positivist formulation that this fi eld of study had tried out and, in some 
ways, let fall by the way. Research for peace placed itself at the service of 
the freeze-dried universalisation of the institutional and political models 
produced by Western modernity, proving that it had not yet managed to 
escape this domain (Santos, 2004: 16). In this sense, with the experience 
of the post-Cold War period, Peace Studies had shown how much they 
were still lacking to fulfi l the paradigmatic transition in epistemological, 
but, mainly, in social and political terms.
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Highways and Byways of a Return to the Critique
As an institution, Peace Studies currently seem to have lost a lit-
tle of their rhetorical attraction (Patomaki, 2001: 734). The end of the 
Cold War, its association with the neo-liberalism linked with the models 
of post-war reconstruction imposed during the 1990s or the failure of 
the original conceptual formulation, when compared with the 1970s, 
can have motivated this decline of disciplines. Born as a form of critical 
knowledge — committed to the realization of a normative and eman-
cipatory project — Peace Studies had shown itself, after all, easily co-
opted to integration in the discursive and ideological hegemonic block. 
Denaturing the project that its founding fathers intended as making 
a drastic break with the positivist-realist tradition in International Rela-
tions, Peace Studies is still not only not presented as an alternative to 
the viewpoint and discourse legitimating the practices of domination 
hidden by the dominant paradigm, but runs the risk of in fact becoming 
an instance of legitimisation and sophistication of this system of power. 
It is certainly the case that the main centres of research in this fi eld have 
gone from a profi le of work almost exclusively centred on theoretical 
development to an increasing use as platforms for rendering consulting 
services in the ambit of international operations “on the ground”. 
The radicalism of the alternative tends to be confi ned to the con-
ceptual plane, not becoming materialized in the drawing up and imple-
mentation of the policies. The risk of instrumentalisation is, therefore, 
great, which is facilitated to the extent that Peace Studies becomes ex-
plicitly a fi eld for policy-oriented investigation-action. However, what it 
is in question is not the abandonment of “theoretical purity” but the 
loss of critical capacity in the face of the emergent systems of interna-
tional domination. In these circumstances, the marriage between aca-
demic theory and community practice may become counter-productive, 
strengthening the structural, relational and cultural contradictions that 
provoke the confl ict.
In a way, Peace Studies are today, in our opinion, faced with a chal-
lenge identical to that which was found in the refl ection on processes 
of economic development since the 1980s. In the same way that it was 
becoming evident that the continuation of politics of development sub-
merged in a deliberate myopia as regards the exhaustion of the physical 
resource base, would result in catastrophe during the stated period, it also 
becomes clear today that the objective of building a solid peace requires 
a critical distancing relative to all the sources of violence, even (and espe-
cially) when these appear under the disguise of instruments normalizing 
or reducing the epidemic violence. But the challenge does not end here. It 
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has parallels with the way the sustainability requirement was assimilated 
by development policy. What would have been, originally, a base for radi-
cally different policies, became, with the concept of sustainable develop-
ment — or, at least, with the dominant practices associated with it — a 
way of saving business as usual by painting it light green. 
The challenge of a sustainable peace cannot, in our understanding, 
mean less than an unequivocal distancing from institutional prescrip-
tions, power relations and the codes of social relations that neo-liber-
alism carries with it. What it means, very concretely, is that to place 
the objective of a sustainable peace on the horizon of the processes of 
peacebuilding means, not only the eradication of immediate war and its 
sequels, but the creation of conditions to prevent military violence from 
being substituted, in the short or long run, by social violence increasing 
in intensity, translated into exponentially increasing indices of domestic 
violence and crime, or the reconfi guration of the relationship between 
political forces and the population in general in terms directly cloned 
from the relations that had propitiated and perpetuated the war. These 
are the two most perverse results of a mechanical application of the 
standard operating procedure and the centrality it confers to the union 
between low-intensity democracy and structural economic adjustment 
of neo-liberal type. 
In this context, Peace Studies lacks a profound decolonisation. What 
was, so far, a solid conceptual elaboration from the North, has ever more 
to learn about the South and its singularities. The materialization of this 
learning will allow them to reinvent their emancipatory text and to free 
themselves from the social and political praxis that they have subscribed 
to so far (Santos, 2004: 6). To start with the proper designation of war as 
the structural social condition of the periphery, which necessarily com-
pels the opening of this fi eld of study to the formulas and experiences 
of peace that are rooted in the very ground of violence and confl ict. The 
most appropriate institutional framework for the objective of sustainable 
peace must be supplied by the context in each case, aiming to satisfy the 
needs and to correspond to the most genuine local aspirations. To learn 
about the South means, more specifi cally, that public policies based in 
the conceptual universe of Peace Studies, supposedly in the name of 
post-confl ict reconstruction or prevention of confl icts and management 
of crises, need to get more distance from the recipe-book formulated in 
the academies and chancelleries of the North and confer a more central 
place to local actors, either giving to more attention to practices rooted 
in local customs and in regional cultural and social contexts, or giving 
the capacitation of local societies the status of an absolute priority in 
these politics. 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives87   87 4/1/07   11:20:31
88 JOSÉ MANUEL PUREZA AND TERESA CRAVO
But this necessity for critical recentralisation of Peace Studies is cur-
rently faced with an adverse climate. In the international system after 
11th September 2001, the realistic paradigm is resurgent, demanding 
a world vision more suitable to the beginning of the 21st century. The 
emergency of the “war against the terrorism,” as an orienting principle 
of the response to the new threats to world-wide security and stability, 
imposed a dramatic narrowing of the international agenda that Peace 
Studies has not succeeded in preventing or, so far, reversing.
Similarly to what happened in the ten years following the Second 
World War, where the realistic current dominated without rival the anal-
ysis of international relations, now also Peace Studies is taken hostage by 
the idea of the inevitability of confl ict. The consideration of the attacks 
of 11th September 2001 in an isolated way and their simplistic analysis 
without questioning their relations with the disorder or the power re-
lations of the current international system, silenced what should have 
been the contribution of this discipline. In this context, Peace Studies risk 
a marginalisation that places them in defi nitive “agenda niches” — like 
post-war reconstruction, environmental questions or nuclear disarma-
ment — amputating their true emancipatory vocation.
Disarmament will remain, without doubt, a pressing question in the 
agenda of Peace Studies, especially in this new post-Cold War nuclear 
era. The risks of use of nuclear weapons that has represented, since 
1945, a continuous threat to world-wide stability, remains - now in a 
scene of insecurity marked by horizontal proliferation and by tension 
between the desire of new States to join the nuclear club and their 
respective repression by the current possessors. However, Peace Studies 
are far from managing to mobilize the pacifi st and antinuclear move-
ments in numbers comparable to the last years of the Cold War, whose 
activism contributed so much both for the projection of the cause as for 
the discipline itself. 
There exists yet another scene, whose concretion could be par-
ticularly penalizing for Peace Studies: the “originality” of the realistic 
paradigm in this, its second life, initiated since 11th September. If the 
resurgence in itself is confi gured as a déjà vu — in the emphasis placed 
on military promptitude, in the discourse on the inevitability of clashes 
between States or in the prosecution of the national interest —, it also 
involves particularities that lead to the assumptions that we customar-
ily associate with this traditional conception of International Relations. 
As the war against Iraq shows, it is today about a disguised realism of 
missionary democracy, which appropriates the normative discourse that 
it was traditionally alien to it and invokes the commitment to defi nitive 
values to legitimise the war. The same people who defended “anarchy” 
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now take advantage of the image of “community.” Using the very bases 
of the critique of violence but in the service of the moral legitimisation 
of war, they are gradually occupying the ethical and normative fi eld of 
Peace Studies.
Conclusion
The transforming promise borne in Peace Studies was deprived of 
its characteristics in the standardization of policy of peacebuilding in the 
1990s, and today is shown in the polyfacetic re-emergence of realism 
as a discourse allegedly more appropriate to the circumstances of the 
system of international relations. The political contraction of Peace Stud-
ies, which puts them in a position of instrumental utility in the manage-
ment of the peripheries of the global system, carries with it a theoretical 
contraction. However, the genetic identity of Peace Studies is located, 
necessarily, in its radicalism. It is this radicalism that will stop its imprison-
ment in the place of normal science — science that canonizes the future 
in function of the past, closed to innovations. 
Therefore, to be fully marked as post-positivist expression, Peace 
Studies now have to radicalise their critical approach, assuming the par-
tiality and imperfection of the concepts that underlie Western modernity 
and opening up, consequently, to heterogeneity, plurality, the periphery 
and the contributions of the feminist, environmental and cultural-stud-
ies epistemologies. The decolonisation of its knowledge and the horizon 
of sustainable peace are announced as the necessary mediators of this 
return to the critical vocation. Only thus will Peace Studies be a vehicle to 
overcome the conceptions of power and dominion whose denunciation 
and deconstruction determined its birth and affi rmation. Only thus will 
its emancipatory objective of social transformation materialize, and its 
conversion into a new form of social oppression be prevented.
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On the Relationship between Human Rights Law 
Protection and International Humanitarian Law
Hans-Joachim Heintze
Ruhr-University, Bochum
Abstract 
Research shows that the protections offered by human rights 
law and by international humanitarian law converge. Both bodies 
of law can be applied in armed conflicts in order to achieve the 
greatest possible protection in the sense of the Marten’s clause. The 
most important practical consequence of this situation lies in the 
possibility to enforce international humanitarian law. As its imple-
mentation mechanisms are insufficient and the elaboration of State 
reports and individual complaints procedures are not be expected 
for international humanitarian law in the nearest future, the exist-
ing human rights procedures gain in practical importance. As initial 
timid decisions, in which international humanitarian law has been 
applied, are showing: “In sum, although the practice of human 
rights bodies described above is still limited, it provides a welcome 
addition to the admitted limited array of international means to 
enforce compliance with international humanitarian law by parties 
to armed conflicts” (Kalshoven and Zegveld, 2001: 201). This gives 
clear proof of the practical and useful consequences of the conver-
gence of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
Introduction
As States tend not to be willing to push for the unequivocally neces-
sary further codifi cation of international humanitarian law and, espe-
cially, of mechanisms of implementation, the question is posed as to 
what developments have been made in the adjoining bodies of law and 
how they infl uence international humanitarian law.1 Particular attention 
1 This approach is in line with the ICRC Avenir statement, which underlines that 
“the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law must be strengthe-
ned.” Cf. Forsythe (1999).
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has to be paid to international human rights law, as today, human rights 
form a central part of international law for the common welfare of hu-
manity and represent common values, which no State may revoke, even 
in time of war (Tomuschat, 1994: 195). While international humanitar-
ian law and human rights law vary as to their origins and situations in 
which they apply, the two corpus juris share the objective of protecting 
and safeguarding individuals in all circumstances.
Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law
Classic international public law recognized the separation between 
the law of peace and the law of war. Depending on the state of inter-
national relations, either the corpus juris of the law of peace or that of 
the law of war was applied. The adoption of the United Nations Char-
ter in 1945 as well as of major human rights documents yet changed 
this surgically clear division. Since then there have been norms which 
are valid both in times of peace and in times of war. As with every in-
novation, this development was not immediately accepted by all. In 
particular, those who subscribed to the so-called separation theory re-
jected the application of human rights norms during armed confl icts 
with the argument that they were two separate fi elds, which could 
not be applied at the same time (Kimminich, 1979: 28). This position 
is rather surprising because, in classic international public law, human 
rights considerations — on the basis of natural law — were taken into 
account. In this vein, Bluntschli argued in 1872 (para. 529) that the 
declaration of war did not rescind the legal order but “on the contrary, 
we recognise that there are natural human rights that are to recog-
nised in times of war as in peacetime [...]”. Further, the 1907 Hague 
Convention on Land Warfare regards the parties to the treaty “ani-
mated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of 
humanity.”2 In the light of these statements one can have doubts about 
the justifi cation of the separation theory. 
Yet, the separation theory seems to have supporters even nowadays. 
For instance, the well-known “Handbook of International Humanitarian 
Law” (Fleck, 1995) does not deal with the the topic “human rights in 
armed confl icts” at all. In this regard, it may be argued that the Hand-
2 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Signed at The 
Hague 18 October 1907, in Schindler and Toman (2004: 55).
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book lags behind the leading opinion which the International Court of 
Justice (1996) expressed in the “Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion“ 
and in the “Legal consequences Advisory Opinion” (2004). In these Ad-
visory Opinions the court clearly rejected the position that the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 19 December 
1966 could only be applied in peacetime. 
The wording of relevant human rights treaties supports the ICJ juris-
prudence on the subject. Indeed, these treaties contain clear references 
to the obligations of State Parties concerning the observance of human 
rights obligations in times of armed confl ict. For example, Article 15 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 4 November 1950 
deals with the fate of the human rights norms in situations in which the 
life of a nation is threatened by war or other public emergencies. Un-
der such circumstances the State parties are allowed to “take measures 
derogating from their obligations under this Convention.” However, the 
human rights listed in the ECHR may only be limited to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. Some rights explicitly men-
tioned in the same Article may not be derogated from (inter alia the right 
to life, the prohibition of torture, and freedom of belief). These human 
rights are called non-derogable. The existence of non-derogable rights 
implies that they are to be applied under all circumstances. Herewith, 
the traditional impermeable border between international humanitar-
ian law, which applies during armed confl icts, and the law of peace, is 
crossed. This “crossing of the border” is further supported by common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (GC) which 
contains a list of rights which are to be protected under all circumstanc-
es. Interestingly, these rights broadly cover the so-called non-derogable 
human rights. It is exactly this confi guration that led academics to draft 
the “Turku Declaration,”3 which called for the legal grey areas — in the 
border areas of the laws of peace and the laws of war — to be fi lled 
by the cumulative application of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, thereby guaranteeing a minimum standard (Rossas 
and Meron, 1995).
The ECHR is not the only instrument referring to the applicability of 
human rights in wartime. A further regional human rights instrument, 
the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969 lists 
in Article 27 non-derogable rights which cannot be abrogated in times of 
war. Universal human rights treaties also refer to non-derogable rights. 
3 In: UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55.
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For example, Article 4 of the ICCPR includes an emergency clause, simi-
lar to that stated in regional instruments. 
All these human rights instruments demonstrate that human rights 
are a substantial part of the legal order of wars and other emergency sit-
uations. Taking into account the duty of States to respect non-derogable 
rights under all circumstances according to human rights instruments 
and the fi nal document of the fi rst world conference on human rights in 
Teheran in 1968, Cerna concluded in 1989 that international public law 
had already been “transformed into a branch of human rights law and 
termed ‘human rights in armed confl icts’” (Cerna, 1989). 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989 
impressively corroborates this view. Here the substantial overlap be-
tween international human rights protection and international humani-
tarian law becomes obvious. Article 38(1) CRC obliges the State Parties 
to undertake to respect and ensure respect for rules of international 
humanitarian law that deal with the protection of children. Herewith a 
human rights treaty, normally applicable in peacetime, contains provi-
sions that are not only applicable in armed confl icts but that are also 
enshrined in the law regulating armed confl icts. The regulations are even 
more detailed under Article 38 (2), (3) and (4). In these paragraphs the 
standards of Article 77 of the Additional Protocol I to the First Geneva 
Convention (GC I) regarding the recruitment and the direct participation 
of children in armed confl icts are repeated. The standards adopted in 
1977 permit the recruitment and direct participation of children from 
the age of fi fteen onwards. 
This undoubtedly unsatisfying standard in the CRC of 1989 speaks 
on the one hand against the progressive codifi cation of international 
public law and on the other against the goal of the convention, which, 
according to Article 3, is to ensure that the “best interests” of the child 
(who according to Article 1 is a person until his/her 18th birthday) are 
protected. It is most unlikely that it is in the interest of a child aged fi f-
teen to directly participate in hostilities. 
This contradiction has been severely criticised in legal literature. In 
particular, the issue was raised as to why the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child , which was drawn more than a decade after the 
adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, and 
which is a considerably progressive codifi cation of the protection of the 
individual, contains no protection exceeding that of Article 77 of AP I 
(Heintze, 1995). This failure is all the more regrettable as the opponents 
of the improvement of the pertinent child protection (in particular the 
USA, Iran and Iraq) had not submitted, at the time of the negotiations of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a very sturdy legal argument. 
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As a matter of fact, the USA was of the opinion that neither the General 
Assembly nor the Human Rights Commission were suitable fora for the 
revision of existing international humanitarian law.4 
The American argument, which is based on the aforementioned tra-
ditional separation of the law of peace and the law of war, is however 
not convincing. In fact, the Convention on the Rights of the Child aimed 
to be a new, independent treaty and not a revision or amendment of in-
ternational humanitarian law. Furthermore one can also argue that there 
should have been duties laid down for the State Parties of a new instru-
ment over and above the general standards, which is defi nitely possible 
in treaty law. As many feared a lowering of standards, the American 
argument was not further discussed. That the USA later departed from 
their (untenable) position came to the fore when, in 1992, they signed 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed confl ict. This protocol, adopted in 
2000 through Resolution 54/263 of the UN General Assembly, obliges 
the State Parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that children 
under the age of 18 do not directly take part in hostilities. The protocol 
entered into force on 12 February 2002 and has been, up to now, rati-
fi ed by 52 States. This means that, at least for these States, the standard 
of protection is higher than that propounded in international humanitar-
ian law.5 
The example of the CRC concretely demonstrates not only that the 
law of peace and the international humanitarian law overlaps but also 
that, when examining which duties are borne by a State in times of 
armed confl ict, one cannot avoid taking international human rights law 
into consideration. This situation alone justifi es speaking of a conver-
gence of both bodies of law. 
The Cumulative Application of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law
Some obligations in human rights treaties remain in force during 
armed confl icts. The consequence is undoubtedly a substantial overlap 
between both bodies of law. However, this situation is refl ected differ-
ently in literature and in practice. Gasser (2002) argues against “advo-
cating a merger of the two bodies of international law” and speaks of 
4 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989, S. 55/Add.1, p. 6.
5 This aspect was not taken into consideration by Happold (2002). 
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the theory of complementarity. According to this theory, the bodies of 
law of human rights law and international humanitarian law are not 
identical but complement each other and, fi nally, remain distinct. 
Although the ICRC has in the past approached the theme cau-
tiously it is nowadays involved in the establishment of common values 
that transcend legalistic arguments and distinctions. For example, the 
ICRC has published a special edition of the Review on the convergence 
of international humanitarian and human rights law (Forsythe, 1999).6 
The somewhat more assertive convergence theory is gaining in infl u-
ence, which is thoroughly convincing in light of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child described above. The convergence theory goes 
further than mere complementarity and aims for the greatest effec-
tive protection of the human being through the cumulative application 
of both bodies of law, so that one unifi ed complex of human rights 
beneath different institutional umbrellas can be spoken of (Meron, 
1987). 
A glance at the most recent State practice shows that this is not 
merely theory. Kälin (1994) pointed that the cumulative application of 
both corpus juris during the armed confl ict in Kuwait was both “feasible 
and meaningful” and clarifi ed the practical meaning of the convergence 
theory applied to the occupying regime in Kuwait in 1990/91. Parallels 
can be drawn between this and the current situation in Iraq. Resolution 
1483 of the United Nations Security Council (2003) which lays down the 
basic principles the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq (see requires 
all “involved” to uphold their duties under international law, especially 
those according to the Geneva Conventions (para. 5) and obliges the 
Secretary General’s special emissary for Iraq to work towards the promo-
tion of human rights protection (para. 8 lit. g). It goes without saying 
that such duties require the cumulative application of international hu-
manitarian law and human rights law. 
This has already been analysed by academics with regard to other 
occupations, whereby it was established that three aspects need to be 
emphasised: 
The interpretation of rights and duties must refer to both areas of 
law. It is, for example, diffi cult to interpret the term “inhuman treat-
ment,” found in human rights law, in any way other than according to 
the requirements of GC III, as it has a specifi c meaning in the context 
of a prisoner of war camp. On the other hand one could not fulfi l the 
6 The UN Sub-Commission of the Human Rights Commission speaks in its Resolu-
tion 1989/26 about “Convergence” too.
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requirements of para. 1 lit. c of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions after considering “the legal guarantees deemed imperative 
by civilised nations” in criminal proceedings without applying the hu-
man rights instruments.
Human rights strengthen the regulation of international humanitar-
ian law by a more exact formulation of State obligations In this way 
the duties arising from Article 55 GC IV pertaining to the health system 
have to be applied in the light of the right to health contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the 
separation of rape, as a method of war and as prohibited by interna-
tional humanitarian law, from torture, the human rights law provisions 
of the UN Convention against Torture must necessarily be resorted to 
(Blatt, 1994).
International humanitarian law brings human rights law into effect 
in that it, for example, puts the duties regarding missing persons into 
concrete terms. Even though “disappearances” doubtlessly represent 
a serious human rights violation, the relevant law regarding States’ 
obligations in such cases is very underdeveloped. In times of armed 
confl ict, the occupying power is obliged by the Third and Fourth Ge-
neva Conventions to provide information about deceased detained 
persons and the possible causes of their death, detained persons who 
are still alive as well as to search for those whose fate is unknown 
(Kälin,1994). 
In a report to the Security Council entitled “On the Protection of Ci-
vilians in Armed Confl ict,” the UN Secretary-General voiced his opinion 
on the cumulative application of all norms which protect the individual, 
at least those civilians as defi ned in the Geneva Conventions and their 
protocols. He recommended States to ratify equally the relevant instru-
ments of international humanitarian law, international human rights law 
and refugee law, as all three are “essential tools for the legal protection 
of civilians in armed confl icts.”7 
From a practical point of view the turn towards international hu-
manitarian law protection is, of course, also a result of the increased 
occurrences of civil confl icts, which often take place in an international 
humanitarian law grey zone due to the slim amount of regulation of 
international humanitarian law in this area (Meron, 2000). The practical 
importance for parties to the confl ict was convincingly pointed out in 
legal literature (Fleck, 2003). 
7 UN-Doc. S/1999/957, para. 36.
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International Humanitarian Law as Lex Specialis
The cumulative application of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law inevitably raises the question of the reciprocal relation-
ship. The ICJ (1996) had to answer this question in the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion because the advocates of the illegality of the use of 
nuclear weapons had argued that the use of these weapons violated 
the right to life established in Article 6 of the ICCPR.8 According to Ar-
ticle 6 ICCPR “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.“ The ICJ 
established in its opinion that Article 6 is a non-derogable right and, 
consequently, also applies in armed confl ict. Even during hostilities it 
is prohibited to “arbitrarily” deprive someone of their life. In the same 
opinion, the ICJ recognises the primacy of international humanitarian 
law over human rights law in armed confl icts, thereby describing the 
(latter/former) as lex specialis. The term “arbitrarily” is, therefore, to be 
defi ned according to international humanitarian law. As the following 
example demonstrates, human rights law cannot be considered in this 
type of context: a combatant, who within the scope of a lawful act dur-
ing an armed confl ict, kills an enemy combatant cannot, according to 
the ius in bello, be charged with a criminal offence (Greenwood, 1999). 
These exceptions to the protection offered by human rights law in times 
of armed confl ict — “war” in the language of the ECHR — are clearly 
mentioned in Article 15 of the ECHR It is stated there that cases of death 
as a result of legal acts of war are not to be regarded as a violation of the 
right to life spelled out in Article 3 ECHR. 
The evaluation of the ICJ opinion has been welcomed by academ-
ics, mainly for its clarifi cation that the norms developed for peacetime, 
i.e. human rights law cannot be applied “in an unqualifi ed manner” to 
fi ghting. Human rights have rather to be inserted into the structure of 
international humanitarian law in a sensitive manner (Matheson, 1997). 
Herewith the primacy of international humanitarian law is emphasised. 
It must however be noted that human rights law as a whole remain 
valid as prescribed in Article 4 of the ICCPR (and respective analogous, 
regional treaties) and are consequently of importance. Therefore, the ICJ 
in its Advisory Opinion supports the necessity of regarding the protec-
tion granted by international humanitarian law and human rights law as 
a single unit (but this is not what the ICJ says in the 2004 advisory opin-
ion!) as well as the harmonisation of the two sets of international rules. 
8 According to Greenwood (1999) this viewpoint was taken by Malaysia, Solomon 
Islands and Egypt.
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Admittedly such a viewpoint inevitably leads to the necessity of tack-
ling the lex specialis derogat legis generalis objection. This objection can 
be refuted by pointing at the Marten’s clause, which is accepted in in-
ternational treaties as well as in customary international law. This clause 
confi rms that the rules of the laws pertaining to armed confl icts cannot 
be regarded as the fi nal regulation of the protection of humans, but can 
be supplemented with human rights law protection (Reimann, 1984). 
Article 72 AP I also proves the “openness of the international laws of 
armed confl icts” (Vöneky, 2001) as it is declares with regard to the treat-
ment of persons, who fi nd themselves in the power of one of the parties 
to the confl ict that “[t]he provisions of this Section are additional to [...] 
other applicable rules of international law relating to the protection of 
fundamental human rights during international armed confl ict.“ 
Implementation Mechanisms of Human Rights Law Protection
The literature aptly refers to the fact that human rights protection 
not only shares a common philosophy with international humanitarian 
law, but also that it can be used to compensate for the defi cits of inter-
national humanitarian law (Gardam, 2001). The underdeveloped imple-
mentation mechanisms of international humanitarian law, which have 
to be described as fairly ineffective, are among its great weaknesses. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that both the ICRC and academics 
have on numerous occasions attempted to use the implementation 
mechanisms of the UN human rights treaties, disarmament treaties and 
environmental treaties as examples of possible systems ensuring compli-
ance with international humanitarian law and to make them appealing 
to States. Central to these implementation mechanisms are the State 
reporting procedures (Drewicki, 2001).
The amazing aspect of these suggestions is that academics advocate 
new reporting procedures and, therefore, support the infl ation of such 
mechanisms. This is not convincing because it is already diffi cult enough 
today, in view of the sheer number of such reporting procedures in the 
human rights fi eld, to keep a survey of the content and to avoid end-
less repetitions. One should not forget to mention that the situation 
in some States is such that many governments are not in a position to 
submit their periodical reports on time, notably due to a serious lack 
of resources. For example, Suriname owes the human rights commit-
tee four State reports and the anti-discrimination committee eight State 
reports. In total 44 member States have not provided the human rights 
committee with one or more report due every fi ve years; 68 of these 
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reports are over fi ve years late.9 In view of this dilemma the UN General 
Secretary has been endowed with the task of compiling methods for the 
tightening up (“streamlining”) of the State reporting procedure. In this 
context a brainstorming meeting that focused on the strengthening and 
consolidation of the reporting procedure took place in early 2003.10 
In light of this fact regarding UN reporting procedures, the proposal 
to create a new reporting procedure seems impracticable. It appears 
that in today’s context it is vital to use the already existing procedures 
in parallel. Such a parallel use would appear possible due to the overlap 
between human rights law protection and international humanitarian 
law.11 The following paragraphs which aim to describe the practice will 
prove this point.
The Duty to Report in the Case of a Public Emergency
It is well known that, especially under conditions of war or other 
public emergencies in which the life of the nation is threatened, par-
ticularly serious human rights violations or mass killings may transpire 
(Gowlland-Debbas, 1999). Hence, the observance of human rights in 
these situations is of crucial importance. 
This challenge is met by the ICCPR in that the States Parties, which 
declare the emergency, are obliged according to article 4(3) to inform 
the UN Secretary-General as to which human rights law duties are being 
derogated and which grounds there are for these actions. The Human 
Rights Committee is allowed to check the conditions for the existence of 
a state of emergency and, if necessary, demand special reports. As early 
as 1981 the Committee adopted a “general comment” on the interpre-
tation of State duties as enshrined in Article 4. It emphasised the extraor-
dinary and temporary nature of the emergency law and requested States 
to submit a report immediately after the declaration referring to a state 
of emergency, and to guarantee the upholding of the non-derogable 
rights (Nowak, 1993).12 Moreover, the Committee stresses that the ben-
efi t of the derogable human rights be abrogated only if it is absolutely 
required in the light of the given circumstances. In this regard, the ICCPR 
applies the principle of proportionality, which also belongs to the core 
principles of international humanitarian law.
9 UN Doc. HRI/ICM/2003/3, para. 15.
10 UN Doc. HRI/ICM/2003/4.
11 HAMPSON recommended such an approach as early as 1992.
12 Manfred Nowak, CCPR-Commentary, Engel, Kehl, 1993, p. 81.
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The ECHR recognises no duty to report but a duty to inform. “To re-
port” is to inform about the fact that state of emergency has been de-
clared and explain the measures taken while “to inform” solely involves 
sending a notice stating that the state of emergency was declared and 
that some provisions of the ECHR are not applicable for a certain period of 
time. According to Article 15 (3), the Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe must be informed about the emergency measures. This duty is to 
be taken seriously because an individual may complain against a State that 
may have violated his/her rights. If the State has informed the Secretary-
General about the derogations, an individual may not complain about in-
fringements upon his/her derogable rights; the explanations are published 
by the Council of Europe (this part of the sentence is absolutely not clear). 
This model was later copied and adopted in article 27(3) of the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights which also provides for only for a duty to 
inform the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States. 
The duty to report provides a mechanism, which can be used to con-
trol compliance with both human rights law as well as international hu-
manitarian law (in so far as both bodies of law overlap). This is made 
clear by the most recent report of the Human Rights Committee to the 
UN General Assembly which states that “[w]hen faced with situations of 
armed confl icts, both external and internal, which affect State Parties to 
the Covenant, the Committee will necessarily examine whether these par-
ties are complying with all their obligations under the Covenant.”13 The 
advantage of this procedure can especially be discerned in the fact that 
the parties to the treaty have to justify derogations from human rights 
law. The disadvantage is that the Human Rights Committee, in view of the 
overload with the periodical reports, hardly has time to deal with emer-
gency measures notifi cations. In sum, effective supervision is not reached 
through new procedures but through a better organisation of the work. 
Individual Complaints Procedures
There are no individual complaints procedures available to the vic-
tims of violations of international humanitarian law at the international 
level. This underlines once more the fact that Doswald-Beck considers 
a “truism”: international law is primarily aimed at regulating relations 
between States (Doswald-Beck, 1998). Yet, one must note that human 
rights law constrains the might of the States inasmuch as it envisages 
international complaint procedures.
13 UN-Doc. A/57/40, para. 29.
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104 of 149 State Parties to the ICCPR have also ratifi ed the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR which permits victims of human rights violations 
to fi le a complaint with the Human Rights Committee after they have 
exhausted all domestic remedies. The Human Rights Committee then 
considers whether the complainant’s human rights have been violated. 
According to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol the test is limited to “any 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant,” i.e. international humanitarian 
law cannot be directly applied. This procedure is useful as far as there are 
exceptionally numerous and serious human rights violations in emergen-
cy situations (Svensson-McCarthy, 1998). Therefore international super-
vision is of utmost relevance. In addition, such human rights procedures 
allow checking whether the curtailment of the rights of the complainant 
is compatible with the requirements laid out in Article 4.14 The proce-
dure ends with an opinion of the Committee (Wolfrum, 2001), which, 
due to the publicity of the procedure, puts pressure on the State that has 
breached human rights law (the “public blame” effect). This pressure is 
all the more intense in procedures introduced by regional human rights 
treaties inasmuch as these procedures are court-like. Even more interest-
ing are regional complaint procedures because they take place before 
human rights courts and their judgements are binding upon the State 
that has acted in contravention of the regional human rights treaty. As a 
consequence, these procedures deserve further consideration.
The question arises whether human rights law procedures can make 
up for the lack of complaints procedures available to victims of violations 
of international humanitarian law. It should be noted that the cumula-
tive and direct application of international humanitarian law has already 
been recognised in these individual regional complaints procedures. This 
is due to the wording of Article 15 ECHR that spells out that emergency 
measures cannot be “inconsistent with [the State’s] other obligations 
under international law.” Article 27 of the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights is formulated similarly. A glance at the practice demonstrates 
the advantages and disadvantages. 
The Inter-American Human Rights Protection System
At the beginning it was contentious as to whether the American hu-
man rights bodies were allowed to use international humanitarian law 
when deciding upon the legality of certain activities and/or measures. 
14 UN-Doc. A/57/40, para. 31.
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The fi rst time the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was 
confronted with such a question was in the case of Disabled Peoples’ 
International et al. v. United States which related to the intervention of 
the USA in Grenada in 1987 in which 16 inmates of a psychiatric clinic 
were injured. The US government argued that the Commission was not 
the responsible authority to adjudicate upon the allegations of improper 
conduct. In the opinion of the USA, the Commission was not allowed to 
consider the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention because its 
mandate was limited to the “examination of the enjoyment or depriva-
tion of the rights set forth in the American Declaration of Rights and 
Duties of Man.”15 The position of the USA was criticised at the time by 
academics, because the principles of international humanitarian law are 
applicable to a military operation (Weisbrodt and Andrus, 1988). 
Later practice confi rmed this view. In this regard, particular attention 
should be paid to the report of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights in the Tablada case. This case concerned the attack by 42 
armed persons on the La Tablada barracks of the Argentine armed forces 
on 30 October 1997. During the 30 hour battle, 29 of the attackers 
and some of the soldiers were killed. Surviving attackers applied to the 
Commission, complaining that Argentina had violated the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights and international humanitarian law. 
The Commission examined whether it could directly apply international 
humanitarian law and fi nally decided that it was entitled to do so. The 
decision was awarded great importance by academics as it ascertained 
that an international organ responsible for the protection of human 
rights could directly apply international humanitarian law to a State Par-
ty to a human rights treaty (Zegveld, 1998). The Commission founded 
its reasoning for the application of international humanitarian law upon 
the basis that it was the only manner it could do justice to situations of 
armed confl ict. Even though the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights is formally applicable in times of armed confl ict, it contains no 
regulations regarding the means and methods of conducting war. In 
order to be able to establish what constituted a (prohibited) deliberate 
taking of life under conditions of war, the Commission had to resort to 
international humanitarian law.16 
15 See http://www.wcl.American.edu/pub/humanright/digest/Inter-American/
app9213.htm.
16 “[…] the Commission must necessarily look to and apply definitional standards 
and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance in its resolu-
tion of this and other kinds of claims alleging violations of the American Convention in 
combat situations.” Case 11.137. Inter. Am. C.H.R., No. 55/97, para. 161 (1997).
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In this regard, the argument of the Commission is accurate: the 
human rights provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights alone are not suffi cient to determine who is legally permitted 
to take part in hostilities and carry out acts of damage. At the same 
time, however, the Convention does not contain any provision requiring 
the Commission to use international humanitarian law. The Commission 
based its approach on 
The overlapping of the scope of application of human rights law 
and international humanitarian law: according to the aforementioned 
Convention States are under the duty to fulfi l the standards laid out in 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions:
— Article 29 lit. b, which does not allow for an interpretation accord-
ing to which the enjoyment or the execution of rights, guaranteed 
by another agreement binding the State, may be limited;
— Article 25, which spells out that everyone has a right to a suitable 
legal remedy for the violation of his or her basic rights; 
— Article 27, which states that derogations from duties entrenched 
in the convention may not stand in the way of other international 
legal duties.
The report of the Inter-American Human Rights Court which de-
clared that the Commission may use treaties which did not emerge from 
the Inter-American system.17
The reasons provided by the Commission seem to be solid. Herewith 
the Commission directly applied international humanitarian law and did 
not merely use as it as an aid in interpretation.
The Inter-American Court did not follow the position of the Com-
mission in its decision in the Las Palmeras case18 and decided it was 
not competent to apply international humanitarian law and in particular 
could not directly apply Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
The Court conceded that it could only use the Geneva Conventions for 
the interpretation of the Human Rights Convention. Therefore the Court 
argued in the Las Palmeras case, which was about the execution of six 
unarmed civilians by the Colombian police, that the Convention “has 
only given the Court competence to determine whether the acts and 
norms of States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”19 The main ground for the non-ap-
plication of international humanitarian law was the argument by the 
17 Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 vom 24.9.1982.
18 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser.C), No. 67 (2000).
19 Op. cit., para. 33.
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Colombian Government that the State Parties to the Inter-American 
Convention have only accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court 
concerning the rights enlisted in the Convention itself. The Court admit-
ted the objections to that effect by the respondent state and rejected the 
viewpoint of the Commission that international humanitarian law could 
be applied as customary international law or as lex specialis. 
The decision received an impressive number of comments in the le-
gal literature. Martin (2002) examined this decision and concluded that 
it “overturns” the position taken by the Inter-American Commission. 
Also Kleffner and Zegveld (2002) consider this decision to be proof of 
how problematic the assertion of the Commission is, that they could 
directly apply international humanitarian law. The authors argue, as it 
is highly questionable whether the Court can apply international hu-
manitarian law, that there is a need to establish an individual complaints 
procedure for violations of international humanitarian law. As desirable 
as such a procedure is, the likelihood of it being implemented in the near 
future is fairly slim. Therefore there is a need to call for the treaty bodies 
of international human rights protection to lead the way, as was chosen 
by the Commission in the Tablada decision in order to provide interna-
tional humanitarian law more importance. According to Zwanenburg 
(2004) such Courts may use international humanitarian law indirectly 
as authoritative guidance in interpretation of human rights norms. Even 
in the Las Palmeras case the Court did not exclude the possibility short 
of applying international humanitarian law directly. Furthermore, if the 
parties to a confl ict agree international humanitarian law will be applied 
directly. Consequently there is no need for the establishment of new 
procedures but a further dissemination of the opportunities for the exist-
ing mechanisms. 
In light of this evaluation the more recent practice of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court is encouraging. Especially, the Bamaca-Velasquez case20 rela-
tivises the criticism of Kleffner and Zegveld. This judgement concerned 
a guerrilla fi ghter who fell into the hands of the Guatemalan military 
during a battle and was tortured and murdered by them. In this case 
international humanitarian law was allowed to be applied as Guatemala 
and the Commission had agreed that international humanitarian law 
could be applied and that Article 3 of the Geneva Convention could be 
used when interpreting the duties according to the American Conven-
tion. The Court contended that in order to avoid an illegal restriction of 
human rights, Article 29 of the Convention permits in the interpretation, 
20 Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (Ser.C) No. 70 (2000).
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reference and resort to other treaties to which Guatemala is a party. 
The Court clearly concluded that the undeniable existence of an internal 
armed confl ict meant that “instead of exonerat[ing] the State from its 
obligations to respect and guarantee human rights, this fact obliged it 
to act in accordance with such obligations.”21 This judgement ascer-
tained the direct applicability of international humanitarian law by hu-
man rights courts and led to academics coming to a further conclusion: 
the necessity confi rmed by international humanitarian law of punishing 
those responsible for such crimes (Wilson and Perlin, 2002). 
European Court of Human Rights
As, according to Article 15 ECHR, derogations from duties under the 
Convention are only permitted if concurrent with other international 
legal duties, the duties of the Geneva Conventions are to be observed. 
In the Northern Ireland case (Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, 1995) the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) investigated into whether the 
derogations from the ECHR were in accordance with the other public 
international duties of the affected party to the treaty. It was researched 
whether the British legislation on Northern Ireland was in accordance 
with the Geneva Conventions. The investigation was not gone into in 
any more detail, though, as the Irish side failed to provide any further 
details.22 This example clearly demonstrates that referral to international 
humanitarian law is generally possible. 
Practice has nonetheless shown us that the bodies of the European 
Convention on Human Rights are hesitating to subscribe to a clear posi-
tion in this regard. Frowein (1999) made this point concerning the fi rst 
state complaint in Cyprus v. Turkey, where the European Human Rights 
Commission allowed the application of the Third Geneva Convention 
of 1974 regarding prisoners of war, however did fi nd it necessary to 
investigate whether there had been a violation of Article 5 ECHR (right 
to freedom and security). This uncertainty is to be observed throughout 
(Reidy, 1998). 
In Loizidou v. Turkey the ECtHR did not apply international humani-
tarian law, even though it concerned human rights violations arising out 
of a military occupation; the Cypriot complainant was not able to use 
her property in Northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion of 1974. In 
21 Op. cit., para. 207.
22 Cf. Brannigan and McBride v. UK, ECtHR Series A 258-B, 26 May 1993, pa-
ras. 67-73.
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1989 she made a complaint in which she asserted that the continual 
refusal to allow her access to her property was a violation of her right to 
the peaceful use of her property according to Article 1 of the First Ad-
ditional Protocol to the ECHR. In the end the ECtHR found in her favour 
and on the 28th July 1998 pronounced the awarding judgement.23 
Central to the case was the question as to who was sovereign over 
Northern Cyprus. Indeed, Turkey contended that it was not the correct 
defendant. The correct defendant was, in fact, the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), an independent State responsible for its ac-
tions under international law. In its judgement the ECtHR ascertained 
that the defi nition of jurisdiction in article 1 ECHR was not limited to 
one’s own national territory. The question of sovereignty was far more 
important, as it could have implications both inside and outside the 
State’s national territory. In this way a State could have effective control 
over another State outside its own national territory with the use of 
military measures, where it is unimportant as to whether this control is 
carried out by its own armed forces or a subordinate local administra-
tion. As the complainant was unable to use her property due to the oc-
cupation by Turkish troops, these processes came under the jurisdiction, 
according to Article 1 ECHR, of Turkey. 
At the same time the ECtHR avoided establishing that the case of 
the TRNC concerned an occupied territory. This did not however hold 
the court back from referring to S/550/1984 of the UN Security Council, 
which clearly describes the “occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus.“ 
This contradiction did not remain uncommented on. In a dissenting opin-
ion Judge Pettiti objected to the fact that the whole situation regarding 
the Turkish intervention in Cyprus had not been suffi ciently clarifi ed. 
This related to the problems of annexation and occupation, which also 
necessitated the application of international humanitarian law.24
The argument is as follows: the whole judgement suffers from the 
fact that the complicated status questions were evaded. In this way the 
ECtHR withdrew to the position that international human rights law pro-
tection is a “matter of international concern”. It was necessary there-
fore to fi nd a pragmatic clarifi cation (effet utile). At the same time the 
question must be posed as to whether it would have been possible to 
bring about the same result with resort to international humanitarian 
law. International humanitarian law is of course also “a matter of inter-
national concern.” The application of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
23 23 March 1995 (No. 310).
24 Eur.Ct.H.R 1996, S. 2251.
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would have supported the fi nding of the ECtHR, as Northern Cyprus is 
an occupied territory and Loizidou, contrary to Article 49, was forced to 
leave the occupied territory without underlying interests of security or a 
military need for this. This contravenes the duty to respect the property 
of civilians in occupied territories. It is thus incomprehensible as to why 
the court did not make use of this line of reasoning. 
According to the construction of the Geneva Conventions, the par-
ties to an armed confl ict are bound by their duties even if outside of 
their national territory. In light of the decision in Loizidou v. Turkey the 
jurisdiction of a state can even be exercised outside of national territory. 
It is therefore all the more surprising as to why the ECtHR in Bankovic v. 
Belgium25 was not able to resolve a broader interpretation of the term 
“jurisdiction.” In this case relatives were suing on behalf of four citizens 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who had been killed in the NATO 
attacks on the broadcasting station of Belgrade. In the attack they saw 
a violation of the right to life, the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to an effective legal remedy. They further based their claim on 
the duties arising from international humanitarian law, which they con-
tended to be applicable because the NATO states were on the one hand 
parties to the Geneva Conventions and the relevant rules of the First 
Additional Protocol and on the other hand because they held both these 
have characteristics of customary international law. The court did not 
consider the international humanitarian law argument. It concentrated 
far more on not making a broad defi nition of the term “jurisdiction.” 
The Court unanimously found that jurisdiction in international law is 
primarily territorial. Other grounds of jurisdiction must be considered 
“exceptional.” The claim of Bankovic was consequently declared inad-
missible. Shelton argued that this narrow view of jurisdiction is “under-
standable” because the Court “would seek to limit its jurisdiction to 
exclude the extra-territorial military operations of its contracting states.” 
(Shelton, 2003) However, in the light of the Loizidou case this interpreta-
tion cannot convince completely. 
The military operations in the Kurdish territories of Turkey have led 
to countless casualties amongst the civilian population and have caused 
huge material damage. This also led to an upsurge of cases brought be-
fore the human rights bodies in Strasbourg. This demonstrated the lim-
its of international jurisdiction, which is applied only when all national 
remedies have been exhausted and only for the reparation of violations 
to individual human rights (Reidy, Hampson and Boyle, 1997) These pro-
25 App. 52207/99, Eur.Ct.H.R. 
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cedures are not suitable for taking effective action against gross human 
rights violations on a mass scale. 
Human rights infringements on a mass scale also have simultane-
ously an individual dimension. The case of Ergi v. Turkey26 concerned the 
accidental killing of a woman who was uninvolved in a military opera-
tion. During the analysis of the facts of the case the Commission had 
established that in the planning and execution of such an operation 
care must be taken “[...] not only in the context of the apparent targets 
of an operation but, particularly where the use of force is envisaged in 
the vicinity of the civilian population, with regard to the avoidance of 
incidental loss of life and injury to others.”27 Measured against these 
standards, the Commission found that the planning of the above-men-
tioned operation had not been careful enough to prevent there being 
victims among the civilian population and to avoid the confl ict expand-
ing in the area. 
In its judgement the ECtHR argued that the state was responsible 
for its failure “to take all feasible precaution in the choice of means and 
methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group 
with a view to avoiding or, at least, minimising incidental loss of civilian 
life.”28 The court used the wording of international humanitarian law 
in order to analyse the violations of human rights. On the one hand 
this demonstrates the cumulative application of both legal authorities. 
On the other hand it also corroborates the decision of the ICJ, that in-
ternational humanitarian law is lex specialis, namely the binding law in 
armed confl icts, which is meant to be used to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities. In other words, just as much as the ICJ, when examining the 
legality of nuclear weapons, was not able to avoid checking the compat-
ibility of the weapons systems with both international human rights and 
humanitarian law; the ECtHR also had to refer to international humani-
tarian law to determine the lawfulness of the measures taken by the 
Turkish security forces in the Kurdish areas. In the Ergi case the ECtHR 
resorts directly to international humanitarian law, in that it elaborates on 
the lawfulness of the target, on the proportionality of the attack and on 
whether the foreseeable risk regarding civilian victims was proportionate 
to the military advantage. Merely the list of points to be checked make it 
clear that consideration is to be taken of international humanitarian law, 
as it can be of foundation-laying importance for the implementation of 
human rights law. 
26 App. 23818/94, Eur.Ct.H.R. 
27 Op. cit., para. 145.
28 66/1997/850/1057.Eur.Ct.H.R.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives109   109 4/1/07   11:20:38
110 HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE
Gülec v. Turkey29 was a case regarding shots fi red from a tank onto 
violently protesting demonstrators, in which the son of the head com-
plainant was fatally injured. The Court examined as to whether the state 
use of violence was permissible according to Article 2 Paragraph 2 lit. c. 
The criteria it laid down was that the use of force must have been pro-
portional to the aim and the means used. Such a weighing-up of the 
situation had obviously not been taken by the armed forces, as they 
had used battlefi eld weapons. The armed forces had not been equipped 
with the necessary equipment (water cannons, protective shields, rub-
ber bullets or tear gas) for fi ghting demonstrators. This was all the more 
reprehensible as Sirnak Province was located in an area where a state 
of emergency had been declared and public disturbances could have 
been expected. The government could show no proof for its assertion 
that there had been terrorists among the protesters. The massive use of 
armed force, which caused the death of Gülec, was not held to have 
been absolutely necessary in the sense of Article 2 and so Turkey was 
found guilty of violating the ECHR. 
The method of reasoning put forward by the Court shows once again 
many parallels with international humanitarian law. These parallels begin 
with the fact that, in the relevant area, a state of emergency had already 
been declared and public disturbances were always to have been ex-
pected. These circumstances alone imply that the norms of international 
humanitarian law can be applied. Such situations highlighted the lack 
of education, equipment and the insuffi cient “rules of engagement” of 
the armed forces. The court also mentions that the numerous losses of 
human lives in South East Turkey could be blamed on the “security situ-
ation” there. At the same time, the frequent “violent armed clashes” do 
not release the State from the observance of Article 2 ECHR. 
The cases at hand demonstrate that in the practice of the Strasbourg 
human rights bodies there are considerable overlaps between human 
rights and international humanitarian law. This particularly affects the 
rights which are laid down in Common article 3 to the Geneva Conven-
tions as well as those characterised as non-derogable in article 15 ECHR. 
It must be stressed that the use of armed force, in the sense of article 
2(2)(c) in emergency conditions or under war conditions, is found to 
be permissible if States use force to suppress tumult and revolt. This in-
cludes the use of force until death. If one ignores the fact that the article 
is “unhappily formulated” (Frowein and Peukert, 1996) the question still 
remains as to which circumstances, and in which jurisdiction, allow the 
29 Application No. 54/1997/838/1044, Judgement of 27 July 1998.
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use of force. The aforementioned cases show that the constraints relat-
ing to the use of force are much looser in human rights law protection 
than in international humanitarian law. When adjudicating on the con-
crete dimensions of the use of force, the bodies in Strasbourg would fi nd 
it much easier if they resorted to the criteria expounded in international 
humanitarian law, especially to the principles of proportionality and dis-
tinction and to the standards developed in international criminal law. It 
is also feasible to conceive situations occurring during an armed confl ict 
in which human rights instruments would have no ready criteria for the 
legality of the use of force. In such cases international humanitarian law 
must automatically be consulted. Therefore, one needs to agree with 
Laursen (2002) when he approves of the ECtHR having a limited “poten-
tial for the future application of international humanitarian law.”
The Engel case, in which the ECtHR explicitly refers to international 
humanitarian law, shows that there are no theoretical legal objections 
to the direct application of international humanitarian law.30 This case 
concerned the unequal treatment of different military ranks in discipli-
nary punishments. Academics welcomed the reference to Article 8 GC I 
because this treaty is “so well accepted” (Merrills, 1993). In view of this 
decision it appears obvious that the ECtHR has up to now only been 
held back from applying international humanitarian law on political 
grounds. 
Overcoming Existing Lacunae
Karl sees the decisive step in the development of international hu-
manitarian law becoming “world law” in the creation of international 
criminal jurisdiction (Karl, 1999). Independently of whether one shares 
this far-reaching opinion, it is a fact that, with the creation of the well-
known ad-hoc international tribunals and the permanent international 
criminal court, it has become possible under certain circumstances to 
punish crimes under international law, crimes which seriously violate in-
ternational humanitarian law as well as human rights law. Herewith a 
wide gap is fi lled, as human rights courts can only award compensation 
or reparation for human rights violations and the question as to the fate 
of those responsible was previously left open. 
The opening of a way for the implementation of an international 
right to punish, increases the probability that criminals will not remain 
30 Engel v. The Netherlands, Application 5370/72, Judgment, 23 November 1976. 
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unpunished (Griffi n, 2000) and one can assume there will be a general 
preventative effect. Even if, like Bothe (2000), one holds the general pre-
ventative effect to be a mystifi cation and therefore one has doubts — he 
refers to the atrocities of Srebenica occurring after the introduction of 
the ICTY as grounds for his doubts — it must be stated that criminal law 
is the basis of a legal conscience and especially in post-confl ict societies 
it can contribute greatly to the creation of both legal and social peace. 
As Mundis establishes with the examples of Sierra Leone, Cambodia, 
East Timor and Kosovo, the restoration of the rule of law — to which 
criminal law also belongs — is a circumstance of great importance for 
a new beginning and also serves the implementation of international 
humanitarian law in the form of “enforcement” (Mundis, 2001). 
As international criminal law refers to international crimes — there-
fore simultaneously to international humanitarian law as well as to hu-
man rights protection — further proof for the coming together of both 
legal corpus juris can be observed. International criminal jurisdiction at 
the same time also fi lls another lacuna, which can be traced back to 
the dogmatic weakness of international human rights protection. This 
weakness is namely that international human rights law assumes that 
human rights violations are carried out by States. The typical armed con-
fl ict situation, of human rights infringements by non-state actors and 
rebel groups, is thus outside of its jurisdiction. This lacuna is from now 
on fi lled by the international criminal jurisdiction. 
The question as to how far victims of international humanitarian 
law infringements will be able to make reparation claims against alleged 
violations is admittedly unresolved. A group of Yugoslav nationals, vic-
tims of a NATO air raid during the Kosovo war in 1999, unsuccessfully 
attempted to claim a right to compensation derived from a violation of 
international humanitarian law before the Civil Court of Bonn, Germany. 
In the Varvarin case, the court disagreed that individuals could make 
claims against States for violations of international humanitarian law in 
front of a national court.31 This fi nding differs in principle from the rules 
of international legal human rights protection; therefore, human rights 
mechanisms for the implementation of international humanitarian law 
seem all the more interesting. 
31 For a translation of relevant excerpts of the judgement in English, see “The Var-
varin Case: Excerpts of the Judgment of the Civil Court of Bonn of 10 December 2003,” 
Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004, p. 178-180. For a discussion of the case, 
see Quénivet (2004), Sayapin (2004), and Herrmann (2004). 
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Constitutive Violence and Rhetorics of Identity: 
A Comparative Study of Nationalist Movements in the 
Israeli-Occupied Territories and the Former Yugoslavia1
Glenn Bowman
University of Kent
Abstract
This paper examines the processes through which nationalist 
movements developed among both the Palestinian people and 
those national communities which made up the late Socialist Fed-
erative Republic of Yugoslavia so as to examine the role played by 
‘antagonism’ in what the paper terms the ‘nationalist imaginary’. 
Fundamental to the text’s respective analyses of nation formation 
and state dissolution is the concept that the imagined violence of 
a national enemy is at the core of the ‘defensive’ mobilisations we 
call nationalisms. This idea that the ‘inside’ of identity formation 
is not only shaped by but also grounded on the ‘outside’ of the 
perceived antagonism of an other poses a substantial challenge 
to essentialist conceptions of the various modalities of communal 
identities.
Introduction
In this paper I will argue that violence is not simply a device nation-
alists of certain persuasions take up in pursuit of their ends, but that it 
plays a constitutive role in the formation of all nationalisms. The violence 
which engenders nationalism is not, however, the violence the imagined 
community of the future nation turns against its ‘enemies’ but the vio-
1 Research in the Israeli-Occupied Territories (1983-1985, 1987, 1989, 1990 and 
1993) was funded by grants from the Palestine Exploration Fund, the Lady Davis Foun-
dation, the Deya Mediterranean Area Research Centre, and the Wenner Gren Foundati-
on for Anthropological Research. Fieldwork in the Former Yugoslavia (1990, 1991, and 
1993) was made possible by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council and 
the European Community Tempus Fund. Preparation of this text was generously suppor-
ted by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.
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lence members of that not-yet-existent nation perceive as infl icted upon 
them by others they recognise as making it impossible for them to exist 
in anything other than the embrace of an independent state. The future 
nation of the nationalist imaginary functions as an antidote to a violence 
which threatens the survival of persons who did not, prior to its advent, 
conceive of themselves as members of a distinct community, much less 
of a nation in waiting. Decisions about what strategies — violent or 
otherwise — are appropriate to achieving national independence follow 
from the recognition that such independence is the only guarantor of 
individual, and collective, survival. Although I will, in the following analy-
ses, demonstrate the ways ‘defensive’ violences are variously articulated 
in response to constitutive violences, such strategies are not the focus 
of this paper. Instead I will concentrate, through investigations of the 
generation of nationalist movements in the Israeli-Occupied Territories 
and what is now the ‘Former Yugoslavia,’ on the way perceptions of a 
violence affl icting a diverse range of persons give rise to a concept of 
a ‘national enemy’ and, through that concept, to the idea of solidarity 
with the nation that enemy opposes.
In investigating the way the Palestinian people came into being as 
a result of the project of nation formation the Zionist movement suc-
cessfully carried out on the land the ‘Palestinians’ had occupied long 
before they thought of themselves as ‘Palestinians’ and the way Yugo-
slavians came to see themselves not as co-nationals within an existing 
state but as members of opposed national communities unnaturally 
forced to co-exist under the tyranny of an imposed federation, I will 
emphasise that national identity is an historical construct which emerg-
es from a reformulation of one’s relation to a social fi eld rather than 
something essential and non-contingent. Furthermore, by stressing the 
role played by the perceived violence of an other in formulating that 
identity I will criticise the material determinism of nation theorists such 
as Benedict Anderson who argue that the emergence of national con-
sciousness simply refl ects developments in systems of communication 
and exchange (1991: 37-46 and passim). Mandate Palestine and pre-
dissolution Yugoslavia were — in terms of the development of print 
culture and trans-regional economies — ‘modernised’ to extents quite 
capable of supporting nationalist consciousnesses prior to the articula-
tions of Palestinian, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian nationalisms, but 
these national movements did not emerge until antagonisms2 between 
2 I will, throughout this text, refer to constitutive violence as ‘antagonism.’ Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe define ‘antagonism’ as a radical threat to the socially con-
stituted subjectivity of the individual: “in the case of antagonism...the presence of the 
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groups occupying those territories were interpreted in ways which split 
the fi eld of sociality into domains of the nation and its enemy. I contend, 
therefore, that while the development of modes of communication ena-
bling dispersed members of a community to conceive of others sharing 
with them a common language and a common territory was an essen-
tial prerequisite of being able to imagine an extended community, this 
development was not in itself enough to promulgate nationalist con-
sciousness. Communication might suffi ce to promote an abstract idea 
of community, but it was the matter communicated which transformed 
that abstraction into something with which to identify and for which 
to struggle. For nationalism to arise it was vital that one not only had 
to see one’s identity as integrally linked with that of the wider commu-
nity but also had to sense that that community, and the identity with 
which it provided oneself, were at risk. Palestinians, especially after the 
creation of the state of Israel drove a majority of them into diaspora, 
rarely (if ever) became Arab nationalists despite their sharing the Arabic 
language and the Arabic press with other Arabic-reading communities; 
they became anti-Zionists because they recognised the role of Israel in 
the dispossession of themselves and other ‘Palestinians’ who suffered 
from the anti-Palestinian violence central to the Zionist project. Serbs 
and Croats were not united in imagined community by their mutual 
use of Serbo-Croatian and their shared access to a Yugoslav press; de-
spite (and through) that shared medium they came to conceive of each 
other as blood enemies who had to wage war for the defence of their 
respective national identities. In each instance, it was stories of violence 
carried through those media which enabled members of the respective 
groups to recognise in those scenarios violences like those they suffered 
and enemies like those who tormented them. Identity, in other words, 
emerged from identifi cation, and the idea of the nation was generated 
as a fantasy of the utopian space to be occupied by all those who suf-
fered ‘the same’ violence at the hands of the enemy after that enemy 
and its violence are extirpated.
‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself....(it is because a peasant cannot be a 
peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner who is expelling him from his 
land). Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 125). This usage emphasises the fact that an antagonism disrupts 
and disallows a previously constituted identity, and by its incursion makes necessary 
the formulation of a new identity as a means of countering that antagonism. The new 
identity is not continuous with the identity which preceded the advent of that violence 
but is constituted in opposition to that violence; its ‘positivity’ is that of a negation of a 
negation. 
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The focus of this paper is, therefore, on the constitution of what I 
will term the nationalist imaginary. The nationalist imaginary is a dis-
cursive structure which emerges out of particular interpretations of vio-
lences encountered by those persons who come to see themselves, in 
its terms, as members of the future nation. It serves to articulate most, 
if not all, of the antagonisms encountered by those diverse persons as 
manifestations of the violence of a shared enemy which, in opposing 
all of them, simultaneously renders all of them ‘the same’. As a conse-
quence it presents the contemporary world as divided in a Manichaean 
manner between the good, but threatened, community of ‘us’ and the 
evil community of a ‘them’ which exists solely to destroy ‘us.’3 Although 
there tends, in the nationalist articulations discussed below, to be an 
imagined utopian future state in which all of the other’s antagonisms 
will have been elided, the chief emphasis of the nationalist imaginary 
is on the contemporary struggle to expel or extinguish the sources of 
constitutive violence. It is, in other words, a logic of mobilisation and as 
such gives rise to practices which transform the worlds both of the im-
agined community and those it wages nationalist struggle against. Thus, 
although the logic which demands an absolute distinction between the 
good space of the nation-to-be and the negative space of its other may 
be fantastical, it nonetheless constructs a reality around that opposition 
(Taussig, 1987: 3-36 and Kapferer, 1988: 1-26). In studying the genesis 
of the nationalist imaginary the analyst must attempt to discern the his-
torical contexts and social processes which give rise to the nationalist 
imaginary, but must not assume that such an understanding dissolves 
3 Both the genesis, and the structure, of nationalist identity is uncannily paralleled 
in what Sigmund Freud describes as the formation of infantile ego. Freud contends that 
the infant is forced to make a primary distinction between itself and an outside it initial-
ly narcissistically saw as continuous with itself because it senses, in the way the source 
of its sustenance (breast or bottle) is ‘taken’ from it against its will, an external violence 
which hurts and deprives it (Freud, 1963a: 66-69 and 1963: 416). “A further incentive 
to a disengagement of the ego from the general mass of sensations — that is, to the 
recognition of an ‘outside,’ an external world — is provided by the frequent, manifold 
and unavoidable sensations of pain and displeasure.... A tendency arises to separate 
from the ego everything that can become a source of such displeasure, to throw it out-
side and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 
‘outside’” (Freud, 1963b: 67). Here too identity is not given but is constructed through a 
defensive process of separation from an outside which steals pleasure and inflicts pain. 
Here too the inside and the outside are opposed in a Manichaean manner. I have else-
where used psychoanalytic categories in approaching questions of xenophobic hatred 
in Yugoslavia; see my “Xenophobia, fantasy and the nation: the logic of ethnic violence 
in Former Yugoslavia” in Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict 
(1994), especially pp. 160-165.
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that discursive structure. People caught up in the logic of nationalism 
may be engaged in playing out a fantasy but that fantasy is nonethe-
less real in its ability to conceive a coherent world and give rise to real 
acts of violence and resistance. Louis Althusser, precariously balanced 
on the border separating Marxist positivism from discourse analysis, de-
fi ned ideology as “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1971: 152). 
As I will demonstrate in the following analyses, nationalism may provide 
‘imaginary’ solutions to real problems, but such solutions engender real 
situations of violence and inter-communal warfare.
In the early years of the twentieth century, there were neither ‘Pal-
estinians’ nor a Palestinian national movement. This was not, as Joan 
Peters argued in From Time Immemorial, because Arabs only emigrated 
into Palestine from surrounding countries after 1920 to take advan-
tage of economic opportunities opened by Zionist settlement (Peters, 
1984)4 but because the indigenous occupants of the region the British 
conquered in 1917 and named Palestine had no conception of them-
selves as a single community. The millet system through which the Ot-
toman Empire had previously administered the region functioned by le-
gally dividing the population into autonomous religious enclaves which 
provided their members with legal identity and social support (see 
Asali, 1989: 206; Abu-Jaber, 1967 and Cohen and Lewis, 1978). Such 
a separation of communities “precluded concern for, or even interest 
in, any people but those of one’s own religious community” (Betts, 
1975: 112). Among the rural peasantry the tradition of a thousand 
year confl ict between Qais and Yemini provided a categorical opposi-
tion allowing communities caught up in local confl icts to articulate their 
mutual antagonism in terms drawn from the time of Muhammad (see 
Tamari, 1982: 181-185; Hourani, 1991: 30 and Lapidus, 1988: 363). In 
the cities families and clans perceived friends and enemies in terms not 
only of sectarian affi liation or alliances in long-running feuds but also 
of the heated debate between ‘Arab nationalists’ and ‘Ottomanists’ 
4 According to the first British census of Mandate Palestine (which took place in 
1922 and excluded the residents of Trans-Jordan) the total population of Palestine 
(excluding the occupying British forces) was 752,048 of which 589,177 persons were 
indigenous Muslims (including 103,000 Bedouin), 71,464 indigenous Christians and 
83,790 resident Jews, both indigenous and immigrant (Palestine, 1946: 141). The 
remaining 7,617 persons were for the most part foreign nationals residing in various 
Christian monasteries and institutions. Peters’ thesis, which in effect elaborates Golda 
Meir’s famous assertion that “Palestine is a land without a people for a people without 
a land”, has been soundly refuted by scholars in the U.K., U.S. and Israel (see Finkel-
stein, 1988: 61-63 for a citing of the critical scholarship).
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(see Muslih, 1988: 47-54 and 58-68; Lesch, 1979: 23-74; Antonius, 
1938: 79-148 and Hourani, 1991: 258-262). This multiplicity of avail-
able categories of identity served to articulate the disparate social and 
economic interests of relatively autonomous groups and thereby en-
sured that the community of ‘Palestinians’ could not recognise ‘itself’ 
as a community. 
The development of a sense of a specifi c land, and of a people 
whose identity devolved from their residence within its borders, needed 
a powerful impetus to free itself from the domains of familial, sectar-
ian, regional and economic identities and become amenable to integra-
tion within a nationalist discourse. That impetus was provided by the 
movement of substantial numbers of Jewish immigrants into the region 
in the period following the escalation of anti-semitic persecutions of 
Jews in Russia (1881-1882). Jewish immigration changed the face of 
the land; between 1881 and 1922 the Jewish population more than 
tripled (rising from 24,000 in 1881 to 84,000 by 1922) and immense 
tracts of land were bought up by the Jewish colonies, often from absen-
tee Arab landlords (Aaronsohn, 1983; Abu-Lughod, 1971 and Ruedy, 
1971). Arab peasants were driven off lands they had long inhabited and 
cultivated while others were denied their traditional grazing rights5. In 
1930 the Hope Simpson Report indicated that 29.4% of the rural popu-
lation of the Mandated area was landless (cited in Ruedy, 1971: 131). 
Many peasants emigrated to urban slums where they rarely found op-
portunities for employment. Throughout the twenties anti-Jewish riot-
ing frequently broke out in the cities — particularly on occasions when 
religious festivities generated crowds — and these disturbances would 
often spread to the countryside where villagers, sparked by rumours of 
Jewish attacks on Arabs, would take up arms against local Jewish settle-
ments (see  Lesch, 1979: 206). While there was a general sense among 
the rural peasantry and urban lumpenproletariat of being threatened by 
‘the Jews’ this perception remained inchoate. The disquiet felt by small 
merchants and craft producers about the incursion of Jewish competi-
5 Zionist insistence on avodah ivrit (Hebrew labour) meant that Jewish land could 
not be worked by non-Jews. As a result «settlers refused to let neighboring villagers 
and bedouin tribes continue customary pasture rights on their lands... Such misun-
derstandings over customary rights and over boundaries often resulted in violence» 
(Lesch 1979: 28). As early as 1886 the villagers of al-Yahudiyya, after a dispute over 
grazing rights, attacked the Jewish colony at Petah Tikva, killing one Jew, wound-
ing four others and inflicting considerable damage (Muslih, 1988: 71-72) and other 
armed clashes occurred between peasants and settlers in Tiberias (1901-1902) and in 
‘Affula (1911) when local Arabs discovered the land they lived on had been sold out 
from under their feet (ibid. 72).
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tors into their economic domains (Scholch, 1989: 243-245) was similarly 
only voiced among restricted circles of fellow tradespersons and thus 
remained unpoliticised. 
The Palestinian elites, which traditionally provided the political lead-
ership of the region, were unable to forge a vocabulary capable of des-
ignating Zionism as a common threat. Even when individual urban no-
tables recognised the need to resist the steady expansion of Zionist set-
tlement and immigration, they nonetheless attempted to articulate that 
threat in terms of earlier enunciations of identity and antagonism. Such 
expressions re-sparked antagonism between them and their potential 
allies across borders already inscribed in the Ottoman period by struggles 
between ‘Ottomanists’ and ‘Arabists’ and in the contemporary period 
by previous attempts to serve the interests of specifi c sectarian and fam-
ily groups through attacking those of others. British diplomacy further-
more convinced most Palestinian politicians “that the Arabs’ position 
in Palestine was not as severely threatened as they had initially feared, 
and therefore...[they should] grasp the available levers of power” (Lesch, 
1979: 99; see also Porath, 1974: 241f). 
The failure of the urban notables to provide a political vocabulary 
capable of enunciating the threat Zionist actions seemed to pose to the 
peasantry forced it to express its fear and its will to resist ‘Jewish’ vio-
lence in terms drawn from the idiom of its own traditions. In 1929, after 
the political initiatives of the urban leadership had collapsed in a fra-
cas of factionalisms, major rioting broke out in Jerusalem when Jewish 
militants celebrating the Jewish fast of Tisha Bav (the destruction of the 
Temple) asserted claims to the Wailing Wall on the eve of the Muslim 
feast of Mawlad al-Nabi (the birth of the Prophet Muhammad). In the 
following two weeks Jewish communities (both Zionist and non-Zion-
ist) were attacked throughout Palestine, leading to the destruction of 
four colonies as well as the murders of sixty Jewish residents of Hebron 
and twenty of Safed (see Lesch, 1979: 208-212 and Porath, 1974: 258-
273). The ‘Wailing Wall Riots’ were legitimated in Islamic terms but, as 
Nels Johnson points out, Islam provided a banner under which to fi ght 
not because of a deep investment of peasant subjectivity in religion but 
because religion was the only idiom able to join a peasantry divided by 
regional, factional, kin and clan ties into a united front:
There is no doubt that the idea of national interests — even the idea 
of nation itself — were foreign to the Palestinian peasantry. The very 
name ‘Palestine’ was new and uncomfortable, as witnessed by the ref-
erences to ‘Southern Syria’ as an appellation for the country in this and 
earlier periods. Ties of faction, clan and religion remained of greatest 
importance to the mass of Palestinians. Of these, faction, kin and clan 
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ties had no utility as a symbolic armature on which to mould an ideology 
for mass resistance. If anything, they were a hindrance....Islam, however, 
was highly appropriate; faced with a foreign enemy of two different reli-
gions who sought domination over the second holiest land of the Faith, 
Islam provided the cultural categories, in the conceptual fi eld of jihad 
[holy war], to encompass and organize resistance (Johnson, 1982: 57; 
see also Tamari, 1982).
Johnson, like Kalkas (1971) and Waines (1971), sees the Arab Revolt 
as a struggle mobilised by the device of religion towards ends which 
were inarticulately anti-colonial. The identity of the peasantry that rose 
up in 1929 — and later during the bloody Arab Revolt — was predicated 
on the antagonism it experienced as a consequence of British and Zion-
ist colonisation. The fi rst widespread manifestation of what later com-
mentators have come to call ‘Palestinian nationalism’ was thus neither 
Palestinian nor nationalist; it was purely oppositional. “Palestinian na-
tionalism was essentially nihilist in the sense that it contained no concept 
of the shape of future society but was concerned fi rst and foremost with 
the destruction of European hegemony” (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, cited in 
Waines, 1971: 220).
The Arab Revolt lacked either a coherent programme or a unifi ed 
leadership and, although it lasted more than three years, tended to frag-
ment into local skirmishes against perceived enemies who were often 
Palestinians on other sides of the Qays-Yemini divide. It also faced a well-
organised enemy. Widescale mobilisation of the British military through-
out Palestine defeated the revolt by killing and wounding between 4,007 
(Government of Palestine, 1946: 34-58) and 19,792 Palestinian casual-
ties (Khalidi, 1971: 846-849; see also Waines, 1971: 234) and destroying 
rural and urban centres of resistance through aerial bombing, collective 
demolitions, and ‘slum clearance’ programmes. Despite this victory the 
British, weakened by the six year attrition of the Second World War and 
by the subsequent anti-British liberation struggle of Zionist irregulars, 
pulled out of Palestine in May 1948. A year of war between Arab and 
Israeli forces followed resulting, by July of 1949, in the State of Israel 
occupying 73% of what had been Mandate Palestine (the remaining ter-
ritory — Gaza and the West Bank — was subsequently commandeered 
by Egypt and Jordan: see Hilal 1992). 711,000 (82.6%) of the 861,000 
Palestinian Arabs who had lived on the territory which became Israel 
were forced into exile outside its borders (Morris, 1987: 297-298). 
The nakbah (‘catastrophe’ in Palestinian Arabic) initiated nearly a dec-
ade’s surcease in the elaboration of Palestinian political identity. “Military 
defeat and the destruction of the fabric of their society forced Palestin-
ians to adjust either to varying degrees and forms of statelessness or to 
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citizenship in the new Israeli state” (Waines, 1971: 207). Underlying this 
was the loss of reference points around which to reconstitute identities. 
In the refugee camps this experience was perhaps most radical; the loss 
of lands and properties as well as the dispersal of families and communi-
ties left the exiles in a virtual limbo. Rosemary Sayigh, who worked in 
the Lebanese refugee camps, described the experience of exile from the 
familiar habitus:
The village — with its special arrangements of houses and orchards, 
its open meeting places, its burial ground, its collective identity — was 
built into the personality of each individual villager to a degree that 
made separation like an obliteration of the self.  In describing their fi rst 
years as refugees, camp Palestinians use metaphors like “death,” ”pa-
ralysis,” “burial,” “non-existence,” etc... (Sayigh, 1979: 107). 
Palestinians of urban origins sought refuge within a network of well-to-
do assimilationist expatriate communities scattered throughout the Middle 
East, Europe and the Americas (see Tamari, 1982: 180; Lustick 1980: 48 
and Brand, 1988: 1-21). Those who remained in Israel proper experienced 
radical disruptions of their previous ways of living under the severe regime 
of military control Israel imposed on its internal enemies (Lustick, 1980). 
Military authorities strove to enforce upon resident Palestinians even more 
radical forms of factionalisation than those which had prevailed before 
the upsurge of anti-colonialist mobilization (Lustick, 1989; Cohen, 1965; 
Asad, 1975 and Morris, 1987). As a result of these diverse experiences 
communities in the various milieu of Palestinian life began to reconstitute 
themselves in relation to their settings rather than with reference to a 
shared ‘Palestinian’ identity (Bowman, 1994a).
Curiously, it was after the destruction of any shared ‘Palestinian’ ex-
istence that the idea of a Palestinian identity per se came into play. The 
focus of this identity — the emblem which gave it coherence — was the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation. This extra-territorial organisation was 
originally established by the Arab League as a “gathering of traditional 
and infl uential notables” (Brand, 1988: 28) capable of voicing Palestinian 
interests in the councils of the League. However, the debacle of the 1967 
war — during which the rest of what had been Mandate Palestine was 
lost to Israel and another 200,000 Palestinians were made refugees — put 
paid to the illusion that Palestine could be redeemed by other Arab states 
and led to the ‘hijacking’ of the P.L.O. by Fatah, a political-commando 
group which had initially come together to resist Israel’s occupation of 
Gaza during the Suez Crisis (Brand, 1988: 26; see also Cobban, 1984 and 
Gresh, 1985 on the origins of the P.L.O.). As a guerrilla organisation dedi-
cated to military attacks on the State of Israel and its representatives, the 
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P.L.O. was able to stand for Palestinians in exile and under occupation as a 
representation of their own desires to fi ght back against the forces which 
had dispossessed them. For the fi rst time there was an objective correlate 
to Palestinians’ disparate desires for restitution. 
The fundamental reason the P.L.O. was able to serve as an icon of 
Palestinian identity was that it presented itself as representative of all of 
the diverse ‘Palestinian’ constituencies which had been disinherited by 
the creation of the Israeli state. Its programme was solely that of reinsti-
tuting a Palestinian national entity on the territory of Mandate Palestine, 
and it made no effort to articulate the nature of that future entity save 
to say that it would be ‘Palestinian.’ ‘Palestinians’ were able to recognise 
themselves as addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the P.L.O. insofar 
as that rhetoric did not specify any particular identity to its addressees 
other than their recognition of themselves as somehow stripped of their 
rights by the antagonism of the ‘Zionist entity.’ 
The ‘Palestine’ the P.L.O. promised to redeem was of necessity a 
place which had never really existed; any accurate evocation of the Pal-
estinian life which had preceded the loss of  the national territory was 
likely to evoke the inter-Palestinian confl icts which had helped to bring 
about that loss. Palestine as a ‘national homeland’ could thus only be 
conjured up through imagining a space in which the Palestinian people 
would have lived as a community if the enemy whose violence had cre-
ated that community had not existed. Since the nation itself had not 
existed as an imagined community before its enemy came into view, 
the image of the nation and its population without the enemy had in 
effect to be called up ex nihilo. Creating a Palestinian history which was 
not that of the struggle against Zionism demanded a reading back into 
pre-Israeli Palestinian history of a consensus which did not preexist that 
struggle. This is evident in Palestinian evocations of Jerusalem’s Old City 
as a place where Christian and Muslim Palestinians mutually respect-
ed and engaged in each other’s religious traditions ‘until the strangers 
came’ (see also Tamari, 1992 on the post-1967 elevation of the peasant 
into an icon of Palestinian identity from its previous status as an easy ob-
ject for the scorn of the urban intelligentsia). Palestinian community and 
Palestinian history were constituted through antagonism to an enemy 
which had, by stealing the ground on which a nation might have been 
built, destroyed the possibility of ‘Palestine’ before it had ever been con-
ceived.6 Thus any evocation of the nation’s pre-Zionist community had 
6 Insofar as it is the loss of the land of Palestine which particularly expresses the 
impossibility of creating a Palestinian nation, the British — who could, in anti-colonial-
ist rhetoric, have been seen as as much of an enemy as the Zionists — are not demon-
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to appear as something like Holbein’s anamorphic ‘The Ambassadors’ 
in which the blurred image at the heart of the picture is revealed, when 
looked at through a special lens, to be a death’s head. 
By presenting its programme as the inverse of that of the Zionist 
state builders the P.L.O. provided a space of identifi cation for all those 
who felt they had lost their identities as a result of Zionism’s success. 
They could see in the P.L.O.’s project the negation of the negation 
which had opened them to the various violences which affl icted them. 
In this national imaginary all Palestinians were ‘the same’ insofar as all 
of them — as Palestinians — could recognise their true selves as mutilat-
ed and denied by the violence of the Zionist enemy (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 129-130; and Bauman, 1989: 26-27). However, Palestinians in 
the various locales of their dispossession experienced the impossibility of 
Palestinian identity in a number of diverse ways and the particular forms 
of violence through which Zionism’s generalised antagonism was made 
manifest led Palestinians in various sites to elaborate strategies of sur-
vival and resistance specifi c to those violences (Bowman, 1993a, 1993b, 
and 1994a). The strategies of the fedayeen (guerrillas) of the Middle 
Eastern refugee camps differed in method and motive as substantially 
from those of the samidin (those who ‘stood fast’ on the land) of the 
Occupied Territories as they did from those of the bureaucrats, business-
men and cosmopolitan intellectuals of the urban diaspora. All worked to 
‘negate’ the activities of the enemy and its allies, but the forms of nega-
tion (from terroristic ‘erasure’ through passive resistance to intellectual 
and diplomatic revisionism) were formed in response to the specifi cities 
of the violences their formulators encountered. The P.L.O. subsidised and 
supported this diversity of communities and maintained their respective 
organisations (see Cobban, 1984: 26) and was thus able to claim a wide 
range of ‘defensive’ responses to Zionism as its own. Thus the actions of 
each community and its representative organisations answered to their 
respective needs to resist specifi c antagonisms while serving, for other 
communities in different situations, as signs of a generalised Palestinian 
resistance to the enemies of Palestine. Dispersion has meant that the 
actions each group has carried out have not interfered in any immediate 
way with the interests of other groups in other situations.
Ironically, concrete moves towards a settlement with Israel effected 
by the success of the intifada have shattered that general consensus by 
bringing into view the possibility of an actual State of Palestine. During 
ised today in the same manner as the Israelis. The British, after all, also lost the land to 
the Zionists.
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the long period of their exile, Palestinians have diversely imagined what 
their nation could be if the antagonisms which prevented it were to 
disappear. Whatever the specifi cities of these redemption images, every 
Palestinian saw a place for himself or herself in a ‘reborn’ state of Pal-
estine. However, as the project of Palestinian positivity begins to near 
fruition, the abstract concept of the ‘Palestine’ which was lost begins to 
take on discernable form. The concretisation of the ‘symbol’ of Palestine 
in the shape of a ‘statelet’ in the rump of what was Mandate Palestine 
gives little pleasure to those who fl ed the area when Israel took control 
of it. Now, with the P.L.O. negotiating with the Israeli State over which 
territories will be marked as ‘Palestinian’ and which permanently surren-
dered to Israel, many Palestinians from the diaspora and the territories 
themselves feel betrayed by a leadership they previously revered. Edward 
Said, one of those Palestinians who has watched the P.L.O. accept that 
his birthplace will never be Palestinian, accused the P.L.O. of betraying 
“the diaspora Palestinians, who originally brought Arafat and the PLO 
to power, kept them there, and are now relegated to permanent exile or 
refugee status” (Said, 1993: 5). Others within the Israeli Occupied Ter-
ritories who have been crippled by Israeli ‘rubber bullets’ or have seen 
friends and family members die fi ghting for Palestinian freedom now 
fear that they, and the country they suffered to bring into being, are be-
ing sold out by their leadership.
At the moment the boundary dividing the antagonist from the ob-
jects of its violence breaks down, the consensus on identity discursively 
structured around that antagonism loses its coherence. The wide fi eld 
of Palestinian experience was ‘fi xed’ by a perceived antagonism which 
made the various experiences of those who occupied it coherent in na-
tionalist terms. When perceptions of the nature of that antagonism are 
transformed by events such as that of the Oslo agreement, various oc-
cupants of the formerly ‘sutured’ fi eld fi nd that former enemies have 
become allies and, respectively, that former allies appear as antagonists. 
Here the apparent ‘disappearance’ of the constitutive antagonism can 
only lead to new searches for matrices of identifi cation. The responses of 
those in diaspora and those in the Territories who see Arafat as having 
‘sold them out’ are not radical reconfi gurations of Palestinian identity; in 
these instances the fantasy of the nation is still viable but persons who 
were previously deemed allies in the struggle to recover it are now seen 
as traitors who have gone over to the enemy. Largely ‘external’ secular 
nationalist groups like the Progressive and Democratic Fronts for the Lib-
eration of Palestine (P.F.L.P. and D.F.L.P.) as well as radical factions which 
have broken away from the P.L.O. ‘inside’ may now turn their violences 
against Fatah as well as against the Israelis, but they are still working 
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within the nationalist idiom. More salient evidence of the restructuring of 
identities is the growing infl uence of Hamas (an acronym for the ‘Islamic 
Resistance Movement’), an Islamicist movement which has declared that 
the secular nationalist strategies of the P.L.O. and its affi liates have al-
ways been doomed to failure because they fundamentally misconstrue 
the struggle against the Jews as a secular, rather than a religious, confl ict 
(on Hamas see Abu-Amr, 1993; Taraki, 1989; Legrain, 1990 and 1991; 
and Bowman, 1993a: 442-443 and 451-453). For Hamas activists the 
fi ght for the redemption of Palestine is a religious confl ict fought in the 
military and political domain “in the defense of Palestine, God’s blessed 
country and that of the prophets, eternal property (waqf) of the Islamic 
community” (Hamas, 1988: 11). In the Hamas Covenant Palestine’s le-
gitimate inhabitants are not ‘Palestinians’ but ‘Muslims’ — members of 
the Islamic umma (community). Hamas’s redefi nition of the struggle is 
thus as well a redefi nition of the imagined community engaged in that 
struggle. This shift in the fi eld of identity causes Christian Palestinians to 
query what sort of role they might play in a Palestinian entity in which 
a movement which tends to consider ‘Palestinian’ as synonymous with 
‘Islamic’ has substantial infl uence. As Palestinians who have played a 
central role in the national liberation struggle both inside the borders 
of Mandate Palestine and in diaspora, Christians can imagine playing 
an important part in building up a Palestinian state;7 as Christians living 
within a state which can be imagined as adopting Islamic identity and 
law, they have little if any prospects for the future.8 
7 Christian Palestinians were, before the ghurba, a significant and influential ele-
ment of the Palestinian intelligentsia because they owned substantial properties and had 
enjoyed quality educations provided them by foreign Christian churches supporting Chris-
tians in the ‘Holy Land.’ Subsequently they played a major role in the P.L.O. and affiliated 
resistance groups (Betts, 1975: 39-43). The importance of Christians to the Palestinian 
movement, in both exile and the Territories (where they make up only about 4.5% of the 
population), is evident not only in the central positions occupied by Christians (Naif Ha-
watmeh — leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine — and George 
Habash — leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — are both Chris-
tians as is Hannan Ashrawi — spokeswoman for the Palestinian team in the peace talks 
initiated in Madrid) but also in the efforts made by Yasir Arafat to foreground Christian 
participation in the nationalist movement (exemplified, perhaps, by his marriage to Suha 
Tawil, a Christian Palestinian who is the daughter of a major figure in the ‘internal’ leader-
ship of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine).
8 During the Mandate Period Palestinian Christians affiliated to the Greek Ortho-
dox Church organised Arab Orthodox Societies in order to overturn Greek control of 
Orthodox holy places located in Palestine (Bertram and Young, 1926). These societies 
have recently, in part because of the threat to the continuance of a Christian Palestinian 
presence in Palestine posed by Hamas, reconstituted themselves after forty-five years of 
dormancy. Such foregrounding of Christian identities by persons who until very recently 
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The Hamas solution, which strives to recuperate ‘older’ models of 
identity and thus to exclude both secularists and Christians from the 
imagined community, is one new imagining of the ‘nation.’ Another, 
that adopted by the secular rejectionists, is to assert that nothing has 
changed in the nature of Israeli antagonism but that a number of former 
co-nationals have become traitors and aligned with the enemy. The P.L.O. 
however asserts that the ‘enemy’ has tempered its violence and dropped 
its antagonism. Its suggestion that the boundary separating ‘Palestinian’ 
from ‘Israeli’ is no longer the most salient thing in Palestinian life opens 
two alternatives for Palestinian identifi cation. One is that national iden-
tity ceases to be the central focus in the lives of the people who come 
to make up the nation, and various more local forms of identifi cation 
struggle for representation within the parameters of a democratic state 
and in association with others (including Israelis) outside its boundaries. 
The other alternative is the advent of ‘civil war’ within the Palestinian 
community as the P.L.O. and its Palestinian opponents fi ght to decide 
the nature of the real ‘Palestine.’ On one side would be Arafat and the 
P.L.O. engaged in organising a repressive state mobilised against ‘inter-
nal traitors’ and on the other groups opposed to peace with Israel who 
view the P.L.O. as a tool expropriated by the enemy and turned against 
the Palestinian people. 
In the Palestinian instance we have seen how the violence of an 
other prompts both the ‘invention’ of a national identity and the articu-
lation of a national politics capable of promoting that identity; in the 
instance of the Former Yugoslavia we can observe how the politics of an 
already established state are discursively transformed through the elabo-
ration and promulgation of stories of the violence of ‘others’ previously 
perceived as neighbours and co-nationals.
The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was an explicitly 
anti-nationalist state formed in response to the crises nationalisms 
had forced on Yugoslavia before and during the Second World War. 
Between December 1918 and the Nazi invasion of April 1941, an 
earlier ‘Yugoslavia’ — known as “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes” — had consolidated the diverse national movements of 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the framework of a single state. 
This formation had, however, been highly unstable; the representa-
tives of the three narods (‘nations’ or ‘peoples’) who had joined to 
create it had different and in large part incompatible reasons for unit-
felt secure in asserting Palestinian identities reveals a substantial shift in where antago-
nism is perceived to originate.
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ing. Slovenes wanted a state to guarantee political autonomy to Slov-
ene-speaking peoples formerly under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; 
Croats wanted self-determination for Croat-speaking Catholics which 
entailed independence from that same empire as well as protection 
from the expansionist nationalism of the Hungarian ‘Magyars’; Serbs 
wanted all Serbs — especially those living outside the borders of the Ser-
bian kingdom established in 1867 after Ottoman dominion was thrown 
off9 — to enjoy union under a single state (Pavlowitch, 1988: 2-4). The 
kingdom’s twenty-three years were scored with assassinations, coups 
and the violences of nationalist movements fi ghting to seize the state 
for their own respective peoples, but it survived until the Nazis broke 
up Yugoslavia and diversely promoted incompatible national aspira-
tions as a means of dividing and ruling the area10. The consequences 
were dire: the Ustaša operated death camps within which massive 
numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croat communists and demo-
crats were brutally slaughtered; Ustaša and Cˇetnici (‘Chetniks’) respec-
tively carried out wholesale massacres of Serbian and Muslim civilian 
populations; and the communist partisans, ‘cleaning up’ as the war 
closed, massacred large numbers of ‘Chetnik’ Serbs and Croat and 
Slovene ‘traitors’. All in all, at least 1,014,000 of a pre-war popula-
tion of 17,186,000 were killed during the war (Banac, 1992: 18) and, 
according to Paul Garde, eighty percent of the deaths were infl icted 
on Yugoslavs by Yugoslavs (Garde, 1992). “During the Second World 
War the conquerors not only destroyed the state, but they set its com-
ponents against each other in an unprecedented way, for never be-
fore had there been physical confl ict among the Yugoslav peoples as 
such” (Pavlowitch, 1988: 14). 
Tito, who had mobilised wartime resistance through “a National Lib-
eration Anti-Fascist Front of all the peoples of Yugoslavia regardless of 
9 The salient issue then, as now, was the Krajina, a region of present-day Eastern 
Croatia which had been the frontier line between the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish 
empires and had been populated not only by Serbs fleeing the Turks but also by Serbs 
who were recruited into the area by the Austro-Hungarians after 1689 to serve as a de-
fensive shield against the Ottomans along that borderline (Hammel, 1993a: 37; see also 
Hammel, 1993b). 
10 Slovenia and the Dalmatian coast were ceded to Italy which promoted fascism as 
an explicit ideology rather than Slovene nationalism per se (Clissold, 1968: 209) but in 
the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ the German administration fomented the viciously 
anti-Serb and anti-Jewish Croatian nationalism of Ante Pavelicˇ and his Ustaša while 
in Serbia the Nazis promoted a loose confederation of Serbian nationalists led by Mi-
lan Nedicˇ and Dimitrije Ljoticˇ which was frequently backed by nominally anti-Nazi yet 
fiercely nationalist and anti-Muslim Cˇetnici led by Dracˇa Mihajlovicˇ. 
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party or religion” (Clissold, 1966: 216), maintained emphasis on pan-
Yugoslav confederation in the post-war period by stressing bratstvo i 
jedinstvo (‘brotherhood and unity’). When Tito fi rst used the phrase in 
1942 it was not simply ‘brotherhood and unity’ but ‘armed brotherhood 
and unity’ (Godina, 1998) and throughout his long rule Tito stressed 
that the space of Yugoslav federation was a good space endangered 
by an antagonistic outside. That the border between inside and outside 
was Titoism’s essential ideological plank is made clear by the fact that, as 
in Orwell’s Nineteen eighty-four, the external threat continuously shifted 
its character and its source. From the initial opposition to fascism which 
gave Tito and the partisans power, Tito oscillated over the years between 
emphasising “the Soviet threat” (Auty, 1966: 247) and the threat of ‘the 
capitalist West.’ While the interests of the nation — and of the various 
peoples who constituted it — were always presented as threatened by 
the conspiracies of a labile set of enemies located outside Yugoslavia’s 
territorial, and ideological, borders (Pavlowitch, 1988: 22-25), there was 
no indeterminacy about what threatened Yugoslavia from within. Na-
tionalism for Tito’s Yugoslavia was a symptom of what the deconstruc-
tivists refer to as a “constitutive outside” (see Derrida, 1974: 39-44 and 
Staten, 1985: 16-19); it provided evidence of the attempts of external 
enemies to subvert the integrity of the space internal to the federation. 
Throughout all the discursive transformations of the external enemy, na-
tionalism remained fi rmly fi xed as the way external antagonisms were 
made manifest ‘inside’ through the perfi dy of ‘domestic traitors.’ 
Communist policy did not outlaw national identity but attempted 
to discursively reformulate it. For Titoism nationalism expressed a po-
litico-economical will to power through which “one society aspires to 
dominate, exploit or despoil the others” (Ramet, 1992: 55). The state 
therefore worked to dissolve the national aspirations through, on the 
one hand, devolving economic power to the community level where 
worker’s collectives would cohere around aspirations for mutual eco-
nomic betterment (see Simmie, 1991 on self-management) and, on the 
other hand, breaking up the political and economic power blocs of the 
dominant ‘republics’ (particularly that of Serbia) through the creation of 
new nationalities (such as those of the ‘Macedonians’, ‘Montenegrins’ 
as well as the ‘Muslims’, later enshrined in the 1967 constitution — see 
Allcock, 1992: 278, 282-283) and the devolution of authority to au-
tonomous regions (as with ‘the Vojvodina’ and ‘Kosova’ which were 
progressively carved out of Serbia between the early 1960s and 1972). 
The federal state protected the rights of narods (nations) and narodnosti 
(national minorities) and strove, through differential policies of appro-
priation and distribution of resources, to lift the poorer republics up to 
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the economic level of the wealthier ones. Titoism was founded on the 
assumption that economic and political homogenisation would lead to 
the withering away of national differences (and hence of nationalisms) 
and the enshrinement of a workers’ state. 
Paul Schoup points out, however, that the system could only work 
“as long as the communist system in Yugoslavia retained its revolu-
tionary dynamic, or was perceived to be imperilled from without” 
(Shoup, 1992: 52). In the 1980s that dynamic collapsed and the exter-
nal threat which consolidated the inside came to be interpreted as the 
threat of the state’s policies to the good interior of the nations them-
selves. The death of Tito and the collapse of the Yugoslav economy chal-
lenged the hegemony of Yugoslav ideology. In the popular imagination 
Tito had been “a symbol of a Yugoslav style that had less to do with 
socialism, self-management and non-alignment than with freedom of 
movement, the advent of the consumer society, and fending for one-
self” (Pavlowitch, 1988: 27). His death coincided with the collapse of 
the debt-ridden economy which had artifi cially maintained the style of 
living he represented. In the early eighties international debts began to 
be called in and harsh IMF policies were imposed on Yugoslavia. As a 
result unemployment had surged by 1984 to fi fteen percent, infl ation 
was topping sixty two percent and the average standard of living had 
dropped thirty percent from its 1980 level (see Pavlowitch, 1988: 31 and 
Mencinger, 1991: 76-79). Central state policies began to be seen not to 
defend the people and their standard of living but to be attacking them; 
in the early eighties a wide range of assertions — expressed in idioms 
ranging from economic and political to those of art and culture (Mast-
nak, 1991) — began to articulate perceptions of the antagonism of the 
state to the people.
These expressions did not, however, fall ‘naturally’ into a nation-
alist idiom. Tito’s anti-nationalist policies and the modernization proc-
esses which had accompanied them had to a large extent submerged 
the idiom of national identity beneath a fl ood of contending discourses 
on selfhood. Tito’s above-mentioned ‘invention’ of nationalities had suc-
ceeded in dispersing identities across a wider national fi eld than had op-
erated when one was either Slovene, Croat or Serb. The ethnic isolation 
which had characterised largely rural Yugoslavia prior to the foundation 
of the communist state had in large part been dispelled by rural migra-
tion to the cities and to areas ‘outside’ Yugoslavia where money could 
be earned (Pavlowitch, 1988: 22). In the cities a trans-Yugoslav cosmo-
politanism had developed around work, education and cross-marriage 
(Cottrell, 1990). The violence of the state was not initially perceived as 
infl icted upon one’s national being; it appeared, in a much less ethno-
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centric manner, to attack people’s abilities to earn and save money, play 
or listen to rock music, call for greater representation in political forums, 
and so on. All Yugoslavians were affl icted by the declining standard of 
living and the clumsy moves of the state to enforce cultural and eco-
nomic homogeneity during this period. Within the republics the state’s 
antagonism to personal fulfi lment struck at all residents, regardless of 
whether or not they were of the ethnic majority. 
The discursive shift to nationalist discourse occurred through the 
intervention of republican politicians who created ‘national’ platforms 
from whence they could launch bids to increase their holds on power in 
a Yugoslav state characterised, after the death of Tito, by a vacuum at 
the political centre. To gain power they had to consolidate their holds on 
the dispersed dissatisfactions of the “apocalypse culture” (Ramet, 1985) 
which followed the breakdown of Titoist hegemony, and they did so 
by inventing ethnically-defi ned constituencies to represent. Slobodan 
Miloševicˇ, a banker who became head of the Belgrade city council in 
1984 before meteorically rising to the post of president of Serbia in 
1987, used Tito’s own rhetoric of ‘internal enemies’ to create a domain 
of ‘Serbian interests’ for which he could speak. Through a carefully me-
diated media campaign he alerted Serbs within the Serbian republic to 
the danger posed to their well-being and rights by the presence of Ko-
sovans (ethnic Albanians who made up ninety percent of the popula-
tion of the autonomous region of Kosovo) within the borders of Ser-
bia. Kosova was the poorest region of Yugoslavia and the substantial 
fi nancial and political support Kosovans had been granted by the state 
to raise their standards of living could be cited, after the disappearance 
of Yugoslavia’s wealth, as a ‘drain’ on the well-being of other republics. 
Miloševicˇ, however, did not limit his attacks on the Kosovans to the do-
main of the economic, but accused them of being blood enemies of the 
Serbian people per se. Miloševicˇ repeatedly announced an active assault 
by Kosovans on the ‘body’ of Serbia: they were said to rape Serbian girls 
as well as nuns in the Orthodox monasteries of Kosova (monasteries 
which stand in the Serbian imaginary as monuments to a Greater Serbia 
destroyed by the late fourteenth century Ottoman invasion), to raze and 
desecrate those Orthodox holy places, and to drive Serbs living in Kosova 
out of their homes so that they could be taken over as residences for 
the fast-breeding Kosovan population as well as for the illegal Albanian 
immigrants they encouraged (Salecl, 1993: 79-81).
Miloševic turned the Titoist rhetoric of internal enemies to nationalist 
use by suggesting that Albanians ‘inside’ Serbia would make it impossi-
ble for Serbian individuals to live as Serbs on Serbian ground. The threat 
of Kosova was not explicitly a threat to the lives of Serbs but a threat to 
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their ability to manifest their national characteristics. Images of raped 
women, whether laity or nuns, struck at the heart of a strongly patri-
archal society in suggesting enemies could ‘steal’ the ‘vessels’ through 
which, in the case of lay women, men transmitted their identity to future 
generations and, in the case of nuns, the wider community of Serbs 
established kinship links with God by ‘marrying’ their sisters to Christ.11 
Stories of Serbs driven out of their homes by rapacious Kosovans simi-
larly assaulted the sensed security of a community in which family and 
family life were central markers of identity while the ‘attacks’ by Mus-
lims on Orthodox sanctuaries extended this insecurity to the cherished 
domain of religion. Through evoking Kosovan violence towards Serbian 
attempts to inscribe a Serbian identity on Serbia’s land, Miloševicˇ recon-
stituted ‘Serbia’ as a locus of identity and ‘Serbian interests’ as a focus 
of concern. 
Kosovans were, however, only the internal agents of an external 
enemy. Their assault against Serbia and Serbians was, according to 
Miloševicˇ, backed by a ‘Vatican-Comintern conspiracy’ (Ramet, 1992: 
230) which linked the communist state (which had ‘stolen’ the Serbian 
homeland of Kosova from Serbia) with the Catholic Church (which was 
said to have sponsored the Ustaša).12 Miloševicˇ and his ideologues ef-
fected a further discursive shift whereby the Kosovans — many of whom 
had, under Ottoman occupation, opportunistically converted to Islam 
(Norris, 1993: 271-277) — became the same as the ‘Muslim Turks.’ Ko-
sova was not only an autonomous region within Serbia but was also 
where the defeat of the Serbian armies of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovicˇ by 
Ottoman forces on the 15th of June 1389 initiated the collapse of the 
short-lived Serbian Empire Stephen Dušan had established only forty-
three years before (Darby 1966: 96-102). Miloševicˇ characterised his 
11 Rape was used by Bosnian Serbs as a means of terrorizing their Bosnian foes 
after the war had spread to Bosnia in 1991. The logic of expropriation of the bodies 
of the enemy, already evident in anti-Kosovan propaganda, was there turned against 
non-Serbs. Women were mass raped until they became pregnant, after which they were 
kept in captivity until they bore the rapists’ children. Not only was the Serb theft of their 
enemies’ women thus monumentalised, but the Serbs were also thus able to re-enact 
an ancient tactic celebrated in the Serbian epics which chronicled their ancient struggle 
against the Ottomans. In the BBC2 ‘Bookmark’ programme entitled “Serbian Epics” Ra-
dovan Karadcˇicˇ, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, sings to the accompaniment of the guzla 
(a single-stringed bowed instrument) the lines “beautiful Turkish woman, your child will 
be baptised by a priest.”
12 The embodiment of this anti-Serb cabal was, of course, Tito himself who was 
both a communist and a Croat (both Comintern and Vatican) and had occupied the 
position — dictator of the Yugoslav state — which Miloševicˇ intended to usurp (see 
Ramet, 1992: 226).
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struggle to strip Kosovans of their political rights and regional autonomy 
as yet another “battle for Kosovo [which]...we shall win despite the fact 
that Serbia’s enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with 
those in the country” (speech given by Miloševicˇ on 19 November 1988, 
quoted in Ramet, 1992: 230). The twentieth century struggle to suppress 
Kosovan autonomy thus became a continuation of the struggle against an 
enemy which, six hundred years before, had stripped Serbia of an empire 
which had once stretched from Bosnia to the Gulf of Corinth. Miloševicˇ, 
by reminding Serbs of the Greater Serbia which had been stolen by the na-
tion’s enemies (Cˇicˇek, 1990 on ‘nation theft’), thus legitimated and popu-
larised his simultaneous drive to strip Montenegro and Macedonia of their 
republican independence and to outlaw the autonomy of the Vojvodina 
(these regions, like Kosova, were parts of the Serbia Tito had dismem-
bered in his anti-nationalism project — see Aspeslagh, 1992; Canak, 1993; 
Cegorovic, 1993; and Poulton, 1991: 39-56). Through the evocation of 
the nation’s loss and the people’s enemies Miloševicˇ was not only able to 
constitute a Serbian positivity — a repertoire of Serbian traditions and an 
agenda of Serbian aspirations grounded in a former wholeness — but also 
a popular following which saw in their leader’s discourse both the ‘real’ 
causes of their sufferings and the means of expunging them. 
Whereas the Titoist programme had been ‘supra-national’ in its at-
tempt to create a domain of identifi cation which transcended and en-
compassed the space of national identifi cation (Godina, 1998), Miloševicˇ’s 
programme was to subsume ‘Yugoslavia’ within a nationalist discourse. 
Miloševicˇ had no intention of withdrawing Serbia from Yugoslavia; he 
instead intended that Serbia would dominate Yugoslavia so that all the 
Serbs scattered throughout the federal state — forty two percent of Serbs 
lived outside of the republic of Serbia (Pavlowitch, 1988: 25) — would be 
united within a single state serving their interests. Miloševicˇ, seventy years 
after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
was attempting once again to work out the Serbian nationalist agenda of 
making Yugoslavia over into a Serbian state. 
Miloševicˇ’s rise to power coincided with the mobilisation, in Slovenia 
and Croatia, of ‘democratic oppositions’ which were to contend for re-
publican power in the fi rst Yugoslav elections allowing non-communist 
participation. Their campaign rhetorics were not grounded on calls for 
reforms and changes in the Yugoslav constitution but on highly nation-
alistic platforms arguing that the Slovene and Croatian peoples were 
being destroyed by the communist state. I was in Ljubljana during the 
campaigns for the Slovene election and can remember non-communist 
campaign stations bedecked with pictures of caves (foibe) fi lled with the 
bones of persons killed during the massacres which had taken place at 
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the close of the Second World War (Ballinger, forthcoming). Although 
the persons the partisans had killed came from various national group-
ings and political movements, the captions on the photographs said 
simply “This is what They did to Us.” The assertion was direct — ‘the 
communists killed Slovenes en masse as they came to power’ — and the 
implication needed no further elaboration — ‘and subsequent policies 
from the communist state towards the Slovenes has been a continuation 
of national genocide by other means.’ This rhetoric called on people as 
Slovenes to recognise that communist violence towards Slovenes in the 
past was the same as the state’s violence towards them in the present. 
Antipathy towards communist policies in the economic and social do-
main thus became articulated as justifi able defensive responses to an ex-
ternal power motivated by the desire to exterminate the Slovene nation. 
In turn, the Slovene nation was constituted as a good thing because the 
enemy wished to deny it to the people. Slovenia, which had never previ-
ously moved to constitute itself as an independent nation, committed 
itself between 1990 and the outbreak of war in 1991 to a programme 
of nationalist realisation.
In Croatia Franjo Tudjman’s Christian Democratic Community party 
(the HDZ) also paraded pictures of bone piles and asserted these were 
not the skeletons of ‘Nazis’ or ‘quislings’ but of ‘Croatian victims’ of 
communist brutality. Tudjman, however, in constituting a nationalist po-
sition for Croatian identifi cation, drew upon a more salient articulation 
of the ‘us’ which opposed the communist ‘other.’ Croatia had had a 
recent national positivity which had been destroyed by the communist 
state, and Tudjman reclaimed the quisling Ustaša ‘Independent State of 
Croatia’ as an “expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian 
people for its own independent state” (Tudjman quoted in Denich, 1991: 
6). Tudjman and the ideologues of the HDZ campaigned for the repub-
lican leadership (and later for Croatian independence) with the — not 
inaccurate — assertion that the Yugoslav state had existed to prevent 
Croatians from enjoying their nationhood. Tudjman claimed that, since 
1945, Titoist policies had served unjustly to ‘punish’ the Croatian people 
for attempting to realise themselves as a nation. Equating contempo-
rary Croatian aspirations towards nationhood with those of the Ustaša, 
Tudjman simultaneously equated the enemies of the Ustaša with the 
enemies of the contemporary Croats. Yugoslavia was, then, not simply 
a communist state opposed to nationalism but was a state dominated 
by Serbs who wanted nothing more than to destroy their national en-
emies, the Croats. To fi ght back against Serbian ‘aggression’ against the 
Croatian people Tudjman and the HDZ adopted the same anti-Serbian 
rhetorics and programmes their Ustaša predecessors had utilised (with 
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Nazi encouragement) to defeat the ‘Serbian threat’. Tudjman and the 
HDZ called for an independent Croatia which would expand to Croatia’s 
‘historical borders’ (the borders, encompassing most of Bosnia Herçe-
govina, of the ‘Independent State of Croatia’), would fl y a national fl ag 
on which the red star of the Yugoslavia would be replaced by the ‘chess-
board’ pattern (šahovnica) which had graced the fl ag of ‘Independent 
State of Croatia,’ and would purge the Croatian language of the pollu-
tion of ‘Serbian’ words.
The HDZ’s nationalist programme, articulated almost exclusively in 
anti-Serbian terms, panicked the Serbs of the Krajina who saw in the 
post-communist resurgence of all the gestures and policies of the Ustaša 
a ‘return of the repressed’ threatening to infl ict on them the same geno-
cide they had suffered in the early nineteen forties. They too had their 
bone caches.13 Krajina Serbs invited local and Serbian journalists and 
photographers into caves where the skeletons of Serbs massacred by 
Ustaša had been cached. These monuments to the fate of Croatian 
Serbs under the Ustaša functioned locally to legitimate Croatian Serb 
resistance to the new Croatian order and attempts to drive out local 
Croats and constitute a Serbian mini-state within Croatia. They simul-
taneously served within Serbia itself to substantiate Miloševicˇ’s claims 
that the Croats were the same as the Ustaša. Denich points out that the 
consequent ethnic hatred of Croats by Serbs in Serbia was based on this 
identifi cation rather than on history: 
while the rebellions of Serbian communities in Croatia were moti-
vated by their own memories of the Ustasha [sic] regime, now eerily 
reincarnated in the declarations and symbols of the new nationalist 
government...the inhabitants of Serbia itself had not experienced 
the Ustasha [sic] terror, and their wartime suffering had come at 
the hands of the Germans and other foreign occupiers, rather than 
Croats. Accordingly, there was little history of overt anti-Croat feeling 
throughout Serbia (Denich, 1991: 11).
Serbs in Serbia, already infl amed by tales of the violence infl icted 
on fellow Serbs within the borders of the Serbian republic, were now 
offered evidence of what fate awaited Serbs outside the republican bor-
ders at the hands of other ethnic enemies. Miloševicˇ’s rhetoric about 
Albanian threats to a Serbian presence in Kosova made it possible for 
13 The wealth of bones in post-war Yugoslavia was fortuitous. As Bloch indicates 
in his work on Madagascar funerary practices (Bloch, 1982 and 1989: 170), bones em-
blematise undifferentiated community because they are what remains after individuat-
ing characteristics have rotted away. 
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Serbs to think in terms of a Serbian homeland (albeit one made palpable 
only through the evocation of its loss); his conjuring up of the ‘future 
holocaust’ facing the Serbs in the Croatian krajina enabled Serbs to im-
agine a Greater Serbia unifying the ‘Serbian people’ through the evoca-
tion of that people’s extermination (Bowman, 1994b).
Benedict Anderson, in describing the process of ‘imagining commu-
nity’, posits that one imagines one’s own situation (as, for instance, a 
newspaper reader) reproduced in that of thousands — or millions — of 
others. Through that imaginative extension, Anderson claims, one is able 
to conceive of a nation of others ‘like oneself’ (see Anderson, 1991: 35-36 
and, for a critique, Bowman, 1994a). In the republics of what was Yu-
goslavia the imagining of community came about instead through im-
agining oneself as like others. Audiences, addressed in terms marked as 
‘ethnic’ by diacritics of language, script, cultural and historical reference 
or site of address, were ‘interpolated’ into national subject positions by 
their recognition that it was they who were being addressed (see Althusser, 
1971: 152-165). Subsequently the addressee was ‘worked on’ by a narra-
tive which focussed his or her diffuse and often inchoate anxieties upon 
powerful and graphic images of violences infl icted by the members of other 
communities on the bodies and properties of fellow ‘Serbs’, ‘Croats’ or 
‘Slovenes.’ Here the violences the addressee encountered in his or her 
life were the same as those which the national enemy infl icted on the 
bodies of the tormented objects of the discourse. Recognition that one’s 
own apparently minor sufferings were in fact premonitions of the greater 
violence the enemy intended to infl ict on all who shared one’s national 
identity impelled the addressee to defensively join in infl icting violence 
on that other under the inspired leadership of those politicians who had 
‘recognised’ the real nature of those violences and the implication of the 
previous order in their infl iction.
The rhetorics of violence which carried Yugoslavian politics into the 
nineteen nineties could only lead to war between the peoples they con-
stituted. The character of the Serb-Croat confl ict which began in the 
Krajina and spread to Bosnia-Herçegovina (where the Bosnian Muslims 
became legitimate objects of nationalist violence either because they 
were the ‘historic enemies’ of the Serbs or because they impeded the 
creation of ‘Greater Croatia’) need not be elaborated here; its genocidal 
brutality is still displayed daily in the Western media. Suffi ce it to say that 
evidence of the violence of the enemy, which proliferate in situations of 
warfare, fuels the passionate need to extirpate the source of that vio-
lence. The ethnic fantasies which sparked the war have given it all the 
characteristics of a millenarian struggle in which the signs of the other 
(whether they be markers and agencies of individuality such as the eyes, 
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noses and genitals which are carved from the bodies of the enemies 
or of a cultural presence like the houses, churches and mosques which 
must be desecrated before being destroyed and built over — see Bow-
man, 1994b) must be fully effaced so that the ‘real’ national territory, 
which can only be imagined through the absolute absence of the other 
which prevents it, can be ‘reinstituted.’
More hopeful is perhaps the fact that in Slovenia, where the drive 
to national realization was fuelled by an antipathy to the communist 
state rather than to other ethnic communities, nationalist xenophobia 
disintegrated when Yugoslavian hegemony dissolved. During the 1990 
elections the victorious anti-communist Demos coalition had proposed 
no policies other than a radical acceleration of Slovene detachment from 
the federal state. That goal was achieved with the Slovene defeat of 
the Yugoslav National Army in the four day war.14 Subsequently Demos 
was left with a politics which could not be legitimated if there were 
not an enemy to blame for everything. Between the withdrawal of the 
J.N.A. and the spring of 1992, when Slovenia was welcomed into the 
community of nations, the Demos coalition attempted to maintain the 
discourse on the enemy which had brought it to power. It cracked down 
on democratic dissent within the state (a state which, when it was still a 
Yugoslav republic, had prided itself on its tradition of dissidence) claim-
ing that Demos “directly represented the general, i.e. national interest” 
(Mastnak, 1991: 60). It furthermore attempted to maintain national-
ist antagonism towards non-Slovenes by repressing minority rights and 
curtailing the fl ow of refugees from the escalating war to the south. 
Perhaps most signally, it stripped women of their long-established right 
to abortion on demand on the grounds that ‘Slovenia is a tiny country 
surrounded by enemies, and every Slovene child is a potential fi ghter 
for the defense of Slovenia’ (see Gaber, 1993: 62; and Salecl, 1993). A 
substantial number of women, however, felt less threatened by an im-
palpable external antagonist than they did by Demos’s attempt to abro-
gate their powers over their bodies. This new articulation of antagonism 
engendered numerous pro-abortion groups which joined with parties 
representing other groups (minorities, leftists, homosexuals, etcetera) 
experiencing the ruling coalition’s policies as threatening. In the spring 
14 The Slovene defense force met the Yugoslav National Army as an invading for-
eign army while, according to people I spoke with in Belgrade while the confrontation 
was still going on, the J.N.A. soldiers saw the ‘invasion’ as a simple policing action. 
Fatalities among the J.N.A. forces were several times higher than those among the 
Slovenes (total casualty figures range between sixty and one hundred), and more than 
2,000 J.N.A. soldiers were taken prisoner (Ramet, 1992: 256). 
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of 1992 this popular front succeeded in overturning Demos’s parliamen-
tary majority and took power as a liberal coalition concerned in large 
part with local issues. With the loss of an enemy perceived as common, 
the nationalist community that enemy’s violence made possible simply 
dissolved (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 144) and people began to enunciate 
their encounters with frustration and violence in situational terms rather 
than in terms of a global antagonism: 
The failure of the totalitarian elements to prevail in the battle for 
the right to choose, which coincided with the decreasing popular sense 
of an external threat and the achievement of international recognition 
of the statehood of Slovenia, tipped the scales away from totalitar-
ian democracy and led to the collapse of the Demos coalition’s rule 
over Slovenia. In spite of elements working to increase the power of 
totalitarian and national homogenizing tendencies, Slovenia now has 
a fairly good chance of building an identity based on civil rights rather 
than on the totalitarian xenophobia of a ‘genuine’ Slovene nationalism 
(Gaber, 1993: 62).
The dissolution of the nationalist imaginary in the post-war Slov-
ene instance, like that which threatens the solidarity of the Palestinian 
community in the wake of the autonomy agreements effected at Oslo, 
provides evidence of the necessity of the violence of a national enemy 
for the maintenance of nationalist solidarity and commitment. Identity 
is not a fi xed thing but is labile and prone to situational reformulation. 
In the absence of perceptions of a shared threat which renders all the 
members of a community ‘the same’, those persons are likely to reorgan-
ise the discourses which constitute their identities in ways which they 
deem appropriate to the diverse challenges to their respective integri-
ties posed by the wide range of situations they encounter. Rhetorics of 
nationalist identity can only function for as long as the subjects they 
seek to interpellate can recognise in the ‘national enemy’ the source 
of the violences which affl ict them in their everyday lives. When the 
constitutive violence of the other appears to disappear the discourse 
which forges a diverse community into a defensive bloc fails to offer 
convincing interpretations of the fi eld of sociality to the subjects it ad-
dresses. Henceforth those subjects are forced to seek new ways of con-
ceiving not only their own identities but also those of their enemies. 
Such new ‘imaginaries’ may — if the nationalist project of state forma-
tion has been successful — operate within the horizon of the national 
community, but within that horizon there are spaces for many diverse 
articulations of identity. The politics of difference which characterises the 
space of the national community cannot, however, be asserted within 
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the domain of the nationalist imaginary where all identity devolves from, 
and is forestalled by, the violence of the other.
References
AARONSOHN, R. (1983) “Building the land: stages in the fi rst Aliya colonization 
(1882-1904)”. Jerusalem Cathedra: Studies in the History, Archaeology, Ge-
ography and Ethnography of the Land of Israel. ed. L. Levine. Jerusalem: Yad 
Izhak Ben Zvi Institute. 236-279.
ABU-AMR, Z. (1993) “Hamas: a historical and political background”. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. XXII. 4. 5-19.
ABU-JABER, K. (1967) “The millet system in the nineteenth century Ottoman em-
pire”. The Muslim World. LVII:3. 213-223.
ABU-LUGHOD, J. (1971) “Demographic Transformation of Palestine”. The Trans-
formation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Is-
raeli Confl ict. ed. I. Abu-Lughod. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
ALLCOCK, J. (1992) “Rhetorics of nationalism in Yugoslav politics”. Yugoslavia 
in Transition. ed. J. Allcock, J. Horton and M. Milivojevic. London: Berg. 
276-296.
ALTHUSSER, L. (1971) “Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards 
an investigation)”. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. ed. London: Ver-
so. pp. 121-173.
ANDERSON, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism. Revised. London: Verso.
ANTONIUS, G. (1938) The Arab Awakening: the Story of the Arab National Move-
ment. London: Hamish Hamilton.
ASAD, T. (1975) “Anthropological texts and ideological problems: an analysis of 
Cohen on Arab villages in Israel”. Review of Middle East Studies. I. 1-40.
ASALI, K. J. (1989) “Jerusalem under the Ottomans (1516-1831 AD)”. Jerusalem 
in History. ed. K. J. Asali. London: Scorpion. 200-227.
ASPESLAGH, R. (1992) “Trianon dissolved: the status of Vojvodina reconsidered?”. 
The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Yearbook of European Studies 5). ed. M. 
van den Heuvel and J. Siccama. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
AUTY, P. (1966) “The post-war period”. A Short History of Yugoslavia from Ear-
ly Times to 1966. ed. S. Clissold. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
236-266.
BALLINGER, P. “The politics of submersion: history, collective memory, and ethnic 
group boundaries in Trieste”. Unpublished manuscript. 
BANAC, I. (1992) “the origins and development of the concept of Yugoslavia 
(to 1945)”. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. ed. M. van den Heuvel and 
J. G. Siccama. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 1-22.
BAUMAN, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press.
BERTRAM, S. A. and J. W. A. YOUNG. (1926) The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusa-
lem: Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of Palestine 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives142   142 4/1/07   11:20:48
 CONSTITUTIVE VIOLENCE AND RHETORICS OF IDENTITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ... 143
to Inquire and Report Upon Certain Controversies Between the Orthodox Pa-
triarchate of Jerusalem and the Arab Orthodox Community. London: Hum-
phrey Milford.
BETTS, R. (1975) Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study. Athens: Lycabettus 
Press.
BLOCH, M. (1982) “Death, women and power”. Death and the Regeneration 
of Life. ed. M. Bloch and J. Parry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
211-230.
BLOCH, M. (1989) “Almost eating the ancestors”. Ritual, History and Power: Se-
lected Papers in Anthropology. ed. London: Athlone Press. 166-186.
BOWMAN, G. (1993a). “Nationalizing the sacred: shrines and shifting identities in 
the Israeli- occupied territories”. Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropo-
logical Institue. XXVIII. 3. 431-460.
Bowman, G. (1993b) “Tales of the lost land: Palestinian identity and the for-
mation of nationalist consciousness”. Space and Place: Theories of Identity 
and Location. ed. E. Carter, J. Donald and J. Squires. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 73-100.
BOWMAN, G. (1994a) “’A country of words’: conceiving the Palestinian nation 
from the position of exile”. The Making of Political Identities. ed. E. Laclau. 
London: Verso. 138-170.
BOWMAN, G. (1994b) “Xenophobia, phantasy and the nation: the logic of eth-
nic violence in Former Yugoslavia”. Anthropology of Europe: Identity and 
Boundaries in Confl ict. ed. V. Goddard, J. Llobera and C. Shore. London: 
Berg.  143-171. 
BRAND, L. (1988) Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the 
Search for State. New York: Columbia University Press.
CANAK, N. (1993) “National identity in a multi-cultural context”. Antagonism 
and Identity in Former Yugoslavia (Journal of Area Studies 3). ed. G. Bow-
man. 137-143.
CEGOROVIC, N. (1993) “Montenegrin identity: past, present and future”. Antago-
nism and Identity in Former Yugoslavia (Journal of Area Studies 3). ed. G. 
Bowman. 129-138.
CLISSOLD, S. (1966) “Occupation and resistance”. A Short History of Yugoslavia 
from Early Times to 1966. ed. S. Clissold. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 208-235.
COBBAN, H. (1984) The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
COHEN, A. (1965) Arab Border-Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and 
Change in Social Organization. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
COHEN, A. and B. LEWIS. (1978) Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine 
in the Sixteenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
COTTRELL, A. (1990) “Cross-national marriages: a review of the literature”. Jour-
nal of Comparative Family Studies. XXI: 2. 151-165.
DARBY, H. C. (1966) “Serbia”. A Short History of Yugoslavia from Early Times to 
1966. ed. S. Clissold. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 87-134.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives143   143 4/1/07   11:20:49
144 GLENN BOWMAN
DENICH, B. (1991) “Unbury the victims: rival exhumations and nationalist reviv-
als in Yugoslavia”. American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting. 
Chicago. 1-14.
DERRIDA, J. (1974) Of Grammatology. Trans. G. Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press.
FINKELSTEIN, N. (1988) “Disinformation and the Palestine question: the 
not-so-strange case of Joan Peters’s From Time Immemorial”. Blaming the 
Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestine Question. ed. E. Said and 
C. Hitchens. London: Verso. 33-69.
FREUD, S. (1963a) “Civilization and its discontents”. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. ed. J. Strachey. London: 
The Hogarth Press. 57-145.
FREUD, S. (1963b) “Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis”. The Standard Edi-
tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. ed. J. Strachey. 
London: The Hogarth Press. 9-476.
GABER, S. (1993) “The limits of democracy: the case of Slovenia”. Antagonism 
and Identity in Former Yugoslavia (Journal of Area Studies 3). ed. G. Bow-
man. 57-64.
GARDE, P. (1992) Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie. Paris: Fayard. 
GODINA, VESNA. (1998) “The Outbreak of Nationalism on Former Yugoslav Ter-
ritories: An Historical Perspective on the Problem of Supra-National Identi-
ties”. Nations and Nationalisms. IV: 3 (July). 409-422.
GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE (1946) A Survey of Palestine. Vol. I. London: Her Majes-
ty’s Stationary Offi ce.
GRESH, A. (1985) The P.L.O.: The Struggle Within for an Independent Palestinian 
State. London: Zed Press.
HAMAS. (1988) The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Mimeo-
graphed Circular.
HAMMEL, E. A. (1993a) “The Yugoslav labyrinth”. The Anthropology of East Eu-
rope Review. XI. 1-2. 35-42.
HAMMEL, E. A. (1993b) “Demography and the origins of the Yugoslav civil war”. 
Anthropology Today. IX. 1. 4-9.
HILAL, J. (1992) “West Bank and Gaza Strip social formation under Jordanian and 
Egyptian rule (1948-1967)”. Israel/Palestine: Fields for Identity (Review of 
Middle East Studies V). ed. G. Bowman. London: Scorpion. 33-73.
HOURANI, A. (1991) A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber.
JOHNSON, N. (1982) Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism. 
London: Kegan Paul International.
KALKAS, B. (1971) “The revolt of 1936: a chronicle of events”. The Transformation 
of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Con-
fl ict. ed. I. Abu-Lughod. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 237-274.
KAPFERER, B. (1988) Legends of People/Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and 
Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
LACLAU, E. and C. MOUFFE. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives144   144 4/1/07   11:20:49
 CONSTITUTIVE VIOLENCE AND RHETORICS OF IDENTITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ... 145
LAPIDUS, I. (1988) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
LEGRAIN, J.-F. (1990) “The Islamic movement and the Intifada”. Intifada: Pales-
tine at the Crossroads. ed. J. Nassar and R. Heacock. New York: Praeger. 
175-189.
LEGRAIN, J.-F. (1991) “A defi ning moment: Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism”. Is-
lamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis. ed. J. Piscatori. Washington, D.C.: 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
LESCH, A. M. (1979) Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: the Frustration of a 
Nationalist Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
LUSTICK, I. (1980) Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minor-
ity. Austin: University of Texas Press.
MASTNAK, T. (1991) “From the new social movements to political parties”. Yu-
goslavia in Turmoil: After Self-management? ed. J. Simmie and J. Dekleva. 
London: Pinter. 45-64.
MENCINGER, J. (1991) “From a capitalist to a capitalist economy?”. Yugoslavia 
in Turmoil: After Self-management? ed. J. Simmie and J. Dekleve. London: 
Pinter Publishers. 71-86.
MORRIS, B. (1987) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MUSLIH, M. (1988) The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
NORRIS, H. (1993) Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and 
the Arab World. London: C. Hurst and Co.
PAVLOWITCH, S. (1988) The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 
1918-1988. London: C. Hurst and Co.
PETERS, J. (1984) From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Confl ict 
Over Palestine. New York: Harper and Row.
PORATH, Y. (1974) The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 
1918-1929. London: Frank Cass.
POULTON, H. (1991) The Balkans: Minorities and States in Confl ict. London: Mi-
nority Rights Publications.
RAMET, P. (1985) “Apocalypse culture and social change in Yugoslavia”. Yugosla-
via in the 1980s. ed. P. Ramet. Boulder: Westview Press. 3-26.
RAMET, S. (1992) Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991. Second 
edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
RUEDY, J. (1971) “Dynamics of land alienation”. The Transformation of Palestine: 
Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Confl ict. ed. I. 
Abu-Lughod. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
SAID, E. (1993) “The morning after”. The London Review of Books. XV:20. 21 
October 1993. 3-5.
SALECL, R. (1993) “Nationalism, anti-semitism and anti-feminism in Eastern Eu-
rope”. Antagonism and Identity in Former Yugoslavia (Journal of Area Stud-
ies 3). ed. G. Bowman. 78-90.
SAYIGH, R. (1979) The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries. London: 
Zed Press.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives145   145 4/1/07   11:20:49
146 GLENN BOWMAN
SCHOLCH, A. (1989) “Jerusalem in the nineteenth century (1831-1917 AD)”. Je-
rusalem in History. ed. K. J. Asali. London: Scorpion. 228-248.
SHOUP, P. (1992) “Titoism and the national question in Yugoslavia: a reas-
sessment”. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. ed. M. van den Heuvel and 
J. G. Siccama. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 47-72.
SIMMIE, J. (1991) “Self-management in Yugoslavia”. Yugoslavia in Turmoil: After 
Self-Management. ed. J. Simmie and J. Dekleve. London: Pinter Publishers. 
3-9.
STATEN, H. (1985) Wittgenstein and Derrida. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
TAMARI, S. (1982) “Factionalism and class formation in recent Palestinian histo-
ry”. Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries. ed. R. Owen. London: Macmillan. 
TAMARI, S. (1992) “Soul of the nation: the fallah in the eyes of the urban intel-
ligentsia”. Israel/Palestine: Fields for Identity (Review of Middle East Stud-
ies V). ed. G. Bowman. London: Scorpion. 74-83.
TARAKI, L. (1989) The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian uprising. 
Middle East Report. XIX. 1. pp. 30-32.
TAUSSIG, M. (1987) Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Ter-
ror and Healing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
WAINES, D. (1971) “The failure of the nationalist resistance”. The Transforma-
tion of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli 
Confl ict. ed. I. Abu-Lughod. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
207-235.
ZIZEK, S. (1990) “Eastern Europe’s republics of Gilead”. New Left Review. 183. 
Sept./Oct. 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives146   146 4/1/07   11:20:50
Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Building
Luc Reychler
University of Leuven
Abstract
1989 was an annus mirabilis: the end of the Cold War and 
the beginning of the era of violence prevention and peace build-
ing. Three 2005 reports on conflict and peace indicated that the 
world has become more peaceful. The authors attributed this 
to an increase in conflict prevention and peace building efforts. 
These good-news reports should be handled carefully, however, 
due to: the unreliability of the statistics, the narrow definition of 
violence used, the profits of violence, the fact that most conflict 
prevention efforts are reactive, and the impact of globalisa-
tion on the experience of violence. Despite the lessons learned 
and the booming research, serious impediments remain for the 
learning process. There are problems with freedom of research, 
professionalism, and the exchange of knowledge between de-
cision-makers, practitioners, researchers and recipients. After 
reviewing the state of research based on six key components of 
peace building — the end state, the base line, the process, the 
regime, the context, and the criteria used for evaluating peace 
building interventions — recommendations are made for the 
future research agenda. These relate to: (a) the need for more 
systematic and cumulative research on successful peace building 
architecture, and  the question of ‘professionalism’ in the field 
of peace building, (b) deconstructing the narrow definition of 
violence , (c) the proactive assessment of the impact of policies 
on conflict dynamics, (d) a better accounting of the costs and 
benefits (i.e. profiteers) of violence, (e) the establishment of an 
effective ‘accountability’ system, and (f) the branding of war and 
peace. This paper is dedicated to Professor emeritus Rene Bou-
wen, who introduced and developed appreciative inquiry and 
social constructionism in the process of peace building.
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1. A Careful Analysis of Good News
Recent reports have observed signifi cant progress in confl ict preven-
tion and peace building. In its 2005 yearbook, the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2005) counted 19 major confl icts. The Peace 
and Confl ict 2005 report of Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr (2005) showed 
a marked decrease of major armed confl icts in the Post Cold War era. The 
decline in the global magnitude of armed confl ict, following a peak in the 
early 1990’s, persisted and few of the many social wars, which were con-
tained in the last decade, have resumed. Major social wars are down from 
twelve at the end of 2002 to eight in early 2005. Most democratic regimes 
established during the 1980’s and the 1990’s have endured despite political 
and economic crises. Ethno-national wars for independence, which were 
the main threat to civil peace and regional security in the 1990’s, have con-
tinued to decline to their lowest level since 1960. Repression and political 
discrimination against ethnic minorities, as surveyed by V. Asal and A. Pate, 
have also diminished signifi cantly, which coincides with the dramatic decline 
in autocratic regimes since the late 1980’s. These fi ndings were supported 
by A. Mack’s (2005) human security report War and Peace in the 21st Cen-
tury. The number of armed confl icts dipped by more than 40% since 1992; 
the deadliest confl icts (with 1000 or more battle-deaths in a year) by 80%. 
The number of military coups and attempted coups has declined by some 
60% since 1963. In 2004, there were ten, all of which failed. The drop in 
armed confl icts in the 1990’s was associated with a worldwide decline in 
arms transfers, military spending, and troop numbers. Wars have become 
dramatically less deadly over the past fi ve decades. The average number of 
people reported killed per confl ict per year in 1950 was 38,000; in 2002 it 
was just 600. The number of genocides and politicides plummeted by 80% 
between the 1989 high point and 2001. International terrorism is the only 
form of political violence that appears to be getting worse. A. Mack at-
tributes these improvements to the end of colonialism (colonial wars made 
up 60-100% of all international confl icts, depending on the year), the end 
of the Cold War (one third of all confl icts were proxy wars), and to the 
upsurge of international activities designed to stop ongoing wars and to 
prevent new ones. Exemplary are: a six-fold increase in UN preventive diplo-
matic missions (with the aim of preventing wars), a four-fold increase in UN 
peacemaking missions (to end ongoing confl icts), a four-fold increase in UN 
peace operations (to reduce the risk of wars restarting), and an eleven-fold 
increase in the number of states subject to UN sanctions (aimed at pressur-
ing parties into peace negotiations). In addition to the UN, several other ac-
tors joined the effort: the World Bank, regional organizations, donor states, 
and thousands of NGO’s. 
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Despite the good news, the authors of the reports make it clear 
that there are no grounds for complacency. “The positive trends are 
no ground for unqualifi ed optimism about the future of world peace” 
(Marshall and Gurr, 2005). I share this cautious attitude for several rea-
sons. 
First, we must be careful because of inadequate violence statistics. 
The statistics are unreliable and incomplete. A great deal of physical vio-
lence never reaches the statistics. This is especially true for second and 
third class victims. First class victims receive a great deal of attention. The 
cameras zoom in on the suffering and there are accurate updates on the 
number of people killed or maimed. In Iraq, up until March 16, there 
were 2318 killed and 16,653 wounded American soldiers. In the last six 
years 427 Israelis died in 58 suicide attacks. The second class victims, 
such as the Palestinians, are treated with less precision and at a greater 
distance. In recent years, more than 4000 Palestinians died in Israeli as-
saults. The third class barely receives attention. Thanks to the estima-
tions of the medical journal The Lancet we can guesstimate that in Iraq 
approximately 100,000 Iraqi civilians died, while in Congo 3 to 4 million 
died. In Chechnya, the estimate is 100,000. These people have no face. 
They do not get much attention. The second problem with these reports 
is the use of a narrow defi nition of violence, defi ned in terms of peo-
ple killed or maimed by weapons. A more complete picture of violence 
defi nes violence as shortening the life expectancies of certain groups of 
people, not only with arms, but also by other means of violence, such 
as structural violence, psychological violence, ecological violence, bad 
governance (bad governance kills), and extra-legal transnational activi-
ties (Nordstrom, 2004) that involve the trade of drugs, weapons, people, 
and other precious resources (Reychler, 2006a). To prevent violence and 
build peace more effi ciently, we need to learn to listen actively to vio-
lence. There is too much denial. 
A second reason for caution is greed and the profi ts derived from 
armed violence (Reychler, 2005). If wars were costly for the stakeholders 
in a confl ict, they would have disappeared a long time ago. Profi teer-
ing from political violence has many names: military-industrial complex 
(MIC), fatal transactions, predatory regimes, confl ict profi teers, peace 
spoilers, global shadow networks of exploitation, mercenaries, destruc-
tive minorities, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. P. Collier 
and A. Hoefl er call it greed.1 They consider greed as a major predictor 
1 Collier et al., 2003. Rebellion is the use of resources to exploit others for an eco-
nomic gain.
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of civil war. Research should not only focus on actors who make use 
of violence (i.e. just war) to end aggression, repression, exploitation or 
occupation, but also the actors who pursue their self interests in con-
fl icts and thereby, directly or indirectly, contribute to the escalation and 
prolongation of confl ict. War profi teers: create disintegrative climates, 
corrupt politicians, steal resources, enhance unequal relations, and sup-
port authoritarian or anocratic2 regimes. They pursue economic, politi-
cal, psychological and moral profi ts (the four P’s). 
Physical violence: 
terrorism, guerilla and 
conventional warfare 
— visible, direct and 
intentional
Psychological violence. Cultural  / epistemic 
violence
Structural violence: 
political, economic and 
cultural exclusion — less 
visible,  indirect and 
intentional
Violence
shortens  life
signifi cantly lowers 
the   quantitative 
and qualitative life 
expectancies of 
particular group(s)
Violence caused by bad 
governance
—Maladministration
—Corruption
— Indifference and 
neglect
— Greed and self-
interest
— Religious and 
ideologically inspired 
misgovernance
— Unintended 
negative impacts 
of well-intentioned 
interventions.
Violence committed by 
organized crime .
Violence caused by 
extra-legal economic 
activities
Environmental
violence
Exhibit 2
The violence fabric
2 “If autocracy and democracy are at the opposite ends of a continuum, then the 
anocratic regime that possesses a mixture of democratic and autocratic features lies in 
the middle of that continuum. An institutionalized state where the patterns of political 
competition cause the executive leaders to be constantly imperiled by rivals. The anocra-
tic state is an intermediate state where elites maintain themselves in power despite the 
exist...“ (ibid.)
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Economic profi ts: Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) estimates that violence 
generates trillions of dollars in profi ts. “The cosmopolitan centres in the 
world depend in part on ‘shadow economics and politics’, and are intri-
cately linked to wildcatting in war zones.”
Political profi ts: confl icts are used to manipulate fear and angst, to 
rally people around the fl ag, to justify occupation and repression, or to 
build political careers. 
Moral profi ts: confl icts can be used to raise the level of moral permis-
siveness, to legitimise our own violence, and de-legitimise the violence 
committed by others. 
Psychological profi ts: violence is used to generate feelings of supe-
riority, of being the fi ttest, and exaggerated pride. Chris Hedges (2002) 
describes war as a force that gives meaning. Probably, the best book 
written on the psychology of violence is Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of 
the Earth (1963). He gives the reader a deep understanding of the psy-
chology of outrage, frustration, and violence of the oppressed. 
A third factor advising caution is the critical issue of the environ-
mental and the spread of untenable life-styles. Jared Diamond in his 
book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005) describes 
twelve problems, varying from the destruction of natural habitats, the 
fi nite sources of energy, to the per capita footprint of different nations 
on the environment, as time bombs with fuses of less than fi fty years. 
A fourth reason for caution is the fact that most interventions are 
reactive rather than proactive, as well as the problem that the available 
means are insuffi cient. The yearly budget for confl ict prevention and 
peace building is less than one percent of the yearly expenditures of the 
members of the international community for their own security. The Mil-
lennium goals and the requested means are a mere pittance. They will 
not alleviate the tension. 
Finally, we should be careful, because globalisation raises expecta-
tions, increases awareness of inequalities within and between the states, 
and amplifi es feelings of relative deprivation. The disparities between 
the core countries and the gap countries are vast and are expected to 
increase if no serious measures are taken to narrow the gap.3 Madhav 
Gadgil (1995), speaks of “islands of prosperity, oceans of poverty.” Life 
in gap countries is poor, repressive, short, brutal and solitary (Barnett, 
2004). 
3 Gap countries or nations, as defined by Thomas Barnett (2004), are countries that 
do not adhere to the globalization security rules accepted by the core states , like “don’t 
harbour transnational terrorists,” and “don’t seek weapons of mass destruction.” 
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2. Some Impediments to Accelerating Learning
The monitoring and evaluation of confl ict prevention and peace 
building efforts have produced a plethora of lessons learned and best 
practices. However, the learning process and the ability to actively use 
the lessons are inhibited by political, managerial, and conceptual fac-
tors.
Political impediments
The political impediments are: a lack of perceived interest, compet-
ing defi nitions of peace, the business of violence marketing, political 
correctness, and other well researched reasons why societies choose 
to fail or survive. First, there is the problem of commitment to confl ict 
prevention and peace building. The propensity to intervene is related 
with the perception of interests. When vital interests are at stake, do-
nors will tend to make greater efforts than when the interests at stake 
are perceived as marginal. Second, when there is no consensus on the 
peace one wants to achieve, it diffi cult to build it. Third, the marketing 
of violence has become big business. The aim of violence marketing 
is packaging one’s own violence as good and the other’s as evil. The 
war against terrorism, the regime change in Iraq, and the ‘planned’ war 
against Iran, are facilitated by strategic communication, the aim of which 
is to exaggerate the external threats and sell our own use of violence as 
just, defensive, and as the only possible option. Fourth, there are the 
pressures of political correctness. Today, academic freedom is not only 
curtailed by limited and politically biased research funding, but also by 
political correctness. An example is the denial of civil war in Iraq. “If this 
is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.”4 The anti-terrorism 
doctrine is also illustrative. This doctrine differs signifi cantly from what 
peace research teaches us about terrorism: how to stop and prevent it 
(Reychler, 2006b). The anti-terrorism doctrine is characterized by: the 
use of a narrow defi nition of violence, special attention to fi rst class 
victims, the expectation of exclusive loyalty to the dominant perspective, 
political marketing of violence, the lack of fi nancial accounting and ac-
countability regarding the costs and benefi ts of the anti-terrorism war, 
the personalization of the confl ict and lack of contextual sensitivity, the 
depiction of private interests as national or international interests, and 
4 Quote from the former prime minister Ayad Allawi on the rise of sectarian vio-
lence in Iraq, Newsweek, 3 April 2006, p. 5. 
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the preference for hard and military approaches (ibid.) Finally, there are 
the other well-researched reasons why societies fail to make effective 
decisions to prevent confl ict and build peace. Janis Irving (1972), for 
example, draws the attention to ‘groupthink’ or the psychological drive 
for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent and any appraisal of 
alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. Bush’s foreign policy 
in the Middle East could be attributed to ‘hardhearted actions by soft-
headed groups.’ Robert Jervis focuses on the processes of perception, 
for example, of cognitive consistence, the assimilation of information to 
pre-existing beliefs, and how decision-makers learn from history. Among 
the common misperceptions he lists, for example ‘centralization’ (seeing 
the behaviour of others as more centralized, planned, and coordinated 
than it is), or overestimating one’s importance as an infl uence or target. 
Keith Murnighan and John Mowen (2002) shed light on tough calls or 
high stake decisions that must be made be made when information is am-
biguous, values confl ict, and experts disagree. All peace building process-
es are tough calls. The authors identify, in each of seven decision-making 
phases, factors which could lead to blunders or missed opportunities. For 
example in the sixth phase, “Consider the time frame,” the authors focus 
on decision-myopia or the tendency to overweigh short-term outcomes 
and underestimate long-term outcomes of high-stakes decisions. In Col-
lapse, Diamond (2005) identifi es impediments on each of the stops of the 
roadmap to success or failure: the failure to anticipate a problem before it 
arrives; the perception of misperception of a problem that has arrived; the 
failure to attempt to solve the problem once it has been perceived; and 
the failure to solve the problem after it has been anticipated, perceived, 
and efforts have been undertaken to solve the problem. 
Conceptual impediments
The conceptual impediments are the limited understanding of peace 
building architecture and the poor exchange of knowledge between the 
major parties involved: the decision-makers, the practitioners, the re-
search community, and the citizens or recipients. First, there is the limited 
understanding of peace building architecture (Reychler, 2006a).5 Peace 
building is about complex change; it involves concurrent activities by 
many people in different sectors, at several levels, and in different time 
frames. It is a multi-level, multi-sector and multi-time activity. One of the 
5 The challenges focussed upon are: seeing the big picture; understanding sustain-
able peace building architecture, synergizing the learning and know-how of violence 
prevention and peace building, and dealing with peace building context. 
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mindsets that inhibits one’s ability to see the big picture is the single dis-
ciplinary approach of sustainable development and peace building. This 
narrow mindset is reinforced by the faculty structure of the academic 
education system. Each faculty has scholars who want to contribute to 
a more peaceful world. For economists, development tends to be seen 
as the most important factor in the peace building process; for lawyers, 
it is the rule of law; political scientist point out the importance of stable 
political institutions and democracy; for psychologists and educators, 
peace is all about building peace in the minds and hearts of people; 
theologians stress the importance of mercy, forgiveness and reconcili-
ation; medical doctors stress that a healthy mind resides in a healthy 
body; and artists believe in the aesthetics of peace building. Another 
mindset that inhibits peace research is the assumption of the ‘realists’ 
that violence is normal; that it always has been and always will be part 
and parcel of the world. We can try to control it, but in the end we will 
have to learn to live with it. This is an unacceptable assumption. Violence 
is an outrage, an outrage that we have simply gotten used to because 
we set the bar so shamefully low. Finally, there is the belief that more 
efforts for development and peace building will add up to sustainable 
peace (the additive peace model). Without synergy, peace efforts (peace 
negotiations, democratisation, development, security building, reconcili-
ation, etc.) could end up in piles of peace building blocks, instead of a 
complete peace building. At the organizational-bureaucratic level there 
is the negative impact of intensive competition among decision-making 
units and routine organizational procedures. Policy planning tends to be 
the result of bargaining among the components of a bureaucracy; it is 
not guided by a consistent plan, but rather by confl icting conceptions of 
national, bureaucratic, and personal goals. This fi nding is also true for 
the relations between NGO’s. The competition for funding has increased 
and many NGO’s have become extremely competitive non-governmen-
tal companies (NGC’s). The problem of routine operational procedures 
is that they resist changes, except when a major disaster occurs (Allison, 
1971; Steinbruner, 1974). 
A second conceptual impediment is the weak exchange of knowl-
edge between the decision-makers, practitioners, researchers and peo-
ple in general (Bouwen et al., 2006). The lack of an effective dialogue 
and the weak connections between the decision-makers and the practi-
tioners in the fi eld (the operari) and the researchers (the speculari) results 
in serious knowledge waste. To improve peace building architecture, the 
development of dialogue and connections between these four sources 
of knowledge and know-how should be encouraged and rewarded. It 
is natural that theory and action are complementary, that they consti-
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tute harmonic aspects of one whole. In reality, however, there exists 
a ‘theory - practice gap.’6 This gap is caused by the incentive systems 
of politicians, of the practitioners in the fi eld, and of the researchers 
(academics). Today’s academic incentive system is characterized by: a 
publish-or-perish mentality, recognition for originality, the tendency for 
research methods to triumph over substance, the preference for funda-
mental over applied research, papers fi lled with jargon, and by the rein-
forcement of all of this by academic faddishness. The incentive system 
of the policy makers is to fi nd timely solutions for concrete problems. 
Offi cials have less time to read and refl ect. Joseph Nye, one of the few 
people who have acted as both a scholar and a policymaker, was sur-
prised at the ‘oral’ culture of top-level government service. One of the 
major challenges of peace research is to facilitate dialogue and con-
nections between the decision-makers, practitioners, and the research 
community. Peace researchers have a bridging role; they should not only 
provide policy-relevant knowledge,7 but also effectively dialogue with 
practitioners, especially in instances where they have common interests. 
The most productive exchanges might take place between researchers, 
who have spent some time in government and in the fi eld, and prac-
titioners, who have had some academic training in violence prevention 
and peace building research. All of the above does not imply that the 
Ivory Tower should be dismantled. It exists for good reasons: it provides 
academic freedom without which scientifi c research is impossible; it also 
allows intellectuals to refl ect on the world from some distance, and not 
simply to do the work of policy commentators or journalists at a slower 
pace (ibid.). 
A third obstacle to sustainable peace building is the diffi culty of many 
researchers in overcoming political biases. A good example is a set of 
two recent studies on suicide terrorists. Pape (2005) makes an excellent 
analysis of the strategic, social and individual logic of suicide terrorism. 
Pedahzur (2005) gives an in depth analysis of the motivation, recruit-
ment, and socialization of suicide terrorists. However, when formulat-
ing responses to this challenge, both authors do not seem to be able 
to transcend their ‘positional thinking’. They identify with the victims 
of terrorism and not with the victims of occupation and anti-terrorism. 
It is a pity that many analysts are unable to transcend their ethnocen-
6 For a very good analysis of this issue see Legfold and NINCIC, 2002.
7 Peace research can provide instrumental knowledge (for example: How to prevent 
groupthink in crisis situation?); contextual knowledge (for example: specifying the ne-
cessary conditions for sustainable peace building) and consequential knowledge (antici-
pating the costs and consequences of policy options).
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trisms and national biases. Despite Pedahzur’s claim to offer an integra-
tive approach for responding to suicide terrorism, most of his attention 
goes to the short- and long-term offensive responses (identifi cation and 
elimination of terrorists and their organizations) and to short-term de-
fensive measures (border and barrier controls, crisis management, and 
reconstruction). His long-term defensive responses are vague and do not 
address root causes. He recommends honest and fruitful negotiations 
with moderate leaders, some humanitarian aid to the population, and 
the creation of trust. 
Managerial impediments
The managerial impediments to accelerated learning relate to prob-
lems of supervision, planning and coordination, professionalism and 
leadership. First, there are the well-known problems of supervision, 
planning, and coordination. We come back to this problem in part four 
under the heading “peace building regimes.” Second, there is the prob-
lem of professionalism and leadership in the fi eld of confl ict prevention 
and peace building. One of the most important factors of successful 
peace building is the peace builder. He or she helps to transform the 
confl ict by means of research, advocacy, education, decision-making, 
and fi eldwork. What kind of talents, qualities, and skills are needed? 
(Ingelstam, 2001) What does professionalism mean in the fi eld of peace 
building? The last question provokes positive and negative responses. 
Positive reactions come from people: (a) who are concerned with the 
identifi cation of peace building leadership and empowerment as a nec-
essary condition for a sustainable peace process, (b) who are responsible 
for the selection of well qualifi ed people and for the sidetracking of 
amateurs and peace quacks,8 (c) who insist that each profession needs 
clear and widely supported criteria, and (d) from educators who develop 
peace education and training programs. The reservations are based on 
other concerns. First, peace building is considered as a science and an 
art that cannot solely be taught, but it also requires talent, commitment, 
creativity, imagination, and courage. J.P. Lederach (2005), for example, 
stresses the importance of serendipity or fi nding something useful while 
searching for something else. The underlying assumption is that MA or 
Ph. D. programs in Peace Studies can deliver better peace builders, but 
also that academic certifi cates are not enough to perform profi ciently. 
8 Peace quacks or paxzalvers (in Dutch) are people who pretend to, but do not have 
the skills or knowledge to prevent violence and build peace.
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The second type of reservation comes from traditional professions: dip-
lomats, lawyers, economists, and military personnel who consider their 
own training, practical experience, and contributions as the core of 
peace building. Third, there are practitioners who trust their intuitions 
and their school of hard knocks more than theories and research. Fi-
nally, reservations come also from politicians who see peace as the 
result of power relations. They stress the importance of political em-
powerment and assume that most of these skills can be learned on 
the job. The last basis of reservations towards the idea of professional-
ism is the meaning attached to ‘professionalism’ and ‘professional’. 
Webster’s dictionary associates the term professionalism with (a) a call-
ing/vocation, (b) requiring specialized knowledge — and often long 
and intensive academic preparation and practical experience, (c) con-
forming to technical and moral standards, (d) exhibiting a courteous, 
conscientious and generally businesslike manner in the workplace, (e) 
engaged in by persons as a permanent career and receiving fi nancial 
return. The latter does not exclude professional volunteers, for exam-
ple the doctors without borders. In this paper, we are not addressing 
the skills needed for humanitarian aid, economic development, design-
ing appropriate power-sharing systems, peace keeping, or setting up 
a health system. Instead we are considering the qualities of people 
(teams) who do peace building work or are engaged in activities to 
resolve or transform confl icts, such as: tracks I, II and fi eld diplomacy, 
facilitating/supervising the peace building process (planning, imple-
mentation and evaluation) at the macro, meso, and micro levels, peace 
action research, peace education and journalism, reconciliation, etc. 
Some of these qualities are also useful for people (organizations) who 
are specialized in specifi c peace building blocks. When working in war 
and confl ict zones, they have to negotiate, mediate, reconcile compet-
ing interests, and show a great deal of leadership to make the peace 
building process more successful. 
What does professionalism mean in the fi eld of peace building? 
To tentatively answer this question, fi ve sources were consulted: (a) 
the qualifi cation criteria used in MA and PhD programs in peace and 
confl ict studies, (b) the results of a comparative study of successful peace 
builders and peace spoilers, (c) suggestions made by practitioners, (d) 
qualifi cations suggested by students of the MA program in confl ict and 
peace building (MaCSP) in Leuven, Belgium, and (e) evaluation criteria 
used for assessing successful peace building processes.
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MA and PhD studies
The fi rst source of answers comes from directors of MA’s and PhD’s 
programmes in peace studies. Mari Fitzduff (2005) suggests that gradu-
ate students should acquire the following competences and values. 
Core knowledge competences: (a) understand the main structural 
and psycho-cultural theories about the causes of confl ict, (b) compre-
hend theories about group leadership and followership as well as social 
change theories, (c) through case studies and in partnership with confl ict 
stakeholders, understand the issues that are relevant to the existence of 
particular violent confl icts, (d) identify intervention needs at any stage, 
e.g. prevention, mitigation and resolution, and post violence confl ict set-
tlement, (e) design coexistence intervention, (f) network between inter-
veners, (g) recognize cross-cultural considerations, (h) continue to learn, 
(i) understand and address ethical issues. 
Core skill competences: (a) assess particular confl icts and design in-
terventions, (b) secure and develop partnerships, (c) implement policies 
and programs, (d) secure support and funding, (e) foster dialogue using 
empathetic mediation and negotiation skills, (f) undertake, supervise, 
and commission research. 
Specialist competences in: regional or national issues, assessment, 
mediation, negotiation or evaluation, and language skills. 
Values of coexistence work: (a) the pursuit of equality that respects 
diversity and that acknowledges the interdependency of communities 
and nations, (b) primacy of local people in transforming confl icts, (c) 
humanitarian concern, (d) human rights and humanitarian law and prin-
ciples, (e) respect for gender and diversity, (f) impartiality, (g) account-
ability, (h) confi dentiality, (i) partnerships, and (j) institutional learning.
Jacques Haers, Elias Lopez, and Luc Reychler (2004) expect their 
MA students (a) to be acquainted with the main theories and tools in 
the fi eld of peace research, (b) to know how to apply the knowledge 
to concrete cases, (c) to respect the values of peace building work, 
and (d) to underwrite the importance of a comprehensive approach, 
context sensitivity, personal development, social constructionism, and 
leadership. 
Sarah Perrigo and Jenny Pearce (2005) drafted, for the European 
Doctoral Enhancement Network on peace and confl ict studies (EDEN), 
the following qualifi cations for doctoral students: (a) knowledge and 
understanding of peace and confl ict intellectual traditions in distinct Eu-
ropean contexts, (b) knowledge and critical refl ection on peace and con-
fl ict methods/methodologies, (c) application of knowledge, (d) making 
judgments, (e) communication, and (f) learning skills. 
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Peace building leadership
A second source of inspiration comes from comparative research 
about peace builders and peace spoilers (Reychler and Stellamans, 2005). 
There are peace builders and spoilers in different domains (politics, di-
plomacy, defence, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc.) 
and at different levels: the elite, middle, and grassroots levels  (Lederach, 
1997). Research shows both similarities and differences between peace 
builders and peace destroyers (Reychler and Stellamans, 2002). Peace 
building leadership distinguishes itself by the way it leads the confl ict 
transformation process. Peace building leaders envision a shared, clear, 
and mutually attractive peaceful future for all who want to cooperate; 
they do everything to identify and attain a full understanding of the 
challenge with which they are confronted; they frame the confl ict in a 
refl exive way; their change behaviour is adaptive, integrative, and fl ex-
ible; they are well acquainted with non-violent methods; they use a mix 
of intentional and consequential ethics and objectives; and they are cou-
rageous men or women with a high level of integrity. John Gardner’s and 
Ronald Heifetz’s work is inspiring. John Gardner (1990) lists fourteen at-
tributes of effective leadership: physical vitality and stamina, intelligence 
and judgment in action, willingness (eagerness) to accept responsibili-
ties, task competence, understanding of the followers/constituents and 
their needs, skill in dealing with people, a need to achieve, a capacity 
to motivate/courage/resolution/ steadiness, a capacity to win and hold 
trust, a capacity to manage/decide/set priorities, confi dence, ascend-
ance/dominance/ assertiveness, and adaptability/fl exibility of approach. 
Ronald Heifetz (1994), provides useful recommendations for leading 
with and without authority. The essences of ‘adaptive leadership’ are: 
identifying the adaptive challenge, regulating stress, directing disciplined 
attention to the issues, and giving the work back to the people. 
Recommendations from practitioners
The third source for answering the question of professionalism is 
the group of practitioners. In Peace Building: a Field Guide, Katarina 
Kruhonja refl ects on the motivation and qualifi cations needed for peace 
building work in confl ict zones. She stresses the importance of absolute 
commitment to truth and striving toward openness and transparency in 
one’s work. “A commitment is a promise that I make to myself, consist-
ent with the vision and for the benefi t of the society. We expect a com-
mitment to non-violent social change and participatory democracy. A 
question like ‘how can I help’, which sounds right, can be very wrong” 
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(Kruhonja, 2006). In his chapter, “Who Should Go Where?,” Luis En-
rique Eguren (2006) stresses the importance of: the ability to cope with 
a violent situation and dealing with the risk of getting hurt; motivation 
and personal commitment, and not joining the peace building effort 
simply to do someone a favour. “Prospective peace builders should be 
able to fi nd a balance between personal commitment (which may lead 
to a lack of overall perspective and objective judgment) and disinterest 
or apathy (which will prevent him or her from having the necessary fl ex-
ibility required for peace building work).” 
Suggestions from MA students
The fourth source of responses comes from students of the MA in 
confl ict and peace building at the University of Leuven. They were asked 
to discuss what kind of qualifi cations they felt are needed to work in the 
fi eld. The brainstorming exercise produced a list of 53 qualities, which 
can be clustered into seven groups. 
1. Motivation/commitment: Most students considered the nature of 
the motivation for engaging oneself in confl ict prevention to be 
very important. Recommended motivations were: a strong com-
mitment to peace, an interest in the confl ict, compassion, and a 
willingness to accept responsibility.
2. Talent/intelligence: The most important blend of intelligence in-
cluded: analytic, interpersonal, intra-personal, emotional, cultur-
al, and linguistic talents (Gardner, 1990). 
3. Knowledge of theories about: different types of confl icts, confl ict 
dynamics, and anticipating confl ict; the cross-impact of different 
types of violence, confl icts, costs, and benefi ts; confl ict management 
styles; the prevention of violence; and sustainable peace building.
4. Know-how and skills related to: analysing confl ict, making peace 
building defi ciency assessments, planning and evaluating peace 
building processes, assessing the peace and confl ict impact of an 
intervention, negotiating and mediating (using problem solving 
workshops, appreciative inquiry, Aria, etc.) (Mitchell and Banks, 
1996; Rothman, 1997; Sampson et al., 2003), building a team, 
managing stress, thinking creatively, empathizing, listening and 
networking, and being acquainted with the toolboxes for con-
fl ict prevention and peace building (Confl ict Prevention Network-
CPN, Gene Sharp, Michael Lund, and Luc Reychler). 
5. Ethical values and norms: A preference was expressed for: proac-
tive confl ict prevention, sustainable peace building, the use of 
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non-violent methods (an intelligent non-use or use of violence 
was accepted under certain circumstances), honesty and in-
tegrity, impartiality, the empowerment of the weakest party 
in asymmetric confl icts, compassion, inclusion, a high level of 
moral reasoning (L. Kohlberg’s stages of moral development: 
Crain, 1985: 118-136), and courage. People involved in confl ict 
prevention and peace building are not only expected to make 
explicit their theoretical but also their epistemological assump-
tions (their values and interests).
6. Health: physical strength and mental health
7. Psychological assets: judgment in action, open-mindedness, 
adaptability, fl exibility of approach, a sense of coherence (man-
ageability, comprehensiveness, and meaningfulness: Antonovsky, 
1979), adaptive leadership, a capacity to motivate, courage, reso-
lution, steadiness, a capacity to win and hold trust, a capacity to 
manage, to decide, to set priorities, assertiveness, perseverance, 
and patience.
8. Experience and practice
Criteria for evaluating peace building
The fi fth source of answers to the professionalism question is the 
criteria to guide and evaluate peace building efforts: effectiveness, ef-
fi ciency, legitimacy, comprehensiveness, coherence, inclusiveness, etc (as 
discussed in part four).
Section summary
A major research task is the generation of a list of qualifi cations ex-
pected from people involved in peace building activities. This is not an 
easy assignment because peace building is about reconciling competing 
values as well as a variety of efforts at different levels. Some of the quali-
ties can be developed in MA’s, PhD’s or other training programs; while 
others require fi eld experience. Qualities like motivation and ethical val-
ues are the result of personal or organizational choices. It is clear that 
peace building requires a great number of qualities that are not always 
provided in academic environments, for example: seeing beyond what is 
to what might be, reality testing, understanding the big picture of peace 
building, acting from a strong sense of purpose that is not restrained by 
sentimental walls (such as political correctness), leadership, and dealing 
with power and empowerment.
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3. Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Building
At the end of the Cold War, and especially since the mid-nineties, 
there has been a boom in evaluations (including lessons learned and 
best practices) and academic research efforts. The development com-
munity at national and international levels played a major role in the 
growth of violence-prevention and peace-building research. There was 
a growing awareness that sustainable development could not succeed 
without initiatives for sustainable peace building. Initially, a great deal of 
the attention went to the development of early warning systems (Gurr 
and Harff, 1994). Then the attention went to the proactive assessment 
of possible negative impacts on confl ict and peace building by humani-
tarian and development intervention (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2006). 
Since the mid-nineties we saw a nearly exponential growth of academic 
studies about different aspects of peace building processes. Most studies 
have originated in the global ‘North’ and ‘West.’ The incidence and per-
vasiveness of intrastate confl icts forced both policymakers and scholars 
to devote more attention to these confl icts (Hartzell, 1999). Concerned 
with both human suffering and the potential economic and regional-
security consequences, governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions now pay more attention to confl ict prevention and peace building 
and are looking for expertise. Moreover, during this period research on 
peace building issues has attracted attention from different disciplines 
(e.g. political, economic, sociological, psychological, philosophical, etc.). 
In addition to the research that has specifi cally focused on issues of peace 
building and confl ict resolution within confl ict countries, there is a vast 
(academic) literature on issues and problems that are inextricably linked 
with building self-sustainably peaceful societies. In this respect one can 
think of the research on processes of democratic transition, economic 
reform and development, institution building, structural adjustments, 
development cooperation and aid, environmental sustainability, etc. 
Let us briefl y review some studies that have contributed to enhanc-
ing our understanding and explanation of successful and unsuccessful 
peace building processes:9 
— Caroline Hartzell (1999) explores the role of institutions in mitigat-
ing the security threats that antagonists face as they move from a 
violent confl ict situation — characterised by self-help — towards a 
9 Part of the literature has been discussed in Reychler and Langer (2004), Resear-
ching peace building architecture, paper presented at the International Peace Research 
Association (IPRA) conference in Sopron, June 2004.
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situation of centralized state power. She fi nds that the settlements 
that are more extensively institutionalised prove to be more stable. 
— Barbara Walter rejects the conventional view that the main ob-
stacle for solving intrastate confl icts is the unwillingness or in-
ability of rival leaders to compromise or fi nd mutually accept-
able ground. She asserts that even if adversaries in war do solve 
their underlying grievances, they still confront a “unique set of 
commitment problems” that stem from the need to integrate 
two or more separate organizations into a single state (Walter, 
1999). Successful implementation of a settlement requires that 
each group is able to convince its opponent that it will faith-
fully disengage its military forces and then honestly share power 
(ibid.: 154). This requires a complex set of internal and external 
guarantees. In this respect Walter stresses “the crucial role that 
outside intervention can play in resolving these confl icts” (Wal-
ter, 1997). Charles William Maynes (1993) is another scholar 
who emphasizes the importance of outside actors, such as inter-
national - especially the United Nations - and regional organiza-
tions. 
— Alvaro De Soto and Graciana Del Castillo (1994) examine the im-
portance of economic conditions to a settlement’s stability ac-
cording to the case of El Salvador.10 Moreover, they assert that El 
Salvador faces the following dilemma: “Should it sacrifi ce eco-
nomic stabilisation to proceed with implementing the peace ac-
cords, or should it strictly carry out its stabilisation and structural 
adjustment program, perhaps endangering the peace?” (ibid.: 4) 
In this context they foresee a potential collision between, on the 
one hand, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, and, on the other hand, the United Nations. Neither proc-
ess is independently sustainable; therefore there is a need for an 
integrated approach.
— Fen Osler Hampson (1996) studies why some peace agreements 
fail and others succeed at ending civil war. In order to explain 
the outcome of peace processes, he analyses four different fac-
tors: the extent of international involvement in the peace proc-
ess, the ripeness of the confl ict, the systemic and regional power 
balance, and the quality of the peace agreement itself. Based on 
his analysis of the peace processes in Namibia, Cyprus, Angola, 
10 Other studies in this respect are among others: Haggard and Kaufman (1996); 
Boyce (1996).
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El Salvador, and Cambodia, he concludes that the outcome of 
peace process is dependent on “the quality and level of support 
given by third parties to the peace process” and “the support 
of a country’s neighbours and outside great powers that are in-
volved directly or indirectly in the confl ict” (ibid.: 210). 
— Stephen John Stedman (1997) focuses on the spoiler problem. 
He identifi es spoilers as leaders or parties that see their interests 
threatened by the peace process and who will use force to un-
dermine the peace process. He puts forward a spoiler typology 
based on the spoiler’s position in the peace process, the number 
of spoilers, intent, and whether the locus of spoiling behav-
iour lies with the leader or followers of the party (ibid.: 12). In 
the presence of spoilers, the peace building strategy should be 
adapted accordingly because, in his view, confi dence building 
will not be enough to stop these wreckers of peace agreements. 
He suggests that international implementers should start by di-
agnosing the spoiler type “and then choose an effective strategy 
for managing the spoiler” (ibid.: 12). 
— Roland Paris (1997) points out that the effectiveness of the cur-
rent international peace building paradigm of “liberal interna-
tionalism” has been limited. This paradigm assumes that “the 
best way to consolidate peace in war-shattered states is to trans-
form these states into stable market democracies” (ibid.: 89). He 
argues that the main reason for this limited success stems from 
the “destabilising effects that the process of political and eco-
nomic liberalisation itself generates” (ibid.: 89). Peace building 
agencies have not adequately anticipated or addressed these 
problems. 
— John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty have edited a volume based on 
the project, “Coming out of Violence,” which aims to identify 
those factors that expedited or frustrated fi ve peace processes 
in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, the Basque Country, South 
Africa and Sri Lanka. The study investigates the infl uence of the 
following six variables on the success or failure of peace proc-
esses: violence and security issues, the economy, external actors, 
public opinion, symbols, and progress towards political settle-
ment. They fi nd that violence and the progress towards a politi-
cal settlement are the most important variables in determining 
the outcome of a peace process. With regard to the latter varia-
ble, it is crucial to suffi ciently include ex-militants in order to pre-
vent or limit potential spoiler behaviour. 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives165   165 4/1/07   11:20:55
166 LUC REYCHLER
— Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens have edited a volume that focuses on the role of out-
side implementers in peace processes. Therefore peace agree-
ments that were “largely self-implementing,” such as South 
Africa in 1994, or Zimbabwe in 1987, were not included in 
the case studies (Stedman, 1997: 22). They claim that the cur-
rent research on peace implementation suffers from several 
weaknesses, such as a lack of confl ict differentiation with re-
gard to the complexity of the peace building environment, the 
prescription of open-ended, underspecifi ed strategies for im-
plementing peace agreements or a lack of prioritization in the 
implementation agenda (ibid.: 12). An important fi nding of 
the project was that “cases of peace implementation differ in 
two important respects: diffi culty of the implementation envi-
ronment and the willingness of states to provide resources and 
risk troops” (ibid.: 12).
— Ho-Won Jeong (2005: 18) has examined how security, political, 
social, and economic components support each other in “re-
weaving a divided society’s fabric.” He presents a conceptual 
framework for the design of peace building and the coordina-
tion of different functions in the fi eld. He concludes that: sus-
tainable peace based on justice can be an illusive goal in the ab-
sence of the long-term perspective of structural transformation; 
an emphasis on political and military stabilization alone is not 
suffi cient to end a protracted confl ict based on ethnic and reli-
gious rivalries and opposing political and economic interests. His 
book goes beyond political and strategic considerations to incor-
porate the perspectives of communal security, social rehabilita-
tion, and confl ict resolution, refl ecting on the concerns of the 
populations who have been victimized by violence. A distinction 
has to be made between short-term emergency measures, aim-
ing to give an effective response to the emergent material needs 
of devastated communities, and long-term measures directed to 
change conditions that have underpinned confl ict and to infl u-
ence perceptions and behaviour. 
— James Dobbins and colleagues (2005, 2006) did a comparative 
study of ‘nation-building’ since 1945. America’s role was ana-
lysed in seven cases (from Germany to Iraq) and the UN’s role 
in nine cases (from the Congo to Iraq). Each case study started 
by mapping the challenges confronted (security, humanitarian, 
civil administrative, democratising and for economic reconstruc-
tion). This is followed by a description of the US-UN and inter-
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national roles and the results. Success was primarily defi ned as 
the establishment of a stable and enduring democratic political 
system. On the input side they collected and compared statistics 
on: military presence, police presence, total external assistance, 
per capita assistance, and external assistance as a percentage 
of GDP; on the output side, they looked at post confl ict com-
bat deaths, the timing of elections, changes in the number of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP’s) and changes in 
per capita GDP over time. In addition to the numerous case spe-
cifi c lessons, they drew a number of general conclusions, such 
as: “There is no quick route to nation-building. Five years seems 
to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition 
to democracy;” “It is nearly impossible to put together a frag-
mented nation if its neighbours try to tear it apart. Every effort 
should be made to secure their support;” and “Multilateral na-
tion-building can produce more thoroughgoing transformations 
and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts.”
— David T. Mason and James D. Meernik (2006) gathered a 
number of analysts to address to address the question ‘what 
works and what doesn’t in sustainable peace building?’ On the 
basis of 30 cases (15 cases with one or more peace building ef-
fort and 15 cases without peace building efforts), Mark J. Mul-
lembach concluded that: (a) cases with multidimensional peace 
building missions were more likely to result in peace than cases 
without such efforts and (b) the better multidimensional peace 
building missions are coordinated, the more effi ciently and ef-
fectively they tend to contribute to the peace building process. 
Constance V. Elliott and V. Lani Elliott, as well as Seonjou Kang, 
noticed that the absorptive capacity of post confl ict countries for 
receiving aid is lower in the initial post confl ict years than in the 
years thereafter. They conclude from this, that aid grants should 
be gradually increased over medium- and long-term periods af-
ter a civil war ends. Seonjou Kang claims that increasing aid over 
medium- and long-term periods can better help economic recov-
ery and growth in post civil war countries. Infrastructure recon-
struction, a medium- to long-term goal, requires large amounts 
of capital. 
— Michael Pugh (2000: 129) encourages a reexamination of the 
dominant peace building approach. He pleads for ‘regeneration’ 
rather than for ‘rehabilitation.’ Regeneration is a self-sustaining 
process; it is a generative change rather than a restoration of the 
status quo. The term ‘rehabilitation’ tends to connote a power 
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relationship, whereby so called victims or offenders have done 
things because they are incapacitated or deprived. Attention is 
given to (a) the legacies of modern confl ict in the transition to 
relative peace, (b) the question of ownership and accountabil-
ity in the interactions between internal and external actors, (c) 
the need for coherent responses to regeneration, and (d) the im-
portance of context-specifi c approaches. In terms of vertical in-
tegration, the top-down as opposed to bottom-up approaches 
are not seen as alternatives, but complementary. Peace build-
ing requires better balancing of the short-term, ‘hard,’ visible re-
construction measures with the ‘soft,’ long-term, social-civil pro-
grams as well as balancing “short-term, project-centred funding 
for physical rebuilding, and funding for social and civil develop-
ment where long-term qualitative change is made.”
— For Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse (1999: 
202-210), peace building is made up of (a) the negative task of 
preventing a relapse into overt violence and (b) the positive tasks 
of aiding national recovery and expediting the eventual removal 
of the underlying causes of internal war. They also offer a post-
settlement peace building framework, consisting of fi ve sectors 
- military/security, political/constitutional, economic/social, psycho/
social, and international support - and three time frames (interim/
short-term, medium-term measures, and long-term measures). 
They assert that often the local input had been neglected and 
they plead for better adapted peace building strategies in order to 
make these more effective in the long term.
— Francis Fukuyama (2004, 2006) comments on the American ex-
perience in promoting democracy and political development. Re-
cent cases of successful democracy promotion had three char-
acteristics: (1) the initiative has to come from the society in 
question, (2) external support work only in semi-authoritarian 
regimes that feel the need to stage  elections and permit some 
degree of freedom for civil society groups to organize, (3) the 
receptivity of the indigenous pro-democracy  forces to outside 
support, and particularly support from the United States, is very 
much dependent on the society’s  specifi c history and the kind 
of nationalism at work. He argues for a rethinking of the institu-
tions for world order and for a diversity of institutions and insti-
tutional forms to provide governance across a range of security, 
economic, environmental, and other issues. These forms of in-
ternational cooperation differ in terms of their legitimacy, effec-
tiveness, and formal-informal nature. 
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— George Soros (2004) contributes to the study of peace build-
ing by focussing on the impact of the global capitalist system . 
He observes  three major disparities: between public and private 
goods, centre and periphery , and good and bad governments. 
He argues for constructive intervention, based on the principle 
of people’s sovereignty, the responsibility of protect and proac-
tive confl ict prevention.  
— Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oslen Hampson and Pamela Aall’s 
(2001) book contains a rich collection of research fi ndings in the 
area of peace building, but lacks a synthesis of these fi ndings. 
They situate the book in the context of fi ve emerging dynam-
ics that characterize the setting for confl ict analysis and man-
agement in the current period. The fi rst is the return of geo-
politics, the endemic and hegemonic confl ict patterns between 
states that have long characterized the international system, 
along with rising concerns about how these contests will be 
conducted in today’s technological environment. The second is-
sue is that a one-dimensional approach and isolationism miss a 
much richer reality of challenges and trade-offs in confl ict man-
agement, which revolve around questions of socio-political con-
text, timing, sequencing, and grasping the stages and the cycles 
in the life of a confl ict. The third theme is the continuing and still 
unresolved dialogue among scholars and practitioners about the 
interaction between confl ict management and other elements 
of what broadly can be called governance (or nation building). 
The fourth theme is the need for more explicit recognition of the 
truth ‘it depends’ when analysing confl ict sources and appropri-
ate remedies. A typology of types of societies and confl icts could 
advance thinking about what works, when, and where. The fi fth 
theme is the existence of complications to reaching a negoti-
ated agreement and to creating from that negotiated agreement 
a sustainable peace. Special attention goes to the negative im-
pact of turbulence in rough neighbourhoods. The authors also 
present a useful framework linking various confl ict management 
strategies and techniques to sources of confl icts at three levels: 
systemic factors, states and societies, and leadership and human 
agency. 
— Michael Brown and Richard Rosecrance (1999) developed a 
methodology, including counterfactuals,11 for comparing the 
11 A condition which has not been fulfilled.
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costs of prevention and the costs of violent confl ict and applied 
it to ten confl icts. 
— John Paul Lederach is a pioneer researcher who addressed the 
kaleidoscope of building peace, involving reconciliation, struc-
tures, process, an integrated framework for peace building, re-
sources, coordination, and strategic and response evaluation. A 
key step in the peace building process is reconciliation: the envi-
sioning of a common future that provides new lenses for dealing 
with the past (Lederach, 1997). 
— Tom Keating and Andy Knight (2004) edited a book on build-
ing sustainable peace in memory of Sergio Vieira de Mello, who 
was special representative for the UN Secretary General in Iraq. 
The authors address a number of themes in the literature on 
peace building: conceptualising peace building, relocating peace 
building from post confl ict to preventive strategies, deconstruct-
ing the culture of war and constructing an indigenous culture 
of peace, broadening the scope and scale of peace building, as-
signing an international architecture in support of peace build-
ing, examining civil-military relations and the tensions between 
order and justice, positing peace building within the broader 
concept of human security, and balancing reconciliation and re-
tributive justice. 
— In their book, Breaking the Conflict Trap, Paul Collier et al. 
(2003: 4) attribute the global incidence of civil war to the iner-
tia of the international community. They base this on two be-
liefs: that we can safely ‘let them fi ght it out among themselves’ 
and that ‘nothing can be done’ because civil wars are driven 
by ancestral and religious hatreds. After investigating the eco-
nomic and social costs of civil war, they provide explanations 
for the vicious interaction between war and the failure of devel-
opment. One explanation is that civil war has adverse ripple ef-
fects, which are often not taken into account by those who de-
termine whether wars start or end. The fi rst ripple is within the 
country: most of the victims are children and other non-com-
batants. The second ripple is the region: neighbouring countries 
suffer reduced incomes and increased disease. The third ripple is 
global: civil war generates events beyond governmental control, 
such as epicentres of crime and disease in the surrounding ter-
ritories. Many of these negative consequences persist after the 
end of the civil war, so that much of the costs of the war oc-
cur after its end. A great deal of attention is paid to the role of 
grievance and greed and to the ‘confl ict trap.’ “Once a country 
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stumbles into civil war, its risk of further confl ict soars.” At the 
end of their study, they provide a series of recommendations for 
international collective action: aid, the governance of natural re-
sources, and military interventions.
— Luc Reychler and the Leuven research team have focused on: 
mapping the violence fabric, democratic peace building, assess-
ing peace and confl ict impact (P-CIAS and aid for peace: Paffen-
holz and Reychler, 2006), the identifi cation of necessary building 
blocks of sustainable peace (the peace building pentagon), sus-
tainable peace building architecture, the international organiza-
tion of confl ict prevention and peace building, and the diffi culty 
of confl ict transformation and peace building leadership (Bau-
wens and Reychler, 1994; Reychler, 1999, 2001, 2003). 
— After contrasting the differences between the mindsets of agen-
cies of confl ict resolution, humanitarian aid, and development, 
Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (2005) plead for more con-
fl ict-conscious development. They identify the root causes of vi-
olent confl ict on four levels: (1) external/internal, (2) characteris-
tics of the state, (3) characteristics of society, and (4) individual 
orientations. They conclude with a list of suggestions for the 
best way forward. 
— On the basis of case studies of the Confl icts in Northern Ireland, 
Israel/Palestine and South Africa, Colin Knox and Padraic Quirk 
(2000) conclude that political accommodation at the macro level 
must be underpinned by the active involvement of civil society. 
The widening of the traditional democratic base is necessary to 
consolidate and embed peace within communities.
— Cynthia Sampson and colleagues (2003) offer concepts, theo-
ries, and activities which help people to plan and act together 
for a common future. They are based on social constructionist 
thought which stresses the link between image and action and 
between positive image and positive action. 
— Andreas Wengler and Daniel Möckly (2003) focus attention on 
the untapped potential of the business sector. The case for cor-
porate confl ict prevention is based on three interrelated argu-
ments: the balance sheet of confl ict prevention is still unsat-
isfactory; the business community has direct interests in the 
advancement of peace; there are long-term socio-economic rea-
sons for corporate social responsibility. 
Some scholars have also contributed by translating research fi nd-
ings for practitioners. Mary Anderson’s book Do no harm (1999) 
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helped to increase sensitivity to confl ict and played a major role in 
the development of peace and confl ict impact assessment (Reychler, 
1996). Michael Lund (1997, n.d.) developed a toolkit for the preven-
tion of violent confl icts and practical guidelines for developing peace 
building strategies. Recently, a great deal of attention has been given 
to the management and/or administration of peace building processes. 
The following authors studied different aspects of these transitional re-
gimes.
— Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) examined 124 
post-civil war interventions, ranging from monitoring missions, 
traditional peace keeping, multidimensional peace keeping and 
peace enforcement. They found that effectiveness was infl u-
enced by three variables: the local roots of hostility, the local ca-
pacities for change, and the international commitment to attain 
a sustainable peace. Multilateral enforcement operations are 
usually successful in ending the violence and there is a positive 
correlation between UN peace keeping operations and democra-
tisation processes after civil wars.
— In his book You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Ad-
ministration and State Building, Simon Chesterman (2004: 1) 
addresses the question: “Is it possible to establish the conditions 
for legitimate and sustainable national governance through a 
period of benevolent foreign autocracy?” On the basis of four 
case studies (Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Af-
ghanistan) he identifi es three tensions in the transitional admin-
istration of post confl ict zones: (1) the tension between the use 
of an authoritarian transition authority for creating a legitimate 
and democratic regime, (2) the tension caused by the inade-
quacy of the available means to achieve the stated ends, and 
(3) the tension between the demands for high international 
standards and the need for locally sustainable institutions. 
The central argument in this book is that resolving the above 
contradictions requires an acceptance that even though the 
ends of the transitional administrations may be idealistic, the 
means may not be. Consecutively, he addresses different forms 
of transition, the use of force to maintain law and order, the 
building of democracy through benevolent autocracy, the rule 
of law in post confl ict territories, the politics of humanitarian 
and development assistance, elections and exit strategies, and 
the future of state-building.
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— Richard Caplan (2005: 256) studies international governance in 
practice and addresses fi ve critical issues for international admin-
istration: planning operations, the exercise of executive author-
ity, accountability, exit strategies, and enhancing effectiveness. 
On the basis of the experiences he studied, he distilled success-
enhancing factors. The fi rst of these factors is favourable objec-
tive conditions, such as a decisive military defeat, third party in-
tervention, and the positive attitudes of regional powers. The 
second factor that may affect the ease or diffi culty of adminis-
tering the transition is the clarity and appeal of the operational 
aims. The type of operations (supervisory operations relying on 
cooperation or those exercising full authority) also has implica-
tions for the ease or diffi culty of the administration. Finally, the 
structure of the operation or the degree of authority invested in 
the transitional administrator and the relationship of the admin-
istrator and the components organizations, also has a consid-
erable bearing on the success of the operation. He ends by de-
picting the “International administration [as] the Rolls-Royce of 
confl ict management strategies, and it is doubtful that there will 
be the political will to repeat the experience often.” 
— Jarat Chopra’s (1999: 9) analysis has produced interesting in-
sights in the issue of the effi cacy of maintaining peace in war-
torn societies. “Peace maintenance as a ‘unifi ed concept’ for 
multifunctional UN peace operations needs to integrate diplo-
matic, military and humanitarian activities as part of an over-
all political strategy.” He distinguishes four stages in the peace 
maintenance process. In the fi rst, the constitutive stage, the 
challenges in the fi eld and the elements of the operation are 
identified. Deployment takes place in a second constitutive 
stage, in which the mission arrives decisively and establishes it-
self as an international authority with logical jurisdiction. The 
third, consolidative stage is formally a transitional phase in 
which the international authority and local population function 
together to achieve a sustainable result. In the fourth phase, 
peace maintainers withdraw altogether or a longer term pres-
ence is accepted locally. At the end of his study he discusses a 
list of peace-maintenance puzzles about: the feasibility of peace-
maintenance, the temporal question, the dilemma of selectivity, 
UN capabilities, the moral dimension, and the violence of non-
intervention. 
— Larry Minear (2002: 22) reviews the challenges faced by the hu-
manitarian enterprise, and in particular the complex links be-
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tween humanitarianism and the world of politics and military 
engagement. He highlights several issues involved, such as coor-
dination and leadership. “Coordination is about power … what 
agency or individual has the authority to orchestrate the activi-
ties of the diffuse and far-fl ung humanitarian community in a 
given emergency?” His research fi ndings indicate that success is 
a function of the command model of coordination. Coordination 
implies (1) strategic planning, (2) gathering data and managing 
information, (3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountabil-
ity, (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour in the fi eld, 
(5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with 
host political authorities, and (6) providing leadership. He con-
siders coordination-by-consensus as more effective than coordi-
nation-by-default and ‘coordination-by-command’ as more ef-
fective than ‘coordination-by-consensus’. The persuasiveness of 
coordination is limited in the absence of authoritative institu-
tional reinforcement. 
— Robert Ricigliano (2003) is a member of the chorus of research-
ers and practitioners pleading for a holistic, integrated approach 
to peace building that combines the traditionally distinct disci-
plines — such as human rights, humanitarian assistance, sus-
tainable development, environment, confl ict resolution, security, 
and the rule of law — in order to be effective in today’s complex 
confl icts. He introduces the concept of a Network of Effective 
Action (NEA) as a set of practices for collaboration that is capa-
ble of facilitating integrated approaches to peace building both 
on the ground and in terms of the theoretical development of 
the fi eld. 
In addition to the above, there are many more studies made by gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations. It is close to impos-
sible to track and synthesize all the publications. Some of these are: the 
infl uential UN Agenda for Peace (1993); the report of the UN Secretary 
General’s high level panel on threats, challenges, and change released 
in December 2005, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility; 
or the report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All presented at the 2005 Millennium Summit. The 
World Bank has become a major source of relevant studies on the inter-
action between development, security and political development. Also 
regional organizations, such as the OECD, OCSE and the European Un-
ion have published materials on confl ict prevention and peace building 
(Moyroud, 1999). Other sources of publications are the foreign offi ces 
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and departments of international cooperation of many countries.12 The 
wide spectrum of publications of international and national non-govern-
mental organizations is another source of publications that is impossible 
to keep up with.13 
Section summary
In this part several academic studies have been mentioned which 
have contributed to improving our understanding of the failures and 
successes of peace processes. The research overview is by no means 
complete or exhaustive; we could have liked to discuss many other inter-
esting studies and publications. However, the crucial point is that there 
still is a serious lack of understanding of the architecture of these trans-
formation processes. Comparative research is necessary to fi ll this void. 
In general terms, this research should be aimed at exploring the ques-
tion how the overall design of a peace process affects its successfulness. 
Further research questions in this respect are, for example: how do the 
different building blocks of sustainable peace (e.g. democratisation, rec-
onciliation, etc.) interact and affect each other? Which building block 
should get priority? Is there an implementation sequence or timing that 
increases the chances of success? The study of Alvaro De Soto and Gra-
ciana Del Castillo (1994) is very interesting in this respect because it is 
one of the few studies that actually looks at the interaction between two 
different peace building blocks (economic versus political). In any case, 
a study that aims to research these issues should take notice and learn 
from the above described studies. 
12 Smith (2004): For example Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The over-
all findings of this report, which was made in cooperation with PRIO, and in which 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK also participated, centred on the challenges 
presented in defining policy terms, articulating goals, key concepts and vocabulary in 
peace building. A key finding is that a major strategic deficit exists between the articu-
lation of policy and efforts to translate this policy into practice (Lawry-White, 2003). 
First part of the review of the UK government approach to peace building and synthe-
sis of lessons learned from the UK government peace building projects funded 1997-
2001. “This study has made some conclusions stating that a number of key lessons 
as to questions such alike planning, coordination, development, that are significant 
for the future of policy and practice in peacebuilding can be drawn, this to make the 
peace building enterprise more effective.“ There are also the SIDA en CIDA studies 
and many others.
13 An example of INGO collecting lessons learned is the European Center for con-
flict prevention, Utrecht, Netherlands: Van Tongeren et al. (2005). 
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4. Key Components of Peace Building Architecture
Peace building is a tough call. It involves high-stake decisions that 
must be made when information is ambiguous, values confl ict, and ex-
perts disagree. During the peace building process a series of decisions 
or choices have to be made: (a) about the peace to be established (the 
end state), (b) the situation before the intervention (the base line), (c) the 
building process, (d) the peace building regime, (e) the context, and (f) 
the evaluation criteria for monitoring progress.
CRITERIA for evaluating peace building (6)
Peace Building REGIME (4)
—internal-external (uni-multilateral)
—strategy formation
Peace Building PROCESS (3)
—time frame
—pace
—priority setting
—cross-impacts/synergies
BASE LINE (2)
—conflict
—peace
building
deficiency
assesment
END STATE (1)
—operational
definition of peace
—pre-conditions
CONTEXT (5)
Difficulty of conflict, time, scope of change, preservation, diversity,
capability, capacity, readiness, power.
Exhibit 3
Key components of peace building architecture
The end state
What kind of peace does one want to achieve? Ideally, the defi nition 
of peace should be clear and compelling. In addition, the peace build-
ers should have a valid theory about the necessary conditions (building 
blocks) to build the peace desired. Does the peace one wants involve a 
radical transformation or a reconstruction or realignment of the situa-
tion. Transformation is a change which cannot be handled within the 
existing paradigms; it entails a change in the assumptions made and 
the ‘way of doing things as usual.’ It is a radical change in the end goal. 
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Realignment, on the other hand, involves a change that does not involve 
a substantial reappraisal of the central assumptions and beliefs within 
the confl ict zone. It may involve major changes structurally, such as a 
reduction of corruption or more privatisation, but it does not radically 
change the previous system. It is more about reconstruction than build-
ing something totally different (like the European Union after 1945). The 
determination of the end state determines the scope of the change. In 
many peace building interventions, the end state is left vague and un-
defi ned. This is also the case in a great deal of the research work. Most 
of the authors perceive peace building as the result of multi-level and 
multi-sector efforts. Some focus in their research on one of the peace 
building blocks. S. Chesterman studies state building, but only as one 
part of many other activities needed for peace building. R. Paris focuses 
on two peace enhancing conditions: marketisation and democratisation. 
Most authors specify, more or less, what conditions they consider neces-
sary for peace building. E. Cousins et al., specify fi ve objectives of peace 
building: a self-enforcing cease-fi re (meaning that the armed confl ict, 
just settled, will not recur), a self-enforcing peace (meaning that new 
armed confl icts will not occur), democracy, justice and equity. R. Caplan 
divides the chief functions of the transition administrations into: the es-
tablishment and maintenance of internal order and security; repatriation 
and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; perform-
ance of basic civil administrative functions; development of local insti-
tutions and the building of civil society; economic reconstruction and 
development. M. Pugh defi nes peace building as a sustainable process 
having as the main purpose the prevention of threats to human secu-
rity, which cause protracted violent confl ict. Human security implies the 
need for intervening in the domains of political security and governance, 
community security and societal stability, personal security and human 
rights, and, lastly, economic security. T. D. Mason et al. defi ne peace as a 
combination of negative peace and positive peace. The latter involves a 
transformation of the confl ict by means of democratisation efforts, the 
establishment of truth commissions, the establishment of security, and 
long-term economic and social development. Ho-Won Jeong focuses on 
four peace building pillars: security and demilitarisation, political transi-
tion, development, and reconciliation and social rehabilitation. Luc Rey-
chler defi nes sustainable peace as a situation without war, a low level of 
structural violence, a high level of legitimacy, and a constructive man-
agement of confl icts. The essential requirements or preconditions for 
sustainable peace are clustered into fi ve plus one peace building blocks 
(the peace building pentagon): (1) an effective system of communica-
tion, consultation and negotiation, (2) peace enhancing structures, (3) 
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an integrative political-psychological climate, (4) peace support systems, 
and (5) a cooperative international environment. The installation of these 
building blocks requires a critical mass of peace building leadership. All 
of the peace building blocks are necessary and mutually reinforcing. The 
lagging of one can seriously undermine the stability or effectiveness of 
the entire peace building process. One of the aims of peace building 
research is to specifi cation the kind of conditions that are necessary for 
building the specifi ed kind of peace. Without clear operational defi ni-
tions of peace, it is diffi cult to develop a valid theory for identifying the 
preconditions and making a comprehensive peace building defi ciency 
assessment. 
Effective system of communication
consultation and negotiation
Multilateral
cooperation-support
Peace-enhancing
political, economic
and security structures
Support systems
Health
Education
Legal
Media
Integrative
climate
Exhibit 4
Sustainable peace building pentagon
The base line 
Any study or planning of peace building demands an analysis of the 
base line. This implies an analysis of the confl ict, a prognosis of pos-
sible future developments, and a peace building defi ciency assessment 
(Paffenholz and Reychler, 2006). The latter compares the current confl ict 
situation with the preferred peaceful situation and identifi es areas that 
need to be remedied. This allows for choosing priority areas of interven-
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tion and selecting relevant concrete measures. For the assessment of de-
fi ciencies, many assessment tools and checklists are available (Reychler, 
2003; Reychler and Langer, 2002). 
The peace building process
The third part of peace building architecture involves choices about 
the process or ‘how to build peace’. The following choices must be con-
sidered. 
The time-frame of the peace building process: entry and exit, per-
ceived phases in the process, the framing of the peace building from 
a linear, circular, or procedural perspective (Murnigham and Mowen, 
2002). People who take a linear perspective act as though they have 
reifi ed time: they plan to fi nish the peace building at a particular time. 
People with a circular time perspective tend to act when things have 
to be done; putting off as much as possible, but doing what has to be 
done. People with a procedural time perspective focus on completing 
the process, no matter how long it takes. The element of entry-exit is 
dealt with by several authors. This issue has many facets, such as: when 
to intervene, the expected exit, when and how to exit (instant vs. phased 
withdrawal), assessing the impacts of withdrawal, and the choice of fol-
low up arrangements. Richard Caplan (2005: 213-229) observes that “A 
good exit strategy depends on good entrance and intermediate strate-
gies. An exit strategy cannot compensate, easily or at all, for major de-
fi ciencies in the design or implementation of a territorial administration, 
but by the same token, a poorly conceived exit strategy can jeopardize 
the achievements of the international administration and imperil the vi-
ability of the new state or territory.” Simon Chesterman (2004: 204-
235) focuses on the timing of the elections. He criticizes the timing in 
the Dayton peace agreement which provided for elections to be held 
between six and nine months after the conclusion of the peace, and he 
also critiques the perception that the troops would be home in a year. 
“After the elections, politics became the continuation of war by other 
means”. All the authors perceive peace building as a multi stage process, 
each stage characterized by its own priorities. Often, peace building is si-
multaneously a synchronic and sequential operation with a mix of short-
term, mid-term, and long-term efforts (Reychler, 1999: 46-47). De Deut-
sche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (DGTZ, 2002) makes 
a distinction between stabilization (1-3 years), reorganization (4-7 years) 
and consolidation (8-10 years). The Center for Strategic and Internation-
al Studies works with three phases: Initial Response (short-term), Trans-
formation (mid-term), and Fostering Sustainability (long-term); no exact 
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timelines are given to each phase. The peace building strategy of the 
US State Department (2005) uses the same peace building phases. The 
New Partnership for African Development (Nepad, 2005) frames post 
confl ict reconstruction into three phases: emergency (90 days to 1 year), 
transition (1 to 3 years), and development (4 to 10 years). Lederach 
(2005, 115) prefers a four-phased approach: the crisis and issues stage 
for a period of 2-6 months; then the people and relationships stage for 
1-2 years; then the institutions or sub-system phase for 5-10 years; and 
fi nally the phase that needs work for generations — the vision of peace 
and the desired future that all hope for and move towards. Lederach 
(ibid.) opts for a non-linear, procedural perspective; Nepad (2005) uses a 
more linear perspective with clearly defi ned timetables.
The pace of the peace building process: Changes can be implement-
ed, either in an all-at-once, big-bang fashion, or in a more incremental, 
step-by-step, stage-by-stage fashion. The interventions in Bosnia and 
the regime change war in Iraq were handled in a big-bang fashion, but 
each turned into ‘operation creep.’ Most intervention tends to take time 
and is handled in incremental ways.
Priority setting: In the different phases of the confl ict transformation, 
which tasks get priority (allocation of human and material resources and 
time)? Although there is a consensus on the need for ‘complementarity,’ 
several authors emphasize the shifting of one area of intervention to 
another in order to overcome identifi ed post-confl ict ‘defi cits.’14
1. Security approach: Without basic security, peace building goes 
nowhere. K. Maynard points out the need to address insecurity 
as key to successful post-war peace building. It is of vital impor-
tance that freedom of movement, the absence of personal or 
group threats, and safe access to resources are achieved for all 
in the post war setting. A. Schnabel believes that military and 
police forces play a crucial role in the long-term success of po-
litical, economic and cultural rebuilding efforts in post confl ict 
societies. Confl ict prevention should therefore address the mili-
tary/security defi cit foremost so that internal security structures 
become an asset, not a liability, in the long-term peace building 
process.
2. Development approach: Economic development is the key to 
success; it should be prioritised. Economic vulnerability should 
be tackled from the beginning. 
14 Monica Llamazares (2005) confirms this point.
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3. Social-civil approach: Social welfare and civil society are of vital 
importance to regenerate societies and peace building. M. Pugh 
(2000: 116-117) points to imbalance between short-term, hard, 
visible reconstruction measures and soft, long-term social-civil 
programmes. The former are more easily audited. But the latter 
also tend to refl ect hierarchical relationships that gear participa-
tion and accountability away from civil development based on 
host ownership of the peace building process. 
4. Political economy approach: P. Collier (but also D. Keen, M. Duff-
ield and W. Reno) believes that the political economy of civil 
wars, which is considered to be a key source of ‘protractedness’ 
in many of today’s confl icts, remains unchallenged by current 
peace-building approaches. In the ‘greed over grievance’ de-
bate, Collier (2003) sees the economic agendas of war as key 
source of confl ict. He recommends that good peace building 
must include disincentives for those benefi ting from war in or-
der to reduce their infl uence over the process. 
5. Political approach: First, the political and institutional defi cits 
must be remedied. Cousens and Kumar (2001: 4) consider the 
“fragility or collapse of political processes and institutions” to 
be the main catalyst for war. They argue that post-confl ict elec-
tions restore political institutions’ and processes’ loss of legiti-
macy, thus institutionalising a confl ict resolution mechanism into 
the body politic. Building political capacity must be the ultimate 
goal. 
6. Psychosocial approach: W. Lambourne (2004) argues that both 
justice and reconciliation are fundamentally signifi cant goals that 
need to be addressed in the design of successful post confl ict 
peace building processes and mechanisms, especially in the af-
termath of genocide. R. L. Rothstein points out that “since there 
is obviously an important psychological or emotional compo-
nent of protracted confl icts, there is […] likely to be an equally 
important psychological or emotional component to their reso-
lution.”  M. Pugh believes that an emphasis on structural causes 
of confl ict underplays the “…psychological and cultural deter-
minants of violence”, and that “… reconciliation between social 
groups previously at war, requires more then money.” (Llamaza-
res, 2005: 9)
Synchronicity and sequencing: Are all the tasks implemented at the 
same time or is there a clear sequencing of the efforts? Are all the ef-
forts made simultaneously and given a varied amount of attention (time 
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and human and material resources) in different phases? This is one of 
the least systematically researched key components of the peace build-
ing process. There are several approaches: (a) the free-for-all approach: 
the underlying assumption is that more peace building interventions will 
add up to more peace; (b) the ideology-driven approach, based on a 
belief in the primacy of security, development, democracy or other types 
of interventions in peace building; (c) the power-driven approach which 
claims that power makes or breaks peace; (d) the theory-driven ap-
proach, based on the research of successful and unsuccessful sequenc-
ing of different activities within and between different sectors. R. Paris 
(2004: 289) claims that pushing war-shattered states into stable market 
democracies too quickly can have damaging and destabilizing effects. 
A sensible approach would be to establish a system of domestic insti-
tutions capable of managing the disruptive effects of democratisation 
and marketisation in a fi rst phase, and only then phase in political and 
economic reforms as conditions warrant. Mansfi eld and Snyder (1995) 
support Paris’ vision that fast democratisation is susceptible to instability. 
In the short-term, economic measures can disturb political goals. Fur-
thermore, economic gains in the medium- and long-term can be created 
if in the short-term macro-economic policies are socially sensitive (Collier 
et al., 2003: 155).
Negative and positive cross-impacts or synergies: How much atten-
tion is paid to the positive and negative cross-impacts of efforts in dif-
ferent sectors and at different levels? Have the impacts been assessed 
proactively? What is being done to create synergies? This is becoming 
a major area of research. Peace building must be understood as a com-
plex system, the dynamics of which do not obey hierarchical lineari-
ties. The assessment of cross sector and cross level impact is not new. 
Everyone makes an implicit assessment of the impact of their efforts. 
These assessments are infl uenced by the analysts’ or decision-maker’s 
theories of war and peace. The assessment of peace and confl ict im-
pacts is not new. In December 1919, J. Keynes book, The Economic 
Consequences of Peace appeared on the bookstalls. Keynes argued 
that the terms of the Versailles treaty would be disastrous both for Ger-
many and its allies. At the end of the book he presented an alternative 
policy — something like a Marshall plan — providing Germany with re-
sources that would enable it to pay a reasonable amount of restitution, 
but also to recover economically and socially (Reychler, 2003). In the 
last ten years, however, we have seen a serious effort to enhance the 
peace and confl ict sensitivity of interventions in confl ict zones. A good 
summary of the efforts can be found in T. Paffenholz and L. Reychler’s 
Aid for Peace (2006). 
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The peace building regime(s): Choices need also be made about 
the management of the peace building process. The options are dif-
ferent regimes or sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which the expectations of 
the actors involved in the peace building process converge (Baylis and 
Smith, 2001). Peace building regimes can be distinguished via different 
dimensions: 
a. Is the peace building an externally and/or internally driven proc-
ess? If external, is it a multilateral, multi-unilateral or unilateral 
intervention?  
b. Do the donors cooperate in the peace building process? Do they 
cooperate by exchanging information, consulting, joint planning, 
and/or coordinating the implementation?  
c. What strategy formation process is used? How does one choose 
the courses of action to build peace and the objectives formu-
lated in the previous phase? S. Hart identifi es fi ve modes of 
strategy formation processes. Hart’s framework is built around 
who is involved in the strategy formulation and in what man-
ner (Verwiere and Van den Berghe, 2004). In the ‘command 
mode,’ a strong leader controls the process. The strategy is a 
conscious, controlled process that is centralized at the top. The 
end state, the base line, and alternatives are considered, and an 
appropriate course of action is decided upon and implemented. 
This strategy formation mode can vary from being directive to 
coercive (using power to impose change) (Balogun and Hailey, 
1999). The ‘symbolic mode’ involves the creation, by the actors 
who take the lead, of a clear and compelling vision and mission. 
The major task is to motivate and inspire and to provide the nec-
essary focus to guide the creative actions of the actors involved. 
Education and communication are core activities. This mode re-
quires a great deal of participation and commitment. The ‘ra-
tional mode’ is a theory-driven strategy formation. Strategy is 
developed through formal analysis (and information processing) 
and strategic planning. The ‘transactive mode’ is based on inter-
action and learning rather than on the execution of a predeter-
mined plan. Strategy is crafted based upon an ongoing dialogue 
with the key stakeholders. Cross-sector and cross-level com-
munication among the actors involved is very important in this 
mode. The last mode of strategy formation is the ‘generative 
mode.’ This mode depends on the autonomous initiatives of the 
actors involved in the peace building process. The donor com-
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munity selects and nurtures initiatives with high peace potential. 
These ‘ideal’ types are not exclusive. In many cases, one notices a 
combination of several of these modes. The choice is infl uenced 
by several factors: the power relations between the actors, the 
level of complexity of the peace building plan, the heterogeneity 
of the confl ict environment, the phase the confl ict is in, etc.  
Internal-external involvement: There is a broad consensus on the 
need to involve inside and outside actors in most peace settlements. 
F. Hampson (1996: 23) assessed the impact of several factors based on 
the success or failure of peace settlement negotiations and concluded 
that third party intervention contributed greatly to successful post set-
tlement peace building. R. Caplan (2005: 180) observes that a minimum 
of local ownership is needed in a transition regime. Without local own-
ership, its diffi cult to develop political responsibility; the wrong lessons 
could be remembered by local population and the legitimacy of the tran-
sition process fall. This is illustrated by the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where the High Representative could dismiss elected or appointed of-
fi cials. The HR could remove anyone from offi ce who, in his estimate, 
was obstructing the implementation of the Dayton accord. There was no 
need for evidence to support his action, no right to appeal. This has been 
called despotic or transnational authoritarianism. J. Large (1998: 157) 
believes that the unique resources brought by local actors to the process 
make it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. 
Multilateral-unilateral: Some research deals with the pros and cons of 
multilateral and unilateral approaches. J. Dobbins (2005, 2006) observes 
that multiplicity tends to create a more complex and time-consuming 
decision-making than the unilateral approach. The activities could be 
highly atomised and the administration unwieldy. R. Caplan (2005: 34) 
stresses that in a post colonial age it has become politically unacceptable 
(and too expensive) to entrust responsibility for the administration of a 
territory to a single state, even if elaborate accountability mechanisms 
would be created. “Although the US drew in other states to share the 
responsibility of administering Iraq, precisely in an effort to confer le-
gitimacy on the interim regime, the dominant role played by a major 
western power is one reason why it encountered such fi erce resistance.” 
M. Mullenbach saw some evidence that the risk of military hostilities is 
at least somewhat lower when the UN or a regional IGO coordinates a 
multidimensional peace building mission. 
Strategy formation and coordination: B. D. Jones (2001) addresses 
three types of coordination problems: (a) diffuse intervention efforts, 
(b) confl icting strategies, and (c) fragmented international responses. 
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R. Caplan emphasizes that coordination is needed at different levels: the 
strategic level, the tactical level, and the fi eld level (2005: 174-175). 
L. Minear (2002: 22-32) identifi es fi ve factors which could inhibit effec-
tive and effi cient coordination: a lead agency’s lack of power (sticks and 
carrots), a lack of visibility and an inability to mobilize resources, the high 
costs, the existence of ineffective structures (the multiplicity and autono-
my of actors), and the lack of leadership. A. Donini (1996) distinguishes 
three types of strategy formulation and implementation: (a) coordina-
tion by command, (b) coordination by consensus, and (c) coordination 
by default. Some analysts, like L. Minear (2002: 288), argue in favour 
of the coordination by command approach; others, like M. Stephenson, 
prefer coordination by consensus. (Stephenson, 2004; Stephenson and 
Kehler, 2004; Kehler, 2004)
5. The Peace Building Context
All the aforementioned choices are infl uenced by the features of 
the peace building context. Successful peace building depends on the 
development of a context-sensitive approach. The lack of universal for-
mulae and the complexity of confl ict necessitate a great deal of context 
sensitivity. This involves a deep appreciation of the impact of the context 
on the peace building process and vice versa. Contextual judgment is 
more important than knowledge of the ten best peace building practices 
in other situations. The contextual features are: the diffi culty of the con-
fl ict, scope, time, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness 
for change and power.15 
The diffi culty of the confl ict
Some confl icts are more diffi cult to resolve than others. Diffi cult 
ones have been given a variety of names, such as deep-rooted confl icts, 
protracted, or intractable confl icts. Recently, more systematic compara-
tive research has been undertaken to distinguish easy from diffi cult con-
fl icts. According to S. J. Stedman (2001: 737-752), several factors are 
commonly associated with a diffi cult environment: spoilers (leaders or 
factions hostile to a peace agreement and willing to use violence to 
undermine it), neighbouring states that are hostile to the agreement, a 
15 A great deal of the context features are described in Balogun and Hailey 
(1999: 56-96.)
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large number of soldiers, valuable natural resources, and secession-ori-
ented confl ict. J. Dobbins (2005, 2006) looks at: prior democratic expe-
rience, the level of economic development, and national homogeneity. 
Among the controllable factors, the most important determinant seems 
to be the level of effort needed — measured in time, manpower, and 
money. R. Caplan (2005: 253) correlates diffi culty with the clarity and 
appeal of operational objectives. S. Chesterman (2004: 246) links clarity 
of purpose with success. M. Doyle (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000) sees hos-
tile, or incoherent factions as obstacles for peace building operations. 
L. Reychler and A. Langer (2004; Reychler, 2006c) use a checklist con-
sisting of seven clusters of variables to assess the degree of diffi culty: the 
parties involved, the issues, the confl ict styles, the internal opportunity 
structure, the legacy of the confl ict, the internal readiness for peace, and 
the external involvement and support of the peace process. 
Time 
How much time does the peace builder have to achieve peace? Is 
he/she operating in the middle of a crisis or is it perceived as a long-term 
peace building process? Are the stakeholders expecting short term re-
sults from the intervention?  
Scope
Is the expected outcome realignment or transformation (see the 
fi rst component of peace building, above)? Does the change affect the 
whole country as well as all sectors and levels, or does it only impact part 
of the country or a particular sector? 
Preservation
To what extent is it essential to maintain continuity in certain practic-
es or preserve specifi c assets? Do these practices and/or assets constitute 
invaluable resources, or do they contribute towards a valued stability or 
identity within a country? 
Diversity
Is the group of actors involved in the peace building process diverse 
or relatively homogeneous in terms of its values, norms, and attitudes? 
Are their many cultures or subcultures within the country? Are there 
confl icting and common interests?  
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Capability
How capable or competent are the peace builders at managing the 
peace building process? Are the necessary kinds expertise (internal and/
or external) available? Is there enough expertise at the policy, manage-
ment, and individual levels? 
Capacity
How much cash or human resources are available for peace build-
ing? 
Readiness
Are the external actors willing and motivated for peace building? 
How much support (domestic and international) is there for change? Are 
the internal actors ready for change? 
Power
Who are the major stakeholders? How much power do they have? 
Who are the stakeholders whose support must be canvassed? 
Functions, operations, judgments Criteria
Analysis of confl ict
Analysis of confl ict 
Anticipation of future developments
Violence 
Diffi culty of confl ict
Is the analysis accurate? Is the anticipation of 
future developments timely and reliable? Is 
the analysis of violence broad enough? Is the 
assessment of the diffi culty of the confl ict 
reliable? Is the diffi culty over- or underesti-
mated?
Peace building defi ciency assessment
Defi nition of peace Do the interveners use a clear and compel-
ling defi nition of peace? 
Underlying theoretical and epistemological 
assumptions about building peace
Has the underlying theory of peace been 
made explicit? How valid is the theory?  
Peace building defi ciency assessment 
(PBDA)
Is the peace building defi ciency assessment 
comprehensive? 
Cont.
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Relevance of the intervention(s)
Policy objectives
Accounting for defi ciencies
Resources for implementation
Have the policy objectives been well de-
fi ned? Do the interventions respond the 
defi ciencies? Do they respond to some or 
all the defi ciencies? Is it a partial or com-
prehensive peace building policy? Are there 
adequate or inadequate resources? 
Risk and opportunity assessment
Adequate crisis-management and preven-
tion 
High stake decision-making 
Threats and opportunities 
How are crises dealt with? 
Is the assessment holistic? Does it assess the 
dynamic changing environment and recog-
nize the signs of problems and opportuni-
ties?
Confl ict and peace impact assessment
Planning 
&
Implementation 
Is the assessment: comprehensive, proactive, 
coherent, synergistic, complementary, coor-
dinated, effi cient and effective, sustainable, 
high impact, legitimate? Does it incorporate: 
peace building leadership, appropriate lead-
ership mechanisms, strategic sequencing 
and priority-setting?
Involvement of owners and stakeholders
Involvement of stakeholders and owners in 
the above-mentioned phases
Is the process transparent? Does the re-
sponsibility primarily rest with the people 
concerned? What about empowerment and 
ownership? What is the legitimacy status of 
the process? How accountable are the deci-
sion makers for the consequences of their 
actions? Is the subsidiarity principle respect-
ed?
Evaluation and learning
Personal and institutional learning How well organized is the evaluation proc-
ess? Is there a positive learning climate? 
Is the lessons-learned process effectively 
organized? Have individual and collective 
senti-mental walls been identifi ed and dis-
mantled? 
Exhibit 5
Criteria for the evaluation of peace building processes
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6. Criteria for Evaluating Peace Building
Finally, choices must be made about the criteria for evaluating the 
peace building process. Exhibit 5 lists several criteria, which are used for 
evaluation of peace building processes.
Conclusions 
The study of violence prevention and peace building is not without 
emotions and feelings. Some events are heartening, such as the creation 
and widening of the European Union, the relative peaceful implosion of 
the Soviet Union, or the reduction of the magnitude of violent confl icts. 
Other events are discouraging. The protracted confl ict between the Israe-
lis and the Palestinians and the forty episodes of genocide and politicide 
since 1955 are appalling. What have we learned from the Holocaust? 
Israel has become a gated country and what is left of Palestine an open 
prison. Many people in today’s world live in despair. Hopelessness stands 
in the way of peace building. Hope and despair have the effect of self-ful-
fi lling prophecies. Despair leads to defeatism, cynicism, reconciling oneself 
to the facts, or to radical and desperate behaviour. Raising hope is vital for 
peace building. The term hope, as used here, refers not to wishful think-
ing, false hope or the expectation of a better future. In contrast, it refers 
to an attitude that refuses to let the current situation or development have 
the last word, and that continues to search for solutions. It is hope that 
does not wait for probability assessments (Reychler, 1995). It generates 
efforts to build peace more effectively. The peace research community 
has a great responsibility to keep hope alive. In this paper several areas 
were highlighted that need more and better research. First is the archi-
tecture of sustainable peace building: a more systematic, cumulative and 
comparative study of successes and failures is essential. The research com-
munity is scatterbrained; it does not function as a brain trust. We need to 
think about what professionalism means in the fi eld of peace building. 
Secondly, we need to deconstruct the narrow discourse on violence. The 
marketing of violence has become a great business as is distorting the 
perception of violence in our contemporary world. Third, we want better 
data on the costs and the benefi ts of violence, violence prevention, and 
peace building. Most data on violence (black statistics) cannot be found 
in offi cial publications. This is brought to the fore in Carolyn Nordstrom’s 
Shadows of War. In the areas of poverty, lives and fortunes are forged 
and lost (illegal trade in arms, people, resources, drugs, etc.). A fourth 
area that urges study is ‘violence profi teering’ and the development of 
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an effective accountability system. Finally, there is they question of ‘peace 
appeal’ or a lack of it (Reychler, 2000). Something has to be done about 
the image of peace and peace building. Peace is a social construction that 
needs to be made more appealing; it could use the creativity of the best 
marketing strategists. 
‘Waging peace’ has become the greatest affair of the international 
community, the basis of life and death, the way to survival or extinction. 
It must therefore be thoroughly pondered and analysed.16
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Reconciliation as a Political Concept: 
Some Observations and Remarks
Kjell-Åke Nordquist
Uppsala University
Foreword
This paper summarizes a number of observations and reflec-
tions on the phenomenon and practice called “reconciliation,” in 
connection to peace processes and peace-building initiatives. In 
particular it draws from processes followed by the author, in East 
Timor in particular, but also in Europe, the Middle East and, more 
recently, Colombia. 
It is a discussion paper. The purpose is to invite to reflection, 
both on the level of perspectives and that of concepts. It is devel-
oped from a lecture called “The Challenge of Reconciliation” held 
at Universidad Nacional, Bogotá, in December 2003. Following 
substantial revision since then (more than doubling the length of 
the text) I realized that today not many parts of the original text 
are still recognizable from that presentation, then organized by 
the Embassy of Sweden in Colombia, as part of its commitment 
to the peace process in that country.
The field of “political reconciliation” is evolving, definitions of 
reconciliation abound, and different contributors have different 
takes on the subject matter, quite naturally. It is the author’s view 
that reconciliation can and should not be “held captive” by any 
particular field of study. It relates to fundamental, some would say 
existential, issues of meaning, trust, contradictions, and suffering 
in the midst of a violent political reality. It is wise to tread softly on 
ground with such a complex subsoil.
1. Armed confl ict and reconciliation
It is fair to ask the question: Why, and how, has reconciliation be-
come a concept in political discourse?
The century recently ended demonstrated some fundamental chang-
es in the nature of armed confl icts and wars. Three observations can be 
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made about these, so as to serve as a guide for identifying develop-
ments, all of which are pointing towards the emergence of “reconcilia-
tion” into a political concept and practice, taking active form in the last 
part of the century. 
One of the major achievements of the 20th century was the crea-
tion of legal instruments that bring the individual person into the realm 
of international politics. Not only states came to be holders of rights 
and duties, but also individual persons — whether in private capacity 
or (even) as state servants. It was a process that took shape in differ-
ent ways. Milestones, each one in their own right, are of course the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1945, and the establish-
ment of the International Criminal Court, based on the Rome Statute 
of 1998. These two mechanisms — so different in nature but with the 
same basic idea of defending fundamental human rights — combine 
the fact that individuals, as well as states, have both rights and duties 
which are not limited by, for instance, state boundaries or professional 
rules. Thus they are applicable not only in civil life but also under the 
special legal and practical conditions that defi ne a situation of armed 
confl ict or war. 
Another observation is that, after the Second World War, armed 
confl icts and wars turned gradually into a blend of internal and in-
ter-state confl ict. On the surface this was not always visible: the Cold 
War was a  period where confl ict was fuelled in some areas while be-
ing kept under control in others. Only a few confl icts were open, in-
ter-state confl icts; examples include India-Pakistan, Ecuador-Peru, and 
Iran-Iraq. 
As systematic collection of data shows, the vast majority of wars 
have, for decades, been “internal wars” (Wallensteen and Lotta, 
2005). Internal wars are either about the rule of a given state (“civil 
wars”) or about its fundamental structure, i.e. the constitution of a 
state (“state formation wars”). Civil wars are thus challenging an ex-
isting government, its policy, etc. but not the state as a unit, while 
state formation wars include issues which involve one or more of the 
parties struggling for a “re-constitution” of a state, the most radical 
type of proposals being the territorial separation and independence 
of regions within an existing state. While Colombia, Sierra Leone, and 
Afghanistan are examples of civil wars, the confl icts in Southern Su-
dan, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines (Mindanao) are examples of state 
formation wars.
While internal wars dominate as the typical war of today, they have 
at the same time become internationalised, often due to parties’ inter-
national economic and political relations and support. This often con-
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tributes to the protraction of such wars. This can be regarded as the (ex-
pansion of the) “horizontal” dimension of civil wars. There however also 
a “vertical” dimension: a civil war penetrates into the state; it means 
in practice, and almost by defi nition, that large groups of a population 
are affected, much larger than would be the case if the confl ict was 
fought, say, in boundary areas, at sea, or in the air. Protracted civil wars 
in particular are devastating for the civil population. Sometimes this is, 
or becomes, part of a strategy by the parties — the civilian population 
represents a target since it is seen as a resource (for protection, as in clas-
sic guerrilla strategy, or for material support) for one side or the other. 
The result of all this is that on the whole displacement, killing, and hu-
man suffering in modern armed confl icts are greatest among civilians, 
not among the military/soldiers. This has obviously consequences for the 
peace process. A normative proposition one can formulate from this 
observation — given the broad negative effects of civil wars — is to say 
that if the war affects everyone, then the peace process should affect 
everyone, assuming that peace — on all levels of a society — should not 
be expected unless all levels are also addressed in a peace process.
The human loss and suffering, together with the physical and envi-
ronmental destruction, after a civil war, on the whole creates a situation 
of such magnitude, that it goes far beyond the capacity that any nor-
mally functioning state would have at its disposal — much less a state in 
a post-confl ict situation. 
This leads to very uncomfortable decisions regarding the priority or-
der of using scarce resources, both material and human, and its short-
and long-term effects on the development of a country.
As noted above, peace processes have taken on wider responsibili-
ties in the last decades. This is true in particular since the end of the Cold 
war. Individual peace processes have developed different aspects of the 
wide spectrum of mechanisms and dimensions that might actually be 
part of a process. Table 1 below is an attempt at summarizing four main 
components of what could be called a “comprehensive peace process:” 
the formal peace agreement, a process of individual legal responsibility, 
a mechanism such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and fi nally, 
apologies by state or other leaders. These four components are thus 
found in concrete peace processes; at the same time, there is (probably) 
no single process in which all of the components appear in a planned 
and developed way.
While most of the components have been commented on above, 
the apology aspect has not. It refers to the many cases of apologies 
expressed by heads of state, leaders of parties or international organiza-
tions, churches, etc. who apologize to victimized groups — for instance 
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after civil wars or with regards to historically victimized groups, including 
indigenous peoples.1 
Table 1 indicates that there are mechanisms available, in principle, to 
deal with the impact of civil wars on societies. At best, the four compo-
nents in a process could strengthen each other, be complementary and 
add to each other’s legitimacy. For this reason, the reconciliation process, 
on which this paper is focusing, should not be used as a remedy for fail-
ures in the other squares of the table, but rather be seen as an integral 
part of a larger whole.
Few peace processes, if any, can involve the appearance of all four 
components at the same time. It is not even obvious if it is desirable that 
they appear, so to speak, simultaneously. Certainly, an apology is not a 
time-consuming act in itself, while legal processes are. Either way, the 
timing of the four will nevertheless impact on the process. 
Table 1
Four components in intra-state peace processes
LEVEL
ASPECT Political Individual
Legal Formal peace agreement/
equivalent
Responsibility according to na-
tional /  international law. War 
Crime Tribunals
Moral Apologies from leaders Truth and reconciliation process/
commission
Speaking of timing, the formal peace agreement, many would say, 
should be the start. However an apology from responsible leaders could 
also be a trigger towards an agreement, and a larger peace process, and 
thus serve a purpose at an early stage. Whether legal and reconciliatory 
processes should overlap in time or not, is often a matter dependent on 
the relationship between the two. In Sierra Leone, for instance, there 
was sharp disagreement between the National Truth and Reconciliation 
1 For instance, when traveling in Africa and Rwanda, UN Secr.-Gen. Kofi Annan 
apologized for the UN’s inability to protect the Rwandans from genocide; Queen Eliza-
beth has apologized for British exploitation of the Maoris; the Japanese Prime Minister 
has apologized for what his country did in China, Korea, and the Philippines during 
WWII.
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Commission, and the international Special Court set up for dealing with 
crimes against humanity in the war, due to the Court’s over-ruling of 
some of the conditions in the peace agreement, making it inoperable 
de facto. 
If we regard a peace process in this way, the reconciliation process 
should be seen as part of the total agreement, i.e. part of the compre-
hensive peace process, and not be seen, for instance, as a remedy for 
failures in other parts of the peace process.
The challenge is then to design a reconciliation process that inte-
grates with other parts of the peace process, and thereby becomes a 
process in its own right.
In order to answer the introductory question — why reconcilia-
tion? — the nature of today’s armed confl icts, as internal wars affect-
ing wide groups of populations, requires different treatment to what 
history books tell us about peace processes. As we have seen, there 
are mechanisms available; experiences exist in a number of countries 
and processes, with different ways and means of dealing with the 
past, often with a reconciliatory dimension involved.
1.1. Reconciliation in politics
The phenomenon of “reconciliation” does take place in real life, be-
tween individuals and between groups, but does that make it a process 
that can be part of what we call “politics”? Politics, as usually under-
stood, deals with power, the distribution of resources, changing society, 
etc., and it is for many an important principle that certain aspects of life 
should stay out of the infl uence of “politics.”
There are two observations to be made in relation to this. The fi rst, 
that when it comes to peace processes after civil war, in particular after 
protracted civil wars, then it is fair to say, that we are not only talking 
about a political process in the narrow sense of a process that depends 
solely on actions from governments. Peace processes after civil war, in 
particular, are wider than this. They are social processes, which encom-
pass much broader layers of a society than are usually infl uenced by 
decisions taken by governmental structures. So for that reason, recon-
ciliation can have a place in a peace process understood in this wider 
sense. If we have a wide defi nition of “peace,” then it is not diffi cult to 
see how reconciliation can be part of a “peace process.”
The other observation is, that inasmuch as reconciliation depends 
on the free will of people to change their minds, its scope and pace will 
always be individually decided; it can never be commanded by political 
decision. Governments and governmental agencies can provide space 
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and opportunity for reconciliation to take place, but not so much more, 
really, in order not to press individuals beyond what is ethically appropri-
ate. In addition to this, it should always be remembered, that this is all 
about situations where many are deeply victimized, and who is to say, 
under such conditions, whether— and if so, when — a change of mind 
shall take place?
1.2. Reconciliation — a note on the cultural question
The conceptual overlapping that many observe between “recon-
ciliation” and Christian teaching — doesn’t this make reconciliation a 
Western phenomenon, even, and in reality, a part of Western cultural 
dominance, when applied in non-Western cultures?
The critical aspect in a theoretical context is whether “reconcilia-
tion” represents a social phenomenon that is universal — as far as we 
can understand that concept — in character, or not. 
What will be presented below as a defi nition of reconciliation shows, 
as I see it, that reconciliation appears, and more important can appear, 
in principle in any culture where the words used in the defi nition have 
any meaning. 
Reconciliation, understood in this sense, may well carry the content 
of a global phenomenon. That is a necessary, underlying assumption for 
this paper. 
Maybe the phenomenon of “reconciliation” should have another 
“name”, which remains to be seen. At present, though, the conceptual 
development has led to a wider acceptance of the concept, meaning 
that it is basically a contextual and not defi nitional issue if it were to lose 
its religious connotations. Most important is that it includes all situations 
with the same content — be they religious and/or non-religious experi-
ences.
2. Reconciliation — Both a Goal and a Process
Obviously, “reconciliation” represents a process as well as a goal 
for that process. As a process it refers both to political, social, and legal 
components, and it has in practice, the last decade, come to include 
acknowledgement of victims, truth-telling, reparation, and justice. The 
relation between these components can be discussed. For some groups, 
“justice,” “truth,” or “reparation” are all sine qua non for reconcilia-
tion. My position, developed below, is that reconciliation is not a mere 
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composition of aspects, but has a distinct meaning and contribution in 
itself, to the nature of peace processes.
As a goal, there are two types of reconciliation that need to be iden-
tifi ed; both are relevant for protracted armed confl icts. The fi rst and 
most common is intra-generational reconciliation, i.e. a process between 
persons who themselves have experienced, or committed, atrocities, in 
short, those that have suffered and carried the burdens related to that 
suffering. 
In inter-generational reconciliation processes, we deal with those in-
dividuals and groups who have to come to grips with prejudices, memo-
ries, and who have had to grow up in divided communities, due to past 
grievances and divisions. Here, dealing with history, so that it in itself 
does not become a new reason for confl ict, is a major challenge — for 
individuals as well as societies.
There are distinctive features of these two types of process. A funda-
mental observation about inter-generational reconciliation is that while 
being a victim easily translates into the second generation, both in terms 
of perceptions and world-views, as well as materially, the same does not, 
however, as easily apply to perpetrators. From a legal point this is obvi-
ous, but also morally the responsibility looks different — from culture to 
culture — when it comes to compensating in one way or another for 
what “our fathers did.”
Many countries have struggled with inter-generational reconcili-
ation, for example Germany and Poland, Germany and France, Japan 
and its South-East Asian neighbours, and Finland (which suffered a civil 
war between “reds” and “whites” in connection to World War II) are a 
few examples. These processes have included everything from leaders’ 
pronouncements of apologies to common history-book projects. This 
long-term process of a conscious re-building of understanding and ac-
ceptance of a common fate and history is an interesting and important 
investment in time and effort. It is more diffi cult to measure, but as often 
in similar cases, it may not be the result in itself that is the most impor-
tant aspect, but the process, with all its reassessments, acknowledge-
ment, and new insights on all sides involved.
In countries which have experienced protracted armed confl icts, such 
as India and Pakistan, Burma, the Middle East, Colombia, and maybe a 
few more, experiences from inter-generational reconciliation processes 
could provide important issues to be considered, if and when these areas 
and countries are bound for reconciliation on a national, political level.
We should also note here that there is a growing literature on the 
question of “historic responsibility,” i.e. whether subsequent genera-
tions have the moral obligation to meet demands of reparation for in-
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justices carried out by previous generations, for instance towards indig-
enous peoples, slaves, colonial peoples, etcetera.2
Below, however, we will concentrate on intra-generational reconcili-
ation processes. 
3. Four Reconciliation Structures
We have already mentioned the distinction between inter- and intra-
generational reconciliation. There are obviously a number of practical 
issues connected to this difference, but it raises also some fundamental 
ethical and philosophical ones, related to the degree that responsibility 
can be transferred between generations; and as a corollary, whether 
victimhood can be inherited, and if so how, etc. This is a major issue for 
political philosophers.3
All of these issues are already dealt with in various ways in daily life 
as well as in our conceptions of what it means to live — in relation to 
morality, responsibility, and how injustice is dealt with. 
Besides this time-based distinction of generations, another distinction 
of fundamental importance is the nature of the relationship between the 
victim and the perpetrators, or rather: are victims always “only” victims, 
and are perpetrators always “only” perpetrators. Obviously, there are 
situations where I think one can make this black and white distinction. 
However, there are probably other, and more, cases where the dominant 
impression in terms of “who is who?” is more grey — in different shades, 
but still grey. Thus we could distinguish between a unilateral and a mutual 
moral relationship between the victim and perpetrator, i.e. unilateral vic-
timhood and mutual victimhood.
Some empirical cases are likely to represent mainly one of these four 
categories of reconciliation; this is illustrated in the table below.
It should be noted that individuals or groups that may very well be 
regarded as victims also might have been in situations where they have 
infl icted harm upon the other side. This is a major issue, a very sensitive 
issue, in situations where the victim becomes the power-holder as an 
outcome of the process, such as in the case of South Africa, East Timor, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone.
Some cases border between inter- and intra-generational, such as 
Colombia and East Timor. 
2 See Townsville (2002), a study arguing for transgenerational responsibilities.
3 For a useful overview of the issues, see Townsville (2002).
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives204   204 4/1/07   11:21:09
 RECONCILIATION AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT: SOME OBSERVATIONS AND REMARKS 205
Obviously these structural differences have both methodological and 
ideological consequences, not all of which can be developed here.
Before discussing some of them, we need to pay attention to yet an-
other structural dimension that is critical for a peace process as a whole, 
and not least for political reconciliation.
Table 2
Four types of reconciliation settings and examples of cases
Intragenerational Intergenerational
Largely one-sided 
responsibility
(largely one side victim, 
other side perpetrator)
Massacres Systems of segregation 
and oppression; racial 
laws
Largely mutual 
responsibility
(both sides have 
infl icted 
injustices upon each 
other)
Armed confl icts/ wars Protracted armed 
confl icts/wars
3.1. The power dimension
There is a fundamental difference for any legal or reconciliatory 
process — or any peace process for that matter — whether the parties 
have agreed to the process as a result of negotiation or a negotiated an 
understanding (or an agreement) where no side has been forced to give 
up militarily, and a situation where one of the sides can claim military vic-
tory. Also, in the case of a victory of one side over the other, it is not the 
case that the losing side does not have bargaining power. However, the 
situation is still fundamentally different from a negotiated and therefore 
explicitly or implicitly made agreement. 
A negotiated agreement recognizes as a reality that the two sides, while 
having made an agreement, still have a military capacity, maybe to the de-
gree that one can destroy an agreement, and also that there is some political 
support as well. Nevertheless the parties have agreed to settle their differ-
ences in other ways than militarily, without the use of force and violence. 
Such processes are often marred by political argument, deception, 
manoeuvres, broken cease-fi res, and the like. Still, the leadership on 
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both/all sides can be very clear in their intention. It is fi tting to remember 
here that, for instance, in the South African process towards a post-
apartheid democratic state, a cease-fi re was never signed between the 
parties involved. Nevertheless, the course of events was clear, even if 
challenged in substance and practice many times.
While its was clear in South Africa that the days of the apartheid 
system were numbered, and thus South Africa seems less of a negoti-
ated process, there was still a lot of political space to be used by both/all 
parties in the constitutional process. A typical case in point of a negoti-
ated process is Colombia, and the on-going demobilization process of 
the paramilitary groups under the AUC. In Rwanda, there was, and is, a 
heavy moral burden on the perpetrators of the genocide, while this on 
the other hand can never imply from a democratic-theory point of view, 
that there is no room for other actors or opinions than the dominating 
one. The same is true for East Timor, where the present government 
won a victory so strong that the political space of the side that lost the 
referendum faces the risk of being reduced only because it had a clear 
minority outcome in the referendum.4
This is a general problem, and illustrates the power dimension which, 
one could say, is what is typical for “politics.” However, the idea behind 
for instance democratic institutions is to hinder one group’s monopoliza-
tion of political life and mechanisms.
In order to make clear the different conditions under which reconcili-
ation processes take place, table 2 describes four types relating to the 
power dimension, and the moral dimension.
In the context of reconciliation, we need to recognize, that since 
reconciliation by nature is a voluntary process — which is different from 
legal processes for instance — the power dimension can play a strong 
role in which forms of reconciliation it is possible to apply in a given 
post-confl ict situation. This observation leads naturally to the next prob-
lem — what to do in a context of continued violence?
3.2. Reconciliation and forgiveness
As an early and general refl ection on the relationship between poli-
tics and reconciliation, an observation can be that reconciliation is not 
a “political process” of traditional type (including its ‘violent continua-
tion,’ as Clausewitz would say); it is rather a “pre-political” process in 
4 The winning, pro-independence option in the referendum on East Timor’s future sta-
tus got 78,5% of the votes, while the pro-autonomy (within Indonesia) option got 21,5 %.
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the sense that it is a de facto recognition that “politics,” in the form 
practiced up to that point, has failed to produce an acceptable social 
situation, and that in order to avoid (total) social destruction, and in 
order to produce conditions for a more acceptable development, one or 
another form of “reconciliation” is necessary.
By its nature, reconciliation is not a totally individual process — as 
forgiveness can be. There have to be at least two individuals that can 
reconcile with each other. In this sense, reconciliation is a relational con-
cept.
Reconciliation is thus providing a tool for building relationships. It is, 
to use sociological language, a structural concept, which for that par-
ticular reason can serve in a political context, and not only in a private or 
individual setting. It is this structural, relation-building capacity of “rec-
onciliation” which makes it relevant and useful in a political discourse.
The latter is however not the case for “forgiveness.” Forgiveness 
is — or can be — a one-sided act that can be expressed without any 
reciprocal action from the intended recipient’s side. In practice there 
can very well be cases of mutual forgiveness, but the concept as such 
does not require this to happen, in order to be meaningful. As a conse-
quence, forgiveness, when used in a political vocabulary, can at worst 
function as a kind of imposition on individuals —”you shall forgive!” 
— something that goes against the nature of the whole process.
So far as the relational dimension of reconciliation goes — “it takes 
two to reconcile,” to paraphrase another expression.
4. Reconciliation in a Violent Context
Obviously, “reconciliation” in the midst of violence that is on-go-
ing — geographically and/or politically — can easily become a be-
trayal of its own purpose. No one wants that to be the case, and 
a critical question to address is of course if there are unconditional 
circumstances for a meaningful reconciliation process. The key ques-
tion is: Under what circumstances can reconciliation be initiated as an 
effective5 part of a peace process?
The bottom-line, it is assumed here, for an effective reconciliation 
process, is to safeguard it from being kidnapped for partisan political 
purposes. If the purpose is to overcome divisions, then the process needs 
5 “Effective” is here thought of as meaning “meaningful,” “relevant” and “produc-
tive.”
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to stand above the divisions themselves. This principle is in a way obvi-
ous, maybe simplistic, but it addresses not only issues like the choice of 
leading personalities, but also the staffi ng, fi nancial and practical as-
pects as well. 
More intriguing are the political conditions for a reconciliation proc-
ess. A tentative conclusion, given the experiences from truth and recon-
ciliation commissions from three decades, is that the higher the level of 
on-going violence during the work of the commission — with or with-
out a fi nal peace accord signed — the more shallow or limited the work 
of the commission. Violence always limits the work of a commission: its 
political support, its witnesses, its possibility to move, the security of its 
members, etcetera. In order for a commission to work effectively in the 
midst of ongoing violence, a possible means to deal with it would be to 
structure the work into units of geographical and political nature. For 
instance, in regions where demobilization has taken place, and where 
leaders signal willingness to redefi ne their position, the reconciliation 
process can be initiated and work itself through different steps to the 
extent that the conditions allow. Hopefully, this work will initiate a posi-
tive spiral, which shows both politicians and the population at large, the 
advantages of a reconciliation process: more security, increased trust, 
and new possibilities for social and economic initiatives.
This way of thinking implies that a nation-wide and fi rmly estab-
lished peace agreement, on its way to completion, is not a necessary 
condition for a reconciliation process. However, it requires a degree of 
fundamental change on the public level — for instance, geographically 
(regions, cities, actors) and/or politically (cease-fi re, demobilization, and 
the like).
Thus, reconciliation processes in the midst of on-going violence can 
take place in certain regions, with certain actors, and on certain dimen-
sions, as a way to demonstrate what this can mean for a nation as a 
whole. The goal of such partial processes would of course be, to make 
it deeper in terms of methods and content, and wider in terms of ge-
ography. As long as the reconciliation process is not reversed by actors 
deviating from its fundamental nature, this can be defended both politi-
cally and morally.
5. The Contribution of Reconciliation
When new concepts are introduced it is necessary to ask what does, 
in this case reconciliation say, which is not covered by other concepts, 
for instance, “confl ict settlement”? The answer can best be illustrated 
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by reference to a classical fi gure in early peace research, namely the con-
fl ict triangle6, which says that three ingredients are necessary for a social 
confl ict: attitudes, behaviour and an incompatibility. Thus the classical 
triangle was:
Behaviour
                                                       /               \
 Attitude ________ Incompatibility
Reconciliation belongs to the attitudinal side of the triangle. Confl ict 
resolution belongs either to the behavioural or to the incompatibility 
side. This is so because confl ict settlement can indicate either confl ict 
management (to handle the behaviour of parties so that they act non-
violently, for instance), or confl ict resolution (to resolve the matter once 
and for all by eliminating the incompatibility). So, if the original triangle 
indicated the necessary components for confl ict, it can be developed 
into a triangle of peace components. This process deserves another 
study, but here it will only be briefl y mentioned. The triangle then looks 
as follows:
 Security
                                                       /              \
 Reconciliation ________ Democracy
If reconciliation deals with attitudes in the most profound way we 
can arrange on a political level, democracy is the way by which a society 
peacefully can deal with its incompatibilities. Finally, security, both in the 
sense of physical security in social life, as well as a sustainable and thus 
secure environment belongs to this corner of the triangle.
This illustrates, and explains, the complementary role of reconcilia-
tion in a confl ict resolution process.
6. The Content of Reconciliation
Reconciliation, in order to be a useful concept, also has to relate to 
the content, the nature, of the relationship. I would argue that it is too 
6 The conflict triangle was developed by Galtung, in an early and now famous artic-
le, “Conflict as a Way of Life“ (1978).
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives209   209 4/1/07   11:21:10
210 KJELL-ÅKE NORDQUIST
weak to equal reconciliation with “being nice.” This would place the 
concept on the level of fundamental rules for social interaction. There 
has to be some more to it. In sum them, reconciliation cannot be for-
giveness, and cannot mean just being friendly.
6.1. The relational component
A legal process does not normally involve any form of message or 
interaction between victim and perpetrator. In court proceedings the 
two sides try to convince the court, not each other.
In a reconciliation process it is “the other side” — being it a victim 
or a perpetrator — that should primarily be addressed; not, for instance, 
a commission for truth and reconciliation. (The commission can be more 
likened to a facilitator than a court.)
However, as has already been mentioned, a major purpose of recon-
ciliation is to infl uence relationships. Not necessarily on a personal level, 
but on the level where it was before the injustices, etc., started. That 
means — ideally — that leaders should address groups and a nation as 
they did before the injustices; that the local landlords, businessmen, etc., 
who used to meet their employees, etc., on a certain level, should do so 
within the reconciliation process as well. And the single murderer should 
meet those closest to the victim. Again — ideally speaking. The point is, 
that the moral balance in a society is probably best restored at the level 
on which it was broken.
Without this relational component, again, it is hard to call it a proc-
ess of reconciliation; it would be counter-intuitive to the general under-
standing of the concept. 
6.2. Changing minds?
Imagine a perpetrator and his/her attitude to the victims and to so-
ciety before an impending legal process. We do not, and cannot, legally 
demand a change of mind from this person in the direction of contri-
tion, in order for him/her to pass the process, including its judgment. (A 
change of mind can affect the decision of the court, but the point here 
is the opposite: the court cannot enforce contrition.) There may be bold 
ambitions on the part of the prison system to change and develop a per-
son under its protection. Nevertheless, he/she will not have to change 
his/her mind in order to regain his/her freedom at a certain date. Once 
again, in some systems “good behaviour,” etc., can shorten the time, 
but that’s not the point here.
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It is hard to imagine as meaningful a process of reconciliation where 
there is no change of attitude. At the same time, this is something that 
cannot be forced upon anyone. Thus, a process of reconciliation, and a 
commission that organizes such a process, needs to seek out the extent 
to which a change of mind is present.
A consequence of this view is that, theoretically speaking, if all 
atrocities and violations etc. that have taken place during a given con-
fl ict are dealt with within an established, regular legal/court system, 
that would not be an example of a reconciliation process. Instead, 
reconciliation is wider than a legal process, it concerns a reality that a 
court may not be able to reach — either legally or morally — which 
deals with the web of responsibilities, hidden goals, and deceptions 
that become part of daily life in protracted armed confl ict situations; 
being so “human,” so necessary for survival and decent management 
of day-to-day life. Thus reconciliation points to the change of attitudes 
among those involved.
6.3. Moral and legal claims
There is however an ethical dimension, as well, in “reconciliation”, 
which makes it representative for the message that individuals and oth-
ers would like to send when they reconcile. The fundamental message 
is, that an individual, a group, or even a country is prepared to overlook, 
at least to some degree, legitimate claims (moral, legal, material) against 
the other person/side, for the sake of re-establishing relations based 
on the perpetrator’s acknowledgement of the victim’s suffering and a 
responsibility in this connection. The various components mentioned 
above, making up a “reconciliation process” — such as acknowledge-
ment, contrition, truth telling, reparation, and justice — are all instru-
ments for this.
Reconciliation processes, with their different mechanisms, deal with 
a situation that a society’s regular institutions are not built for, and there-
fore not able, to deal with effectively, neither legally, socially, nor ethical-
ly. In this way, a reconciliation commission, for instance, should always 
be temporary, and in most cases the philosophy has been to avoid a 
long-term involvement of such commissions, since it means that neces-
sary lines of responsibility need not to be developed, between regular 
civil institutions, on the one hand, and the commission’s responsibility, 
on the other.
A long-term commission, then, needs to be aware of this fundamen-
tal difference in its working conditions, as compared to the short-term 
ones.
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7. Defi ning Political Reconciliation
Reconciliation as a general phenomenon is here defi ned as a proc-
ess where harm is repaired in such a way that trust can again be estab-
lished. 
“Harm,” then, is a consequence both of injustices in a legal sense as 
well as of violations of human dignity that may not be covered by law. 
“Repaired” refers to a variety of acts and processes that various mecha-
nisms in a process can provide, each of them hopefully tailored to a 
specifi c context. For example, there can be acknowledgement, symbolic 
acts, truth-telling, material reparation, legal justice, common mourning. 
In some cultures, the fulfi lment of local and/or traditional mechanisms 
are as important as any other process; in other cultures, the legal dimen-
sion appears to be the primary, setting others aside, while in yet other 
cultures, the group-oriented and religious dimension takes precedence 
over others.
Hopefully, and critical for the whole process, is that human dignity is 
restored through these different mechanisms. This is easily said, but on 
the basis of dignity comes the possibility for victims to turn from being 
an “object” — of others’ acts — to becoming a “subject,” taking initia-
tives based on their own resources. 
“Trust” is a key word in the defi nition. It refers to what can be de-
scribed as “social trust” meaning the fundamental type of relationship in 
a society, without which there are no valid promises, no fundamental se-
curity in the street, etc. “Trust” in this sense lies between “confi dence,” 
which includes sharing of information, and “acceptance” which is what 
is demanded from everyone towards a third person, irrespective of their 
personal differences.
The defi nition above reads, “trust again can be established,” which 
indicates that it is a broken relationship that should be established. New 
relations, never previously in place, are of course not an example of rec-
onciliation, since there was nothing to sort out, in the fi rst place.
An interesting aspect in this is the component of over-looking old 
events and current claims that on good grounds can be made on the ba-
sis of these events. These claims can be moral or legal, sometimes deal-
ing with economic or material things (land, live-stock, destroyed eco-
nomic production units, etc.). However, “for the sake of” ‘something,’ 
behind which there can be very different reasons and motivations, but 
anyway a new path of relations is chosen: a harbour, a school etc. is 
rebuilt through common effort, since everybody needs it and benefi ts 
from it. Over-looking does not at all have to mean “forgetting,” or “par-
doning/forgiving,” but it brings fresh air into a community — whether 
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temporary or more lasting. It belongs to the things that no one can ask 
for from outside, but which nevertheless can emerge from within, given 
the situation that exists.
Now, political reconciliation is a somewhat different thing than rec-
onciliation on a general level. First, “political” reconciliation is a process 
dealing with injustice due to political confl ict. Secondly, since it takes 
place on the political level, it has to be cognizant and respectful of its 
limitations when it comes to integrity and respect for the individual di-
mension in reconciliation processes, as we have noted in relation to the 
concept of forgiveness, and “over-looking,” above.
A defi nition of “political reconciliation” would read: a process where 
harm, resulting from political violence, is repaired in such a way that 
trust can again be established between victims, perpetrators, and the 
society at large.
A political reconciliation process has a societal dimension to it, which 
is different from inter-personal reconciliation. An issue on the political 
level is not only a matter between the victims and a perpetrator, for 
instance. If they have reconciled then it is a matter for the society as a 
whole — everyone has the right to know that reconciliation has taken 
place. Not least so that the encouraging and positive development that 
can come out from reconciliation becomes known to everybody affect-
ed. This fi nal feature is a clear difference from private/individual forms 
of reconciliation. In the latter, no one can claim the right to know what 
two parties do to their relationship, in principle.
8. Reconciliation in a Legal Framework
In the introduction to this paper, the question was asked, how could 
it be that “reconciliation” made its way into the political discourse and 
language at all. 
The literature in the subject tends either to deal with the justice di-
mension, the socio-psychological dimension or the forgiveness/remorse 
dimension.7
An assumption for the discussion in this paper is that reconciliation 
has a component that includes the re-establishment of broken relations. 
7 In another context a literature review would be appropriate. Here, this statement 
is just an impression from the author’s reading. The authors in the first group are not 
seldom lawyers interested in transitional justice, in the second group social workers and 
NGO-persons, and the third group theologians (academics, Church-based, or politi-
cians).
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives213   213 4/1/07   11:21:11
214 KJELL-ÅKE NORDQUIST
If this is not part of the process, then it is not reconciliation — or better: 
then it should be called something else.
This assumption, which of course can be discussed, clarifi es the spe-
cifi c contribution of “reconciliation” in the political process. It puts the 
concept in a creative relation to many different fi elds, each one con-
tributing with their aspects. Thus reconciliation cannot solely be a legal 
process (to what extent can we talk about broken relations if victim and 
perpetrator were unknown to each other?), or solely a psychological 
process (to what extent should the psychological well-being of an indi-
vidual determine what is possible in terms of [political] reconciliation?), 
or for that matter a moral/ethical process (to what extent should group-
based/indigenous moral principles be allowed to determine the outcome 
of reconciliation? Isn’t that a “parliament of the street”?)
From a legal point of view, reconciliation belongs to the reparative 
process, and as assumed above, it deals with the relations — normally 
broken relations — within such a process. When the existing, positive 
law is violated, the society asks for punishment — thorough the police, 
court, and jail system — of the violating individual, in principle. This 
is a process based on retributive justice. It is concerned with punish-
ment of offences against the (positive) law. Now, if there is an offence, 
there is likely to be someone offended. Reparative justice is concerned 
with this aspect: the compensation to victims for violations of (positive) 
law. 
Methodologically the approach in morally unilateral situations is 
obviously very different from a mutually defi ned victimhood. In the 
former, the “moral power,” so to speak, lies in the hands of the 
victim(s). Thus, a reconciliation process needs to give the victims also 
a degree of social, political and economic power, in order for them 
to leave the situation of being “a victim,” and gain/regain a position 
from where the individual or group is able to make decisions both 
about one’s own situation and how to relate to the perpetrator, as an 
individual and/or group. 
From such a position of strength and independence the victims can 
meet and relate to the perpetrator. Given that position of strength, 
which for instance was achieved by the victim-group in South Africa, or 
in East Timor, it is then possible to develop a system where the perpetra-
tor is dealt with. This can be either through the existing legal system or 
through special legal or non-legal mechanisms. We will come back to 
that later.
In a mutual relationship of where both sides are both victims and 
perpetrators, there is both the sensitivity coming when one of them is 
the power holder, and the risk that the misdeeds by the power holder 
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are “sold out” for cheap sentences against the other side. Or both sides 
can agree, as in Mozambique,8 to leave the whole question of (moral/
legal) responsibility, and never bring it up, saying that it is not an impor-
tant political issue. In terms of reconciliation, this has meant that only 
relatively small, local processes/acts of reconciliation have taken place, 
but not on a national level. 
In the case of Colombia, a law was adopted in mid-2005 that grants 
particular reductions of sentences, etc., given certain conditions, for 
groups “al margen de la ley,” i.e. for guerrilla and paramilitary groups 
who decide to demobilize unilaterally and as a group. If a group chooses 
not to demobilize according to this law, regular criminal law applies to 
that group. 
8.1. The question of impunity or amnesty
The question of amnesty — or impunity as well — lies in the tension 
between the morally unique position that a victim has to grant amnes-
ty, on the one hand, and the socially necessary principle that everyone 
should be treated in a similar way, on the other hand. An individual 
person’s freedom should not depend on a victim’s personal judgment. 
Briefl y one can say, that morally amnesty or impunity is a matter for the 
victims, but legally it is a matter of parliaments and courts.
Legal systems and traditions vary on the role of victims in regard to 
the perpetrator’s fate. In some systems, such as in the USA, victims/rela-
tives have sometimes a say in the release process of prisoners.
There is obviously a risk that leaders — also democratically elected — of 
countries with a weak — for any reason — police and court system, 
including prisons, is likely to consider the mechanism of reduction of 
punishment as a way of dealing with these weaknesses. This is easy 
to criticize from a legal point of view, but the interesting question is of 
course what happens if this weakness is disregarded, and things are set 
to move on as if the situation was “normal.”
However, we don’t deal with normal situations, but with situations 
where the number of cases outnumbers by far what even reasonably 
effective legal systems are able to deal with within any reasonable time 
limit. 
8 This example refers to the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo, the latter the 
party in power in Mozambique, since its independence from Portugal.
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9.  Reconciliation — Aspects of Bottom-Up and Top-Down 
Approaches
Post-confl ict reconciliation processes, in order to be effective, are 
one of the best examples of how necessary it is to combine bottom-up 
and top-down approaches to peace building.
If we start with the top-down process, and look at some experiences, 
one dimension turns out to be critical: the attitude of the winning side 
to its own history. It is a strong hypothesis, that there is a relationship be-
tween a leadership’s — a government’s — willingness to acknowledge 
its mistakes in the past, on the one hand, and other parties’ willingness 
to do the same thing.
Armed confl icts are to a large extent elite projects; without mate-
rial resources an armed confl ict cannot continue over time. Rebellions, 
upheavals, mutiny, looting, burnings, killings — there are many ways by 
which non-armed but still very violent actions can take place. The armed 
confl ict, however, requires weapons, training and communication. Thus, 
settlement of armed confl icts requires dealing with these elites — mili-
tarily crushed or not, they represent access to resources that can either 
spoil an agreement or support and strengthen it.
The elite’s way of dealing with reconciliation — being it against or in 
line with their personal will — is critical, due to the resources the elites 
by defi nition can control.
A much debated apology during a reconciliation process was made 
in South Africa by its former president de Klerk, to the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where he said that “Apartheid 
was wrong. I apologize in my capacity as leader of the National Party 
to the millions of South Africans who suffered the wretched disruption 
of forced removals in respect of their homes, businesses and land. Who 
over the years suffered the shame of being arrested for pass law offenc-
es. Who over the decades and indeed centuries suffered the indignities 
and humiliation of racial discrimination” (Huyse, 2003).
So far the top-down perspective.
The bottom-up perspective establishes the peace and reconciliation 
process among those that have suffered the most — the direct victims, 
the general population, the internally displaced, etc. It is easier said than 
done, to integrate broad layers of a population — in a country torn by 
war and divisions — into a process where most, at least, feel involved or 
at least have access to the extent wanted. Well functioning, peaceful, in-
formation-technology-based countries can still have problems with such 
tasks. The moral and political reasons pointing to the necessity to bring 
all groups in does not make it practically easier; however they give good 
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reasons for letting this process take its time. This is the only solution to 
the commitment idea: lack of resources can be compensated by time, a 
resource that a peace process should have plenty of!
10. Truth-Telling
One of the most well known truth and reconciliation commissions 
was the one in South Africa. Truth-telling was a most signifi cant part of 
its work. Many believed at the time, that the mere telling of the truth 
would work in reconciliatory ways, that it would help to heal people on 
an individual level. This may be so on a national level, but sometimes at 
the cost of the individuals who actually tell the story.
The purpose of the truth component is, or should according to this 
author, not be to heal in the fi rst place, but to recognize, acknowledge 
and bring light to hidden parts of a society’s past. To give information to 
a truth commission should by no means be mixed up with giving a tes-
timony before a court. Testifying to a court means answering the court’s 
questions and needs, but it’s a different matter to tell one’s own story, 
one’s own truth, to somebody that is interested (read: a truth commis-
sion). This is to be recognized as somebody that carries an important 
part of a country’s, a community’s common history. 
As a secondary consequence of this, an individual may feel acknowl-
edged, which is part of a healing process, and this is of course all good. 
However, to take statements is a very different activity from trauma heal-
ing, both in terms of practice and the necessary competence.
At this point it should be noted, that perpetrators also need to get 
their stories told — for their own sake and for the society as a whole.
An interesting and important second phase of truth-telling is the his-
tory-making part of it. If the stories — each person’s story about his/her 
truth - were not told, there would be a greater risk in the future, that 
the history of what has happened would be re-written in the interest of 
some groups, at the expense of others. Truth commissions normally have 
as their task to summarize and draw conclusions in different ways. The 
statements in themselves speak for themselves, but sometimes more po-
litical conclusions are drawn, with recommendations for how a society in 
the future can avoid a development of the same kind, again.9
9 In East Timor, where the report from the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation was handed over to the president on October 30, 2005, more than 400 
statement-takers traveled around the country and collected thousands of stories. An 
early example was the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification. This commis-
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If there were no documents at hand, no evidence and if people never 
had been given the possibility to freely tell their story, that country would 
be more fragile and exposed to historical mistakes in the future. This was 
an explicit South African philosophy; and there is a lot to it.
10.1. Challenging the divisions
Societies are not normally divided to the level of polarization that is 
common in internal armed confl icts, not even in confl icts based on identity 
lines. There are sometimes friendships, marriages, neighbourhood relations 
and common economic interests that cross over divisions that leaders want 
to draw and to profi t from politically. Many in the Balkan states in Europe 
wonder today “how it could happen” that their seemingly mixed society in 
a short time became so divided that neighbours and colleagues could carry 
out the most horrendous acts against each other. But also in these cases 
there were many who stood against the tendencies of the day, there was a 
lot of assistance on the personal level over the (alleged) ethnic boundaries. 
Many confl ict situations show examples of this. The consequence is that, 
when all things are considered, the situation is not black and white, neither 
in terms of loyalty nor in terms of responsibility. In order to adjust and cor-
rect the dominating, often propagandistic picture of a confl ict, stories about 
single events, heroic initiatives, as well as everyday support, among a strug-
gling people — in the midst of war — need to be told and documented. 
The leader’s and professional history writer’s view about what happened is 
not and should not for the future be the only one.
11. Whose Justice?
Besides the legal system that is found in each state today, there are 
at least two other types of systems that also claim relevance. These are, 
on the one hand legal systems of indigenous peoples, on the other hand, 
legal systems that exist parallel to the offi cial state-based system. When 
it comes to indigenous peoples, a lot of work is done by governments as 
well as by the peoples themselves to defi ne and relate offi cial and indig-
enous systems to each other (for an example, see Colmenares, 2001). 
In other cases, such as East Timor, neither the colonial nor the occupy-
ing power penetrated Timorese society on a level and with a strength 
sion was severely constrained by the level of information it was able to publish, due to 
the political situation in the country.
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enough to eradicate the traditional system of law and maintaining social 
order. The United Nations established a formal justice system during the 
UNTAET transitional period, without relating effectively to existing legal 
practices — with, however, one important exception. 
The establishment in 2001 of the Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation10 in East Timor, included in the UNTAET legislation for 
the Commission a reference to a traditional confl ict resolution mechanism 
existing in East Timorese society for centuries, a system of community-
based reconciliation methods, often called ‘badame’, meaning “the road 
to peace” in Tetum, East Timor’s traditional lingua franca. The badame 
process was, and is, well established at village level and beyond. It is also 
today practiced in the capital, Dili, whenever certain matters should be 
sorted out, in particular within family law, and minor criminal offences. 
The UN was able to include a role for the badame process within the 
larger scheme of legislation surrounding the work of the Commission. 
It was less serious crimes, i.e. with non-lethal consequences or without 
constituting crimes against humanity (such as rape), that were allowed 
to be passed on to the local level. Serious crimes revealed in the work of 
the Commission should be brought to the attention of the Serious Crimes 
Unit, a special court set up by the UN in Dili, to deal with these crimes.
A fi nal and very important thing in the East Timorese case is that a 
person who passes through the regular court system, and for instance 
is released after a fulfi lled term of sentence, is not necessarily regarded 
as a “free” person on the local level. He/she still has to go through the 
local reconciliation process, and pay the price that is connected to that, 
in order to be accepted again by his/her local community. The central 
level’s legal system is simply not accepted locally.
This and similar situations require a coordination between various 
systems and levels of justice. 
There is also a need for clarifi cation, and maybe adjustment, be-
tween the national and international levels of justice. The main principle, 
though, for the work done by the International Criminal Court, apart 
from that it cannot act retroactively on events before its inception, is that 
it can take action only when the national legal system is dealing not at 
all, or inappropriately, with a case.11
In the Colombian debate over its legislation in June 2005 called Law 
on Peace and Justice, many mentioned the need for tuning the law to 
10 In Portuguese, offical language of Timor-Leste, the Commission is called Comis-
sao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliaçao, CAVR.
11 This point seems to have missed those in the US who don’t want the ICC to be 
an effective legal instrument.
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international standards, indicating that there was a risk of international 
action if this was not the case. It remains to be seen where the border-
line is drawn. Obviously, impunity is not accepted internationally. In the 
case of Sierra Leone, impunity given to some leaders as part of a national 
peace agreement was in practice over-ruled by the international court 
set up in the country to deal with crimes against humanity and against 
IHL. This is however a different situation than the Colombian one. In the 
case of Sierra Leone, there was no legal process whatsoever included in 
the agreement— with or without impunity. Therefore, the international 
court did not have to address the matter of the quality of a previous 
process on the same material points.
In order for a peace process, including its legal parts, to be legitimate 
in the eyes of the local population and the parties themselves, it is neces-
sary that it is carried out in the country, by its courts if at all possible, and 
on the basis of national legislation. Again, the Sierra Leone case is the 
most recent example of a legal process out of touch with the national 
political and legal situation. Also in East Timor, the sentences from the 
Serious Crimes Panel have in some instances been sharply criticized as 
out of proportion, given the low ranks of those convicted, in practice al-
ienating the Court and its role as a confi dence-building legal instrument 
for the population and the nation as a whole.
It is important that if a national legal system, its police, courts and 
prisons, should contribute to building a stable and peaceful environment 
for the society, it has to actively seek support and legitimacy from the 
nation it serves. Thus, it has to relate to the conditions prevailing in that 
society in the post-war situation that is there. What are the resources 
and competencies available for carrying out justice? With what degree 
of security and resources can witnesses be brought in, offenders kept in 
detention, prisons be managed? 
Some of these questions are closely related to the distinction made 
above between negotiated and enforced agreements. Obviously, in situ-
ations where agreements are negotiated, there is much less leeway for 
actions against perpetrators, than where these are enforced. Also the 
general capacity of a state, not least relevant for East Timor, is a major 
aspect to be considered: building up a national legal system, including 
its staff, takes years. 
12. A Final Word
Reconciliation, as a political process, gives space and provides in-
centives for the restoration of individual and group relations broken on 
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the basis of political confl ict. It aims at adding a “relational,” “informa-
tional,” and “refl ectional” contribution to the political process and the 
security dimensions of a peace process. By “relational” is meant that re-
lations that have been broken due to a political confl ict are restored, by 
“informational” is meant that as part of reconciliation comes telling one’s 
own truth, recognizing that there is not one single truth or interpreta-
tion of an event. This truth telling is the basis for the acknowledgement 
of injustice, of suffering and of the restoration of human dignity. Finally, 
by “refl ectional” is meant the necessary component of self-refl ection 
and a show of a new and different attitude on part of the perpetrator. 
(This can happen in legally relevant as well as symbolic situations.) As we 
have seen, however, it is not always a black-and-white situation when it 
comes to “who is a perpetrator.” Therefore, a moment of self-refl ection 
by all is a very helpful experience in a process called reconciliation. 
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Lessons from Kosovo: Cluster Bombs and their Impact 
upon Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Robert C. Hudson
University of Derby
“Govori Srpski da te ceo svet bombarduje”
(Speak Serbian so that the whole world can bomb you)
Premonitory and black-humoured graffi ti from the 
streets of Belgrade in the summer of 1998
“Kosovo must be made safe for the refugees to return 
— that is the objective.”
Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary, 5 April 1999
In this article, I wish to re-visit the Kosovo confl ict and the post-
confl ict reconstruction of that region. First, I will seek to establish where 
we can actually situate the Kosovo confl ict in terms of both the New 
World Order and the War against Terrorism. In this section I will also 
raise concerns over how post-modern states react towards so-called 
pre-modern states, by making reference to recent writings on this sub-
ject by Robert Cooper, former special advisor on foreign affairs to UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and currently Director-General of External and 
Politico-Military Affairs for the Council of the European Union. Then, I 
will consider the problematic of using cluster bombs in post-modern 
confl icts, by addressing the effects of cluster bombs upon the civilian 
infrastructures, economy and society of Kosovo, both during the confl ict 
and in the subsequent period of post-confl ict reconstruction. One of the 
key issues confronting post-confl ict reconstruction and rehabilitation is 
access to medical treatment for all citizens of post-confl ict regions; and 
this is a situation which I do not feel has been suffi ciently addressed by 
other scholars, politicians and the media, with regard to the situation 
in Kosovo, where inter-ethnic tensions remain high, fi ve years after the 
cessation of hostilities. I will therefore conclude this chapter by raising 
concerns over the adequate provision and access to hospitals and wel-
fare for potential victims of cluster bombs in Kosovo.
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Introduction
The confl icts that engulfed parts of the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s and their post-confl ict aftermaths no longer hold the centre stage 
of media attention. Indeed, even in the arena of debate on interna-
tional politics, these issues and events would appear to have been totally 
eclipsed by developments in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, it 
must be acknowledged that the post-confl ict reconstruction of Kosovo, 
like that of Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH), was a precursor of the kind of 
post-modern protectorates that were later to be imposed upon both 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of confl ict. Indeed, Kosovo and 
BiH apart, it has also become obvious, at the time of writing, that the 
post-confl ict situation in Afghanistan itself attracts very modest media 
attention, by contrast with the post-confl ict engrenage, or descent into 
chaos, that is the reality of Iraq today.1 Yet such a state of affairs does 
not mean that the BiH and Kosovo confl icts and their aftermaths should 
simply be consigned to the dustbin of history. Much can be learned 
from them, particularly with regard to the use of cluster bombs by NATO 
air forces during the Kosovo confl ict, and the deleterious impact that 
the use of such weapons can have on post-confl ict reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. Yet it would seem, from my investigation, that relatively 
little has been learned from past experience, and that governments and 
military establishments continue to make the same mistakes they made 
fi ve years ago, whilst losing hearts and minds on the ground.
Where to Situate the Kosovo Confl ict
I do not see NATO’s war against Yugoslavia, which had been referred 
to as a confl ict of humanitarian intent,2 as the last stage of the Wars of 
Yugoslav secession, but rather as the fi rst stage of the new world order 
that would be fully voiced after the events of 11 September. Of course, 
in a chronological sense, the confl ict over Kosovo predates 11 Septem-
1 At the time of writing, more than 400 United States troops, 50 UK troops and 18 
Italian Carabinieri had been killed by insurgents. The International Red Cross had with-
drawn its presence from the country, whilst President Bush was urging the speeding up 
of the process of handing over power to the Iraqi people, no doubt with an eye to the 
forthcoming US Presidential elections in autumn 2004. In the meantime a media ban 
has been placed on reporting the return of US bodies and on military funerals in Arling-
ton Cemetery.
2 The reference here is to Noam Chomsky’s (1999) The New Military Humanism: 
Lessons from Kosovo, and the use of the term is deliberate.
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ber; but in terms of the response, by the United States-led international 
community, it was the fi rst stage in a new kind of war and international 
response, which some commentators have described as post-modern 
confl ict.
There was a tendency in the late 1990s to situate the series of con-
fl icts that took place in the post Yugoslav states as beginning and ending 
with the Kosovo problem. For example, it was Adem Demaci, the human 
rights activist and leader of the second strongest Kosovar Albanian politi-
cal party, the Parliamentary Party, who in 1997 addressed his supporters 
with the rhetorical statement: “We have come full circle, haven’t we?” 
Here, he was refl ecting that the process that led to the break-up of the 
SFRJ (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) and the wars of seces-
sion that followed, started with riots in Priština in 1981, which in turn 
was exacerbated by the underground strikes in the Trepca coal mines and 
the continuing deterioration of relations between Albanians and Serbs 
throughout the 1980s, which culminated in Kosovo losing its autono-
mous status.3 Although Serbs were the political majority, the Albanians, 
at roughly 90 per cent of the population, were the true demographic 
majority. Yet they had been reduced to the status of de facto second class 
citizens within their own country by the process of Serb chauvinism in the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. It was Miloševicˇ who seized the ini-
tiative in 1987 when he took up the cause of Serbian chauvinism and for a 
short time embraced nationalism for pragmatic reasons. As he languished 
in The Hague, he must have rued the day that he issued his proclamation: 
“Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate 
without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo!” 
Of course, since June 1999, the Yugoslav authorities ceased to have any 
infl uence or control of affairs in Kosovo and, since March 2003, there is 
no longer a country called Yugoslavia.
However, speaking in teleological terms, the confl ict over Kosovo in 
1999 did not mark the end of the Yugoslav wars of secession; in fact, it 
was the Dayton Peace Settlement of the confl icts in BiH, in November 
1995, leading to the implementation of the IFOR/SFOR/UN post-confl ict 
protectorate, which should be recognised as having ended the Yugoslav 
wars of secession. I believe that the confl ict over Kosovo marked the 
opening of a new phase in International Politics which we are still experi-
encing in the early years of the twenty-fi rst century and in the aftermath 
of the confl ict over Iraq. In terms of the US-led international response, 
3 This had been granted, in the true pragmatist spirit of Bratsvo i jedinstvo (Brother-
hood and Unity) in Tito’s 1974 Constitution.
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the confl ict over Kosovo marks the fi rst stage in the War against Terror-
ism, before the eponymous “Terrorism” had even come into existence. 
How do we explain this, which at fi rst sight would appear to be a contra-
diction in terms? It can only be explained by the changing nature of US 
foreign policy towards the end of the Clinton administration. Here we 
witness a process that was developing, in the second half of the 1990s, 
in which the United States State Department had re-asserted its leader-
ship of the international order, under the guidance of Secretary of State 
Madeleine Allbright and Richard Holbrooke inter alia. Gone were failed 
notions of “Yugoslavia” being part of Europe’s “back yard,” whose inap-
propriateness had already been fully recognised long before the summer 
of 1995. For it was in August 1995, following the Markale market place 
massacre in Sarajevo, that the more effective Rapid Reaction Force was 
introduced. This entailed the swift shift from peace keeping to peace 
enforcement and the NATO bombings of Bosnian Serb Army positions 
and the strategic infrastructure, including television transmitters, of the 
Republika Srpska (RS - Bosnian Serb Republic). Indeed, in many ways the 
situation in BiH, in the late summer of 1995, was very much a forerunner 
to Kosovo in 1999. Writing prophetically in 2001, Tariq Ali (2000: 351) 
has commented that: “The bombs that fell on Belgrade and other cities 
may well come to be seen as the fi rst shots of a new Cold War.”
 One also has to consider how, in the build-up to the Kosovo con-
fl ict, NATO was being strengthened and enlarged at the time of its fi f-
tieth anniversary, with the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, whilst the United States had clearly emerged as the single glo-
bal power in a uni-polar world order. The Kosovo crisis was certainly not 
confi ned to Europe’s back yard.
The Attitude of Post-Modern States to So-Called Pre-Modern States
Since the Kosovo confl ict, some policy advisors, politicians and other 
commentators have begun to advocate a “benign imperialism” or system 
of “benign colonial regimes,” which are far removed from former UK 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cooke’s much lauded “ethical foreign policy,” 
the much vaunted and celebrated fruit of the “New Labour” thinking 
of Blair’s fi rst 1997 administration. This “benign imperialism” has been 
refl ected, in particular, in the recent writings of Robert Cooper (2002, 
2003), foreign affairs advisor to British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.4 
4 As the final touches were being put to this chapter, Robert Cooper’s new book, 
The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First Century (2003) came into 
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives226   226 4/1/07   11:21:15
 LESSONS FROM KOSOVO: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON POST-CONFLICT ... 227
Indeed, quite a furore broke out in the United Kingdom, in the spring 
of 2002, concerning a paper entitled The Post Modern State: Re-Order-
ing the World, written by Robert Cooper and published by the Foreign 
Policy Centre. Cooper advocated the need for “a new age of empire,” in 
which western powers no longer had to follow international law in their 
dealings with “old fashioned” states, whereby they could use military 
force independently of the United Nations and impose protectorates to 
replace regimes which are seen to “misgovern.” Of course, in the case 
of the post-confl ict reconstruction of BiH and Kosovo, this “benign co-
lonialism” was already a de facto reality. Cooper’s articulate reasoning 
argued that, as part of the “new military humanism,” the bombing of 
Yugoslavia could be justifi ed on “moral grounds” rather than legal ones. 
It was this very same “new military humanism” that Noam Chomsky had 
dismissed as a total contradiction in terms.
In reading his article, one sees that Cooper had divided the world 
into three types of state: pre-modern, modern and post-modern. If the 
pre-modern state represented chaos, and the modern state was quite 
prepared to resort to war in a Clausewitzian sense as, presumably, an ex-
tension of politics by other means, then the post-modern state no longer 
thought of security in terms of conquest or of going to war, but rather 
in terms of transparency or “mutual interference.” By Cooper’s defi ni-
tion, the proffered examples of pre-modern states were Somalia and 
“until recently” Afghanistan; whilst the examples of modern states were 
India, Pakistan and China.5 By contrast, the most developed example of 
the post-modern system was the European Union, which was seen to 
“represent security through transparency and transparency through in-
terdependence.” Cooper went on to add that the EU was more a trans-
national than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states 
rather than the subordination of states to a central power.6
print. This book elaborates the details and themes that are to be found in the aforemen-
tioned publications. 
5 It is interesting to note how states that were once confident with their “rogue” 
status sought to improve their relations with the international community. I think of 
Gaddaffi’s Libya in December 2003 and Iran in the aftermath of the Christmas 2003 
earthquake.
6 Cooper, op.cit. p.3. It is interesting to note that with reference to the former 
Yugoslavia, Cooper has commented in an endnote to his book The Breaking of Nations 
(p.174) that: “The former Yugoslavia contains elements of pre-modern, modern and 
even postmodern. It used to be pre-modern (hegemony option); this has dissolved and 
it is trying to escape from chaos into the modern national state. In Bosnia, there are 
many with post-modern longings.” When Cooper uses the term “former Yugoslavia” in 
this reference, I am assuming that he is referring to what we now recognise as the State 
of Serbia and Montenegro (the former FRY) on the one hand and Croatia on the other. 
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The real bite in Cooper’s thesis came with the following passage:
The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the 
idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the 
basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing 
with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern 
continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of 
an earlier era — force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is 
necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century 
world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law 
but when operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the 
jungle. [My emphasis].
And, for Cooper, the best way of dealing with pre-modern or failed 
states is through colonisation, although he admits that colonisation per 
se is unacceptable to post-modern states, nevertheless, he argues that 
what is needed is: “…a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a 
world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.”
By applying these values and principles to the Balkans we are pre-
sented with the following:
Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans pose 
a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like 
a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise 
that in both cases the High Representative is European. (Europe 
provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and 
most of the soldiers though the US presence is an indispensable 
stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has of-
fered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce. It is 
not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is 
police, judges, prison offi cers, central bankers and others. Elections 
are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are fi nanced and trained 
by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort — in many areas indispensable 
to it — are over a hundred NGOs. 
Ultimately, for Cooper: “…the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under 
control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the common-
wealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democ-
racy as its constituent parts.”
Certainly, my own definition of Tito’s Yugoslavia (the SFRJ) is that it was without doubt 
a modern state. It would only be the forces of ethnic nationalism that would transform 
that country, and particularly Serbia, into the pre-modern mode.
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At the end of the day, post-modern colonialism may have become 
the reality in BiH and Kosovo, as might well be the case in Afghanistan 
and Iraq — although there is no escaping the fact that the “benign 
colonialism” of the US-led protectorate in Iraq has currently degener-
ated into un bourbier infecte, or chaotic mess.7 One British political 
scientist who has written much about the Balkans in the post-Dayton 
world is David Chandler, who, by contrast, objects to the terminology 
employed by Cooper as being “the old-fashioned language of Real-
politik and western power”, and he has advocated dressing it up in 
what some might refer to as typical rhetorical “Blair-speak” (“univer-
sally empowering”, “equality of human dignity,” “international civil 
society” and the “duties of cosmopolitan citizenship” with the em-
powerment of “local voices,” the provision of “capacity-building” and 
supporting the lengthy process of “democratisation” and “civil society 
building”) (Chandler, 2002).
But I think that the biggest risk here is what underlies the various 
interpretations of our contemporary understanding of international rela-
tions: the misrepresentations of other communities and peoples, which 
make western thought, opinion, and policy, truly colonial, if not actually 
xenophobic: not only in deed, but also in spirit.
This development has not eluded Bosnian intellectuals with regard 
to the UN protectorate established in BiH, the forerunner of the UN pro-
tectorate in Kosovo. For example, Drazen Pehar (2002) acknowledges 
7 I make no excuse for resorting to the use of pejorative French expressions in wri-
ting this chapter (vis. bourbier infecte and engrenage). The reason for this is that as I 
write and reflect on the events concerning the post-conflict situations in Kosovo and 
Iraq, I am constantly reminded of the discourse of my first thesis on French attitudes, 
and particularly the protests, against the French state and army and the way the sales 
guerres (dirty wars) of decolonisation in Indochina and Algeria were being conducted, 
between the late 1940s and 1962. Attitudes and actions in France in that period are 
not far removed from the kind of opinions being expressed and actions taking place 
today. A report on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme on 17 November 2003, threw 
me straight back into that discourse. It has been reported that Italian protesters against 
the war in Iraq have helped to fund the Iraqi rebels who are currently killing US troops 
on a daily basis, and by implication that there are members of the Italian public who 
must bear the burden of responsibility for the killing of 18 Italian Caribinieri, serving in 
Iraq, on 14 November 2003. This is not so far removed from the actions carried out by 
members of the PCF (French Communist Party) and fellow travellers, who, after 1947, 
sabotaged French military materials destined for use by the French Expeditionary Corps 
in Hanoi and Saigon. Similarly I think of those porteurs de valises, pro-FLN sympathisers, 
who carried explosives across the Mediterranean to Algiers in order to help the Algerian 
struggle for independence from their French colonial masters. Plus ça change… And, 
for that reason, I find the title of David Chandler’s (2002) Observer article to be most 
appropriate indeed. 
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that one option might be to transform Bosnia into a protectorate in 
which the OHR (Offi ce of the High Representative) would probably be 
the one to take the role of a “BiH emperor” who would “rule over a 
Bosnia in a fashion not unlike that of the period of Austro-Hungarian 
rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” He admits 
that in such a scenario there would be little sense of compromise in 
Bosnia and that there would be the strong likelihood that: “the leading 
politicians would continue in their underground work on planning for 
the period following the colonial conquest of the High Representative,” 
when the fi rst chance to fi ght for pre-Dayton political objectives would 
most likely be taken.8
Concomitant with the musings of IR theorists and politicians, we 
have also identifi ed a western elitist view of the perceived incapacity 
of so-called Balkan peoples to cope with democracy and, in a linguistic 
register that is redolent of Howard Temperley’s (1912) imperialist prose 
style of the early twentieth century, that the peoples of the Balkans are 
“even incapable of governing themselves,” thus legitimising the growth 
and the empowerment of international mandates in the region. David 
Chandler, in his excellent book Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton 
(1999: 133), recounts an interview he held with Carl Westerndorp, the 
one-time High Representative, based in Sarajevo, who seems to be im-
bued with an essentialist view of the local population: “It is ugly to de-
mocratise a country using force, but where you have such abnormal 
mentality in the leadership, [my emphasis] then you have to do this.” 
Westerndorp’s reasons for saying this serve, no doubt, as an attempt 
to both justify and empower the OHR’s role in BiH, post-Dayton, and 
particularly after the 1997 Bonn PIC (Peace Implementation Council), 
which gave the OHR de facto colonial powers, thus transmogrifying the 
High Representative into a post-modern colonial governor. Nevertheless, 
it says something too of the contempt for the local population held by 
individuals in such powerful positions, which is not that far removed 
from western attitudes towards the Balkans throughout the nineteenth 
and the fi rst half of the twentieth centuries.
Little hope of escape from reductivism and essentialism seems to 
be provided by other political leaders and personalities; even David 
Owen, who, in my opinion, normally demonstrates a very clear and 
8 Pehar also offers the possibility of Bosnia portioning itself into a loose confederati-
on of three entities, although he does not rule out the possibility of this being achieved 
by resorting to further violence. This is a position which I share, in the continued belief 
in the important security role that is being played by SFOR in maintaining stability in the 
region.
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erudite understanding of conditions in the Balkans, felt moved to write 
the following essentialist comment in the introduction to his book, 
Balkan Odyssey: 
History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve 
disputes by taking up arms…it points to a culture of violence…[and] 
dark and virulent nationalism. (1995: 3)
Sadly, many western academics and politicians have fallen into this 
trap and continue to do so. It is this reductivist, essentialist approach 
which keeps re-emerging, probably out of a fear of getting embroiled 
in a perceived quagmire of Balkan politics, which from a US perspective 
might be posited upon the lens of history, with regard to the experience 
of “Vietnamisation” and the fear of “mission creep.”
What happened in BiH may be carried across to Kosovo, with Ram-
bouillet as a successor to Dayton and the imposition of an international 
system that makes it well-nigh impossible for Albanian Kosovar institu-
tions to regulate themselves — to say nothing of the situation confront-
ing the minorities in Kosovo, such as Serbs, the ethnic Turks, Muslim 
Bošnjaks, Gorani, Aškali and the Roma inter alia. Although it is not the 
focus of this work, one does wonder if the international community is 
sowing the seeds that will yield a bitter harvest of the kind that appears 
to be coming to fruition in the newly formed post-colonial protectorates 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. But, we need to return to the way that the 
new imperium conducts its post-modern confl icts, and in particular, to 
address the use of cluster bombs in these confl icts. I will do this by con-
centrating on the delivery of cluster bombs over Kosovo and the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia9 in 1999.
Of course the confl ict over Kosovo was fought “out of conscience” 
(Cooper, 2003; Ali, 2002: 151); nevertheless, conscience is a two-edged 
sword. Tariq Ali makes out the case that both the confl ict over Kosovo 
and that over Iraq were part of the same ideology: “conscience.” This 
links in with the idea of Blair being tough on defence as with crime, and 
also, the other side of the Defence/Kosovo coin, that of being tough on 
Balkan refugees or Asylum Seekers (Ali, ibid.)
But, at the end of the day, it is not just the establishment of “be-
nign colonial regimes” in the guise of post-colonial protectorates in the 
aftermath of confl ict, that is our concern, but also the nature in which 
confl icts are waged by the post-modern states. Is it that some of the 
weapons chosen by the fi rst world powers in these confl icts, such as 
9 Renamed the State of Serbia-Montenegro in March 2003.
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cluster bombs, which by all accounts are little more than de facto anti-
personnel mines when they fail to explode, in terms of their effect? Is it 
that the use of such weapons demonstrates that the post-modern states 
are little more than contemptuous in the way that they treat the peoples 
of so-called pre-modern states, such as citizens of Kosovo, Montenegro 
and Serbia, as, indeed, those of Afghanistan and Iraq? 
The Problematic of Using Cluster Bombs in Post-Modern 
Confl icts
In August 1995, when NATO launched operation Deliberate Force 
against Bosnian Serb positions in BiH, the United States military lead-
ership decided to prohibit the use of cluster bombs, recognising the 
potential dangers to civilian life and safety which were inherent in their 
deployment. By contrast, in 1999, the United States Air Force and Royal 
Air Force resorted to use such weapons in their bombing campaigns 
over both Kosovo and other parts of the then Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia. 
Figures vary slightly on the number of cluster bombs dropped over 
Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. For example, Landmine Action, claims that 
during Operation Allied Force 333 strike missions inside Kosovo used 
1,392 cluster bomb dispensers containing 289,536 sub-munitions, of 
which, according to the report, NATO has claimed that between 8 and 
12 per cent failed to explode, leaving as many as 34,744 live bomblets 
on the ground (Janes Defence Weekly, 2000; Norton-Taylor, 2000). These 
fi gures might indeed raise questions about the dubious “failure rates” 
advocated by the military-industrial complex, which will be addressed in 
due course.
But our fi rst question is this; why was it that the US military were not 
prepared to use cluster bombs over Bosnia-Hercegovina during Opera-
tion Deliberate Force in August and September 1995, whilst they were 
quite prepared to use them over Kosovo in 1999?10 This would seem to 
be a peculiar reaction, when one considers that in the case of Kosovo, 
more than 92 per cent of the estimated population was ethnic Albanian, 
the very side that the United States and its allies were claiming to protect 
in their confl ict of humanitarian intent. Not only this, but the US was 
10 Actually, Titus Peachy, writing his report, Clusters of Death, for the Mennonite Cen-
tral Committee (www.mcc.org, p.9) comments that NATO forces dropped two CBU-87s 
during Operation Deliberate Force, in September 1996, whilst by contrast, NATO forces 
dropped 1,100 CBU-87s on Serbia and Kosovo during the 1999 conflict.
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resorting to the use of cluster bombs, which are not precision weap-
ons, at a time when the US military was claiming greater accuracy and 
sophistication in its weapons systems. In the case of Kosovo there was 
the problem of fragmentation patterns being even greater, because of 
medium and high altitude bombing; the greater the height, the greater 
the dispersal rate and hence the less the accuracy.
This makes me think that in Kosovo, as in Afghanistan with the 
Northern Alliance, there was resort to the widespread usage of “native” 
troops, who could be re-designated as the “Sepoys”11 of the post-mod-
ern confl icts of the contemporary era that have witnessed the imple-
mentation of “benign imperialism.” Similarly, one thinks of Secretary of 
State Colin Powell’s comment about “a First World air force” being con-
nected with a “Fourth World army — B-1 bombers and guys on horses,” 
a sort of combination of the post-modern and the pre-modern.12
Cynicism aside, vis-à-vis the careless use of “Sepoys” by the post-
modern powers in their policy of “benign imperialism,” other factors 
enter into the debate; and a key problem with the cluster bomb, is that 
the big military powers want a weapon that can serve several military 
purposes at the same time. The cluster bomb is referred to as a CEM 
(Combined Effects Munitions). CEMs are clearly seen as being more com-
plicated weapons than land mines per se, which are often the cheapest 
and simplest weapon available. Also of note, is that the delivery systems 
that are needed for CEMs render them affordable only to “big armies” 
thus denying access to the insurgents and guerrillas who make up the 
post-colonial “other” of the post-modern war. Ultimately, the whole 
military argument is focused upon the word “intent” or “primarily,” as 
in the phrase “primarily designed…,” which is the expression used in 
the Ottowa Agreement to legally recognise the deployment of cluster 
bombs as opposed to that of anti-personnel mines.13 This focuses upon 
whether a state or military organisation intends to use these weapons 
as cluster bombs or as landmines. Everything is therefore posited upon 
the moral integrity and moral intent of individuals and states in their 
pursuance of war.
Apart from moral intent, another problem confronting the use of 
CEMs, such as cluster bombs, is that of the “dud rate” or failure rate 
of the sub-munitions contained inside these cluster bombs, which ef-
fectively turns sub-munitions into antipersonnel landmines, which deto-
11 I use the term “Sepoy” deliberately, not out of a spirit of political incorrectness, 
but in keeping with the colonialist theme that underpins this essay.
12 New York Times, 13 November, 2001, quoted by Friedman (2002: 43).
13 This issue is fully elaborated upon in Dr. Faulkner’s introduction to this book.
0 Multidisciplinary Perspectives233   233 4/1/07   11:21:17
234 ROBERT C. HUDSON
nate on contact, and are unable to distinguish between combatants and 
innocent civilians. This is, of course, the moral “bottom line” for those 
who advocated banning cluster bombs. As in the case of bombing from 
greater altitudes, higher dud rates imply the risk of incurring a greater 
number of casualties; including greater numbers of civilians and children, 
who have been killed or injured, both during the confl ict, and in its af-
termath. This means that cluster bombs are transmogrifi ed into de facto 
time bombs. Three types of cluster bomb were dropped over Kosovo, 
each with different fuse failure rates, hence leaving many munitions lying 
around on the ground as UXOs (unexploded Ordnance) or de facto land-
mines. In the short term, live sub-munitions impede civilian and refugee 
movement; in the long term, they inhibit agriculture and economic recov-
ery. Human Rights Watch, HRW (1999) also estimates that the dud rates 
for the CBU-87 and the RBL 755 vary greatly from the conservative 2-5 per 
cent claimed by manufacturers, to between 10 and 30 per cent.
The reasons for high failure rates are many and varied. In compil-
ing the Mennonite Central Committee report, Clusters of Death, the 
author, Titus Peachey, makes reference to an interview with ACT (Action 
by Churches Together) de-miners at Decˇani, Kosovo, in December 1999, 
who cited high altitude delivery, angle of impact, and vegetation, such 
as trees or bushes as contributing factors to a higher dud rate. The use 
of cluster bombs with expired warranty dates may also account for a 
higher dud rate, and Peachey’s report provides photographic evidence, 
taken at the ACT warehouse, of two CBU-87 cluster bomb containers 
which had expired warranty dates.14 So much for quality assurance! 
There is also strong evidence of the propensity of cluster munitions 
to malfunction for a number of other reasons, including pre-combat 
movement and storage, and dispersal failure during delivery; alongside 
the insuffi cient impact force to cause detonation, due to soft ground 
and vegetation, referred to above (Janes Defence Weekly, 2000).15 
Cluster bombs were also used outside Kosovo, as part of the overall 
bombing campaign conducted, twelve days into the confl ict, against the 
major cities of Serbia and Montenegro, most notably over Niš, Novi Sad, 
Belgrade and Podgorica, which suggests an apparent disregard for civil-
ian life, given the indiscriminate properties of these weapons.16 Human 
Rights Watch reports on the use of cluster bombs over Batajnica airbase 
to the north of Belgrade and Zemun and the site of Yugoslavia’s military 
14 Clusters of Death, www.mcc.org., pp. 4-5.
15 It might be interesting to note that the Soviet “butterfly” mines used in Afghani-
stan were deliberately designed so that they would not break on impact.
16 I am not even going to go into the issue of using depleted uranium.
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airbase, as well as over Podgorica airfi eld in Montenegro. The problem 
with bombing these two sites with cluster bombs is that they are sur-
rounded by areas of civilian population, thus making the risk of so-called 
collateral damage all the greater. For example the Batajnica base lies one 
kilometre from the small town of Batajnica.17 Once again it should be 
noted that the higher the altitude at which cluster bombs are dropped, 
the wider will be the dispersal radius of the sub-munitions and the great-
er, therefore, the potential risk to non-military targets. And, in the case 
of the bombing of Batajnica, on 17 April, this was the fi rst example of 
the uses of cluster bombs in Serbia proper. During this raid, a three-year-
old girl was killed outright and fi ve people were injured when a nearby 
school was struck (ITAT-TASS News Agency, “NATO bombs continue to 
bomb civilian facilities,” 20 April 1999, cited in Wiebe, 1999, 5).
HRW, meanwhile notes that “at higher altitudes, pilots have a re-
duced capability to make sighting corrections” and that “at greater al-
titudes, the bomblets do not necessarily have the opportunity to fuse 
properly,” so that in the end the dud rate is likely to be even higher.
It has also been reported by Landmine Action that more than half of 
the bombs used over Kosovo by the RAF were unguided RBL755 cluster 
bombs. Landmine Action has reported that according to reports leaked 
from the Ministry of Defence, 31 per cent of cluster bombs dropped 
Kosovo missed the target, with a further 29 per cent unaccounted for. 
This happened, despite the fact that the offi cial US government assess-
ment of Operation Desert Storm, in 1999, had found that unguided 
munitions, including cluster bombs, deployed at medium to high alti-
tude were likely to miss the target and cause collateral damage (Janes 
Defence Weekly, 2000, 2).
General Sir Hugh Beach, in his briefi ng paper published in February 
2001, in his annex on the use of cluster bombs by the allies in Kosovo, 
addressed the issue of assessing the number of civilian casualties both 
during the confl ict and in the aftermath of confl ict. He comments as 
follows:
17 Of interest is the graffiti employed at the beginning of this chapter, “Speak Ser-
bian so that the whole world can bomb you,” which came from the streets of Belgrade, 
nine months before the conflict started. I discovered this graffiti, during my summer va-
cation, whilst staying with a Serbian friend’s extended family of parents/grand-parents, 
brothers and sisters with their spouses and children, in the very same small town of Ba-
tajnica, to the north of Belgrade and Zemun, which would be bombed in April 1999. At 
the time, August 1998, one of the notable features of my visit was the sound of Migs 
in the skies above Batajnica, Zemun and Belgrade. As the Migs streaked at high altitude 
through the Belgrade skies, the black humour at the time was that NATO was practicing 
for the eventual bombing of Yugoslavia.
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…post-confl ict casualty reports of the Yugoslav government var-
ied, but all agreed in estimating the death toll of at least some 1,200 
and as many as 5,000 civilians. US offi cials on the other hand, testifi ed 
before Congress that there were only twenty to thirty incidents of 
“collateral damage” during the war.
Both these fi gures are belied by the fi ndings of a painstaking and 
comprehensive bomb-damage assessment mission carried out by Hu-
man Rights Watch in August 1999. It found that there had been 90 
separate incidents involving civilian deaths during the campaign and 
that between 488 and 527 civilians were killed as a result. The team 
determined the intended target in 62 of the incidents. Military instal-
lations accounted for much the greatest number but nine incidents 
were caused by attacks on civilian targets believed by Human Rights 
Watch to be illegitimate. A third of incidents occurred as a result of 
attacks on densely populated areas, although in Belgrade at least only 
precision-guided weapons were used. Almost half resulted from at-
tacks during daylight hours.
Of the 90 incidents, 32 occurred in Kosovo, the majority on mo-
bile targets or military forces in the fi eld. These were more deadly, 
accounting for more than half the deaths. The team was able to de-
termine the weapon used in only 28 of the incidents. In 21 of these 
precision-guided munitions had been used. Cluster bombs were posi-
tively identifi ed in only seven incidents (another fi ve being possible but 
unconfi rmed) and the team assessed that some 90-150 civilians died 
from the use of these weapons. [My emphasis].
The civilian death rate of between 90 and 150 deaths is also referred 
to in The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 14th report, 
Conduct of the Air Campaign, Tuesday 24 October 2000, p.14. Sec-
tion 147 of the report records the following:
Greater investment in precision-guided munitions could also help 
to defuse one of the more controversial aspects of the bombing — the 
casualties caused by the use of so-called “cluster bombs”…. The RAF 
is still reliant upon the use of such cluster bombs in certain roles (par-
ticularly anti-armour), and during the air campaign the RAF dropped 
531 BL755 cluster bombs, designed principally to destroy tanks and 
other vehicles. The MoD’s report states that, of the targets engaged 
by the RAF, 530 were against fi elded forces. This strongly suggests that 
cluster bombs were used primarily for this purpose. Over 50% of the 
bombs dropped by the RAF were cluster bombs.
Of course, the main reason for using cluster weapons was to de-
stroy tanks and other vehicles. We learn from Section 149 of the report 
that the British government, recognised the weakness of cluster bombs, 
which was highlighted during the Kosovo air campaign, where cloud 
caused many free-fall and laser-guided missions to be aborted, because 
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the avoidance of collateral damage and civilian casualties were high pri-
orities [my emphasis]. The House of Commons Select Committee on 
Defence suggested that in future confl icts, the RAF should use an al-
ternative weapons system, namely the MoD’s Brimstone programme of 
anti-tank guided missiles “…with their own autonomous target-seeking 
radar, which will not require continuous guidance from its launching 
aircraft.” The report went on to comment that the MoD expected that 
this weapon would enter service in October 2001. The problem is that 
allied forces have since fought two wars over Afghanistan (2002) and 
Iraq (2003), and yet they have continued to use cluster bombs in these 
confl icts. Clearly, the lessons from the air campaigns over Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia remain to be learned.
Finally in Section 150 of the Report, in reply to Secretary of State for 
Defence Geoff Hoon’s vigorous defence of the use of cluster bombs, the 
Select Committee on Defence comments:
The Secretary of State’s claim that cluster bombs are “the most 
effective weapons” for an anti-armour ground attack task does not, 
we believe, apply to the circumstances of this campaign. At the very 
least, their reputation as an indiscriminate weapon risks international 
condemnation, undermining popular support for an action. The UK 
needs a more discriminatory anti-armour system in order to move to 
an early end to reliance and recourse to these weapons in inappropri-
ate circumstances.
At the time of writing, in the aftermath of aerial bombing cam-
paigns conducted against Afghanistan and Iraq, it would appear that we 
still await this development. One of General Sir Hugh Beach’s concerns 
about the conduct of the air war and the number of civilian casualties 
in Yugoslavia was the number of casualties that occurred through the 
bombing of densely populated areas. Yet, when one reads the Human 
Rights Watch Report on Iraq, published on 12 December 2003, and en-
titled The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, it would 
appear that few lessons have been learned since the summer of 1999. 
Indeed, although Bush may have called the war in Iraq: “one of the 
swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history,” thousands of 
Iraqi civilians were killed or injured during the three weeks of fi ghting 
from the fi rst air strikes on 20 March to 9 April, when Baghdad fell to 
US-led coalition forces.18 According to Human Rights Watch, despite the 
18 Casualty rates vary. On page 4 of the report, HRW reports that the Associated 
Press calculated at least 3,420 civilian deaths in three weeks of fighting, whilst the Los 
Angeles Times gives a more conservative estimate of more than 1,700 civilian deaths. 
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fact that cluster munitions strikes are particularly dangerous in popu-
lated areas, US and UK ground forces repeatedly used these weapons in 
attacks on Iraqi positions in residential neighbourhoods, and coalition air 
forces also caused civilian casualties by their use of cluster munitions, but 
to a much lesser degree. In the end, most of the civilian casualties would 
appear to have been attributable to Coalition conduct in the ground war 
and to have been the result of ground-launched cluster munitions. The 
Coalition has left behind many tens of thousands of cluster munitions 
“duds,” in other words sub-munitions that failed to explode on impact, 
which have become de facto land mines, which will continue to cause 
casualties during the period of post-confl ict reconstruction. One of the 
main recommendations of the HRW (2003) is that: 
There should be no use of air- or ground-delivered cluster munitions 
until the humanitarian problems associated with these weapons are re-
solved. In particular, their use should be suspended until the dud rate can 
be reduced dramatically. If cluster munitions are employed, they should 
not be used in or near populated areas. [Beach’s recommendation, four 
years previously!] Stocks of older, highly unreliable and unguided cluster 
bombs should not be used under any circumstances.
Furthermore, one learns that in the three-week period of confl ict 
over Iraq (20 March-9 April 2003) the US Air Force dropped more cluster 
bombs on Iraq than they had over Afghanistan during a period of six 
months. Although, in the section on “The Conduct of the Air War,” one 
reads that some lessons from past wars may indeed have been learned, 
notably the dropping of far fewer cluster bombs in populated areas; and 
furthermore that the United States Air Force, though sadly, it would ap-
pear, not the Royal Air Force, had resorted to improved technology and 
had used more up-to-date equipment so that the use of cluster bombs 
had been reduced to 4 per cent of the total number of air-delivered sys-
tems used. Nevertheless, one learns elsewhere that in Iraq, the greatest 
number of civilian casualties due to cluster bombs, was caused by the 
use of ground-launched weapon systems. 
One of the highly publicised accidents involving the use of CBU-87s 
in the Kosovo confl ict occurred in the Serbian city of Niš on 8 May 1999, 
when a cluster bomb strike aimed at Niš airport went horribly wrong, 
and the city’s hospital and outdoor market were both hit by combined-
effects munitions, resulting in 15 deaths (Simpson, 1999). Another re-
port by Katarina Kratovac, writing for Nando media, reports that 60 
other civilians were wounded in this attack.19 It was after this attack 
19 http://archive.nandotimes.com/kosovo/story/.
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that NATO forces cut back on their use of cluster bombs, allegedly out 
of concern for civilian “collateral damage”. However, an HRW report 
published at the time might cast a different light on this affair, and it 
can be no coincidence that the Niš incident took place at the time of 
another development in the confl ict — namely, events on the ground. 
With reference to previous US experience in the 1991 Gulf War, the 
HRW report, entitled NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, 
comments as follows:
One of the most immediate problems raised by the large number 
of unexploded bomblets that was being observed on the ground was 
the threat to US and coalition forces in ground operations. The situ-
ation became so critical that the use of cluster bombs by aircraft was 
cut back by US Central Command during the ground war for fear 
of friendly casualties. As the ground war began, in some instances, 
“ground movement came to a halt because units were afraid of en-
countering unexploded ordnance.” [My emphasis]. 
Was it, perhaps, this experience of an earlier war that had a more 
profound impact upon US military thinking than concern for civilian cas-
ualties at Niš? 
The war-guilt, however, does not rest solely with the US and British 
allies. Indeed, it should be noted that cluster munitions were used by 
both sides during the confl ict. In his Cluster Bomb Use in the Yugoslavia/
Kosovo War, Virgil Wiebe (1999: 2) comments on how NATO spokesmen 
initially dismissed reports of cluster bomb usage in late March 1999, but 
later attempted to justify the use of the munitions. The Serbian authori-
ties, by contrast, criticised the use of cluster bombs by NATO, because 
these were “banned by international law;” while at the same time VJ 
(Yugoslav Army, Vojska Jugoslavije) artillery was fi ring cluster bombs 
into Albanian territory and therefore deliberately creating de facto mine 
fi elds, in a bid to destroy KLA base camps.
Wiebe’s report (1999: 6) goes on to list NATO’s use of cluster bombs 
against Serb targets, throughout March and April 1999, highlighting 
civilian casualties as and when they occurred. Once again Wiebe re-
marks on how NATO spokesmen, such as Jamie Shea, at fi rst denied 
that NATO was using cluster bombs, then that as it became clear that 
this lie would no longer work, that NATO responded that they would 
never drop cluster bombs anywhere near civilians. The list that follows 
refers to sorties in which civilian casualties were incurred, I have not 
included, in this list, damage reported to have been done to civilian 
property:
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29 March: use of cluster bombs against the Serbian villages of Vr-
bovac, Nogila and Koritište in the Vitina municipality where civilian 
casualties were reported (near the Kosovo-Macedonian frontier).
1 April:  two ethnic Albanians were killed, and six others injured, in 
Orahovac, near Ðakovica.
6 April:  Royal Air Force Harrier GR7s bombed Aleksinac, in which 
12 civilians were killed and 28 injured.
 11 April:  Merdare was bombed and fi ve people were killed.
14 April: civilian tractors and trailers were attacked and ethnic Al-
banian refugees were killed near Ðakovica.
16 April: Batajnica, near Zemun and to the north west of Belgrade 
was bombed by cluster bombs. One three-year-old girl was killed out-
right and another fi ve people were injured.
24 April: fi ve Albanian Kosovar brothers were killed and at least 
two other children injured by a cluster bomblet in Doganovic, about 
30 south of Priština. One hour after the boys were killed, shrapnel 
from a cluster bomb killed a six-year-old child in the ethnic Albanian 
village of Velika Dobranja, about 12 miles to the south of Priština. 
Some of these incidents beg the question, what was NATO doing, 
bombing ethnic Albanian villages in the fi rst place?
29 April: sub-munitions from a cluster bomb dropped on Golubov-
ci military airport, three miles from the centre of Podgorica, capital of 
Montenegro, killed one civilian and injured several others. The sub-
munitions fell on a village near the airbase.
When one reads back over the news reports of the period one is 
nonplussed at the way in which NATO offi cers responded to the press 
on the use of cluster bombs. Virgil Wiebe (1999: 6) refers to the follow-
ing example: 
When asked by a journalist about the use of wide area munitions 
and the possibility of civilian casualties, British Air Commander David 
Wilby stated on April 7, ‘I’ve always stressed the meticulous care in 
which we plan for these attacks. And even though we may use cluster 
munitions, we take the utmost care to make sure that when we use 
them, the area that we are using them against is free from the sort of 
collateral damage that you’re talking about.20
What worries me here is that we seem to enter into the obfusca-
tion and out-right denial of truth, common to conventional, inter-state 
warfare, whereby, to use that old cliché, truth becomes the fi rst casualty. 
Yet the war over Kosovo was not a conventional war; it was an unde-
clared war and arguably an illegal war. It was also a post-modern war 
20 Quoting Leon Harris, “Yugoslav Cease-Fire ‘Cannot Simply Wipe the Slate Clean 
and Take us Back to the Status Quo Ante,’” CNN Live Event/Special, 7 April, 1999.
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in which Britain and the United States were at no time threatened by 
the military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Indeed, many 
of us were even able to stay in touch with our friends and colleagues in 
Yugoslavia, via the Internet, throughout the confl ict, which meant that 
there was always access to an alternative viewpoint to the of NATO. 
Furthermore, we had access to reports in newspapers or on television 
by journalists based in Belgrade, such as Robert Fisk or John Simpson, 
which for individuals, such as myself, who had once lived in Yugoslavia, 
always seemed to have a greater touch of reality than some of the spuri-
ous claptrap that was emanating from NATO headquarters in Belgium.
At the end of the day, to all but the most cynically-minded follower 
of Realpolitik, cluster bombs, because they are indiscriminate and exces-
sively injurious weapons, should be classed as inhuman weapons, along-
side dum-dum bullets, poisonous gases and land mines. Unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) from cluster munitions kills more people than anti-per-
sonnel land mines, but they are not as yet subject to international law. 
Cluster bombs should be made illegal.21
Post-Confl ict Rehabilitation and the Problem of Cluster Bombs
Cluster bombs, by acting as anti-personnel mines, whatever the 
cause, reason or intents of their usage, can create terrifi c wounds to 
human beings. The problem is that their ability to cause wounds is not 
just confi ned to the duration of a confl ict, but that, by their very nature, 
the bomblets can create terrible damage many years after the confl ict 
has ceased. The aim of this section is to consider the long-term, post-
confl ict impact of these weapons.22 Beach’s (2001: 9-10) fi ndings on this 
are useful:
21 In Kosovo, between June 1999 and May 2001, 60 per cent of the victims left after 
NATO’s military campaign were killed by UXO, compared with 37 per cent by landmines. 
Fifty-eight people were killed by UXO and another 97 people were injured — two thirds 
of them children — between June 1999 and May 2001. ICBL Media Report, 19 November 
2003, with reference to the consortium formed to lobby for a ban on cluster munitions in 
the Hague on 19 November 2003. The consortium is made up of more than 180 NGOs, 
including Landmine Action UK, Handicap International and Human Rights Watch. The 
consortium is urging other international organisations to join the campaign for a ban on 
the use, production or transfer of cluster munitions as well as increasing resources to sup-
port communities affected by unexploded cluster munitions and to force countries that 
use these weapons to recognise their responsibility to clearance programmes, the educati-
on of civilians and assistance to victims.
22 It is not the intention of this section to treat this problem from a global aspect 
by looking at, for example, the use of cluster bombs in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and 
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NATO itself is reported to have estimated that 10 per cent of 
bomblets from cluster bombs dropped during the campaign did not 
go off. So, of some 290,000 bomblets dropped, roughly 29,000 re-
mained as a permanent hazard. In fact, reports from expert mine-
clearing parties working in Kosovo suggest a slightly higher fi gure. 
Yet, by the end of May 2000, only some 4,070 unexploded bomblets 
had been cleared under UN auspices.
A document published by the ICRC reports that a total of 492 peo-
ple had been injured by the “remnants of war” in the year ending May 
2000. Of these 176 were caused by APM and 151 by cluster bomblets. 
Of the latter casualties 50 had been fatal. There are a number of fi elds, 
forests and vineyards in Kosovo which as of December 2000 were still 
unsafe due to contamination by cluster bomblets.
In Kosovo, between June 1999 and May 2001, 60 per cent of the 
victims left after NATO’s military campaign were killed by UXO, com-
pared with 37 per cent by landmines. Fifty-eight people were killed by 
UXO and another 97 people were injured — two-thirds of them chil-
dren — between June 1999 and May 2001. Children were more likely 
to be victims of UXO than landmines because they pick up ordnance 
without knowing what it is. Many of the victims were farm workers 
and UXO could have huge economic consequences such as changes in 
the use of land or the abandonment of entire communities.23
This problem is neatly summed up by Landmine Action in their re-
port Cluster bombs: The military effectiveness and impact on civilians 
of cluster bombs, with the following statement: “The legality of using 
weapons that have an unacceptable post-confl ict impact on civilians and 
that act as a widely recognised obstacle to rehabilitation, resettlement, 
reconstruction and development, must be in doubt” (Landmine Action, 
2003: 4). According to Jane’s Defence Weekly (2000: 1):
What became immediately clear was that here was a serious prob-
lem with unexploded cluster submunitions. During Operation Allied 
Force, 333 strike missions inside Kosovo used 1,392 cluster bomb dis-
pensers containing 289,536 sub-munitions. NATO believes that 8-12 
per cent failed to explode, with as many as 34,744 live bomblets re-
maining on the ground. 
other benighted places. This has already been dealt with admirably elsewhere, as many 
of the internet sources which I have resorted to in the compilation of this text might 
already attest; most notably those of the ICRC, the Mennonite Central Committee and 
also Landmine Action. 
23 CNN reporting on the Landmine Action Report, CNN, “Lethal Legacy of Cluster 
Bombs,” 25 March 2002, www.cnn.com.
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Added to this, one has to consider the cost of cleaning up UXO 
contamination. CAAT has estimated that each land mine and de facto 
land mine (cluster bomblet) can cost $1,000 to clear (ibid., 4). According 
to Peter Ford, writing in The Christian Science Monitor on Friday 8 Sep-
tember 2000, quoting fi gures provided by NATO to UNMACC in Priština, 
290,000 bomblets dropped over Kosovo failed to explode.24
Civilians are the principal victims of contemporary confl ict with up to 
90 per cent of victims being civilians in recent intra-state confl icts. This 
contrasts with 90 per cent casualties being young men at the time of the 
First World War. Kosovo started as an intra-state insurgency and then 
escalated to the status of inter-state confl ict, when NATO intervened in 
April 1999.25 The ICRC (2003: 3) reports how large numbers of civilians 
are killed or injured each year by unexploded munitions and how most 
become victims after the fi ghting has ended in spite of the fact that they 
were not the target of the munition when it was laid, delivered and fi red. 
This has an obvious impact on post-confl ict rehabilitation and the return 
of displaced persons, which might seem to contradict the late Robin 
Cook’s claim, used at the beginning of this article. Kosovo provides a re-
cent example of this situation and the ICRC report goes on to comment 
that in the one year following the end of the confl ict in that region, 492 
people were killed or injured in UXO incidents. According to data collect-
ed by ICRC mine awareness staff throughout Kosovo, roughly one-third 
of these victims were killed or injured by anti-personnel mines, one-third 
by sub-munitions and one-third by other ordnance.
Landmine Action comments that: “The key information required to 
speed bomb clearance is to know exactly where the bomblets are, where 
each bomb in each strike was delivered. But the UN was denied access 
to accurate information from NATO for more than 12 months, which 
included information that could have been life-saving. The UN report 
quotes casualty rates in Kosovo from all UXO casualties as follows: 342 
casualties in 1999, 95 casualties in 2000 and 22 casualties in 2001. The 
casualty fi gures for 1999 refer to the six-month period between the end 
of the confl ict on 16 June and 31 December 1999. This means a fi gure 
of 459 casualties for a war that lasted only 3 months by comparison 
with 1,000 casualties in peace time in BiH for a confl ict that lasted three 
years.
Given the circumstances this is quite unacceptable. Ultimately, “…giv-
en the number of people that have been killed by NATO cluster bombs 
24 http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/09/08, p. 2
25 Although it was never officially designated as a war by NATO.
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since the end of Operation Allied Force, and the true achievements of 
the bombings in Kosovo, it seems clear that the use of cluster bombs 
proved disproportionate to the military advantage gained” (Landmine 
Action, 2003, 3).
Yet it would seem that few lessons have been learned from earlier 
Yugoslav confl icts in Croatia and BiH. A study by the ICRC (1998), enti-
tled The Silent Menace: Landmines in Bosnia and Hercegovina, reported 
that every month in BiH, landmines kill between thirty and thirty-fi ve 
people, eighty percent of them civilians. And that the presence of these 
munitions is hindering reconstruction, severely reducing food produc-
tion and diverting resources needed to rebuild society.
Another ICRC report (2001) refers to more than a thousand mine 
victims in peacetime. The ICRC took on responsibility for mine aware-
ness activity in BiH, distributing, by March 1996 alone, 100,000 bro-
chures and 10,000 posters to schools, community centres, various as-
sociations, public kitchens and medical facilities in order to reach the 
greatest number of people (ICRC, 1996a). With a massive, countrywide 
mine-awareness campaign, with Red Cross instructors and volunteers 
in the spring of 1996, which ICRC (2001a) claims helped to reduce the 
number of new victims from over 600 in 1996 to less than 100 in 2000. 
And as I read of this sterling effort by the ICRC on 31 October 2003, I 
refl ected how the ICRC is pulling out of Iraq, where it would seem that 
cluster bombs have been used indiscriminately by both the United States 
Army and the Royal Air Force.
If the reasons for NATO intervention over the Kosovo crisis were to 
stop Serb aggression against Kosovar Albanians, as was frequently ex-
pressed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his cabinet colleagues at 
the time, such as the then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Defence Secre-
tary Geoff Hoon and former Minister for Overseas Aid and Development 
Clare Short,26 with a view to repatriating those Kosovar Albanians who 
had been ethnically cleansed by the Serbian authorities, then why on 
earth did NATO adopt a military policy, namely the widespread use of 
cluster bombs over Kosovo, that would place so many civilians at risk on 
their repatriation?
What happens to refugees on their return? One of the big prob-
lems is that of displaced people, who have been ethnically cleansed, 
and what happens to them when they return to the places that they 
had fl ed from. Farmers have no choice but to work in the fi elds, whilst 
26 One of the ironies of the Iraq débâcle is the way in which Cook and Short, both 
enthusiastic supporters of the war over Kosovo, have distanced themselves from Blair 
over Iraq.
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children might venture into dangerous areas, even though they have 
been warned to keep away from these areas (ICRC, 1996b); hence the 
need for mine awareness training, which is an absolute pre-requisite for 
returnees. In situations where no mines awareness exists, casualties rise 
dramatically. There has been long experience of this in the Yugoslav suc-
cessor states, earlier in Croatia and BiH, more recently in Kosovo. Earlier 
reports estimated the existence of between 2 to 3 million landmines 
and unexploded ordnance throughout BiH, where the civilian popula-
tion faced grave danger (ICRC, 1996a). The ICRC Report goes on to 
comment that:
Many people have no choice but to live and work in areas which 
are heavily contaminated with these deadly devices, especially when 
people live close to the former confrontation line, where four years of 
war have rendered the ground an extremely dangerous place to set 
foot. 
Mary Robinson, former President of the Irish Republic and until re-
cently the UN Commissioner for Human Rights has added her voice to 
the growing concern expressed over the increasing use of cluster bombs 
in or near civilian areas, whilst Sister Pak Poy, Australian Co-ordinator 
for the ICBL has expressed concern over the long-term impact of clus-
ter bombs on civilians which “…far outweighs the justifi cation of their 
short-term military use.”27 
The Kosovo confl ict lasted only eleven weeks (24 March to 10 June 
1999) yet left behind it a severe problem of unexploded devices which 
will take considerable time to address, thus costing civilian lives and 
affecting the process of post confl ict rehabilitation. The ICRC (2001b) 
argues that a large proportion of the deaths and injuries from the ex-
plosive remnants of war in the post-confl ict context is both predictable 
and preventable.
When the confl ict ended in Kosovo, under Resolution 1244, the 
United Nations Security Council authorised the creation of the Untied 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which in turn 
established a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) to deal with 
the threat posed by landmines and UXO, and that contamination with 
mines/UXO during the confl ict was not only the work of the VJ (Vojska 
Jugoslavije — Yugoslav Army) and the KLA but also due to bombing by 
NATO air forces. At its peak MACC had 17 NGOs and commercial com-
panies conducting mine and battle area clearance in Kosovo, and by De-
27 Frank Faulkner quoting Sister Pak Poy, cited in Wiebe (2002).
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cember 2001, all 620 VJ minefi elds had been cleared, and the majority 
of areas struck by cluster bombs were surface, and sub-surface cleared.28 
When MACC closed in December 2001 the responsibility for future EOD 
was passed on to the UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP) and 
the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). As of October 2002, however, there 
still remained 122 areas within Kosovo that still required some form of 
investigation and if necessary, clearance. Meanwhile, Noam Chomsky 
had commented upon the strange morality of getting the VJ to clear 
its own minefi elds, whilst US forces did nothing about removing cluster 
bombs. At the end of the day, Macht ist Macht! 
In the meantime, the Mine Victims Assistance Programme for Kos-
ovo in 2002 reported 192 children (between 10 and 18 years old) injured 
by UXOs on their database and has provided help in fi ve areas: medical, 
material, educational, psychosocial and legal, at the cost of 130,000 DM 
in 2001 and 200,000 Euro in 2002. with the intention of continuing the 
programme throughout 2003.29
Access to Welfare Provision, Hospitals and other Medical 
Services
Access to welfare provision, hospitals and medical services in gen-
eral, for civilian casualties of unexploded ordnance, is perhaps the most 
important aspect in the whole debate over the use of cluster bombs and 
their impact upon the civilian population in a period of post-confl ict re-
construction. Yet, it is a subject which does not appear to have received 
much attention either from fellow academics or members of the media. 
However, given the run-down condition of medical facilities in Kosovo, 
that is often reported by the International Red Cross and Amnesty In-
ternational, concomitant with the often chauvinistic attitudes of ethnic 
Albanian medical staff towards members of the non-Albanian minority 
communities,30 there is cause for expressing extreme concern over the 
condition and access to these facilities in Kosovo. 
28 www.mineaction.org, 30 November, 2002.
29 www.mineaction.org, Mine Victims Assistance Program — Kosovo 2002.
30 I first became aware of these problems following the broadcast of the television 
documentary, A Kosovo Journey, written and presented by Jonathon Dimbleby and 
produced and directed by Alexander Gardiner for London Weekend Television. This 
programme was first broadcast on ITV, on 16 January 2000. At the time of writing, De-
cember 2003, there are still many cases reported by IGOs and NGOs, of ethnic Albanian 
medical doctors and nursing staff, refusing to treat non-ethnic Albanian patients.
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The issue of the availability and access to medical facilities is funda-
mental to the success or failure of post-confl ict reconstruction and reha-
bilitation in the region. Post-confl ict Kosovar Albanian society is a deeply 
racist and chauvinistic society in which discrimination against minorities 
continues to be a major problem for the international community (es-
pecially UNMIK, KFOR, the OSCE and the ICRC) which is trying to intro-
duce the principles of democracy and civil society in that region. I am 
concerned how this negative attitude of the ethnic Albanian majority 
might affect access to healthcare and welfare for minority communities 
in Kosovo and how this would affect the victims of cluster bombs and 
mines, in particular.
Concomitant with the situation confronting the health services in 
Kosovo, one should also note that there is no effective welfare system 
in Kosovo. What welfare there is, is denied to non-Albanians. In South 
Eastern Europe, in general, familial systems of support play a much 
greater role than in other European countries such as the United King-
dom, France or Germany. Because of the poverty of Kosovo, and the 
control of institutions by the Albanian mafi a, exacerbated by inter-ethnic 
rivalry and hostility, non-Albanians have to rely on family support. In 
reality this means a lack of access to education, medical and healthcare, 
welfare and pensions for members of minority communities, such as the 
Gorani, Serbs, Bošnaks, Aškali, Egyptians or Roma.
During the war, cluster bombs and mines were already creating some 
horrifi c injuries. Chomsky cites Paul Watson, writing in the Los Angeles 
Times on 28 April 1999:
…these weapons are causing horrifi c wounds; with hundreds 
treated in Priština’s hospital alone, about half of them civilians, includ-
ing Albanian children killed and wounded, mostly victims of time-acti-
vated cluster bombs designed to kill and maim without warning.
In a similar vein, Virgil Wiebe, in his report Cluster Bomb Use in the 
Yugoslavia/Kosovo War (1999: 5), quotes from the same article by Paul 
Watson, in which Dr. Rade Grbic´, a surgeon and director of the main 
hospital in Priština, reported an unprecedented number of amputations 
as a result of the bombs. He commented as follows:
I have been an orthopaedist for 15 years now, working in a crisis 
region where we often have injuries, but neither I nor my colleagues 
have ever seen such horrifi c wounds as those caused by cluster 
bombs…. They are wounds that lead to disabilities to a great extent. 
The limbs are so crushed that the only remaining option is amputa-
tion. It’s awful, awful…. Most people are victims of the time-activated 
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cluster bombs that explode sometime after they fall… People think 
it’s safe, and then they get hurt… There are villages here where large 
portions of the area cannot be accessed because of a large number of 
unexploded cluster bombs… Even when all of this is over, it will be a 
big problem because no one knows the exact number of unexploded 
bombs.
And Dr. Grbic´ went on to report how, at the time Priština’s hospital 
had treated between 300 and 400 people wounded by cluster bombs, 
of whom roughly half were civilian casualties. 
This was the situation during the confl ict. However, since the end of 
hostilities in June 1999, Serb control had been completely removed from 
all administrations in Kosovo. This has resulted in a reversal of the old 
parallel system, whereby it is the ethnic Albanians who now have politi-
cal and administrative control of affairs in Kosovo.31 No more so, than in 
the running of the hospitals and other healthcare provision.
One also has to consider another aspect of the post-confl ict hu-
manitarian re-building programme, namely the denial of access to hos-
pitals and other medical facilities on ethnic grounds, and this would 
particularly affect those ethnic minority populations who live in the vil-
lages mentioned by Dr. Grbic´ which lie at some distance from the main 
centres of urban population in Kosovo, where the hospitals are based 
and where the dominant populations are ethnic Albanian. Here we en-
ter into a different dynamic, namely that of the denial of treatment to 
ethnic minority groups by the Albanian victors in a society that is deeply 
chauvinistic. Amnesty International reports that thousands of Serbs and 
Roma fl ed to Serbia or Montenegro at the end of the confl ict or took 
refuge in mono-ethnic areas in Kosovo, as murders, violent attacks, ab-
ductions, rapes and attacks on property were perpetrated against Serbs 
as well as Albanians, Roma and others accused of “collaboration” with 
the Serb authorities. Those that remained in Kosovo were concentrated 
in enclaves and pockets that were guarded by KFOR. Against this back-
ground of mistrust, intimidation and violence is the effective denial of 
the right of minorities to enjoy freedom of movement in Kosovo today. 
My concern is that members of these communities are being denied ac-
cess to medical and welfare facilities.
31 Since ethnic Albanians in the early 1990s had been denied access to welfare, 
eduction, healthcare and other administrations, they set up a parallel system to that of 
the FRY which included its own alternative government under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Rugova. Since the end of the conflict in June 1999, “the boot was on the other foot” 
as it were, and now it is the Serbs and other ethnic minorities who have had to strive to 
institute a form of parallel system for their day-to-day survival in Kosovo.
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Suffi ce it to say that the status of the Gorani, Ashkali, Bošnjaks, 
Serbs and people of mixed origin in Kosovo is extremely unenviable. 
They are despised by Albanians in general and disadvantaged in every 
conceivable way, in terms of employment prospects, housing and every-
day resentment from ethnic Albanians who see them, like the Roma, as 
collaborators of the Serbs. On my last visit to this region, in November 
2001, I was taken to Gorani, Serb and Roma villages, near Dragaš, in the 
Gora region of Kosovo, by one of my colleagues in the OSCE. I asked my 
colleague about the plight of these peoples. His reply was that, if, for 
example, one of them was taken ill, they would have to be escorted in 
an APC (armoured personnel carrier) in a military convoy to the nearest 
German military hospital in Prizren. If the illness were more serious, they 
would have to be fl own by helicopter to a civilian hospital in Belgrade. 
Such is the discrimination against the Gorani.
Amnesty International have highlighted their concerns, not only 
about the inadequacy of health care in Kosovo, but also about what 
they describe as discrimination in the provision of health care (Amnes-
ty International, 2003: 17-18). The report opens with a quotation that 
even if medical doctors are prepared to treat patients from the ethnic 
minorities in hospitals in Kosovo, they are often afraid to do so.
Amnesty International (2001: 17) is concerned that:
…members of minority communities are neither provided with a 
system of health protection, nor with equality of opportunity in ac-
cess to healthcare provision, which — according to the UN Committee 
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights — is a “fundamental human 
right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights” (p. 141).
The AI Report goes on to comment that:
AI has received allegations of direct discrimination against mem-
bers of minority communities in the provision of healthcare. The UN-
MIK Social Welfare offi ce in Gjilan reported that they were aware of 
cases in which Albanian doctors had refused to see minority patients, 
or where they had been deliberately kept waiting for several hours 
without reasonable cause (op.cit.).
One of the several examples that the AI Report recites, concerns a 
woman who was only able to receive treatment after the KFOR troops 
escorting her had threatened the doctor at gun-point to provide treat-
ment [My emphasis].
There are accounts of shortages, defi ciencies, lack of staff and short-
ages of medicines, with the comment that: “AI delegates found primary 
healthcare for minorities failed to meet even basic standards” (ibid.: 17). 
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With regard to trauma, which might be incurred as a result of UXO inju-
ries, Amnesty International reports:
Given the prevalence, within the enclaves, of long-term ill-health, 
anxiety, depression, addiction, and mental health problems associated 
with trauma, AI is concerned that the failure to ensure the provision 
of adequate healthcare service within the enclaves violates the right to 
health of minority individuals and communities (ibid.).
Perhaps the most damning concern expressed by the AI report with 
regard to the international community, is this: 
…there is compelling evidence to suggest that the UNMIK Depart-
ment of Health continues to deny members of minority communities 
“the equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable 
state of health”, as required by Article 12.1 (d) of the ICESCR, and in 
CESCR. 
The penultimate paragraph of the AI Report, utterly confi rms what I 
myself experienced and discussed with long-term OSCE staff in Kosovo 
in 2001, namely that:
In an emergency, the minority patient or their relative has to tel-
ephone KFOR, or go to a KFOR check-point, and then await for either 
KFOR or UNMIK Police to come and take them to either the Health 
House (Dom Država) in Kosovo Polje or Gracˇinica.
The last point on this is AI concern that: 
…according to representatives of the Kosovo Doctors’ Association 
and the Serb Doctors’ Association, standards of medical treatment 
had declined, along with access to medicines and sanitary equipment. 
It was also claimed that patients who arrived at the Mitrovica hospital 
for treatment, arrived at the hospital at a point where their health 
condition had deteriorated. In one instance reported to UNMIK staff, a 
man had bled to death while waiting to be taken to hospital.
Conclusion
If the role of the international community, in promoting its moral 
and post-modern wars with “humanitarian intent” (Chomsky) is, in the 
words of former British Foreign Secretary, the late Robin Cook, to make a 
place “safe for the refugees to return” after the confl ict, then one needs 
to take into account the apparent inability of the international commu-
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nity to resolve swiftly and satisfactorily post confl ict-reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq provide three classic exam-
ples of this. One also needs to consider the cost of de-mining and the 
wide-spread damage that can be caused by cluster bombs, which to all 
intents and purposes, apart from legal defi nition, contaminate areas as 
de facto anti-personnel landmines. If one also takes into account the se-
vere problems of access to welfare provision, hospitals and other medi-
cal services and the non-provision of these services for ethnic minorities 
in what are, in reality and practice, nothing more than deeply racist, 
chauvinistic, intolerant and undemocratic societies; then there can be 
only one solution to the continued use of cluster bombs in post-modern 
confl icts and their impact upon post-confl ict reconstruction and rehabili-
tation, and that is simply: Ban them!
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Mourning and Mistrust in Civil-Military Relations 
in Post-Dirty War Argentina
Antonius C.G.M. Robben
Utrecht University
“Often, as I returned to my house late at night, I saw lights burn-
ing in your windows and I asked myself who was living there, how 
the decisions that we had taken that day affected you, to what ex-
tent I was fulfi lling my obligation to watch over the destiny of my 
fellow countrymen, and I would have liked to enter each and every 
house and talk to you, listen to you, and ask you about your joys 
and disillusions.” Admiral Emilio Massera, member of the three-man 
junta, on 17 September 1978
This confession by admiral Massera betrays the extent to which the 
Argentine military dictatorship sought to control the lives of its citizens 
during the dirty war that raged from 1976 to 1983.1 The violence un-
leashed in that tragic decade penetrated deep into the homes of the 
Argentine people, and disrupted the relations of protection, safety, trust, 
and love that dwelt there. Nearly two-thirds of all disappeared were ab-
ducted at home.2 The violation of the home by the military shattered the 
1 The political violence of the 1970s or, more narrowly, the military rule of Argenti-
na between 1976 and 1983, has been described with a confusing array of names that 
each betray different imputed causes, conditions, and consequences. The military have 
used terms such as dirty war, antirevolutionary war, fight against the subversion, and the 
Process of National Reorganization. Human rights groups talk about state terror, repres-
sion, and military dictatorship. Former revolutionary organizations employ terms used by 
human rights groups, but also talk about civil war, war of liberation, and anti-imperialist 
struggle. Whether the violence of the 1970s is described with the term antirevolutionary 
war, civil war, or state terror is important because each designation implies a different 
moral and historical judgment that may turn patriots into oppressors, victims into ideo-
logues, and heroes into subversives. I have chosen to use the term “dirty war” because 
of its common association with disappearances and state terror.
2 To be exact, 62% of the people still missing in 1984 were detained in their home, 
24.6% in the street, 7% at work, and 6% in their place of study (CONADEP 1986: 11).
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intimate ties of its inhabitants, and caused a profound mistrust of the 
State and its institutions among a great segment of Argentine society. 
Civil-military relations remained damaged for more than a decade after 
the turn to democracy in 1983, in part because of the psychological con-
sequences of the terror infl icted on the victims of the dirty war. 
Even though the Argentine military turned the words “dirty war” 
and “disappearance” into household names, Argentina was not the only 
country in Latin America that instilled its own population with fear and 
resorted to a brutal repression of the political opposition. Other military 
regimes had already paved the way. The Brazilian military who ruled be-
tween 1964 and 1985 were responsible for around 125 disappearances 
(Arquidiocese de São Paulo, 1985: 261). Around one thousand people 
disappeared in Chile after the 1973 coup d’état, while Guatemala set 
a sorry record with an estimated forty-two thousand disappeared since 
the start of the ruthless counterinsurgency campaigns in 1966 (Green, 
1995: 119).
State terrorism and systematic repression were characteristic of most 
military dictatorships in Latin America, and in particular of Argentina, 
Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. The military in these four countries perceived 
a common threat of communist infi ltration after the 1959 Cuban revo-
lution, and agreed that the democratic governments were not doing 
enough to protect the national sovereignty and the region’s Christian 
cultural heritage. Once the military came to power, they tried to silence 
the political opposition at great human cost, and cooperated closely to 
persecute political dissidents throughout the Southern Cone. Uruguayan 
citizens were abducted in Argentina and imprisoned in their own coun-
try, Chilean refugees were tortured in Argentina, and Argentine exiles in 
Brazil were traced through the SNI, the country’s all-powerful National 
Information Service (see CONADEP, 1986; Arquidiocese de São Paulo, 
1985). 
The repressive methods of these four military dictatorships were at 
fi rst inspired by the French colonial wars against liberation movements 
in Indo-China and Algeria, and later by U.S. counterinsurgency strate-
gies. Latin American military offi cers were trained in the 1960s at the 
U.S. Southern Command in Panama, and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
(Loveman and Davies 1989). The armed forces in all four countries thus 
received the same training in repressive methods, but each country de-
veloped its own practice of breaking the political opposition and armed 
insurgency, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. Disap-
pearances occurred in Brazil and Uruguay on a relatively limited scale. 
Brazil tortured suspects, held them incommunicado, and used death 
squads to kill political opponents. Uruguay preferred imprisoning nearly 
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fi fty thousand people in detention centers between 1972 and 1983. 
About fi ve thousand persons were convicted, and subjected to trauma-
tizing prison conditions. The Chilean military carried out tens of thou-
sands of executions, but made people disappear in far lesser numbers. 
Argentina was responsible for the largest number of disappearances 
(Fagen, 1992; Stepan, 1988: 14-16). 
Disappearance was the preferred tactic of the Argentine military to 
combat the guerrilla insurgency that had emerged in 1969. The most 
immediate military objective was to sow terror and confusion among 
the revolutionary forces, but repression soon spread to civil society as 
a whole. The disappearance of combatants debilitated the guerrilla or-
ganizations because of the fear that under torture they would betray 
their comrades in arms. The operational goal of the disappearances was 
closely tied to the express wish to annihilate the enemy by breaking its 
will to fi ght.3 This objective turned into the obsession to annihilate op-
ponents also physically; not only by killing them but by destroying their 
remains. The disappearance of these corpses was seen as a means to 
paralyze the opposition. The military believed that the anguished search 
of relatives and friends for the disappeared would rule out any desire for 
further political action.
Paradoxically, the attempt to silence the political opposition had a 
reverse effect. Human rights organizations arose which demanded infor-
mation about the whereabouts of the disappeared, a group of mothers 
held weekly protests in front of the presidential palace at the Plaza de 
Mayo, and a clamor was raised abroad. Apparently, the military had un-
derestimated the human need for mourning and the moral obligation to 
care for the dead. The powerful need of parents to bury their dead chil-
dren became the driving force behind a political opposition movement 
that hastened the eventual downfall of the military regime. 
I shall argue that the disappearances carried out in the intimacy of 
the home invaded the relation of parent and child, and provoked intense 
feelings of guilt among the surviving parents about having failed to pro-
tect their adult and adolescent children in the hour of their greatest 
need. Most disappeared were killed shortly after their detention by the 
security forces, and their bodies interred in mass graves. Parents were 
deliberately left in the dark about the fate of their missing children, and 
were thus denied the right to properly bury them. It was at this inter-
3 On 6 October 1975, the Argentine government signed secret decree nr. 2772 
which authorized the Armed Forces “to carry out military and security operations ne-
cessary to annihilate the actions of subversive elements in the territory of the entire 
country.” 
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section of the political and domestic domains that parental trust and 
protection became mobilized, and led mothers either on a search for 
the human remains or to a vindication of the revolutionary ideals held by 
many disappeared before their abduction. I shall conclude that the dirty 
war tactics of disappearances politicized the human need of parents to 
bury their children, and deeply affected civil-military relations in decades 
after the dictatorship by a continued refusal of the armed forces to hand 
over their former enemy dead.
Basic Trust and Mistrust
Erik Erikson (1951) considered the constitution of basic trust as es-
sential to the healthy social and psychological development of a child. 
Basic trust is shaped during the earliest stage of childhood when the 
baby learns to rely on its main caretakers. Although basic trust is be-
lieved to be a universal stage of human development, its particular mani-
festation in the child’s everyday practice has unique personal, social, and 
cultural dimensions. Each mother shapes in her own unique way her 
child’s personal development. The way in which a mother attends to the 
needs of her baby shapes the child’s development  of confi dence and 
trust in her. At the group level, the mother, father and siblings protect 
the baby against threats from the outside world. The particular social 
dynamics of the nuclear family infl uence the forms of trust acquired by 
the child. Finally, the cultural environment shapes the infant’s develop-
ment. Parents transmit certain expectations about the world through 
culture-bound child-rearing practices, and teach their children whom to 
trust and whom to mistrust (Erikson, 1951: 221; Caudill and Weinstein, 
1972; Levine, 1988; Levine et al., 1994: 247-256). 
On this three-dimensional foundational trust established within the 
intimacy of the home, relationships are build with the outer world, with 
relatives and friends, but also with society at large and its political in-
stitutions. Drawing extensively on Erikson, Giddens (1991: 36-40) has 
argued that this basic trust provides people with a sense of security that 
allows them to interact with strangers in an unpredictable social envi-
ronment. Daily routines and social conventions serve to continuously 
renew their basic trust, because persons cannot feed for the rest of their 
lives on the trust established in early-childhood. Basic trust is thus not an 
inalienable part of the personal constitution but can disintegrate beyond 
recovery after undergoing a traumatic experience. 
Trust is by defi nition intersubjective, and the basic trust given needs to 
be reproduced just as much as the trust received. The protection provided 
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by the mother and the father shapes them as much as their child. Parents 
will continue to provide this care for the rest of their lives, wanting to 
protect the child even when he or she has grown into adulthood. It is the 
impotence at being unable to give this care to one’s suffering child that 
can be so traumatic, as I will continue to demonstrate with an analysis of 
dirty war disappearances in Argentina between 1976 and 1983.
Inner and Outer, Home and State
The abduction of political suspects from their homes and the humili-
ation of their witnessing relatives by the Argentine military violated the 
basic trust of the victims involved. The home is the place where a person 
acquires his or her conception of the world as a social, moral and physi-
cal space divided into an inner sanctuary and an outer world (Piaget, 
1971: 331). The home exudes trust and safety because these values are 
given concrete meaning there between parent and child, brother and 
sister. The forced entry into the home by a military task force is therefore 
an attack that takes place as much on the physical and psychological as 
on the social and cultural level. The basic trust of a person is assaulted 
as much as the integrity of the body and the sanctity of the home, and 
family relations are as much damaged as the symbolic order of society in 
a private and a public domain.
Argentine military task forces had a preference for arresting peo-
ple at home, during nightly hours, and with a massive show of force, 
even when they knew that the suspect was unarmed. “They detained 
me at home,” so began Rubén Darío Martinez the typical account of 
his abduction from his apartment. “A group of people, seven or eight 
persons, entered... I was asleep. They broke down the door, covered me 
with a hood, put me against the wall, and began to inspect the entire 
place. They asked me where the weapons were, turned the mattress 
over, broke everything, and forced me to the fl oor. After hitting me at 
my home, they placed a pistol to my head, and then took me down-
stairs” (Diario del Juicio 15: 331). 
The impact of the physical and psychological violence of the ab-
ductions was so intense because the assaults took place in the home. 
The State intruded violently on the domestic domain, thus transgress-
ing a social, material, and symbolic barrier that is so common in all 
Latin societies, including Argentina.4 The public sphere is regarded as 
4 The roots of this division lie in ancient Greek and Hebrew culture (Arendt, 
1958: 22-78). A similar dichotomy can be found in contemporary Islamic and Mediterra-
nean cultures. The opposition between public and private is elaborated in cultural values 
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a dangerous place whose harmful infl uences must be prevented from 
polluting the intimate domestic sphere. Thresholds, material demarca-
tions, and open spaces are erected to either prevent unwanted intrud-
ers from entering or allow those invited into the home to undergo a 
symbolic transformation as they move from one social sphere to the 
other (Brown, 1987; Robben, 1989b; Taylor and Brower, 1985; Van 
Gennep, 1960: 15-25).5 Thus, a forced entry violates this social, mate-
rial, symbolic and emotional division between the two domains. Chil-
dren sense this infraction on the sanctity of the home immediately. 
When a nightly task force broke into the house of Marta Lifsica de 
Chester in November 1976 to abduct her husband Jorge, the twelve-
year old daughter Zulema woke up and entered the living room. The 
surprised commanding offi cer asked her: “‘What are you doing here?’, 
to which the girl responded: ‘I am in my house. What are you doing 
here?’“ (Diario del Juicio 32: 594).
The assaults were also extended to the objects that gave content 
and meaning to the lives of the inhabitants (see Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton, 1981). Photographs, paintings, porcelain, toys and 
mementos were often broken and even urinated upon. This aggression 
against the home went in one case even to the extreme of tearing down 
walls and modifying the arrangement of the rooms. This happened to 
Mrs. Garcia Candeloro who, together with her husband, had been ab-
ducted in June 1977 from their home in the Andean capital of Neuquén. 
Her husband died under torture. After her release six months later, Mrs. 
Garcia Candeloro decided to move to the coastal town of Mar del Plata. 
When she arrived at her house in Neuquén to put it up for sale, she dis-
covered to her dismay that a group of policemen were living there: “my 
house was completely plundered. They had destroyed the bookcases 
and even the walls. They had made compartments. The house had four 
rooms and with those compartments made out of broken bookcases 
they had created about seven rooms in the dining room” (Diario del 
Juicio 8: 175). The conversion of the dining room into provisional bed-
rooms turned their sociospatial functions and cultural meanings upside 
down (see Robben 1989b). The semi-public living room, where guests 
used to gather, had now become confounded with the most intimate re-
treat of the house in a disturbing jumble in which refuge was no longer 
possible.
such as honor and shame, modesty and display, and loyalty and betrayal (see Benn and 
Gauss, 1983; Damatta, 1987; Moore, 1984; Peristiany, 1965; Robben, 1989a, 1989b).
5 See Feldman (1991: 88-97) for a Foucaultean analysis of the transgression of the 
domestic sanctuary by the nightly house arrest of political suspects in Northern Ireland.
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Forced Separation and Basic Trust
The ways in which Argentine parents responded to such violent 
break-ins and the subsequent abductions reveal much about the mo-
bilization of parental feelings of trust and protection. The threat of loss 
makes parents place their children’s well-being ahead of their own. Weiss 
(1993: 274-275) argues that the mother and father seek to be physically 
close to the child when it is threatened so that it can be reassured of 
their protection by touching or at least hearing and seeing its parents. 
Whenever a task force entered a home during those cruel years be-
tween 1976 and 1983, the thoughts of the mother went invariably fi rst 
to her son or daughter, and only later to her husband and herself. Gen-
erally, she would run to the child’s bedroom and stay at its side. When 
Margarita Michelini was ordered to follow her assailants outside, and 
hand over her baby, “I told them to kill me right there, but that I was not 
going to give them the baby” (Diario del Juicio 9: 207). The twelve-year 
old daughter of Nelida Jauregui was awakened “with a machine-gun 
to her head and they wanted to take her away from me, so I embraced 
her and I told them that this was not going to be possible because she 
was an infant and I took her to my bedroom” (Diario del Juicio 31: 
568). The reaction of mothers in such dramatic situations was so unex-
pected that in a number of cases the infants were not abducted to be 
given to childless military couples (see Herrera and Tenembaum, 1990; 
Nosiglia, 1985).
The feelings between mother and child were reciprocal in the sense 
that the protection went out not just from parent to child, as Weiss 
(1993: 275) suggests, but also from child to parent. Twelve-year old 
Zulema Lifsica de Chester, who had earlier questioned the assailants’ 
presence in her home, protested again when her blindfolded mother 
was thrown to the fl oor: “My daughter saw this and began to scream 
that they shouldn’t push her mommy. Then they asked her: ‘Why do 
you defend your mother?’ She told them: ‘Would you have liked it if 
someone did something to your mother?’, to which she did not receive 
an answer” (Diario del Juicio 32: 594). The girl was taken to her bed-
room and interrogated about the hiding place of political pamphlets. 
The anguished mother heard the men’s questions but not her daughter’s 
replies. “Then I also begin to scream: ‘Where is my daughter? What is 
happening with my daughter?’, until they fi nally throw us together in 
the hall” (Diario del Juicio 32: 594). Mother and daughter were sepa-
rated once more and interrogated in their respective bedrooms. Zulema 
declared nine years later in court that her interrogation took between 
30 and 45 minutes during which she was beaten and sexually abused. 
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But even under these trying circumstances her attention went out to her 
parents: “And I ask him where my parents are; so he tells me that I can 
go and look for my daddy in a ditch. Then I asked him for my mother 
and again he tells me that my mother is fi ne, that she is in the other bed-
room” (Diario del Juicio 32: 595). When Zulema asked to be taken to her 
mother, the men fetched the mother instead, and tied her back to back 
to her daughter. They left the house and took the father with them.
The need to protect the children even endured under torture. How 
can a mother ever betray her children when she raised them with the 
certainty that they can always rely on her? Melba de Falcone, who had 
helped her son move to a new house as he had just married, was de-
tained for abetting a subversive and tortured to reveal his location: 
“I asked them if they didn’t have a mother. I asked them how they could 
do this to me. I had gone to help a son move, and they screamed at me 
that the mother in them had been killed by the guerrilleros.... I really 
didn’t know where he had gone, and if I would have known I would 
have died for my son, because he was my son” (Diario del Juicio 3: 67). 
Maria Elisa Hachmann de Lande was tortured for forty-eight hours to 
reveal the whereabouts of her son. “At that time they thought that it 
would be easier to force the mother to say something, no? Or to say 
where they were. But if I gave life to my son, would I then bring him 
death?” (interview 13 April 1990). 
When the torture of parents did not yield the desired information, 
then the torturers exploited parental feelings by abusing infants and 
even unborn babies (CONADEP, 1986: 305-310; Suárez-Orozco, 1987). 
Norberto Liwski was told that he was going to accompany one of his 
small daughters into the torture chamber. The attending physician, how-
ever, warned the torturer that he could only use the electric prod on chil-
dren that weighed more than 25 kgs. In a psychological torment, Liwski 
was shown the soiled underpants of his little girls. “This went on and 
on, this torture of using the children in this way. At various opportunities 
they told me that they had such control over my daughters that they had 
fi lms of them on which I could ascertain myself--if I cared to see them--
the degree of control they had over them” (Diario de Juicio 30: 549). 
The newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman witnessed the havoc in-
fl icted on the Miralles family as they were being tortured in each other’s 
presence: “The entire affective world, constructed over the years with 
utmost diffi culty, collapses with a kick in the father’s genitals, a smack 
on the mother’s face, an obscene insult to the sister, or the sexual viola-
tion of a daughter. Suddenly an entire culture based on familial love, 
devotion, the capacity for mutual sacrifi ce collapses” (1981: 148). From 
his cell, Timerman heard the father trying to get an apple to his chil-
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dren, and the children trying to learn about the fate of their parents. He 
learned of the father’s powerlessness, “that impotence that arises not 
from one’s failure to do something in defense of one’s children but from 
one’s inability to extend a tender gesture” (Timerman, 1981: 148-149).
This impotence was not only felt inside the torture centers but also 
by the parents of the disappeared. Waiting quietly for the abducted child 
to reappear was felt as abandonment, while active protest was regarded 
as life-threatening. This dilemma became magnifi ed during an offi cial 
media campaign that carried slogans such as: “How are you raising your 
child?” “Do you know what your child is doing at this precise moment?” 
(Kordon and Edelman, 1988: 34). Offi cially intended to make parents 
aware of the education of their children and make them responsible 
for the company they kept, it produced tremendous guilt among those 
parents whose children had been abducted. Mothers were indirectly 
blamed for not raising their children properly and thus for contributing 
to their involvement with the guerrilla organizations. 
As more and more people disappeared, the numbers of those seek-
ing for their abducted relatives also grew. In September 1977, a group 
of mothers of the disappeared decided to stage a weekly protest against 
the abductions. They became world-famous as the Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo (Madres de Plaza de Mayo). This heroic resistance and protest 
against the military junta was a natural expression of maternal protec-
tion, a demonstration of the trust between parent and child. 
The military junta was at a loss about how to react on the public 
protest. They did not think of mothers as political actors. “Paradoxi-
cally... the military in these societies preach traditional family values and 
valorize motherhood in an attempt to strengthen patriarchal rule in the 
home. This insistence upon the woman’s sacrifi ce for and obedience to 
the family and to her children has backfi red on the military as women 
have demanded to know what has happened to their sons and daugh-
ters” (Schirmer, 1988: 45; see also Navarro, 1989). At fi rst, the Madres 
were ignored, then belittled as “the crazy women of Plaza de Mayo” (las 
locas de Plaza de Mayo). Later, the weekly protests at the Plaza de Mayo 
were repressed. Many mothers were abducted, tortured or detained, 
while some leading fi gures disappeared altogether. 
The Madres utilized their role as mothers brilliantly in their resistance 
strategy. They emphasized that they did not have political motives or 
feminist objectives. They simply identifi ed themselves as housewives and 
mothers who wanted to have news about their disappeared children. 
What was more natural for a mother than to want to know about the 
whereabouts of her children? What made their demand unusual was 
that they expressed these maternal feelings in a public domain domi-
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nated by a repressive patriarchal State. They transgressed the division 
between public and domestic in a reverse direction than the one used by 
the military assault teams which had invaded their homes and abducted 
their children. In a second transgressive act, they domesticised the public 
space by introducing symbols of the home. They donned scarves resem-
bling diapers and displayed photographs of their loved ones (Schirmer, 
1994: 203). The maternal feelings of protection and trust were the prin-
cipal driving forces behind their crusade. 
Guilt also played a role in this incessant search. The feeling that one 
had not done one’s utmost to prevent the abductions is a source of 
strength not to be underestimated. The struggle of the mothers between 
1977 and 1983 has been documented extensively and needs not to 
be repeated here (see Bousquet, 1984; Fisher, 1989; Guzman Bouvard, 
1994; Oria, 1987; Simpson and Bennett, 1985). What is of more con-
cern here is how mothers affi liated with the Madres and other human 
rights organizations reacted after a government investigative commit-
tee concluded in 1984 that the disappeared could be presumed dead. 
Once again, confl icting maternal feelings of protection and abandon-
ment were stirred up as now the loss had to be mourned but the fi nal 
rites of death could not be administered in the absence of a corpse. The 
Argentine mothers searched for the remains as if these were still their 
suffering children, while feeling guilty not only about having abandoned 
them in the hour of death but also about being unable to provide the 
maternal care of a proper burial. 
Exhumations and Revolutionary Protest
When Raúl Alfonsín assumed the presidency of Argentina in Decem-
ber 1983, he installed the CONADEP, a commission with the mandate 
to inquire into the fate of the disappeared. This became almost an im-
possible task because the military junta had gone to great lengths to 
destroy the corpses of their victims. Corpses were cremated, abandoned 
at roadsides, thrown in rivers, or interred as unidentifi ed bodies in mass 
graves at cemeteries near the torture centres.6 The Navy even went to 
6 The military rulers made two official attempts to have the disappeared pronoun-
ced dead, even in the absence of a corpse. A law was issued in September 1979 that 
declared all persons presumed dead who had disappeared between 6 November 1974 
and 6 September 1979. They hoped that this decree would end the insistent appeals 
from human rights organizations. After the 1982 defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war, 
the interim government of general Bignone published a final report about the 1976-
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the extreme of fl inging heavily drugged detainees from planes at sea 
(García, 1995: 461-470; Verbitsky, 1995). 
The fi rst evidence of the existence of mass graves appeared in late 
October 1982, only months after the military junta was forced to step 
down following the debacle of the Falklands/Malvinas War. An esti-
mated four hundred unidentifi ed bodies were found at the cemetery 
of Grand Bourg near Buenos Aires (Cohen Salama, 1992: 60-62; So-
mos, 1982 319: 11). The effect of the discovery on the Argentine public 
was shattering. There was disbelief and anger. More mass graves were 
opened in dozens of places and the perforated skulls exhibited in what 
the news media called a “horror show.” The display of piles of bones 
and bullet-ridden skulls revealed to the stunned Argentines the horrors 
of the military dictatorship as well as the chance that they could very 
well have met the same fate. Nevertheless, despite the gruesomeness 
of the discoveries, people were hopeful that now they would be able to 
mourn and bury their dead.
At fi rst, the human rights organizations were much in favor of the 
opening of mass graves. Hebe de Bonafi ni, the leader of the Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo, believed in October 1982 that the exhumations would 
restore the name and identity of the human remains. At last, the disap-
peared would be wrested from anonymity and given a proper burial (Hu-
mor, 1982 92: 47). However, De Bonafi ni and many other mothers in her 
wake began to have misgivings about the continued exhumations when 
forensic experts failed to identify the victims. She became convinced in 
January 1984 that “there is suffi cient proof to send a great number of 
those guilty of this horror to prison,” but she expressed doubts about 
the political will to prosecute them (Somos, 1984 382: 20). The mothers’ 
faith in the justice system declined further when the Alfonsín govern-
ment decided to try the nine commanders of the three 1976-82 juntas 
under military instead of criminal law. 
A fundamental disagreement had arisen in 1985 among the Argen-
tine human rights organizations between those in favor and those against 
exhumations. The division corresponded to two different responses to 
the loss suffered by the disappearances. Both groups were aware of the 
political dimension of their position, but the proponents wanted to give 
the exhumed an honorable reburial, while the opponents wanted to 
vindicate the political ideals of the disappeared. 
1982 dictatorship and declared once again all disappeared as presumed dead (San Mar-
tino de Dromi 1988: 343, 360; Somos 1983 346: 15). 
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The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were also divided amongst them-
selves, and this dispute would lead in 1986 to a tragic split within the 
organization that had most courageously opposed the military dictator-
ship. The majority followed Hebe de Bonafi ni in her condemnation that 
the exhumations were a sinister scheme by the Alfonsín government 
to have them accept and psychologically participate in the death of all 
disappeared. The Madres demanded that fi rst those guilty of the dis-
appearances and subsequent killings had to be identifi ed before any 
further exhumations were to be carried out (Madres, 1984 1: 2). Refl ect-
ing on the intense soul-searching that preceded their position on the 
controversial exhumations, Hebe de Bonafi ni said: “It cost us weeks and 
weeks of meetings at which there were many tears and much despair, 
because the profound Catholic formation of our people creates almost a 
need to have a dead body, a burial, and a Mass” (Madres, 1987 37: 10). 
Despite the anguish, the De Bonafi ni group decided to keep their emo-
tional wounds open in order to resist the societal process of forgetting. 
“It has been eleven years of suffering, eleven years that have not been 
relieved in any sense. Many want the wound to dry so that we will for-
get. We want it to continue bleeding, because this is the only way that 
one continues to have the strength to fi ght.... But, above all, it is neces-
sary that this wound bleeds so that the assassins will be condemned, as 
they deserve to be, and that what has happened will not happen again. 
This is the commitment in the defense of life which the Madres have 
taken upon themselves” (Madres, 1987 29: 1). Continued political pro-
test weighed more heavily than individual relief because anxiety was the 
hinge of memory and oblivion. 
The leading fi gures of the Madres were of course well aware of the 
psychological toll of the enduring uncertainty. They realized that their 
refusal to allow for more exhumations would prevent relatives from 
mourning their dead. However, they were convinced that the govern-
ment did not only conspired to have them accept the death of the disap-
peared but also tried deliberately to set the mourning process in motion 
in order to depoliticise the surviving relatives, and in particular the vocal 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Mourning would break the solidarity of 
the Madres and hasten a reconciliatory attitude. 
As the years went by, there was a profound identifi cation of the 
Mothers with their disappeared sons and daughters. Activism helped 
them cope with their grief (see Maxwell, 1995). Many Mothers began 
to emulate political ideals which they had opposed when their children 
had still been alive. They began to regard themselves as the embodiment 
of their children’s ideals and struggles. “In many respects it was like this: 
my children had given birth to me.... If they are not here, then I have to 
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be them, shout for them, vindicate them with honesty and return even 
a small piece of life to them. They are in my rallying cries, in this fatigue 
that maybe nobody can understand but which always recuperates it-
self; they are in my head and in my body, in everything I do. I believe 
that their absence has left me forever pregnant” (Hebe de Bonafi ni in 
Sánchez, 1985: 74-75). 
By late 1988, the idea took hold that the Mothers had to “socialize 
their maternity” (Madres, 1988 48: 17) and embrace the suffering of all 
victims of political violence in the world. “When we understood that our 
children were not going to appear, we socialized motherhood and felt 
that we are the mothers of everybody, that all are our children” (Hebe de 
Bonafi ni, Madres, 1989 53: 17). Pressing social problems in Argentina, 
such as poverty, poor social and medical services, high unemployment, 
insuffi cient benefi ts for the aged, government corruption, police brutal-
ity, and the privatisation of state companies became a political platform 
to pursue the revolutionary ideals of their children. Clearly, the Madres 
wanted to extend the maternal protection they had been unable to offer 
their own children at the hour of abduction to all victims of repression, 
and at the same time be unconditionally supportive of their sons and 
daughters by embracing their political ideas and ideals. Trust and protec-
tion were the motives of their radical political position.
Reburial and Collective Mourning
Most human rights organizations did not share the opposition of 
the Madres de Plaza de Mayo to the exhumations. They were convinced 
of the legal, political, psychological and historical importance of foren-
sic investigations. Exhumations supplied evidence for legal prosecution, 
provided historical testimony of the human rights violations committed 
by the military, gave forensic proof about the birth of children by dis-
appeared pregnant women, and allowed surviving relatives to begin a 
process of mourning. Exhumations became a recourse for many rela-
tives, as much for their emotional peace as for the political signifi cance 
of a funeral in times of a budding democracy. Reburial would reconcile 
the bereaved with their loss, restore the public honor of the victims, re-
incorporate them into society as deceased members, and politicize the 
recovered remains. 
The multiple signifi cance of a reburial for the surviving relatives can 
be read from the reactions of the Morresi family and of Mrs. Berta Schu-
beroff. Norberto Morresi had disappeared in 1977, and was fi nally iden-
tifi ed in 1989. His parents Julio and Irma Morresi decided to rebury him 
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in the same grave as the disappeared person who was exhumed togeth-
er with him. “The truth, however hard it may be, will in the end bring 
tranquility. I am no longer searching in that God-knows-where place... to 
see if it’s Norberto, or visit a madhouse to see if he is there. I know, un-
fortunately we have this little heap of bones at the Flores cemetery, no? 
It is like a ritual that we go there every Sunday to bring him even if it is 
only one fl ower. It is completely useless, but it helps spiritually... We go 
there, we kiss the photo that is hanging on the niche, and it makes us 
feel good” (interview 29 March 1991). Berta Schubaroff said the follow-
ing about the importance of fi nding the remains of her son Marcelo in 
1989. “I felt that I was emotional because I found my son. I kissed him 
again. I kissed all his bones, touched him, caressed him. But the emotion 
confounded with the pain, because once I found him, he turned out 
to be dead. So I cried the death of my son, and those thirteen years of 
search vanished. I can’t relate anymore to this period” (quoted in Cohen 
Salama, 1992: 249). 
These two responses reveal the social and psychological signifi cance 
of reburials and their relation to basic trust. Reburial gives parents the 
fi nal opportunity to demonstrate and enact their basic trust to their de-
ceased children by providing them with a proper resting place and ob-
serving their departure with a culturally appropriate funerary ritual. The 
torn fabric of society is restored by the funeral, the remains come to 
share the sacred ground of the cemetery, and their souls are reconciled 
in the society of the dead (see Hertz, 1960: 54). These purposes seem 
to have been served in Argentina for nearly two hundred disappeared 
who have been reburied. The violent death of the disappeared at the 
hands of the State gives the reburial a distinct political meaning. Reburial 
implies a reincorporation of the former disappeared as political victims 
in Argentina’s troubled history. Their disappearance, death, unceremo-
nious burial, and the subsequent exhumation and reburial turn into an 
enduring reminder of State repression. 
Robert Hertz (1960: 83) has observed that “It is the action of society 
on the body that gives full reality to the imagined drama of the soul.” 
What a society and, for that matter, a State does with its dead determines 
the place of their souls in those social confi gurations. The planned disap-
pearance of the bodies of its citizens implies that the soul can neither 
pass from the land of the living to the land of the dead. The wandering 
spirit continues to haunt the living in the form of the constant anxiety 
of relatives who cannot mourn the disappeared and keep demanding a 
reckoning from society and its political and military leaders. 
The two predominant responses of Argentine mothers have been 
either to search for the remains of their children and rebury them or 
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to propagate the revolutionary ideals associated with the disappeared 
in a constant appeal for justice. Both reactions arise from the same ba-
sic trust and unconditional support with which the parents wanted to 
provide their disappeared children. The public protests against pressing 
social problems and the reburial of exhumed remains seem to offer the 
mothers some emotional respite from their tremendous grief. However, 
the realization that justice was not served, and that those responsible 
for the disappearances were not convicted, is for many unbearable and 
make them distrustful of the Argentine polity. Peace cannot return to a 
society, and the polity cannot operate properly when its members are 
unable to reconcile themselves with the past. The deliberate obstruc-
tion of reburials impedes a return to normalcy and a repair of the social 
fabric. 
The long-term political consequences of the dirty war are impossible 
to fathom, but the continued uncertainty about thousands of unrecov-
ered dead and the impunity of their executioners cannot but gnaw at the 
heart of the nation. The massive trauma of the dirty war has undermined 
people’s trust in the State and its authorities because a society that does 
not assume responsibility for its dead can never entirely trust the living. 
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Epilogue: Peace and Conflict at a Junction
Jolle Demmers
Utrecht University
The editors of this volume have brought together a number of inter-
esting studies on violence and confl ict, and on peace building, human 
security and post-war reconstruction. The analytical domains on which 
these contributions build have changed over the past decades. Where 
Confl ict Studies was originally grounded in empiricist and behaviour-
ist approaches focused on decision-making by rational actors, it now 
includes a wide range of analytical perspectives including critical dis-
course analysis, ethnography, and political economy. Peace Studies fi nds 
its roots in neo-Marxist structuralism, but has become quite salonfähig 
over the past decade. Some even argue that the fi eld has lost its critical 
and normative stance and has become ‘co-opted’ by a wide range of 
actors (including Iraq and Afghanistan ‘peace’ missions). Although the 
confl ict studies/peace studies dichotomy has not disappeared, the intel-
lectual boundaries separating the two domains have blurred. However, 
despite calls for reorientation and theoretical and methodological clarity, 
the fi eld has not experienced the level of theoretical debate prevalent 
in other social sciences. It still lacks analytical coherence, and theoreti-
cal frameworks for comparison (see Jabri 1996). Although this epilogue 
calls for synthesis, it does not address these matters in a fundamental 
way. Rather, I aim to point out traps and mantras in this relatively young 
and fragmented fi eld of study by means of six brief statements and rec-
ommendations and will conclude by formulating questions for research 
and comparison. 
1. The Interpretation of Confl ict and Peace is Political
Over the past decades, mainstream views on violent confl ict in the 
media and countless UN and World Bank reports, consultancy docu-
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ments, and NGO briefi ngs have shifted substantially. During the Cold 
War, local confl icts were mostly seen as ‘proxy wars’ and explained in 
terms of ideological divides (communism/capitalism) and super power 
strategy, at times combined with political turmoil connected to proc-
esses of post-independence state-building. After the Cold War, the vio-
lent confl icts in the Balkans, Indonesia, and Africa were coded as ‘ethnic’ 
or ‘ethno-nationalist:’ ancient hatreds and primordialist identities were 
seen as root causes. Books such as Balkan Ghosts by Robert Kaplan 
had a great impact on policy makers. Since the late 1990s, confl icts are 
increasingly framed as driven by greed, ‘terror,’ criminality and warlord-
ism (see for instance the work of Paul Collier). Particularly after 9/11, 
criminality became the dominant policy framework through which local 
wars were understood and dealt with. Increasingly, organized violence in 
Congo, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Chechnya and 
Afghanistan was depicted as illegitimate, abusive, terrorist and poten-
tially threatening regional and global security. This new understanding 
of local war, supported for instance by the World Bank report Breaking 
the Confl ict Trap of 2003, established both a justifi cation and legitimi-
sation for intervention, in line with the Bush doctrine and the War on 
Terror. In this volume, Hudson, in his chapter on Kosovo, gives a detailed 
description of the rise of this new form of imperialism. 
Although a lot of scholarly effort has been put into pointing out the 
fl aws in e.g. Collier’s greed theory, the political and policy implications 
of his work have not received much attention. However, since the inter-
pretation and representation of confl ict and violence can have enormous 
consequences (from “letting them fi ght it out amongst themselves” at-
titudes of the early 1990s to the “new imperialism” or “will to govern” of 
today) there is a great need to critically examine the social phenomenon of 
violent confl ict, its interpretations and their consequences. The selection 
of a form and level of explanation for contemporary violent confl ict is a 
serious political act in the sense that representations have political impli-
cations. The way in which violent incidents and confl icts are coded and 
categorized will play — intentionally or not — a role in casting blame and 
responsibility (Brass, 1996). It is therefore not enough to study and critique 
certain interpretations of violence, we also need to place these ‘texts in 
context’ and try and understand how it is that certain interpretations have 
come to dominate others, and why this is the case. 
Just as much as it is important to study the ways in which violent 
confl icts are framed, the concept of peace, and in particular, ideas and 
recipes for peace building need to be scrutinized as well. In their chap-
ter in this volume, Pureza and Cravo point out the ‘standardisation’ of 
peace studies. They explain how the fi eld of peace studies lost much of 
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its normative and critical stance during the 1990s and became co-opted 
by mainstream policy-making. The fi eld of peace studies benefi ted from 
the new world order, assuming a protagonism in the decision-making 
of the international system (UN, government donors, NGOs) that it did 
not have before. However, not without paying a price. According to the 
authors, the fi eld lost its critical capacity in the face of the emergent 
systems of international domination. They point out how peace studies 
run the risk of becoming an instance of legitimisation and sophistication 
of the hegemonic block, by promoting standard operating procedures 
and Western-style recipes for peace (neoliberal market democracies). Al-
though the fi eld of peace studies is not a monolithic ‘school’ and hosts a 
great variety of critical scholars — exemplifi ed by Nordquist and Reychler 
in this volume — I think the above argument needs mentioning. Hence, 
it is not only important to argue for critical confl ict analysis, but also 
for critical ‘peace analysis.’ Clearly, the question ‘Whose peace is this?’ 
needs to be added to our textbooks. 
2. Identity is not Sameness
Despite the great variety of views on contemporary confl ict most 
authors acknowledge the key role of the identity group (however prob-
lematic). Azar (1990) was one of the fi rst in the fi eld who argued for 
a radical revision of Clausewitzean ideas by claiming that it was the 
identity group — ethnic, religious, cultural and other — and not the na-
tion-state that was at the core of most contemporary confl icts. Although 
today the ‘extra-state’ wars conducted by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq 
attract the lion’s share of media attention, Azar’s claim is still supported by 
evidence: in the 1989-2004 period 94 per cent of worldwide violent con-
fl icts were intra-state wars (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005).1 This is not 
to say that ‘identity’ or ‘identity differences’ are causing violent confl ict. 
Although this idea is frequently used unknowingly in the media, among 
academics the ‘ancient hatred’ view is generally rejected, and primordial-
ism is mentioned only when scholars want to point out what they are not 
saying. Instead, identity boundary drawing is seen as a central aspect of 
the mobilization of support for armed confl ict in the world today. Still, 
identity labels should be handled with caution: actors in civil war can-
not be treated as if they were unitary. The problem with ‘identity’ is that 
1 Of the 118 armed conflicts counted by Harbom and Wallensteen (2005) in the pe-
riod 1989-2004, only 7 were categorized as interstate. The other 111 were categorized 
as intra-state (90) or internationalised intra-state (21).
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although semantically ‘identity’ implies sameness across time or persons, 
most (constructivist) analysts continue to speak of ‘identity’ while at the 
same time repudiating this implication of ‘sameness’ (Brubaker and Coop-
er, 2000: 18). This problem also arises in the study of intra-state war: the 
concept of ‘identity group confl ict’ or group violence entails the total in-
terchangeability of individuals, both as participants and perpetrators and 
as targets. However, as Kalyvas (2003) points out, civil wars are not binary 
confl icts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster interaction 
among actors with distinct identities and interests. ‘It is the convergence 
of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endow civil war with its 
particular character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide 
between the political and the private, the collective and the individual’ 
(Kalyvas, 2003: 487). The study of contemporary confl ict should therefore 
consist of a systematic analysis of group dynamics, interests and alliances 
at various levels: including local and national actors, insiders and outsid-
ers, individuals and organizations, civilians and armies.
3.  Make a Distinction between Groups and Categories, and 
Groups and Organizations
As we have stated above, civil wars are not binary confl icts between 
unitary and bounded groups or blocks A and B. Although most peace 
and confl ict researchers acknowledge this, it is nevertheless not easy to 
integrate this knowledge into the ways we talk and write about confl ict. 
However, by continuing to speak about ‘Tamils and Singhalese’ or ‘Serbs 
and Albanians’ we unwillingly, and intentionally reproduce inaccurate 
typologies. By making a clear distinction between groups and catego-
ries, and between groups and organisations, we can escape the ‘unitary’ 
trap, and the portrayal of identity confl ict as a war of all against all. 
The levels of ‘groupness’ of parties in confl ict is not constant, they 
vary, from very loose and socially almost insignifi cant ascriptions (cat-
egory) to high and intense forms of interaction and organisation (group 
or community). Handelman (1977) and more recently Brubaker (2004) 
explained that by distinguishing between categories and groups we can 
problematise — rather than presume — the relation between them. 
We can ask ourselves how categories are transformed into groups, and 
study the political, social and psychological processes involved. This is 
signifi cant, for often the crystallization of identity and groupness takes 
place during the course of a confl ict: high levels of groupness are often 
the result and not the cause of violent confl ict. Peace and confl ict re-
searchers generally agree on the constructivist stance that group identi-
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ties such as ethnicity are the product of social interaction. However, we 
need to take this a step further and seek to explain “the processes and 
mechanisms through which social constructs such as ethnic categories 
can crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality” 
(Brubaker, 2004: 44). In other words, instead of simply asserting that 
social identities such as ethnicity, race and nation are constructed, we 
have to specify how they are constructed. In his contribution to this 
volume, Bowman is doing exactly this when he analyses the making 
and unmaking of groupness in the Israeli-occupied territories and the 
former Yugoslavia. He points at the role of constitutive violence and the 
necessity of the ‘violence of a national enemy’ for the maintenance of 
nationalist solidarity and commitment. 
A second way to ‘break’ the unitary trap is to make an explicit distinc-
tion between groups and organisations. Again, many confl icts are por-
trayed as ‘ethnic groups in confl ict’. However, the protagonists of violent 
confl ict are much more often not ethnic groups but rather various kinds 
of organisations which cannot be equated with ethnic groups (states, 
paramilitary organisations, political parties, churches, gangs, newspa-
pers, radio and television stations). Often the relationship between or-
ganizations in confl ict and the groups they claim to represent is deeply 
ambiguous (see Brubaker, 2004). In his comparative study of nationalist 
movements in the Israeli-occupied territories and the former Yugoslavia 
Bowman shows the multifaceted nature of identity, and the important 
role of organizations in both identity formation and group making. For 
instance, the fundamental reason the PLO was able to serve as an icon 
of Palestine identity was that it presented itself as representative of all 
of the diverse ‘Palestinian’ constituencies, which had been disinherited 
by the creation of the Israeli state. ‘Palestinians’ were able to recognize 
themselves as addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the PLO insofar 
as that rhetoric did not specify any particular identity to its addressees 
other than the recognition of themselves as somehow stripped of their 
rights by the antagonism of the ‘Zionist entity.’ In a very similar way, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) managed to present themselves 
as the ‘sole representative’ of all diverse Tamil categories deprived by the 
Government of Sri Lanka. 
4.  The Field of Peace and Confl ict Studies is Reinventing 
the Wheel
Parallel to the increase in civil wars (since the 1950s) and in particu-
lar to their heightened visibility (since the 1990s), the desire to under-
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stand, prevent and contain violent confl ict resulted in a boom in applied 
research and training institutes, think tanks and consultancy fi rms on 
Confl ict Analysis, Confl ict Resolution, Peace-Building, and Human Secu-
rity. These research initiatives intertwined with the mushrooming debate 
among policy-makers about adequate tools for confl ict prevention and 
intervention. The new fi eld — understandably — has its weaknesses. 
Much older academic traditions accuse it (and in particular studies of 
ethnic confl ict) of ‘reinventing the wheel.’ Examples include the work of 
the popular writer/journalist Ignatieff, who turned to Freud to explain 
why ‘neighbours kill,’ overlooking the work of Social Identity theorists 
who study the process of identity group competition; and the intellec-
tual wall between the study of ethnic confl ict and long traditions of 
scholarly theorizing about group mobilization and collective violence, 
ethnicity, nation-building and nationalism. Clearly, peace and confl ict 
research can greatly benefi t from drawing on these established scholarly 
traditions (see King, 2004).
5. Multidisciplinarity is Taken for Granted
‘Young’ as it may be, Peace and Confl ict Studies has its own set of 
mantras. The two most prominent mantras in the fi eld are the repeated 
stress on ‘confl ict is complex,’ and the ‘need to be multidisciplinary.’ A 
combination of these two mantras (‘multidisciplinarity is complex’) may 
do the fi eld some good, since multidisciplinarity is too often taken for 
granted. The various approaches to confl ict and violence that Peace and 
Confl ict Studies seeks to combine under the heading of ‘multidiscipli-
narity’ are not simply heterogeneous, but in fact often point in (sharply) 
differing directions. To be sure, there are affi nities between certain of 
them, but there are strong tensions as well. The study of confl ict bears a 
multivalent, and at times even contradictory theoretical burden. Where-
as some Social Identity theorists see the eruption of violent confl ict as 
resulting from identity group competition, and stemming from universal 
and fundamental needs for social identity, elite constructivists and struc-
turalists strongly dismiss these ‘social automata,’ albeit for completely 
different reasons. Roughly, the fi eld is still very much divided by the 
classic gap between agency-based approaches (e.g. instrumentalism, 
rational choice, Social Identity Theory) and structure-based approaches 
(e.g. political economy). Authors such as Gurr (Minorities at Risk), Azar 
(Protracted Social Confl ict) and Miall et al. (Levels-of Analysis approach) 
have made attempts to bridge the gap by building models which include 
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both structures and agents, but attempts to truly integrate and synthe-
size are rare and isolated (e.g. Jabri, 1996; Schlee, 2004). 
As researchers we need not only to be aware of the different the-
oretical approaches to confl ict, but also pay (more) attention to their 
underlying assumptions, their affi nities and contradictions. Of course, 
there is no ‘grand theory of violent confl ict’ and I see no use in seek-
ing a ‘one-size-fi ts-all’ approach. Rather, we need to be more explicit 
in the way we position the various relevant theoretical views vis-à-vis 
each other and develop analytical frames for comparison. This will allow 
students of confl ict to do their bricolage, but in a well-informed, and 
knowledgeable way. 
6. Confl ict = Clustered Violent Episodes
Too often confl ict and violence are lumped together as one and the 
same thing. We need to take a closer look. Under the heading of ‘the Sri 
Lanka confl ict’, ‘the Colombia confl ict,’ ‘the war in Bosnia,’ ‘Rwanda,’ 
or basically any other ‘intra-state war,’ many different forms of violent 
incidents take place. If, for instance, the media talk about the Sri Lanka 
confl ict fl aring up again, what we see on the ground are various, at 
times unrelated violent incidents: in-fi ghting between competing fac-
tions within the Tamil Tigers in the East, villagers killed by land-mines in 
the North, local disputes over control of water, violent incidents in the 
South between Muslims and Tamils militias, and yes, ‘conventional war-
fare’ between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE cadres. 
What in fact often happens is that violent episodes are clustered, are 
lumped together and called a confl ict. Consequently, all violence that 
occurs is placed under the heading of the master narrative, the mas-
ter cleavage. Often the great variety of violent incidents and episodes 
are perceived as mere (and rather irrelevant) local manifestations of the 
central confl ict cleavage (Government of Sri Lanka versus LTTE, Hutu vs. 
Tutsi, FARC vs. Colombian army or paramilitaries, etc). They are seen 
as automatic and unproblematic after effects of actions and decisions 
located at the centre. However, ethnographies of collective violence dur-
ing civil wars show a much more complex picture. Violence in an ethnic 
or class war may not be ethnic or class violence. Very often under the 
heading of the master narrative many different forms of violent acts 
occur: private, criminal, sexual violence, the settling of old scores, land 
confl icts, family feuds etc. Most macro studies of confl ict disregard the 
private content of political violence and miscode individual cases. This 
calls for fi ne-grained analysis that takes into account the different forms 
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of violence. It is the interaction between local and central, private and 
political spheres that counts, and helps us to understand the dynamics 
of intra-state war. 
Peace Studies and Confl ict Studies: Questions of Research and 
Comparison
‘Any study or planning of peace building demands an analysis of the 
base line. This implies an analysis of the confl ict, a prognosis of possible 
future developments, and a peace building defi ciency assessment’ (Rey-
chler, this volume). The task of confl ict analysis is to unravel the complex 
dynamics of interactive processes in order to understand how and why 
people resort to violence. The task of peace studies is to determine ‘how 
to build peace.’ Ideally, the latter draws upon the former: peace-build-
ing policies derive from in-depth confl ict analysis. However, in practice 
there is not much of a dialogue between the two domains of expertise. 
In addition, lack of analytical tools and lack of grounded critical analysis 
of confl ict often results in ad hoc policy-making, and misreading (and 
then we do not even mention complicating factors such as donor-inter-
ests and geopolitics). Although the fi eld of peace and confl ict studies 
in many ways has prospered and grown over the past decade, it lacks 
theoretical and methodological debate and clarity. It lacks fora and as-
sociations for the exchange of ideas, research collaboration, as well as 
student exchange programs and joint textbooks. The Peace and Confl ict 
Studies group of HumanitarianNet of which this volume is a product, 
is an important exception to this rule. Having now brought together 
a number of studies, a next step is to develop an analytical frame for 
research and comparison. Taking, for in stance, the prominence of the 
identity group in contemporary confl ict as a point of departure, basic 
questions of research and comparison include: 
1. What makes a group?
2. How and why does a group resort to violence?
3. How and why do they, or don’t they stop?
This will allow for a structured exchange and comparison of ideas on, 
for instance, identity formation, group making, and boundary drawing 
(under question 1); mobilization, collective action, group dynamics, in-
surgency, structural violence, political economy, violent imaginaries, and 
ethnic coding (under 2); and discourses of violence and peace, human 
security, peace architecture, intervention, transformation, international 
humanitarian law, and reconciliation (under 3).
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Clearly, there is a lot to be done. This is an important fi eld of study. 
For, after all, there is a lot at stake. 
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